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Summary 
The growth of a nation-state in the 19th century led to the protection of heritage 
as a distinct discipline. Initially, the prime objective was physical protection and 
conservation of archaeological and architectural monuments valued for their aesthetic 
and historic importance. However, the 20th century practice of imposing nationalist 
ideas onto communities and cultures which share the same territory, but not religion 
and/or language, brought into prominence a discipline of heritage management. One 
of the main characteristics of heritage management is its interpretation in national 
terms which, when used for nation-building purposes, often becomes the subject of 
contested grand narratives; i.e. ethnically, religiously and socially divisive tool in the 
hands of political elites interested in securing and maintaining their powers. Historical 
changes of political systems and state ideologies, however, witnessed the lasting 
impact on the interpretation of heritage over la longue durée, almost always with 
negative outcomes. 
The Wars of Yugoslav Succession during the 1990s resulted not only in the 
creation of new nation-states, but also their own new national narratives and languages, 
often rooted in flagrant revisionism of the interpretation of historical sources and 
surviving heritage. This thesis examines the evolution of national narratives in five ex-
Yugoslav republics and Albania from the time of their individual inception until the 
present. It employs chronologically juxtaposed nation-building processes in the 
observed states and points to the differences in interpretation which usually coincided 
with changes of political systems. It also highlights the contemporary interpretations 
of the heritage as understood by both local and international researchers and publicists, 
affected by the surrounding political atmosphere. It explores the destruction, 
vandalism, and “culturcide” and their condemnations and justifications by the media 
and biased scholarship. The thesis also points to the negative influence of the external 
political factors in heritage management through the extensive production of poorly 
and/or partially researched publications. Finally, it concludes that the (re)interpretation 
of heritage is a recurring process, which will be employed every time when the balance 
of power in Europe changes and almost always with detrimental consequences for the 
local population. 
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1. The Objective of the study: The West Balkans Demystified 
Nearly two decades after the wars of the 1990s, the nations and new states that cover 
the map of Former Yugoslavia and Albania today are still relatively unknown to the 
world beyond the Balkans (Map 1.a16). Those few, who were acquainted with the 
region, frequently accept as verbatim simplified and often deliberately misinterpreted 
national narratives firmly established during the wars. Even though there is much talk 
about reconciliation and the establishment of democracy in the Western Balkans, the 
reality differs significantly from political empty phrases emanating from European and 
American centres of power; the states and nations created during the war still struggle 
to achieve the level of recognition and co-existence acceptable for all. Serbia, Croatia, 
Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, with their politically 
and economically underdeveloped communities, entwined and frequently mutually 
violent histories filled with tense religious and ethnic conflicts, are often considered 
part of the same cultural milieu, so distant from modern European definition of a 
civilized civil society, modelled on the notion of a civic society, consisting of allegedly 
equal citizens, which regardless of race, religion, gender, language or ethnicity are 
loyal to the territory of the state.1 Passionate national feelings expressed in the past 
twenty-five years by various West Balkan ethnic groups and augmented by Western 
media and scholars, became a synonym for the negative interpretation of nationalism 
and national ideas, now considered remnants of the remote 19th and early 20th 
centuries.2 However, the question about the appearance and nature of nationalism in 
the Balkans remained prone to misrepresentation and mystification due to the partial 
and/or biased approach of researchers.3  
                                                            
1
 Ignatieff, M. – Blood and Belonging, London, 1993, 3 
2
 One of the best representations of the ultimately biased approach by the western media was the award-
winning BBC series The Death of Yugoslavia (1995) with the accompanying book of the same title, 
sponsored by the Soros Foundation and authored by journalists Allan Little and Laura Silber which was 
later used as evidence during the Hague Tribunal prosecutions for war crimes in Former Yugoslavia.  
3
 Studies of nationalism in the West Balkans were influenced not only by various theories advanced 
over the decades, but by political and personal backgrounds of the authors. For example, one such 
scholar, Ivan Čolović, an author of the frequently cited Warrior’s Brothel (Bordel ratnika, Beograd, 
1993) and The Politics of Symbol in Serbia (Politika simbola u Srbiji, Beograd, 1997) connected the 
subcultural forms of criminals and sport hooligans with the intellectuals from modern national 
institutions – equalizing the cultural identity of the entire nation with the sub-group identities. To create 
this equalisation, Čolović used the interpretation of Serbian nationalism devised during the existence of 
Communist Yugoslavia which essentially banalised the 19th century nation-building process as 
backward and shamefully wrong. Čolović, a fervent student of official Yugoslav narratives in his youth, 
supported his work with a range of prominent Communist authors (Latinka Perović, for instance) whom 
he proclaimed “democratic” in order to sell his work to the more lucrative Western publishers. See 
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Although there has been a significant number of scholarly works both on the 
history and nationalism of individual Balkan states and on the region as a whole, there 
is still no single volume on the comparative development of nationalism, national 
narratives and nation-building of all the contemporary nations that inhabit the Western 
Balkans: the Former Yugoslavia and Albania. This is not intentional. The outside 
perception of the Balkans as a whole was for too long frozen in time. As Maria 
Todorova argued, there is an enduring “evolutionary belief in the superiority of orderly 
European civilization over barbarity, archaic predispositions, backwardness, 
squabbles, uncomforting and unpredictable behaviour – tribalism.”4 The notion of 
tribalism, she continues, relegates the Balkans to a lower civilizational category, which 
is in itself “intrinsically passive, incompatible and imitative in nature.” This perception 
enables the maintenance of imperial principles towards the Balkans and “releases the 
civilized world from any responsibility or empathy that it might otherwise bestow on 
more reasonable people.”5 Similarly, Balkan tribalism became “a convenient substitute 
for the emotional discharge that orientalism provided, exempting the West from 
charges of racism, colonialism, eurocentrism and Christian intolerance towards 
Islam.”6 On the other hand, Todorova argued that modern Balkan historiographies 
stem from the unconsolidated nation-states and social identities in crisis.7  
Todorova’s analysis of the Western perception of the Balkans is generally 
correct. However, following the end of the wars and instalment of nominally pro-
European governments at the beginning of the 21st century, a somewhat nuanced 
approach to the various West Balkan states was applied by the Western governments. 
Croatia, almost completely ethnically cleansed during the wars was considered to be 
well-prepared to join the European Union on 8 July 2013. Its poor record of human 
rights and unprocessed war crimes were largely ignored by the responsible 
administrations in the key European capitals. Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the direct 
control of European bureaucrats who make strenuous efforts to maintain its unity, is 
in every aspect a failed state, deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines. 
Montenegro has been ruled for a quarter of a century by the same nomenclature of 
                                                            
Čolović, I. – The Politics of Symbol in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology, London, 2002, p. 70-
71 as well as Čolović, I. – Bordel ratnika, Beograd, 1993, the whole book. 
4
 Todorova, M. – Imagining the Balkans, Oxford, 1997, 185 
5
 Ibid, 185 
6
 Ibid, 188 
7
 Ibid, 183 
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corrupt politicians who ruthlessly exploit all available resources to retain power. 
European advice on political plurality and ethnic and religious freedoms, so common 
in some other parts of the world, is noticeably absent in Montenegro. The deep ethnic 
tensions between Macedonian Slavs and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, burdened by 
the dispute with Greece about the name of the state and the Bulgarian programme of 
awarding Bulgarian citizenship to all Macedonians who declare themselves ethnic 
Bulgarians, are artificially contained by the promise of potential integration into the 
EU. Serbia, even though officially proclaimed a candidate for membership to the 
European Union is still under a rigorous regime of punishment. The EU is seeking not 
only the further disintegration of the state after supporting the unilaterally proclaimed 
independence of its southern province of Kosovo and Metohija by demanding that 
Serbia officially recognizes the occupation of its territory, but there are indications that 
the new requirement of separating the northern province of Vojvodina will soon 
become part of the negotiating process.8 Kosovo and Metohija, after proclaiming 
independence from Serbia in 2008, has achieved partial international recognition. The 
province, after expelling most of its remaining Serbian population, is controlled by 
former Albanian terrorists and corrupt European bureaucrats and military.9 Albania, 
with its endemic corruption, shows little signs of economic recovery. Supported by the 
West, the government in Tirana makes significant efforts to promote the future 
unification of the Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija and Macedonia with the state 
of Albania, thus fuelling anti-Albanian sentiments in four neighbouring countries.10 
With such a complex inheritance of the post-Communist conflict of the 
transitional years of the 1990s, the region of the West Balkans is left in a state of 
unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes. Even though there is no danger of an 
immediate new conflict, the majority of analysts of the region agree that such an option 
                                                            
8
 Serbia applied for the EU membership in April 2008 after the pro-Western government led by Boris 
Tadić won the elections. Barely a year later, Vojvodina had the status of an Autonomous Province 
restored. The status of autonomous province it initially held under the provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution until it was cancelled by the government of Slobodan Milošević in 1989. The upgrading 
of Vojvodina’s judicial and economic powers was accompanied by diplomatic recommendations of the 
key Western ambassadors in Belgrade, which all coincided with the application for the EU membership:  
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1603795/Skup%C5%A1tina+Vojvodine+usvojila+St
atut.html – Accessed on 22/05/2014  
9
 In 2014 serious allegations about corruption among the Kosovo and Metohija’s politicians and the 
European mission appeared for the first time in Western media.  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/eu-accused-over-kosovo-mission-failings - Accessed 
on 06/11/2014. Similarly, Hashim Taçi, the former Prime Minister of the so-called Kosova state was 
accused by the Council of Europe for trafficking organs of the Serbian prisoners. 
10
 Petiffer, J. and Vickers, M. – The Albanian Question – reshaping the Balkans, London, 2009, Preface 
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in the foreseeable future cannot be excluded.11 Therefore, the investigation of the states 
and peoples who currently inhabit the Western Balkans, and their changing perception 
of history, identity and nationhood are necessary to explain the persistent revisionism 
and misrepresentation of facts and events that will lead to new disputes and conflicts.  
1.1 The Western Balkans, European but “Other” – The revisionism as a norm 
The changed political situation in Europe at the end of the 20th century led by the 
idea of a pan-European economic empire demanded the rapprochement and 
embellishment of the views of recent common history of the leading states of West 
Europe and Germany. One aspect of this political interaction between former political 
and military adversaries included the revision of the traditional historical interpretation 
of German responsibility for the two world wars as well as finding a convenient 
substitute narrative.12 The disintegration of Yugoslavia presented a convenient case 
for politically motivated historical revisionism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Serbia was 
promptly chosen as the “rogue state,” because it was perceived as neither democratic, 
nor European.  Owing to the traditional European view which labelled all Balkan states 
as “inadequate Europeans,” Maria Todorova in her analysis of Kennan’s conclusions 
argued that “the development of the earlier ages of the Balkans, not only of those of 
the Turkish domination but of earlier ones as well, had the effect of thrusting into the 
Southern Europe reaches of the European continent to the present day to preserve 
many of its non-European characteristics.”13 However, despite the summative view of 
the Balkans as the “alien anomaly” of Europe, some differences were made between 
the ethnic groups and nations when Yugoslav disintegration began.  
This trend of historical revisionism that appeared parallel with the 
interventionism in Former Yugoslavia, termed “normative history” by Mark Mazower, 
used the linear approach of historical evaluation of the 19th century intellectuals and 
historians as generally accepted and transferred them to the end of the 20th century.14 
For this purpose, the political intent hidden behind the tools of normative 
                                                            
11
 In all personal contacts with both Balkan and foreign scholars, professionals and journalists 
encountered over the past seven years, the opinion is unanimous: the 1990s conflict was poorly handled 
by the International Community and the possibility of new conflict is real and present. 
12
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-one/10249760/Germany-intervenes-in-WW1-
commemoration-debate.html - Accessed on 18/08/2013 
13
 Todorova, 1997, 5 
14
 Mazower, M. – The Balkans – A Short History, London, 2000, 17; Ković, M. – Saznanje ili namera: 
Savremena svetska istoriografija o Srbima u XIX veku, Sociologija, Vol. LIII, Beograd, 2011, 402 
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historiography,15 carefully selected and distinguished between those nations and 
ethnic groups that were “European enough” to be immediately admitted to the new 
pan-European family of states: Slovenes, Croats, Romanians and Bulgarians. Those 
responsive to dictated changes, such as the Montenegrins, ready to evolve from being 
considered “Highland Serbs” into the “Docleans” in just one decade were treated 
favourably.16 Those that were not “entirely European,” but could serve as the showcase 
for European tolerance and inclusiveness were the Muslims of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, now renamed Bosniaks, and Albanians, both because of their Muslim 
faith, were also treated as “pet-nations.”17 Finally, those that were “not European:” 
Serbs, because of their traditional links to Russia and Macedonians, because of their 
argument with Greece about the name of the nation, were treated with an exceptional 
political cynicism. In making such distinctions, the entire historiography, 
interpretation and, in some cases, complete invention of national narratives of the 
regional nations and ethnic groups was re-modelled along those lines and established 
as a norm.18  
The international condemnation of the Serbs for the outbreak of war in 1991 and 
the ensuing conflict within Yugoslavia led to intensified interest and new research into 
the Serbian position within the region. The view of Serbian culpability swiftly spread 
through the media, academic works and reports of war correspondents. From 1991 
onwards a countless number of books in all major languages dealing with Serbian 
history, nationalism and politics were published through predominantly Western 
universities as an academic supplement to justify all actions taken against Serbia 
during that period. This began with the Balkan Ghosts by Robert Kaplan in 1992 and 
The Clash of Civilizations by Samuel P. Huntington in 1993, through works by Noel 
Malcolm Bosnia: A Short History, 1994 and Kosovo: A Short History, 1998 and James 
Gow Triumph of the Lack of Will, 1997. These all appeared before the end of the wars. 
Continuing with Sabrina Ramet’s Thinking about Yugoslavia, 2005 and all of her other 
                                                            
15
 Normative history accepts one model of historical evolution as universal and then explains historical 
deviations. See, Mazower, 2000, 17. Similarly, normative historiography transposes traditional 
interpretative methods to define tradition through the prism of modernity.  
16
 See further discussion. 
17
 A term introduced by Rebecca West in the Prologue of her inter-war travelogue published for the first 
time in 1942. See West, R. – Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, A Journey Through Yugoslavia, London, 
2006, 20 
18
 The non-academic writers, mainly journalists and some diplomatic spouses with often superficial 
knowledge of the land and history, but well-connected to the mass-media, contributed greatly to 
dissemination of incorrect and biased revisionist accounts of the recent times. See further discussion. 
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works related to the same region, a revised history of the Serbs became deeply rooted 
in the modern western academia, successfully overturning all previous academic 
studies dealing with the subject. The perception of the Balkans as the “alien other” 
depicted the Serbs as “Nazis” responsible for genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Kosovo.19 Unlike for the rest of the Yugoslav successor states, Serbian 
nationalism20 was most frequently presented as primordialist, negative and threatening 
the stability of the region, because it has been based on the “collective mental state” 
which represents “a classic case of a people with damaged self-esteem.”21 According 
to this approach, Serbian nationalism is entirely a product of the revived and badly 
implemented ideas of the 19th century applied at the end of the 20th century.  
This revised history written since the early 1990s by West European and 
American scholars was criticized by Serbian academics, who argued that the majority 
of foreign historians writing on the subject had neither visited Serbia nor could speak 
contemporary Serbian/Croatian languages or read the Serbian redaction of the Old 
Church Slavonic or Slaveno-Serbian of the 17th and 18th centuries. Equally, they 
argued that these new works show little use of Serbian archives and sources. The 
sanctions imposed on Serbia in April 1992 severely restricted Serbian academics from 
presenting their works in international conferences; this widened the gap between the 
Western and Serbian scholarly debates. Since the official ban on Serbian academics 
ended in 2002, there is a slow movement towards a more balanced view of the role of 
Serbian nationalism, with an increased use of materials and sources written in the 
Serbian language. However, the revised version of Serbian history and historical 
narrative of the 19th and 20th centuries by the Western and some non-Serbian Balkan 
scholars, had an enormous impact by branding the entire Serbian nation with the label 
of “Nazism” which in reality never existed to the extent that existed in Germany and 
its satellites during the Second World War. Nevertheless, behind the revisionism that 
is frequently explained as “groundbreaking and brilliant historical record-
                                                            
19
 Ramet, S. – Thinking about Yugoslavia – Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the 
Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo – Cambridge, 2005, 80 
20
 The term nationalism throughout this work is used in order to determine actions taken in the name of 
the nation and has neither a positive nor a negative connotation. However, there is an increased 
misinterpretation of the term in a negative connotation, even among academics writing about the 
subject, which is in my opinion wrong – the negative perception of nationalism has often been defined 
as chauvinism. In this work, all negative aspects of nationalism will be termed as chauvinism. 
21
 Schoenfeld, C.G. – Psychoanalytic Dimensions of the West’s Involvement in the Third Balkan War 
in Meštrović, S. – Genocide after Emotion: The Post-Emotional Balkan War, London and New York, 
1996, 160 quoted in Ramet, 2005, 306 
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straightening,”22 there is a subtle line of distinction between the real academic 
knowledge and the political intent. Whilst behind the knowledge, as argued by Miloš 
Ković, there exists the need to understand the past, the intent is led solely by the need 
to evaluate and misuse the past.23 This definition is what distinguishes the works of 
proper historiography to that of sensationalist journalism. 
However, it would be incorrect to place the revisionism and invention of new 
historical narratives exclusively on the political intent of the West. Supported by the 
West and for their own political interests, various Balkan nations and ethnic groups 
used the political situation to assert their own versions of normative historiography in 
order to define their national identity, national narratives, state borders and 
justification for territorial expansion. Unsurprisingly, their desires were frequently 
influenced by the forces and ideas from outside the Balkans: they either went along 
the wishes of the West or against them, depending on the perception they held of each 
Balkan nation.  
The objective of this study is to present the evolution of national ideas and 
nation-building in the Western Balkans as they progressed in time and point to the 
defining moments when they intertwined or diverged from each other. This is to avoid 
falling into the trap of normative historiography, as described above. The political 
intent was for far too long the guiding principle in the interpretation of the history of 
the region, that it became almost its foundation block. Because of this, it was deemed 
necessary to deconstruct the processes of national consolidation and enable some 
future researchers to base their argument not on traditional misconceptions, but on the 
evaluation of the material facts that surround these processes.24 
No account of the Balkans written so far is without bias. The mutual exclusivity 
of native authors and the outside influence proved to be more to the detriment of the 
overall argument than to its benefit. This work has no ambition to reconcile the 
irreconcilable, but to point to the facts and discrepancies in interpretations of national 
narratives as they evolved from the time of their conception to the present. As such, it 
                                                            
22
 These words were used by the revisionist historians, politicians and publicists commenting on the 
works of their colleagues who support the same line of argumentation. In this case, the words under 
quotations appeared on the overleaf of both Malcolm’s books.   
23
 Ković, 2011, 402 
24
 National history and historiography cannot be understood without being placed in wider international 
framework which would enable comparisons. Therefore, individual histories of various Balkan peoples 
can be understood only through comparisons for which the Balkans represent the minimal geographical 
and cultural territory. See, Ković, 2011, 405   
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will probably be accused of being biased as well, but the main objective is to create a 
basis for some future detailed factual research based exclusively on material evidence, 
rather than on probabilistic and selective reading of the available sources. 
1.2 Methodology and the strategy of inquiry 
This work attempts to give a summative chronology of developments of national 
ideas and identities in the West Balkans and indicate their mutual causality. The 
analysis is based on the key features of the nation building process of each individual 
nation. This will include definitions of national name and territory, the formulation of 
the guiding national narrative and, finally, the confirmation of the first two notions by 
the acquisition of material evidence inherited from the past and the creation of a new 
public heritage, particularly architectural and monumental, both as an expression of a 
unique national culture, as well as deliberate statements of possession of certain 
territories. The states under survey are: Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Montenegro in their currently recognized international borders. 
Slovenia, even though once part of Yugoslavia, is excluded from the analysis for two 
reasons: firstly, geographically it belongs to the Balkans only in its southernmost parts 
and secondly, with less than 2 million people of which more than 83% declare 
themselves ethnic Slovenes, national tensions are not as prominent as elsewhere in 
Former Yugoslavia.25 Albania, with its 3 million people of which 95% are ethnic 
Albanians is included because it is the centre of gravity for the sizeable Albanian 
population with separatist tendencies in Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.26 
Except for Serbia and Montenegro, within the borders different from their current ones, 
all other West Balkan nation-states date back no earlier than the mid-20th century.27 
Similarly, the nation building process in all observed states, except in Serbia and 
Croatia, did not start prior 20th century; in the Albanian case in the 1900s and after 
1945 in all others. Therefore, the comparative analysis of nation-building processes 
discussed in this work draws on the modernity of the nation, as defined by Eric 
Hobsbawm.28 
                                                            
25
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/si.html - Accessed on 06/04/2013 
26
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html - Accessed on 06/04/2013 
27
 For definition of the term Nation-State, see Appendix II – The Theories of Nationalism, p. 78 
28
 Hobsbawm E. and Ranger, T. – The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, 1983, Introduction, viii. 
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Initially, the nation-building processes in the observed area were to be analysed 
through the role of the surviving cultural heritage of all three religious denominations, 
dispersed in clusters over the vast territory. However, the latest change of 
interpretation of the national narratives of the newly established states and nations 
witnessed not only the physical destruction of the original historical and much later 
memorial-type heritage, but also the blatant misrepresentation of their meanings. The 
upsurge in the deliberate construction of new monuments conforming to new 
interpretations, based solely on post-1990s scholarship, and its sheer scale, altered the 
main idea of analysing the “wars of the monuments” which took place in the West 
Balkans in the aftermath of Yugoslav wars. Competitive nation-building processes 
which claimed ownership of the various West Balkan territories began long before the 
escalation of the Yugoslav crisis at the end of the 20th century. However, they were 
carefully controlled by the authorities during both Yugoslav periods and it was deemed 
necessary to give a general overview of the historical and political circumstances 
which caused them to conflict in the first place and contributed to the survival of the 
old national grievances. For this purpose, the applied analysis concentrated on three 
key-steps in nation-building: 1) the needs for national self-identification and 
circumstances which caused them; 2) the formulation of national narratives and their 
political justifications and 3) the materialization of nation-building processes through 
the establishment of national institutions and construction of imposing public 
monuments.  
During the wars of Yugoslav succession, the cultural heritage and its multiple 
meanings were prime targets in the post-Communist West Balkan societies seeking 
new identities through conflicts. In the aftermath of wars, political, academic and 
professional arguments regarding the surviving heritage represent the continuation of 
ethnic conflicts, only without military engagement. The historical controversies and 
mutually contested narratives involving the heritage on common territory observed in 
this study, not only indicate the extent to which politics has on national histories, but 
also on national myths.29 These controversies stem directly from the levels of public 
representation, such as historical sites, media reports, literature and other activities in 
which selected aspects of past were made present again.30  
                                                            
29
 Berger, S. and Niven, D. – Writing the history of national memory in Berger, S. and Niven, D. – 
Writing the history of memory, London, 2014, 150. 
30
 Fulbrook, M. – History-writing and ‘collective memory’ in Berger and Niven, 2014, 70 
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At this point, it should be noted that the definition of “cultural heritage” used in 
this work is Article I of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention 1972:  
- monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, 
elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and 
combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of 
view of history, art or science; 
- groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of 
their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of 
outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; 
- sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including 
archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, 
aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.31 
Since, with some remarkable exceptions, the 1990s scholarship dedicated to the 
West Balkans is predominantly based on the political intent of normative history, the 
analysis of heritage in that region as distinct from the development of the national 
narratives was considered pointless. As most of the newly created national narratives 
claim to be critical examinations of the surviving historical documents and the 
remaining heritage, the aim of this study is to point to the discrepancies in 
interpretation and to put into historical context some of the earlier interpretations on 
which the contemporary narratives are now based. 
The survey is structured chronologically, dating from the period when all 
elements of the independent national consciousness, followed by the nation-building 
agendas first appeared in individual states, until the present. It follows the evolution of 
national ideas from the earliest stages to the currently accepted national narratives, 
with particular attention being paid to the key moments when the national narratives 
were subject to revision due to the demands of the political situation at the time. As 
the current state borders in the Western Balkans do not correspond to the ethnic borders 
and the population displaced in the 1990s have still not returned to their ancestral 
homes, the overview of the historical creation of national narratives was given 
according to the geographic distribution of the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia and 
Albania in 1990 (See Map 1. and Map 2). However, the changed ethnic structure in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo and Metohija during the 1990s strongly 
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influenced the formulation of the modern national narratives of the Croats, Bosnian 
Muslims and Albanians, based on the current political situation and against the 
background of the 1990s civil wars that brought into existence the current border re-
configuration. 
 
Map 1: Ethnic composition of Yugoslavia – 1990              Map 2: Ethnic composition of Albania – 1989 
For clarity of argument, the analysis of the development of national narratives 
was centred on the main national cultural centres, which are in most cases national 
capitals. Other cultural centres and significant places of heritage are duly mentioned 
as their role in creating the national narratives changed in history.  
Since the formulation of these narratives usually originated in the minds of the 
national intellectuals and precedes the material confirmation of the existence of the 
nation, a significant part of the analysis is dedicated to the appearance of the nation-
building ideas amongst the intellectuals now considered to be “the founding fathers” 
of their respective nations. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that in all observed 
cases, the “ideas of nationalism” were frequently initiated by foreigners and 
implemented from outside the national core territories. Todorova argued that modern 
Balkan historiographies were shaped in the century of the national idea and under the 
strong influence of the then dominant trends of romanticism and positivism, only to 
develop as national accounts primarily plagued by their “relative parochialism with 
little knowledge of the history of their neighbours in the same period.”32 This assertion 
can be partly accepted, as Todorova examined the Western perception of the Balkans 
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as a whole, without taking into account the ethnic groups that were proclaimed nations 
in the 20th century; except for the national movements of the Croats and Serbs, which 
originated in the 19th century concepts of a nation, all others were 20th century 
products: Albanian national narrative appeared on the eve of the First World War while 
those of the Macedonians, Montenegrins and Bosnian Muslims after the Second World 
War.  
The analysis here is primarily focused on the most prominent individuals and 
events that influenced the initial formulation of the national ideas and on the key-
events in the 19th and 20th century that influenced the evolution of these ideas. This is 
because, as the majority of the accounts since the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in 
1991 tend to place the personalities and the events from the 19th century within the 
context of the political developments of the late 20th century. A similar tendency is 
noted with the presentation of the 19th century general concept of nationalism, which 
in its formative decades had a positive and emancipatory role. The new accounts tend 
to analyse the personalities, writings and events of that period through the prism of the 
modern negative interpretation of the term nationalism, which is not only academically 
questionable, but prone to politicization. Therefore, all individuals and their 
contributions mentioned have been analysed against the historical circumstances and 
influences of their own time. The influence they exercised on the later generations of 
intellectuals and their later re-evaluations are again put into the context when those 
later authors produced their works. This approach was considered to be logical and on 
the side of objectivity, despite the fact that a number of surveyed authors had to be 
limited only to the most prominent ones and those who created significant 
controversies.  
1.3 Nature of the evidence 
The historical documents and material remains that could be ethnically related 
to the West Balkan nations vary in numbers, quantities and qualities in case of three 
nations that existed prior to the 20th century: Serbian, Croat and Albanian. These three 
nations had their national narratives formed before the beginning of the First World 
War either by the pioneering national intellectuals emulating the interpretative 
methods of the great European national intellectuals or by the foreign intellectuals 
whose research was led either by an academic curiosity or by the political interests of 
their sovereign states. The originators of the Serbian, Croat and Albanian national 
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narratives evaluated and interpreted surviving cultural heritage using the techniques 
available in their own time. Being the first to formulate the national narratives of 
respective nations, the conclusions of these early intellectuals remained undisputed for 
a long time. Indeed, the 19th and early 20th century translations of the surviving 
documents and inscriptions in Latin, Greek or Old Church Slavonic differ little from 
modern translations. However, they received significant changes in interpretation by 
later researchers, who operated in different political circumstances. Thus, the written 
evidence used for this study is not an attempt to re-interpret current reading of the 
original historical manuscripts or inscriptions, but to record the development of 
representative national interpretations of these originals and point to the omissions and 
misinterpretations. 
The chronology of national narratives of the Macedonians, Bosnian Muslims and 
Montenegrins is much more straightforward, as these are entirely a product of the 
recent decades and there are no existing original historical documents relating to them. 
The written evidence for the development of narratives of these three nations had to 
be based solely on the interpretations of the gaps within the original historical 
documents or richness of imagination of their creators. 
The analysis of material heritage and its interpretation, both historical and recent, 
follows the same chronology as that of the national narratives. Here, too, the given 
examples of the material heritage originating from the pre-nationalist period are within 
the context of when they were discovered and first interpreted. Those created during 
the nationalist period, when they served the specific purpose of nation-building, are 
also put within the political context of when they were presented to the public. As the 
nation building process is impossible without the creation of national styles in art and 
architecture, this study will look into the originators of these styles, rather than their 
aesthetic valuation. The utter scale of the “war of the monuments” that is currently 
taking place in the Western Balkans was chosen to be presented only through the most 
representative examples of public monuments because of their scale and visual 
exposure. This includes: the analysis of the modelling of the urban centres both 
traditional and recent, according to the prevailing understanding of national culture 
and history, the development of the national and quasi-national architectural styles, as 
well as the deliberate erection of public monuments dedicated to the various events 
and personalities from national histories. 
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Particular attention is given to the formation of national cultural institutions and 
their changing role as the national narratives changed. The time and events 
surrounding the establishment of the most representative national institutions, such as 
the National Museums and National Libraries, as the keystones of nation building, 
have been included in the analysis, but in-depth analysis of their collections is omitted 
for two reasons. Firstly, the interpretation of the moveable cultural heritage would 
further complicate the inquiry because of its scale and complexity. Secondly, the 
exclusion of the moveable heritage from the general discussion is not considered to be 
detrimental to the overall argument, especially as some prominent national museums, 
with the largest collections are closed to the public.33 
This analysis also includes the most prominent examples of religious 
architecture, as religion became the defining element of the nation-building process 
amongst the West Balkan nations. Clearly, the most important religious monuments 
inherited from the Early to Late Middle Ages and the Ottoman period are given due 
attention, especially as they are currently subject to great disputes between the 
competing national narratives and claims to their ownership. These monuments, as 
expected, represented obvious targets during the wars in the 20th century and their 
symbolic interpretation was revised as national borders changed. The architectural 
design of those monuments and their aesthetic value are discussed in general terms, 
covering the architectural styles in which they were built and describing the main 
features that give them national characteristics. Only exceptionally, architectural 
details that are interpreted in specifically national terms are given greater attention in 
order to illustrate the established arguments of their national origins. The religious 
artefacts being built after the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s are discussed only as the 
case studies of national delineation in the territories that are now ethnically divided. 
Most of these, irrespective of religious denomination, are rarely of significant aesthetic 
or architectural value, but are important as public statements of national defiance to 
neighbours considered to be a threat to national security. 
                                                            
33
 The National Museum in Belgrade has been partially closed since 1997 and completely since 2002, 
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Finally, the analysis contains a general overview of modern endeavours to build 
new nations and national territories in the Western Balkans. This part is particularly 
related to the nations established after the Second World War. As there is no material 
evidence that would unquestionably confirm their separate national identities, 
attention is drawn to the imagined interpretations of the existence of these nations, as 
defined by Benedict Anderson.34 These newly devised, followed by the erection of 
new monuments and the acquisition of the traditional heritage are discussed according 
to their modern interpretations. As the majority of these narratives have rarely 
published critical assessments of the intellectual and aesthetic values of such 
monuments, this part of the analysis had to rely on media accounts and the personal 
observations of the author.  
1.4 The Outline of the study 
The thesis consists of six chapters and two Appendices, which discuss the nation-
building process of each individual state of the Western Balkans, chronologically as 
national ideas and identities first appeared. Two important parts of the thesis: the 
Historical background overview and the Theories of Nationalism theoretical 
discussion on applied definitions of nationalism appear as appendices in order to allow 
fullest investigation of individual “national” case-studies. Therefore, following this 
Introduction, Chapters I to VI, are given in chronological order as national ideas and 
identities first appeared: The Serbs, The Croats, The Albanians, The Macedonians, The 
Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina (now renamed Bosniaks) and The Montenegrins. 
As noted above, the analysis is structured around the current state-borders, but the 
ethnically non-homogenous territories belonging to the neighbouring states are 
discussed according to the ethnic distribution dating prior to 1991 and the 
internationally recognized borders of each state at present. Each chapter has the same 
outline that includes:  
1) the question of territoriality – geographical distribution of the named 
population, irrespective of the current borders, including the comparative 
census data and the question of national identification,  
2) the imagined aspects of each respective nation – the first mentioning of the 
nation under its current name and political circumstances that caused it,  
                                                            
34
 Anderson, B. – Imagined Communities, London, 1995, 44 
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3) the analysis of the most important historical documents related to the first 
mentioning of each nation and the question of their validity – scarce 
contemporary written documents surviving from the period of nation 
building are widely used and misused for the creation of national narratives; 
this posed the question of their validity, especially amongst the revisionist 
historians, who in most cases tend to read them selectively or completely 
dismiss them as “historically inaccurate.”  
These are followed by the analysis of the nation-building process. Chapters I and 
II (The Serbs and The Croats) contain a somewhat extended analysis of the nation-
building processes, which include the question of language and national myths, which 
precede the appearance of nationalism. Both of these nations can claim full historical 
continuity dating back to the early Middle Ages and their appearance in the historical 
sources is unquestionable. However, as both nations possess a substantial literature 
and material heritage related to all aspects of their respective nation-building 
processes, this discussion concentrates on the most important events and personalities 
in the chronological evolution of their national ideas and narratives. Since the Croat-
Serb dichotomy marked the 20th century and continues until the present, the general 
outlines of these two chapters underline the main disputes between the two national 
narratives and territorial pretensions, as defined in their “myths of the Golden Age.” 
As both nations played pivotal roles in the creation and destruction of the Yugoslav 
idea and state, the creation of the Bosnian Muslims, Macedonians and Montenegrins 
as separate nations is understood to be the by-product of these clashes; the discussion 
of their respective nation-building is given in relation to the Serbs or the Croats and, 
in case of Macedonia, to the Bulgars, Greeks and Albanians.  
Albanian nation-building in Chapter III is presented in relation to the 
neighbouring states and the question of the growing territorial pretensions caused by 
migrations and demographic fluctuations.  
The Conclusion discusses the deeply embedded external influence on each 
observed nation regarding Europe, European values and European perspectives of the 
region as a whole. It attempts to assess the future intra-Balkan developments arising 
from the political intent of current normative historiography sanctioned by the 
prevailing national narratives. Because nationalism as an idea was born and developed 
in the environment of the relatively prosperous and independent societies of the 
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enlightened European countries over the course of two centuries, this analysis asserts 
that versions of nationalism in the Balkans had a much shorter “natural” evolution 
owing to the political circumstances both within and outside the peninsula at various 
times. Therefore, the development of national ideas in each Balkan country in its 
historic context cannot be discussed without taking into account the historical events 
that moulded the idea of nationalism locally. If the future academic debate is still to be 
guided by traditional misconceptions, the process of re-shaping and re-naming of the 
Balkan nations and their states will become a never-ending process. The conclusion, 
therefore, contains a pessimistic view of the future of the Western Balkans, despite the 
current pressures to consolidate the area and put it under the jurisdiction of the 
European Union.   
Appendix I – Historical Background is a short historical survey of the region, 
relevant for understanding the context in which the West Balkan nations and states 
have built and continue to build their own identities and claim national territories. 
 Appendix II – The Theories of Nationalism is a general overview of the theories 
of nationalism, with a discussion on their applicability to the territory in question. As 
already indicated, the chosen model of the development of nationalism in the Western 
Balkans relies on Hobsbawm’s and Anderson’s premises of the modernity of the nation 
and its “imagined character.” However, some elements of ethno-symbolism as argued 
by Anthony Smith were also taken into account, especially in the discussion of the 
development of Serbian and Croatian nationalisms.35 Except for the definitions given 
by the authorities on studies of nationalism and its theories, it also includes some 
adjusted definitions of the terms nationalism, nation, state, nation-state, ethnic, 
memory and heritage, as used throughout this work. The chapter also includes a brief 
discussion of the newly invented definitions and theories devised by the revisionist 
historians in order to justify their accounts.36 As most of these still do not have 
confirmation in practise, this analysis opted for the combination of well-established 
definitions. 
 
                                                            
35
 Smith, A. – Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford, 1999, 9 
36
 Such was the definition of “continuity-in-discontinuity” adopted by Alex Bellamy in his study of the 
formation of Croatian national identity. See, Appendix II – The Theories of Nationalism, p.73 
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The Serbs 
Together with Greek nationalism, Serbian nationalism has the longest history in the 
Balkans. However, its development was affected on three levels. Firstly, at the time of 
the birth of nationalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the Serbs lived divided 
between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, which caused not only an uneven 
economic and cultural development, but equally  uneven development of a national 
idea and identity. Secondly, the appearance of the Yugoslav idea (mid-to-late 19th 
century) and the potentially all-inclusive Yugoslav nationalism1 took an independent 
developmental path from that of the Serbian nationalism. Until the creation of 
Yugoslavia, the Serbian and Yugoslav national ideas coexisted without contrasting 
each other. Thirdly, the communist regime between 1945 and 1990 attempted to 
suppress all forms of Serbian and Croatian nationalisms in order to preserve unity in 
communist Yugoslavia. In doing so, the regime enabled the development of smaller 
nationalisms by carving the groups of specific provincial characteristics previously 
identified as the Serbs. The creation of new nations of Montenegrins, Macedonians 
and Muslims significantly contributed to the final dissolution of the state in 1991.  
The aspects of Serbian nationalism and its development need to be examined on 
three levels. Firstly, its early stages and growth throughout the 19th century will be 
analysed in the context of the time when they occurred, scrutinising the actions of the 
19th century nationalists from the perceptions of the nation-building of this period and 
the events that influenced them. Secondly, the recent manifestations of Serbian 
nationalism will be analysed by the events surrounding the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, which, in turn, coincided with the development of modern studies of 
theories of nationalism – for which the contemporary Serbian nationalism provided a 
good example. Thirdly, during the past two decades Serbian history underwent 
significant revision by predominantly foreign authors, who in process affected current 
manifestations of Serbian nationalism. All these aspects cause difficulties in assessing 
accurately  its future form. 
  
                                               
1
 There were attempts in Yugoslav academia, especially after the Second World War, to place the 
appearance of proto-Yugoslav ideas and feelings as early as the 16th century. However, full development 
of the Yugoslav idea occurred during the 19th century and will be used in this context throughout this 
work. 
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1.1 Territoriality of Serbian nationalism 
The territory of the current Serbian state, according to the official census of 
20117 counted just fewer than 7.2 million of which nearly 83% (nearly 6 million) 
declared themselves Serbs.8 However, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, a 
significant number of Serbs, just over 1.7 million,9 remained outside borders created 
during the communist period, in the territories of Yugoslav successor states, with an 
additional 1.5 million living in Diaspora worldwide.10 Similarly, the mass 
displacement of population in the 1991-1999 war period drastically changed the ethnic 
structure of all newly created states. This is further complicated by the revisionist 
accounts that appeared during the war and in its immediate aftermath explaining the 
causes of the last ethnic cleansing, offering controversial and often dubious 
comparative analysis, which will certainly create future academic disputes.  
The territoriality of Serbian nationalism represents a problem that is difficult to 
resolve politically both inside the Balkans and in the wider international context using 
the existing models of state-creation. Traditional 19th century ideas of the nation-state 
were inapplicable then due to the historical circumstances, as indeed they are now, 
being regarded as superseded. The Wilsonian principles of self-determination, applied 
during the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1919 and 
justifying the dismantling of Austro-Hungary, were again inapplicable, as allowing 
self-determination to one Balkan ethnic group would inevitably have to be at the 
expense of another. The term self-determination, much used and abused by all parties 
involved in the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s and early 2000s, deprived 
the Serbs of this right and left the Balkan conflict for re-consideration in the future. 
Even though the outcome of the 1990s wars is carefully supervised re-building of the 
                                               
7
 http://popis2011.stat.rs/?page_id=2162&lang=en – Final Results of Census 2011 – Accessed on 
06/03/2012 
8
 Data from the disputed territory of Kosovo and Metohija province are not available 
9
 http://www.bhas.ba/obavjestenja/Preliminarni_rezultati_bos.pdf - Preliminary results of 2013 census 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Accesses on 26/01/2015 – In Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to this census live around 1.3 million of Serbs. After ethnic 
cleansing in Croatia, the number of Serbs there counts nearly 200,000, according to the 2011 Croat 
Census, whilst in Montenegro the number of Serbs dropped from over 200,000 (32%) to 180,000 
(28.7%) in less than a decade due to the pressure to declare themselves Montenegrins. See official 
statistics on http://www.monstat.org/userfiles/file/popis2011/saopstenje/saopstenje(1).pdf. In 
Macedonia, the number of Serbs have been in steady decline since 1945. 
10
 The exact data on number of Serbs living in Diaspora are not available. The estimations are between 
1.5 and 3.0 million. In Serbia itself, the 2011 Census points to the decline of nearly 300 000 people of 
the overall population of Serbia, between 2002 and 2011. Similar trend is noticed in all other 
neighbouring countries. 
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broken contacts between the former Yugoslav republics under the firm control of the 
European Union, there is little doubt that the status quo created after the NATO 
intervention in 1999 will be sustainable in the long run. Firstly, there are signs that the 
EU might expect a further break-up of Serbia, by signalling the possibility of the 
secession of the northern province of Vojvodina and demanding special status for the 
region of Raška (Sandžak) with its sizeable Muslim population. If this actually 
happens in the foreseeable future, the territory of the state of Serbia will be returned to 
its early 19th century borders (the Belgrade Pashalik), from which the building of the 
Serbian national identity and state began in 1804.11  
1.1.1 Historical spatial distribution 
On the eve of the First Serbian Uprising in 1804, the territory of the Belgrade 
Pashalik within the Ottoman Empire roughly corresponded to the territory of the 
Serbian Despotate conquered by Sultan Mehmed II in 1459 (Map 1.1). With the fall 
of the last mediaeval capital of Smederevo, a seat of the Branković family, the state of 
Serbia ceased to exist until the early 19th century. The name of the state, its people and 
changeable borders, however, survived and were better preserved in the works of 
European cartographers rather than in the Ottoman administrative system.12 One of the 
earliest European maps showing Servia, albeit within the Ottoman Empire, is 
preserved in the Hall of Geographical Maps in Palazzo Vecchio, in Florence, painted 
by Danti in 1563-1575 period. Similarly, in Mercator’s compilation of maps of 
European lands from the early 1570s the map of Greece also includes a reference to 
Servia,13 positioned further south in comparison with Danti’s map.14 Apart from the 
cartographical works, a number of written sources containing references to the Serbs 
and Serbia appeared between 1459 and 1804 in various languages, by both Serbian 
                                               
11
 The pre-condition for Serbia to begin negotiations for an EU membership was to accept the 
unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo in all but name. Chapter 35 of the negotiations for 
joining the EU contain this requirement. An alternative does not exist at the moment, as key EU 
countries and the US force even the ethnic Serbian regions to distance themselves from the Serbian core 
by providing the economic aid to those agencies and individuals ready to support further disintegration 
of Serbia. See article by Jelena Popadić Ko su najveći donatori srpskog civilnog društva, 29/12/2015 - 
http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/346286/Drustvo/Ko-su-najveci-donatori-srpskog-civilnog-drustva - 
Accessed on 29/12/2015 
12
 Ćirković, 2004, 111 
13
 http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/ttp/mercator/accessible/images/page40full.jpg - Accessed on 
08/03/2012 
14
 The imprecision of those maps indicates not only the lack of knowledge of those early authors, but 
also the spatial distribution of the peoples inhabiting the area. 
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and foreign authors, mostly clergymen of both Christian denominations and travellers, 
but none of them came from the territory of the Belgrade Pashalik itself.  
After the Ottoman conquest, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the main bearer of 
literacy, became impoverished and was severely restricted in its actions.15 This 
resulted in a rapid decline of church activities and the overall literacy rates amongst 
the clergy. The literate Serbian Christian nobility and merchant classes were 
annihilated within a generation after the conquest. Those who survived either 
converted to Islam or left the territory of the Despotate, crossing into the neighbouring 
Christian territories. The first wave of the Ottoman conquest moved Christian Slav 
population of the Balkans northwards, into the sparsely inhabited marshlands of 
southern Pannonia, then part of the Kingdom of Hungary.  
 
Map 1.1 – Belgrade Pashalik within the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the First Uprising in 1804 
When the Military Frontier (Map 1.a.11) was established on the southern 
edges of the Pannonian Plain in 1522, the key-defence of the Habsburg hinterland 
consisted of the Serbian and Croat military units.16 Religious affiliations had less 
prominence than the common goal of defending from the advancing Ottomans. 
Nevertheless, by the time the frontier stabilized on the banks of the Sava and Danube 
rivers at the beginning of the 18th century, the Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats, 
Hungarians and in greater numbers migrating Germans lived in the mixed 
                                               
15
 Ćirković, 2004, 133  
16
 See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 32 
Chapter I                                                                                                         The Serbs 
22 
 
communities in the Military Frontier. This territory became a focus of national and 
ethnic disputes between Serbian and Croatian academics and politicians, from the early 
20th century onwards fuelled by disputes over the religious and ethnic affiliations of 
the population between the Middle Ages and the time of the abolition of the Frontier 
in 1882, when it was renamed into Croatia-Slavonia and re-incorporated into the 
Kingdom of Hungary. There is no available data on this matter for the period predating 
the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699). The earliest reliable census sources date from the 18th 
century and show predominance for the Serbian Orthodox population at that time.19 
Croatian authors explain this as a consequence of the immigration influx of the 
Orthodox Slavs and Vlachs after the end of the 17th century, which “forever shattered 
the integrity of Croat people’s ethnic territory.”20 Serbian scholars, on the other hand, 
explain the shifting of the religious affiliations in favour of Catholicism over the course 
of the 19th century as a result of the Habsburg policies that endorsed the conversion of 
the Orthodox population to Catholicism.21 The political outcome of the Treaty of 
Karlowitz triggered divergent paths of cultural development between the Serbs who 
remained inside the Ottoman Empire and the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy. It was 
precisely the “Habsburg Serbs” who were the originators and main bearers of the 
Serbian national idea. From the Serb populated territories of the Military Frontier, the 
ideas of nationalism spread southwards into the revolutionary Belgrade Pashalik in the 
early 19th century. The 17th and 18th centuries Migrations which contributed to the 
consolidation of the Serbian population in Slavonia and what was later to become 
Vojvodina, played a crucial role in adoption and application of Central European 
cultural models to the Serbian ethnic community within the Habsburg Empire. 
  
                                               
19
 See, for example, the official census of the Habsburg Monarchy. As late as 1846, the Orthodox 
population counted 48%, as opposed to 41% of the Roman Catholics. The data is taken from Ubersichts-
Tafeln zur Statistik der österriechischen Monarchie, Vienna, 1850, 2. The rest of the population were 
the Protestants, Uniates and the Jews. 
20
 Banac, 1986, 493, quoted in Fine, 2006, 175 
21
 The extensive works on the Military Frontier were written in the 20th and 21st century by Serbian, 
Croatian, Austrian, Hungarian and other foreign academics. Depending on the sources used and 
personal affiliations of the authors, they adopt one view or another. The sheer number of works is 
evidence in itself that the question of the Serbian-Croat ethnic dichotomy in the territory of the former 
Military Frontier will remain unresolved. 
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1.1.2 The Migrations controversy23 
While some Croat scholars argue that the Serbs appeared north of the Danube 
and Sava only as late as the early 18th century, Albanian colleagues deny that there 
was any migration at all, in response to the Serbian assertion that after the Migrations 
the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was repopulated by the Albanians in the 18th and 
19th centuries.24 The Albanian and most Western revisionist-historians since the early 
1990s frequently disputed the number of 37,000 families migrating northwards.27 They 
argued that the number of migrants was much smaller or, that the migrations did not 
happen at all because of the discrepancies observed between the Ottoman and 
Habsburg accounts.28 This obvious lack of consensus among the scholars coming from 
different ethnic backgrounds is the best indicator of the selective approach to the 
studies of nationalism in the West Balkans.29 Recently, a modern British scholar 
Frederick Anscombe used a limited selection of available Ottoman documents, defters, 
and works of modern scholars to explain the consequences of the ethnic change in the 
region in the period prior to the appearance of nationalism. Relying on the works of 
another modern British scholar Noel Malcolm, Anscombe asserted that “the great 
Serbian migration, like the events of the battle of Kosovo Polje is the stuff of legend, 
rather than history.”30 Ignoring the existing extensive Habsburg records now situated 
in various European archives, as well as the 16th century Ottoman defters that show a 
predominance of the Orthodox Christian population with Slav names in Kosovo and 
Metohija,33 Anscombe and other revisionists aim to promote a vision of the past 
suitable for the modern political usage that would justify the political campaign against 
the Serbs that took place during the wars of Yugoslav succession and destructive role 
the West had in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the revision goes as far 
as to label all earlier scholarly analysis of the documents previously accepted by the 
                                               
23
 See Appendix I – Historical background, p.34 
24
 Compare Ivo Banac, quoted above, and modern British scholars writing about the history of Kosovo 
and Metohija. 
27
 See Appendix I – Historical background, p.34 
28
 Pro-Croat Western historians strongly argue that the Serbs in Slavonija and Vojvodina are there because 
of the Migrations. See, for example, Bellamy, A. J. – The Formation of Croatian National Identity – A 
centuries Old Dream?, Manchester, 2003 
29
 See Chapter II – The Croats, p. 129-134 
30
 Anscombe, F. F. – The Ottoman empire in recent international politics – II: The case of Kosovo – 
The International History Review 28 (4) 758-793, 2006, 792 
33
 Катић, Т. – Опширни попис Призренског Санџака 1571. године, Историјски институт, Београд, 
2010 – The Serbian translation of one of the three preserved defters for the 16th century Kosovo and 
Metohija.  
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Western historians, as “the Serbian account.”34 This method of historical revisionism, 
as Ković observed, clearly indicates the political intent behind normative 
historiography.35 As such it is not only academically misleading, but potentially 
dangerously suggestive, because it justifies the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs both in 
Slavonija and Kosovo and Metohija.   
Regardless of the exact numbers, the migrations did happen and resulted in two 
significant outcomes. Firstly, the Serbian ethnic core moved northwards and secondly, 
it enabled the Habsburg Serbs to preserve their Orthodox faith through the institution 
of the Serbian Orthodox Church, remaining at the same time exposed to European 
cultural influences, amongst which was the birth of the national idea in the 19th century. 
From there, the idea of nationalism spread to the revolutionary Belgrade Pashalik in 
the first half of the 19th century. Accordingly, it could be argued that Serbian 
nationalism developed from the periphery of the national territory towards its centre.36 
Strengthened by the Migrations, this northern national periphery became the originator 
of nation-creation. 
1.2 Historical and academic settings for the formation of Serbian nationalism – 
Pre-Romantic national period and the diverging aspects of Serbian nationalism 
The re-conquest of Ottoman territories north of the Danube after the 1683-1697 
war established Habsburg administration over the new territories now incorporated 
into the Military Frontier. The Habsburgs had not only efficiently expelled the Muslim 
population, but conscientiously destroyed most of the Ottoman religious and 
administrative symbols of power. They reinstated the Catholic Church and supported 
the spread of Central European culture. However, as the majority of the Serbs were 
Orthodox, Leopold I (1658-1705) issued a Charter of Privileges in 1690, granting 
ecclesiastical rights to the Serbs. Several additional charters followed, one of which 
                                               
34
 Anscombe, 2006, 770 – For example, Anscombe words his argument as follows: “…until now, 
Malcolm, like other Western historians, had previously accepted the Serbian account.” Anscombe’s 
negation of the Migrations, directly supports the Albanian national claim to Kosovo and Metohija is in 
stark contrast with Banac’s claim that the Serbs occupied Croatian national territory through the 17th 
and 18th century migrations. If the Serbs never left Kosovo and Metohija, how could they appear in 
Slavonija in such a great number? On the contrary, if they left in great numbers, how many Albanians 
lived in Kosovo and Metohija prior to the Migrations? 
35
 See Introduction, p.5-6 
36
 Serbian nationalism, therefore, displayed ethno-symbolic characteristics, as explained by Smith, but 
its implementation required Breuilly’s “some form of political independence,” which was at the time in 
the backward Belgrade Pashalik, later Serbian Principality. For the theory, see Appendix II – The 
Theories of Nationalism, p. 65-70. 
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downgraded Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević to the status of Metropolitan of Karlovci 
(Karlowitz) in 1703. The ensuing political and religious distrust that arose between the 
Catholics and Orthodox in the Military Frontier where the Serbs were now majority, 
led to reconfirmation of privileges by Maria Theresa (1740-1780) in 1745.37  
These new Habsburg territories, largely swamps and marshland with a few towns 
situated along the trade and military routes, suffered great destruction during the 
Habsburg-Ottoman wars in the 17th and 18th centuries. After the Ottoman retreat, there 
was neither urban infrastructure nor road networks in place. The re-establishment of 
the Military Frontier and Viennese policies for urban landscaping and re-settling of 
populations (mainly Germans from Swabia) enabled faster economic growth and the 
development of the whole region, including the Serbian merchant and military class. 
The Viennese court awarded noble titles to distinguished soldiers for military services.  
However, as there were no educated Serbs among those who migrated in 1690 
and no educational infrastructure, two decades passed before the firm establishment of 
the first Serbian primary education. The Metropolitans of Karlovci understood the 
importance of education as means of advancement within the Habsburg Empire. The 
Metropolitans Mojsije Petrović (1726-1730) and Vićentije Jovanović (1731-1737) 
issued a series of “pronouncements” requesting bishops and lower clergy to found 
schools and supply teachers. However, the church visitations of 1733 revealed an 
astonishingly low level of literacy amongst village priests. Therefore, they introduced 
foreign Orthodox teachers, mainly from Russia.39  
The coming of the Russian teachers, who brought with them contemporary 
Russian books, created confusion, as the spoken language differed from the language 
used in these books and there was no standardised orthography. By the late 17th and 
early 18th century the Russian and Balkan Slav language groups diverged to such an 
extent that they became almost mutually incomprehensible. The ad hoc created 
orthography for use amongst the Habsburg Serbs was a hybrid of the Mediaeval Old 
Church Slavonic in Serbian redaction, Russian and Serbian vernacular. Its very name, 
Slaveno-Serbian, derived from these early Russian books brought to the Habsburg 
Serbs at the end of the 17th century. In the mid-18th century it was adapted for easier 
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 Ćirković, 2004, 156 
39
 From Peter I, successive Russian emperors provided financial support. This coincides with the rise 
of Russia as a European power and her growing interest for the key-strategic points in the Straits. – 
Ćirković, 2004, 163-164 
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use by Gavrilo Stefanović-Venclović (1680-1749), who first introduced a form of 
phonetic orthography. The Slaveno-Serbian differed to a certain degree from the 
language spoken by the common people and became the language of the educated elite.  
From the beginning of the 18th century a number of Serbian schools opened in 
the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy. By the end of the century, the Serbian 
Metropolitan’s seat was permanently settled in Karlovci, where the first Serbian 
gymnasium opened in 1792, modelled on the contemporary Austrian gymnasium. The 
language of instruction was Serbian, in Slaveno-Serbian redaction and orthography, 
but German and Latin were compulsory for all students. There were university 
educated Serbs, but there were no Serbian universities as such.40  
1.2.1 The Habsburg Serbs 
The cultural impact and modern education originating in Vienna began 
influencing the Habsburg Serbs in the early 18th century. Gavrilo Stefanović-
Venclović translated many manuscripts into Slaveno-Serbian from mediaeval Old 
Slavonic and introduced the first language reform. The first attempt to write about 
Serbian history in the Serbian language and modelled on contemporary scholarly 
historiography, rather than on mediaeval hagiographic patterns that were until then 
maintained by the Church, can be assigned to Count Djordje Branković (1645-1711). 
He left several volumes of Chronicles of the Slavs of Illyricum, Upper Moesia and 
Lower Moesia in Romanian and Slaveno-Serbian languages, written during his time 
as a political prisoner in 1689-1711 period.41 In 1765, Pavle Julinac (1730-1785) 
published in Venice A short Introduction to the History of the Slavo-Serbian People, 
whilst Hristofor Žefarović (1700-1753) published in Vienna in 1741 
Stemmatographia, mainly Serbian and Bulgarian heraldic collections. Zaharije Orfelin 
(1726-1785), a poet and architect, left a collection of elementary works in astronomy. 
Being an excellent calligrapher, he published his Caligraphies in 1778, which brought 
                                               
40
 Ćirković, 2004, 167 – Most of these 18th century intellectuals were educated in Halle and the first 
Serbian doctoral thesis, printed in Latin, dated from the mid-18th century. 
41
 Бранковић, Ђ. – Хроника Словена Илирика, Горње Мезије и Доње Мезије – приредила Јелка 
Ређеп, Нови Сад, 1994, 5 – Branković claimed ancestry from the last mediaeval Serbian ruling family 
of the same name, which died out in the early 16th century, during the Ottoman conquest of Hungary. 
Naturally, his claims were not well accepted in the Habsburg Monarchy. 
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him membership of the Viennese Art Academy.42 By far the most influential historian 
was Jovan Rajić (1726-1801) who wrote History of various Slavic peoples, most 
notably Bulgars, Croats and Serbs written in 1768, but published in four volumes in 
1794-1795 (Fig. 1.1).43   
However, the most outstanding Serbian intellectual of the 18th century was 
Dositej Obradović (1739/42-1811), a teacher and a polyglot, educated in Vienna, 
Bratislava, Halle and Leipzig. He was the first to embrace the ideas of Enlightenment 
and rationalism during his travels around Europe and introduced them to the Habsburg 
Serbs. He advocated the education of the masses, based on scientific principles and in 
a language spoken by the majority of people. Dositej Obradović (Fig. 1.2) spent nearly 
thirty years working as a tutor to the children of wealthy families all over Europe. As 
he spoke Classical languages, but also German, French, Russian, Italian, demotic 
Greek and English, he was frequently employed by the nobles and communities all 
over the Holy Roman Empire. This funded his travels and enabled him to write and 
translate many classical works of literature and philosophy into Serbian.44 In 1793 he 
published a collection of works on philosophy, ethics, history and aesthetics, based on 
German, Italian, French and English scholarly traditions. He was well-respected 
among the Serbs of the Habsburg Monarchy, but his work also influenced some of his 
non-Serbian contemporaries.45  
All these 18th century intellectuals and artists embraced the Western cultural 
models: from baroque to the enlightenment. However, it was impossible for them to 
expand their work south of the Danube, as Ottoman authorities did not allow any 
cultural exchange across the border.  
In terms of quality of life, Habsburg Serbs were also in a slightly better position 
than their co-nationals south of the Sava and Danube. After 1690, the Habsburgs 
dismantled Ottoman heritage north of the Danube. The old towns, together with newly 
established ones, were re-modelled on the baroque principles of Central Europe. 
Viennese policies of settling the Germans brought with them their architectural 
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traditions and building skills. By the end of the century, the urban structure of the 
Military Frontier was transformed, with nothing left to remind of a century and a half 
of Ottoman rule. However, because of the military nature of the region, the early 
baroque features incorporated into the newly built towns were somewhat limited and 
restrained – provincial versions based on Viennese models. By the time baroque had 
fully established itself in the Military Frontier, elsewhere in the Empire it was replaced 
by rococo and neo-classicism.  
     
Fig. 1.1 – Jovan Rajić (1726-1801), the most prominent               Fig. 1.2 – Dositej Obradović (1739-  
Serbian historian from the pre-Romantic national period.             1811), the first Minister of Education                                                                    
                                                                                       in  Karadjordje’s Serbia. 
Until the 18th century, when the influx of Germans brought European tendencies 
in building and lifestyle in the Military Frontier, Serbs kept to their mediaeval tradition 
of church-building. However, from 1726, apart from a few surviving mediaeval 
monasteries on the Fruška Gora, just outside the new town of Novi Sad,46 baroque 
began penetrating Serbian ecclesiastical architecture. When the new metropolitan 
church in Sremski Karlovci was built by Zaharije Orfelin in 1758-1760 on the initiative 
of the Metropolitan Pavle Nenadović (1703-1768), baroque was finally officially 
accepted by the Serbian Orthodox Church (Fig. 1.3).  
                                               
46
 Novi Sad (German: Ratzen Stadt, English: the Rascian City, from the mediaeval name Rascians, 
meaning Serbs – Raškani). The location of the city was inhabited since the Celtic period, but during the 
Ottoman rule, the Christian population was not allowed to reside within the city walls. The mediaeval 
town was destroyed by the Ottomans in 1526, the Ottoman town destroyed in 1683-1690, so a 
completely new urban structure was laid down in 1694. Novi Sad is now the capital of the province of 
Vojvodina. 
Chapter I                                                                                                         The Serbs 
29 
 
   
Fig. 1.3 – Saborna Church in Sremski Karlovci, after Zharije Orfelin, built in 1758-1760.    
The growing Serbian middle classes lived in planned urban areas, in large town 
houses, built in bricks and consisting of one or two floors, with horizontally and 
vertically emphasised facades, achieving symmetry and rhythm through the repetition 
of windows and decorative stone plastic. These also followed provincial baroque 
forms, but as the century went on, the neo-classicism and rococo began slow 
appearance and the fusion of architectural styles could be easily traced in the surviving 
buildings from that period. Representative examples of such town architecture are the 
house of Count Gražalković in Sombor (built in 1763) and the house of Dimitrije 
Anastasijević (built in 1766) in Sremski Karlovci (Fig. 1.4). In the ethnically mixed 
Military Frontier, the nobles and the rich merchants of all ethnic backgrounds built 
palatial residences in the 18th century neo-classical style in the countryside. The 
expression of national feelings through the means of architecture, sculpture, public 
monuments and other visual mediums was not prominent as the idea of national 
identity was still nearly a century in the future. 
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Fig. 1.4 – The house of Dimitrije Anastasijević, built in 1766 in Sremski Karlovci. The agreement to 
found a Gymnasium was signed here in 1791. 
1.2.2 The Ottoman Serbs 
The situation in the Belgrade Pashalik was quite the opposite. From the early 
days of conquest in 15th century, town structures were converted for the use of the 
Ottomans. Most Christian population was driven out of the towns and only small non-
Muslim communities were allowed to reside within the city walls. The urban principles 
of the conversion of towns were based on Levantine models: apart from the main 
mosque, the main town features included bazaars, domed marketplaces (bezistans), 
public baths (hammams) and, if the town was near the main caravan routs, inns 
(caravan-serai). Depending on its size, legal status, economic and military role, the 
population was segregated with the small Christian and Jewish population living inside 
their designated quarters.48 
Town churches appropriated immediately after the conquest were transformed 
into mosques. Even though the Christian religion was not banned, the construction of 
new churches was not permitted, but dilapidated and crumbling churches could be 
repaired under certain conditions and with official approval. Church bells could not be 
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rung. One of the rules of Islamic tradition held that churches would not be destroyed 
if the town surrendered, and they were to be appropriated if it was taken by the sword.49 
On the eve of the final Austrian-Ottoman war in the 18th century (1788-1792), 
in all towns of the Belgrade Pashalik there were in total 670 Serbian houses.50 As there 
were no schools, it can be concluded that, by the end of the 18th century, the Serbian 
Christian population of the Pashalik was nearly 100% illiterate. Additionally,  98% of 
them were rural, as the town populations were almost exclusively Muslim and, in 
smaller numbers, Jewish and Greek. A very small percentage of Serbian merchants 
allowed to work in the Belgrade Pashalik was exclusively involved in trade of pigs 
(which the Muslims did not rear and did not trade), whilst other merchant enterprises 
and crafts were exclusively in Ottoman, Jewish and Greek hands. The pig-merchants 
were rarely literate and if they had some knowledge of reading and writing, this was 
at a rudimentary level. 
The change began with the outbreak of the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813), 
led by Djordje Petrović Karadjordje (Fig. 1.a.11).51 Traditionally, the period of the 
First Uprising is regarded as the beginning of the re-building of the Serbian state.52 
Having killed a Turk in his youth, Karadjordje fled to the Austrian territory north of 
the Danube and joined the Habsburg army in the area around Syrmia (Sremska 
Mitrovica). During his Austrian engagement, Karadjordje gained military experience 
and encountered officers and the literate civilian Habsburg Serbs. The level of his 
literacy remains unclear, but it appears that he became aware of the importance of 
education during this period. After the peace in 1791, the Porte pardoned the rebels’ 
participation in the war on the Austrian side, enabling Karadjordje to return to the 
Belgrade Pashalik where he worked as a pig-merchant exporting to the Habsburg 
Empire, until the outbreak of the uprising. 
Swift military victories over the Ottomans under Karadjordje’s leadership early 
in the Uprising, enabled the establishment of closer links between Habsburg and 
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Ottoman Serbs. The formation of basic state institutions and the foundation of the first 
schools in the Belgrade Pashalik began immediately after the Ottomans were ousted. 
As there were no literate Serbs amongst the rebels, the Habsburg Serbs had to assume 
responsibility for education. A rudimentary form of government was established in 
1805, under the name Praviteljstvujušči Sovjet Serbski, which consisted of regional 
leaders of the Uprising.55 In 1811, it was re-organized into six ministries 
(попечитељства, popečiteljstva). The first Minister for Education was Dositej 
Obradović, who came to Serbia in 1806 on the personal invitation of Karadjordje,  in 
order to organize the foundation of a school system. Dositej’s arrival in Serbia in 1806 
marks the moment when the link between the Western and Central European cultural 
values of the late 18th century and the Serbian population inside the Ottoman territories 
was established.56  
In November 1807, the Sovjet issued a proclamation urging the founding of 
schools. According to Vuk Karadžić, “prior to 1804, one could not find one school in 
a hundred villages, but Black George ordered the schools to be established in every 
town and even in some villages.”57 In August 1808 Velika Škola (the Grand School) 
in Belgrade opened.58 Its founders and first teachers were Habsburg Serbs, responsible 
for sending the first generation of students born in the territory of the Belgrade Pashalik 
to foreign universities.59  Dositej Obradović was, of course, their most prestigious 
colleague. The first students that entered the Grand School were sons and nephews of 
the leaders of the First Serbian Uprising, but the school was not exclusive. Anyone 
could enrol, as the only requirement for entering the school was the ability to read, 
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write and a basic knowledge of mathematics. The school functioned until the First 
Uprising was crushed in 1813 and during this short period had nearly 40 students.60 
The early primary schools opened in the Pashalik between 1804 and 1813 had 
little facilities and lacked libraries, so most of the lessons consisted of the teachers 
giving lectures and pupils and students taking notes or, in some cases, learning them 
by heart. Clearly, this could not last, so the books used by the Serbs in the Habsburg 
Monarchy were brought in to support the nascent school system. All these books were 
in Slaveno-Serbian. However, in 1810, another Habsburg Serb, Savo Mrkalj (1783-
1833), published in Buda a manifesto on language, requiring the reduction of the 
current alphabet from 40 to 26 letters.61 The main message of his manifesto was a 
phrase: “Write as you speak!” which was a direct call for freeing the language from 
archaisms and foreign words. 
1.2.3 Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864) 
The turbulent years of the First Serbian Uprising and the gathering of the 
educated Habsburg Serbs around Karadjordje, launched the long and revolutionary 
career of Vuk Karadžić, the man solely responsible for the creation of the modern 
Serbian language (Fig. 1.5). From his humble origins in western Serbia, then part of 
the Ottoman Empire, he grew into an academic revered across Europe. Born into a 
poor and illiterate peasant family originating from Herzegovina62 Karadžić’s early 
education was sporadic and incomplete. As a boy, he acquired basic literacy from his 
relative Jevta Savić, the only literate merchant in the region. At the outbreak of the 
Uprising in 1804, his father sent him across the Danube to Karlovci Gymnasium in 
order to prevent young Karadžić from joining the rebellion. However, by then he was 
17, too old to attend regular education. He spent some time in the nearby monastery, 
where he learnt German and Latin, then returned to Belgrade to the newly opened 
Grand School. He worked in schools and as a customs officer until the Uprising was 
crushed in 1813. In the same year, Karadžić crossed the Danube as a refugee and joined 
the South-Slav community in Vienna, where he encountered the imperial censor for 
Slavic literature, a Slovene philologist, Jernej Kopitar (1780-1844).63 As a highly 
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educated man, Kopitar (Fig. 1.6) was well acquainted with the new ideas of national 
culture that were spreading throughout Europe. He was particularly interested in the 
vernacular Slavic languages encouraging Karadžić to collect and publish traditional 
folk literature, as well as to work on language reforms.  
   
Fig. 1.5 – Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864)      Fig. 1.6 – Jernej Kopitar (1780-1844) 
Inspired by Herder’s Stimmen der Völker, Karadžić published in Vienna a small 
collection of Serbian epic poetry and a book of Serbian vernacular Grammar in 1814, 
which was followed by the Dictionary in 1818. Well acquainted with the works of 
Venclović and Mrkalj, to whose maxim, he added: “Read as it is written!” Karadžić 
established the modern Serbian phonetic principles. Guided by the theory that each 
sound should be represented by its own sign, he reduced the number of letters to 30. 
However, his collections of epic poems which he wrote down from the bards during 
his many travels around the region were the main interest for the European 
romanticists. Publishing these poems created a sensation amongst the European 
cultural elite, most notably from Jakob Grimm (1785-1863) who highly praised 
Serbian poetry.64 This led a number of early national writers and poets of the period 
from various ethnic and linguistic backgrounds to translate Karadžić’s German 
editions of Serbian folk poetry into their respective languages. The enthusiasm of 
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Jacob Grimm, Lamartine and Sir John Bowring65 were very much in accordance with 
the predominant ideas of romanticism and national re-discovery.  
Some modern Western revisionists portray the overwhelming admiration and 
support that Karadžić received from the prominent foreign intellectuals of his time as 
“the propaganda of Serbian nationalists who fought for the formation and expansion 
of the Serbian nation-territory.”66 However, these claims, written against the 
background of the 1991-1999 wars, reflect modern international political attitudes 
towards Serbia. Back in the early 19th century, the interest of intellectuals for national 
re-discovery, including those of the other peoples, was a matter of culture and new 
philosophical and historiographical theory coming from German philosophical and 
linguistic traditions – historism.67 Nationalism in the early days of its development had 
a positive role emancipating those peoples living under the non-native rule. Modern 
interpretation of those early national ideas and how the intellectuals embracing and 
promoting them might have understood them are separate concepts very prone to 
manipulation. In reality, Karadžić’s ideas did not differ from those of his European 
counterparts. 
Being a man of strong beliefs, Karadžić did not compromise. His advocacy of 
language reform alienated him from the main Serbian cultural institution: the 
Metropolitanate of Karlovci. Because of his friendship with Kopitar, attendance at 
various European universities from 1814 onwards and, finally, his marriage to a 
Viennese Anna Krauss, the Metropolitan Stefan Stratimirović (1757-1836) and 
conservative circles around him, saw him as an instrument of Austrian policies for the 
unification of the Catholic and Serbian Orthodox churches. His clashes with the church 
and Serbian intellectuals of the Habsburg Empire against the language reforms are well 
recorded and lasted for most of his life. Eventually, they ended in his victory in 1847, 
when four crucial works on language reforms were published in Vienna: his translation 
into a vernacular Serbian of the New Testament, the polemical War for Serbian 
Language and Orthography by Karažić’s disciple, linguist Djura Daničić (1825-1882), 
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the collection of poetry by one of the early Serbian romantics Branko Radičević (1824-
1853) and, finally, the philosophical epic Mountain Wreath by the Montenegrin 
Prince-Bishop Peter II Petrović Njegoš (Fig. 6.2).68  
Nor did Karadžić receive much help from Serbs within the Ottoman Empire. 
After the First Serbian Uprising was crushed, the return to the pre-1804 situation was 
not possible. Even though an amnesty for all rebels was announced, the Ottoman 
authorities did not implement it and their attempt to restore full control over the 
Belgrade Pashalik was followed by the retaliations. After several local rebellions in 
1814, the Second Serbian Uprising began in the spring of 1815 led by Miloš Obrenović 
(Fig. 1.a.12). As political relationships among the Great Powers after the Congress of 
Vienna allowed a possibility for the Russian army to intervene, the Porte undertook to 
resolve the problem by pursuing a more diplomatic approach, after the initial victories 
of the rebels. Obrenović had participated in the First Uprising, but did not play a 
prominent role under Karadjordje. When the leaders of the First Uprising went to exile 
in 1813 he, at the risk of execution, remained the only leader left in the Pashalik. This 
act brought him respect among the people and put him in a position to negotiate with 
the Ottoman authorities. He was aware that fighting could result in a great loss of life, 
so he too preferred the diplomatic option. By the end of 1815, a verbal truce was 
agreed, leading to negotiations. The process was slow and required both a humble 
approach and some unpopular measures. He ordered the execution of Karadjordje on 
his return to Serbia in 1817 to take the leadership of the uprising. Eventually, 
Obrenović negotiated some form of self-government, including tax collection by Serbs 
themselves and the opening of the Peoples’ Office in Kragujevac, a basic court that 
dealt with legal disputes among Serbs.  
1.2.4 The creation of the modern state 
The Ottoman authorities still held the town fortresses, but the troops were not 
allowed to enter the villages. Despite the Ottoman presence, the ethnic structure of 
towns began to change. During the military operations 1804-1813 all towns suffered 
great damage and some were totally destroyed by the Serbs, because they were 
bastions of Ottoman military supplies.69 The Muslims were killed or expelled and in 
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1815, when this violence threatened to repeat itself, the Muslims who had been driven 
out of towns did not return and the Christians were allowed to settle and undertake 
some of the crafts and merchant jobs that were previously exclusively in Muslim 
hands. Despite being illiterate himself, Miloš Obrenović, like Karadjordje before him, 
understood the significance of education and initiated the negotiations on re-opening 
of the schools. The Ottoman authorities were reluctant to allow this, as they feared the 
encroachment of Habsburg influence into Ottoman territories, through educated Serbs 
who had entered the rebellious province during the First Uprising. Similarly, the 
Habsburg authorities were also against this request, as they themselves feared that the 
rebellious Serbs from south of the Danube might inspire the Habsburg Serbs to begin 
a rebellion of their own. This question was left pending for another fifteen years, when 
Serbia officially gained autonomy, following the Ottoman defeat from Russia. 
The First Hatt-i-Sharif of 1830 gave the Serbs in the Belgrade Pashalik 
autonomy and confirmed Miloš Obrenović as ruler of Serbia, with the hereditary title 
of Prince (Кнез, Knez). The Ottoman troops stationed in Serbia were now officially 
restricted only to major towns. This enabled Miloš to take full control of the Serbian 
population. He tended to act as an autocrat, but understood the importance of civil 
servants for maintaining order. Because most literate Serbs left in 1813 for Habsburg 
territory, in 1815 there were only 24 literate civil servants in the Pashalik.70 However, 
Obrenović re-started the sending of young Serbian boys to the Karlovci Gymnasium 
which created the first educated class in the Pashalik. By 1830, there were already 245 
literate civil servants, whilst in 1838, the year when Miloš founded the first Serbian 
Lyceum in Kragujevac, there were 850.71 
In 1830, the decision to expel the remaining Muslim population from the towns 
where no Ottoman troops were stationed accelerated the process of urban re-
structuring.72 In the first years of autonomy, urban areas, including those that still had 
a Muslim population, counted for only 2.25% of all habitable settlements. However, 
from 1830, the intellectuals and craftsmen from the Habsburg Empire began returning 
to the Principality. Obrenović’s government knew that waiting for the local students 
to finish their education abroad needed time, so they invited in a number of Habsburg 
intellectuals, working primarily in Serbian Gymnasiums in Karlovci and Novi Sad. 
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These educated professionals were not exclusively ethnic Serbs, but also Czechs, 
Slovaks, Poles and Germans. The state provided the houses and various benefits for 
those who accepted to come and undertake professional posts, so the Principality 
became attractive for them, as they could bring the skills and knowledge that was 
lacking and thus obtain comfortable lives relatively quickly.73 Educational activity was 
revived and in 1832 Obrenović issued a decree which required that a copy of every 
book brought in and printed in Serbia should be sent to the Ministry for Education, for 
record and archive. This decree marks the foundation of the National Library.  
It was not only the educated people pouring into the Principality. The peasant 
Serbs from other parts of the Ottoman Empire, mainly from Kosovo and Metohija, 
Raška and Macedonia also began entering. Their reasons were also economic: they 
were automatically being freed from feudal ties and awarded land.74 Both Uprisings 
abolished Ottoman feudalism, as their leaders needed strong support from the people 
during the hostilities. Promising freedom also stimulated population growth, allowing 
them to become self-sufficient and pay taxes. As the territory of the Pashalik had 
suffered endemic depopulation since the early 18 century, Obrenović’s policies of 
ensuring that all Serbs in the Principality had enough land prevented the creation of an 
aristocratic elite and made Serbia “a European uniquely peasant state.”75 The state also 
encouraged the immigration of people involved in trade and crafts. With them, the 
European norms of business and lifestyle began to penetrate post-Ottoman society. 
However, the state was far too poor, still dependent on the Porte, and with such a small 
professional class to be able to undertake any large scale industrialization.  
The merchants and civil servants, returning to Serbia after gaining education in 
Europe, began building their houses based on Central European models.76 The new 
Serbian authorities were determined to depart from the Ottoman heritage in order to 
emphasize its Christian identity. Already in 1833, a Viennese architect was 
commissioned to design the new Prince’s palace in Smederevo, followed by another 
one in Belgrade, both of which were to be modelled “in the European manner.” A 
modest number of public buildings began to be built, all designed by the foreign 
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architects and all in the late neo-classical style that was still dominant in Europe.77 
Similarly, with the departure of the Muslims from towns and destruction of mosques, 
the erection of new churches in towns became one of the primary enterprises. The 
earliest architects employed for this task were all foreign and followed the neo-
classical style of Orthodox churches erected in the Habsburg Empire in the previous 
century. One of the earliest, the Saborna Crkva in Belgrade (Fig. 1.7), built in 1838, 
was designed by Friedrich Kwerfeld (1774-?) and served as a model for churches in 
several other Serbian towns.78  
  
Fig. 1.7 – Saborna Church, erected in Neo-Classical style with some Baroque elements in 1838-1840 
period, after the design of the Pančevo born Adam Friedrich Kwerfeld (1774-?). 
The opening of the Lyceum and the state Printers in 1838 somewhat eased the 
shortage of books for primary education, but the network of schools and the use of 
unified orthography was still disorganized. By then, Vuk Karadžić had achieved a 
great respect amongst the European cultural elite and advised Obrenović to form a 
state-funded body to accelerate the spread of education. Obrenović refused, arguing 
that Serbia lacked a sufficient number of educated people to be of any benefit.79 
Personal enmities between Vuk Karadžć and Miloš Obrenović resulted in Karadžić’s 
language reform being forbidden and all his work denounced. However, Obrenović’s 
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autocratic rule was opposed by many members of the Sovjet and in 1839 they provoked 
the political crisis using as a pretext the two constitutional crises in 1835 and 1838. 
The 1838 Constitution, drafted by the Ottoman authorities80 and supervised by the 
Russian and Habsburg Empires, was resisted by Prince Miloš, who was consequently 
removed from power in 1839 and replaced by his son, Mihajlo (1823-1868). As prince 
Mihajlo continued his father’s policies of autocratic rule, only three years later, in 
1842, he was exiled and Karadjordje’s son, Aleksandar Karadjordjević (1806-1885) 
was chosen to be the Prince of Serbia. Prince Aleksandar was educated in Russia and 
accepted the Turkish Constitution and the role of the Sovjet. His reign between 1842 
and 1858 was known as the reign of Constitutionalists (Уставобранитељи, 
Ustavobranitelji). The period of the Constitutionalists marks the beginning of building 
the Serbian nation-state and of the formulation of Serbian nationalism.   
1.3 Establishing the Serbian national programme 
The Constitutionalists endorsed policies for the Europeanization of the 
Principality and brought in a series of laws to found schools of further education. 
Already in 1842, the professors of the Lyceum established the Society of Serbian 
Letters (Друштво српске словесности) aiming to systematise the language and 
orthography and increase literacy among the Serbs.81 The Society consisted mostly of 
educated Habsburg Serbs working in the Principality, but it included well-respected 
Slavic linguists and philologists: Jernej Kopitar, a Slovene, Ján Kollár,  a Slovak, Pavel 
Šafárik, a Czech, Ljudevit Gaj, a Croat, Prince Bishop Peter II of Montenegro and, of 
course, Vuk Karadžić himself. By this time, Pan-Slavic ideas were spreading 
throughout Europe and a number of various Slavic societies of similar nature were 
established amongst different Slavic ethnic groups within the Habsburg Empire.82 
North of the Danube, a similar society, Matica srpska, was founded back in 1826 
on the initiative of wealthy Habsburg Serbs in the Pest palace of nobleman Sava 
Tekelija (1761-1842).83 Towards the end of the 18th century, Tekelija abandoned his 
post in the Hungarian court and dedicated himself to philanthropy. A friend of Dositej 
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Obradović, he became interested in Serbian matters from the beginning of the First 
Serbian Uprising, which prompted him to award scholarships to poor Serbian 
students.84 The idea for Matica srpska materialized after the newspaper Chronicle 
(Летопис, Letopis) was first published in Novi Sad in 1824.85 Tekelija (Fig. 1.8) was 
its president for life and on his death he left all his possessions to Matica srpska. 
Matica became a focus for the majority of Serbian intellectuals from the Habsburg 
lands, who in turn maintained contacts with the new Serbian authorities and the Society 
of Serbian Letters in the Principality. The exchange of ideas between the members of 
Matica srpska and the members of the Society of Serbian Letters introduced the new 
ideas of nationalism and national awakening. By the 1840s, the first generation of 
Serbs who were born in the territory of the Principality but educated abroad was able 
to undertake the task of building the state and its national programme. The Society of 
Serbian Letters through its periodicals acted as an early academia and started the 
programmatic development of the humanities. The young intellectuals returning from 
abroad were, clearly, the first recruits for such tasks.  
 
 
1.8 – Sava Tekelija (1761-1842) supported Serbian national programme by supplying necessary funds 
for work of Matica srpska in Pest and Novi Sad. 
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1.3.1 The Draft 
1844 is the best year for dating the birth of Serbian nationalism. Apart from 
its work on language systematization, the Society initiated in 1844 the first legislation 
on civil and educational laws. On 10th May 1844, the Ministry for Education issued an 
order to local authorities to collect “ancient artefacts” and give them to the Society for 
recording and keeping in the newly established National Museum.86 The idea for the 
formation of the Museum originated amongst the intellectuals from the Matica Srpska, 
but it took another four decades before they were interpreted in national terms.87 
In the same year, the Interior Minister Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874) produced for 
Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević a confidential document intended to be the 
guideline for future Serbian foreign policies (Fig. 1.9). The document, simply titled 
Draft (Начертаније), was influenced by the ideas of Polish émigré in Paris, Adam 
Czartorisky (1770-1861), who in 1843 sent his Czech follower František Zach (1807-
1892) to Serbia to propagate Pan-Slavic ideas. Zach (Fig. 1.10) befriended Garašanin 
to whom he expressed his views on the position of the Southern Slavs under Ottoman 
and Habsburg rule. However, Garašanin’s Draft, even though exclusively based on the 
writings of Zach, was adapted for Serbian national ideals which hoped to resurrect the 
glory of the Serbian mediaeval state that would include all South Slavs.88  
Essentially, the Draft represents a first geo-strategic analysis of the political 
situation in the region written by a Serbian, rather than a foreign diplomat. The 
document gave a relatively accurate assessment of the power-politics surrounding the 
Balkans at the time and predicted the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, whilst 
remained aware of the power politics of the Russian and Habsburg Empires, their 
treatment of small nations and the attitude of Britain and France towards them.89 This 
is probably the reason why it remained secret until 1906, even though the contents of 
the document were known to the Viennese authorities already in the 1880s.  
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Fig. 1.9 – Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874) based                   Fig. 1.10 – František Zach (1807-1892), a true             
the Draft on writings of Zach.                                          author of the Draft.                      
 
The tone of the Draft was very much in tune with the growing ideas of 
nationalism in Europe. It envisaged the liberation of all South Slavs by invoking the 
tradition of the great mediaeval Serbian Empire of the 14th century, which the 
Principality sought to continue, as “the Serbs were the first, of all the Slavs of Turkey, 
to struggle for their freedom with their own resources and strength; therefore, they 
have the first and foremost right to further direct this endeavour.” The document 
clearly stated that after the revival of the Serbian Empire, “other South Slavs will easily 
understand this idea and accept it with joy; for probably in no European country is 
the memory of the historical past so vivid as among the Slavs of Turkey, for whom the 
recollection is intense and faithful to the celebrated figures and events of their 
history.”91 The document was later to become one of the main arguments against the 
Serbian nationalism throughout the existence of Yugoslavia, up to the present day.92 
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1.3.2 Nation-Building Programme – 1844-1882 
The real nation-building of the modern Serbian nation was a state programme 
in autonomous Serbian Principality initiated by foreign, mainly Pan-Slav, as well as 
native intellectuals educated abroad, endorsed by all Governments of the Principality 
throughout the 19th century. By 1846, the National Library had in its catalogue nearly 
1500 books, and there was a growing interest in discovering and recovering old 
mediaeval books and manuscripts.93 This was a programmatic task which prompted 
the Society of Serbian Letters to submit to the government a proposal for “recording, 
examining, research and protection of old Serbian manuscripts and artefacts.”94 In the 
same year, a Lyceum professor and a nephew of Pavel Šafárik, Dr Janko Šafárik (1814-
1876), undertook on behalf of the Ministry of Education the first scientific recording 
of the old monasteries, churches, city walls, tombs and frescoes in the Principality. He 
submitted his findings to the Ministry in September 1846, recommending the need to 
preserve old frescoes and monasteries, as they were in danger of disappearing. He 
advocated that “…the Church in Manasija…may serve as an exemplar of how to build 
an eastern church and how to decorate it. From this monastery, thus, but from Žiča, 
Ravanica and others….the Serbs should take the plan, when they start building their 
new churches.”95  
By 1849, the Society was expanded and re-organized into five departments 
working exclusively with national disciplines, of which the language and history were 
the most important.96 It is no coincidence that the programme on national culture and 
history published by the Society and the support it received from the Serbian 
government occurred during the revolutionary year of 1848.  
Upon receiving news of revolutions in Paris and Vienna in May 1848, Serbian 
representatives in the Hungarian court and some intellectuals gathered in the May 
Council (Majska Skupština) in Karlovci, demanding language and religious rights and 
the restoration of privileges granted by Leopold I in 1690. The regions of Srem, 
southern Banat and Bačka, until then still within the Military Frontier, united to 
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proclaim a Duchy of Serbia (Srpska Vojvodina).97 The participants of the Skupština 
demanded the restoration of the Patriarchate of Peć, and there were calls for unification 
with the Principality of Serbia, despite the fact that it was still not officially 
independent.98 There was also an expression of solidarity with the Croats and 
representatives were sent both to Zagreb and to the Pan-Slavic Congress then taking 
place in Prague. Using Serbian and Croatian disappointment with the Hungarian 
attitude, Vienna at first allowed these expressions of national aims, but, by 1849 the 
revolution was crushed and the policies of controlled centralization were introduced 
under the firm hand of Alexander von Bach whose cultural and political measures 
prompted Habsburg Serbs to turn towards the backward Principality.99  
One explanation of this action was that the Serbian government at a time, even 
though relatively poor and politically controlled by both Russia and the Habsburgs, 
supported the national cultural programmes and worked to promote them without 
much interference from these powers. The Society for Serbian Letters had already 
undertaken the task of collecting and recording the surviving mediaeval manuscripts 
relevant for Serbia and Serbian lands, not only in the territory of the Principality, but 
also in foreign archives. For these tasks, Serbian students abroad were engaged in 
recording and transcribing archival materials from the great European libraries. In the 
1850-1862 period, a number of historical documents, translated into Karadžić’s 
reformed language were published.100 Not even the change of dynasty in 1858 and the 
return of Miloš (1858-1860) and Mihajlo (1860-1868) stopped this programme, as 
both the Obrenović and Karadjordjević Princes shared the enthusiasm for national 
culture, so popular throughout Europe.  
However, the physical transformation of the Principality following new national 
lines was much slower. The reasons were primarily economic: public buildings were 
expensive to build and required time for both educating native architects and the actual 
construction. After the initial influence of post-baroque and neo-classical architecture 
in church building, public buildings were modelled on corresponding buildings 
elsewhere in Europe. The Principality could not rely exclusively on foreign architects, 
so in 1846 an Engineering School was founded in Belgrade, where the first lecturers 
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were graduates from European universities. Even though Miloš Obrenović ordered the 
paving the town streets as early as 1837, little was done prior to the 1860s when real 
urban planning took place following the departure of the last Ottoman troops from the 
towns.101 When the new street grid was laid down, a series of neo-classical private 
houses were built around the Kalemegdan Fortress, beginning the transformation of 
Belgrade into a European city. By now, the ideas of historism were dominant in 
Europe, and Serbian students acquired them from their foreign teachers. However, the 
early historism in Serbia was heavily influenced by the historism in Europe. For 
example, a new National Theatre in Belgrade, built in 1869, was modelled on La Scala 
in Milan (Fig. 1.11 and Fig. 1.12).  
   
Fig. 1.11 – The original façade of the National Theatre in Belgrade, built in 1869 by Aleksandar 
Bugarski (1835-1891) was modelled on the Italian Teatro alla Scala in Milan. 
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Fig. 1.12 – The National Theatre, modern façade. After the destruction in the First World War, it was 
rebuilt on a more modest scale. Damaged again in 1941. 
By the late 1860s and early 1870s a second generation of intellectuals educated 
abroad returned to the Principality influenced by the national movements and the 
events in Italy, Germany and Poland. The ideas of “a national golden age” in those 
respective countries inspired similar ideas in the Principality. In January 1864, the 
Society of Serbian Letters awarded honourable memberships to Garibaldi, Cobden and 
Girardin, which upset the Serbian government, concerned that this was a political act 
not to be tolerated by Vienna. For the court in Vienna, the acceptance of the three well-
known European liberals by the Society which was supported by the Serbian Prince 
meant that the Prince himself was anti-Habsburg. The Society was duly suspended by 
Prince Mihajlo, only one day after announcing the names of its new honourable 
members.102  
The growth of political discontent split the Society into two factions: one that 
adhered to the application of modern scientific principles in research and factual 
analysis (the second generation of its members) and another that still wanted to 
concentrate on expansion of literacy among the people (the first generation).103 The 
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questions of the new political ideas that penetrated the work of the Society, threatened 
the delicate position of Prince Mihajlo, so in July 1864 he re-established the Society 
under a new name: the Serbian Learned Society (Српско учено друштво), drawn 
from the older, conservative generation, interested in increasing literacy and spreading 
education in the Principality. Its new Statute underlined that the “Society was a 
scientific institution primarily concerned with the Serbian people and its lands.”104 
The study of international relations was excluded, because the government wanted to 
avoid diplomatic problems with Vienna.  
After the successful publication on the 1000th anniversary of the monographs on 
Cyril and Methodius in 1863 and Šafárik’s biography of Methodius, a series of 
biographies of Serbian mediaeval kings appeared together with modern translations of 
collected mediaeval sources. This brought into prominence young Stojan Novaković 
(1842-1915), a philologist, who translated into modern Serbian several charters of 
mediaeval Serbian and Bosnian kings and princes and gave one of the first descriptions 
of Old Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fig. 1.13).105 The appearance of these 
works marked the end of the romanticism in Serbian historiography and established 
the modern scientific approach to the writing of the national history. After Leopold 
von Ranke published in 1853 The History of Servia and the Servian Revolution about 
the First Serbian Uprising, his methods of work were already well-known around 
Europe.106 Ranke’s influence on Serbian historiography at that time was significant, as 
some Serbian historians were his students.107 
Until the mid-19th century, romantic ideas of the Serbian mediaeval history 
dominated historiography, influenced by the hugely popular Karadžić’s collections of 
epic poetry. Of particular importance was the Kosovo Cycle of poems, which depicted 
the famous 1389 battle between the Serbs and the Ottomans as the battle between Good 
and Evil that ended the Serbian Empire. From this time, research and translation of the 
discovered documents increased interest in Serbia’s 14th century and prompted the 
Serbian Learned Society to send some of its members outside the Principality, into the 
areas of Old Serbia, then still part of the Ottoman Empire, and engage in the fieldwork. 
                                               
104
 Белић, 1941, 47 
105
 Ibid, 49. Old Serbia was the term that marked the core-territories of the mediaeval kingdom: Kosovo 
and Metohija, Raška and northern Macedonia.  
106
 Ranke’s approach to historiography insisted on using primary sources and narratives explaining 
international relations.   
107
 Марковић, 2004, 21 – For example, Jovan Ristić (1831-1899), Ranke’s student, a historian and the 
future Prime Minister, strictly applied his teacher’s methods in his works on Serbian history. 
Chapter I                                                                                                         The Serbs 
49 
 
This was not proper archaeological research, as the Principality lacked both the 
educated professionals and the finances to support such work, but it contributed to the 
growing interest for the Serbian national resurrection.  
 
Fig. 1.13 – Stojan Novaković (1842-1915) 
The eagerness with which the Serbian Learned Society undertook recording and 
collecting material evidence from the past in this period was the enterprise of national 
self-discovery, a theme dominant throughout Europe at the time. The new Serbian state 
desperately tried to relieve itself from the Ottoman inheritance and integrate into the 
advanced European Christian culture by imitating the state and nation-building 
processes taking place elsewhere in Europe.108 Still far away from full political 
independence, Serbian authorities were unable to initiate the liberating movements in 
the “unredeemed Serbian lands.” Discovering national culture both inside and outside 
the Principality was an effort undertaken more for the state-building purposes within 
the Principality itself, rather than national expansionism. 
1.3.3 Creation of the Serbian national style in architecture 
The initial work of Janko Šafárik from 1846 was adopted and extended by 
Mihajlo Valtrović (1839-1915) and Dragutin Milutinović (1840-1900) who in 1871 
undertook the first scientific recording of surviving mediaeval architecture. The 
enthusiasm for the surviving mediaeval monasteries, the only reminder of the existence 
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of the state prior to the Ottoman conquest, concentrated primarily on the Nemanjić and 
Lazarević periods. Of particular interest were the monasteries built in the 14th century, 
partly because they coincided with the “golden age” of the Serbian Mediaeval state, 
but also because they were better preserved.  
The majority of the surviving monasteries were situated in areas difficult to 
access, high in the mountains and outside towns, so they suffered less in comparison 
with town architecture. Generally, the culture and architecture of pre-Ottoman Serbia 
and Bulgaria was mostly influenced by Byzantium, but from the time of the second 
half of the 12th century, this influence slowly fused in local ethnic architectural 
characteristics. In Bulgaria, this was expressed through the Tarnovo School of the 
Second Bulgarian Empire (1186-1396), situated in the vicinity of the then Bulgarian 
capital Tarnovo. In Serbia, there were three such schools: the Raška School (1160-
1335), a fusion of the Byzantine and Romanesque Architecture of the Adriatic coast, 
named after the River Raška valley, where the majority of the surviving monasteries 
were concentrated and in the vicinity of the then capital Ras;109 the Vardarska 
School110 (c.1307-c.1395) named after the River Vardar valley where the majority of 
the surviving monasteries were situated and in the vicinities of the then capital Skopje 
and the Patriarchal Seat in Peć in Kosovo and Metohija and the Moravska School 
(1371-1459), named after the River Morava valley and in the vicinity of the then 
capital Kruševac.  
The Moravska School’s heritage was mainly within the territory of the 
Principality and served as a basis for the newly created national style in the mid-19th 
century. The architectural features of the Moravska School included an emphasis on 
the sequential horizontal layers of stone and brick, with the compulsory presence of 
the stone rosette above the main portal, a clear evidence of the Romanesque influence 
(Fig. 1.14 and Fig. 1.15). As such details were not in use elsewhere in the Byzantine 
cultural domain, the 19th century creators of the Serbian national style concluded it to 
be the authentic Serbian architecture.111 As a consequence, in 1862, a new Act on 
Church Authorities prescribed the use of Moravska School for all newly built 
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churches. The famous curator of the Viennese Anthropological and Prehistorical 
Society, Felix Kanitz (1829-1904), after publishing his great travelogue through the 
Balkans,112 claimed that he personally influenced the Prince for passing this law.113 
Whether Kanitz really persuaded the Prince or not is less important, than the 
consequence of this law. From that moment onwards, all future Serbian churches were 
built in this style, now renamed Serbian-Byzantine Style.  
This interest in creating the national architectural style was endorsed by foreign 
teachers of Serbian students abroad. A key role in promoting the Serbian architectural 
revival adopted by Serbian students was played by the Viennese architect and 
university professor Theophil von Hansen.114 Hansen was interested in Byzantine art 
and culture and introduced his Serbian students to the European understanding of 
mediaeval Byzantine architecture.115 His theoretical postulates were re-interpreted and 
applied throughout the Principality, particularly on ecclesiastical buildings. Ironically, 
the full development of the Serbian-Byzantine style was not reached in church 
architecture, but in large public buildings erected at the end of the 19th and early 20th 
century, after the Principality had become the Kingdom of Serbia.  
   
Fig. 1.14 – The court church of Prince Lazar, built in 1375-1378 in his capital Kruševac, marked the 
beginning of the Moravska School which lasted until the Ottoman conquest.  
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Fig. 1.15 – The rosettes, reminiscent of the 12th century Raška School of architecture were not used 
elsewhere in Byzantine sacral architecture. 
1.4 The fully developed Serbian Nationalism – 1882-1914 
The mass Uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875 and the April Uprising in 
Bulgaria in 1876 re-opened the Eastern Question and prompted the Principalities of 
Serbia and Montenegro to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. Russia intervened and 
in 1878 the Ottomans were defeated.116 The peace accords which ended the war  
extended the territory of the Serbian Principality to the south, gaining four counties.118 
The territory of Old Serbia (Raška and Kosovo and Metohija) remained under Ottoman 
rule. Austria-Hungary acquired the territory of the Bosnian Pashalik119 and the right to 
station troops in Raška (Sandžak). Austria-Hungary also received the rights for the 
unlimited use of Serbian resources and imposed on Serbia the duty of building the 
Belgrade-Niš railway line.120 The Serbian Prime Minister Jovan Ristić, aware of the 
economic catastrophe facing Serbia, refused to sign the commercial agreement that 
was highly disadvantageous for Serbia.121 Prince Milan Obrenović (1854-1901, 
reigned 1868-1889), more of a realist, dismissed Ristić and duly complied with Austro-
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Hungarian demands by signing the Secret Convention in 1881, which de facto 
confirmed the Serbian vassalage. In return, Milan was awarded the title of King in 
1882 and the Belgrade Metropolitanate was allowed to gain independence from 
Constantinople. Even though the constitutional changes were politically insignificant 
and economically catastrophic, it contributed to the further development of national 
ideas and eventually led to Serbia being regarded as the “Balkan Piedmont.”  
It seems contradictory that the Kingdom of Serbia was able to develop further 
its national policies after the restrictions imposed by the Congress of Berlin. The Secret 
Convention prohibited Serbia from interfering directly in the matters of Orthodox 
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the policy of settling the Roman Catholics 
was introduced immediately after Austria-Hungary took over the administration.122 
Additionally, the Austrian troops stationed in Raška, prevented the potential linking of 
the Serbian Kingdom with the Montenegrin Principality, which was one of the war 
aims in 1876-1878. However, the political climate within the Habsburg Empire was 
seriously affected by the growth of nationalism. The second largest nation within the 
Empire, the Hungarians, had resisted the policies of Vienna since the late 18th century, 
but the discontent seriously erupted for the first time in 1848. The following years 
were marked by the constant struggle for Hungarian emancipation and eventually 
resulted in the Ausgleich of 1867. This opened up the problem of other national 
minorities within the Empire, particularly the Slavs. The romantic national ideas of the 
first part of the 19th century that turned into Pan-Slavism were resented by both Vienna 
and Buda. By the time of the Ausgleich and the Berlin Congress, it became obvious 
that the romantic national ideas of the individual Southern Slav nations were 
impossible to achieve. As the Serbian Principality (and later Kingdom) was by then 
the only independent state with a native dynasty123 and had formal national state 
institutions – the Parliament (Narodna Skupština), the Government, the Army, the 
Police and the use of the Serbian language in its educational system – the Serbs living 
within its borders had no reason to fear for their survival as people anymore, unlike 
the Serbs outside its borders and the Croats and Slovenes. The Serbs inside the 
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Kingdom also had no experience of competitive national ideas and religious 
discrimination that dominated Austria-Hungary in the second half of the 19th 
century.124 Despite the political dependence on Austria-Hungary, the cultural policies 
were independent and enabled Serbia to become a focal point for the gathering of 
South Slav intellectuals. Naturally, Habsburg Serbs were the first to turn their attention 
towards Belgrade. Belgrade, constantly in need of educated professional class, did not 
refuse their interest and concentrated its influence on the Habsburg Serbs through 
language and culture. 
During the 1840s, Matica srpska in Pest created favourable conditions for 
scientific evaluation of Serbian literature and formed a library for various literary and 
manuscripts collections, in a manner similar to that of the Society of Serbian Letters.125 
Indeed, many of the members of the Belgrade Society were Habsburg Serbs and 
regularly wrote for the Letopis Matice srpske. However, after 1848, its position in Pest 
became difficult, so it was transferred to Novi Sad in 1864, the same year the Society 
of Serbian Letters in Belgrade was transformed into the Serbian Learned Society and 
one year after the new Grand School was established in Belgrade. This Grand School 
was different from the one formed in 1806, as it was a proper university, consisting of 
three faculties: Philosophy, Techniques and Law.  
The cultural transformations resulted in a more varied political spectrum in the 
Principality (and later Kingdom). Because Obrenović princes were prone to autocratic 
behaviour, the second generation of Serbian intellectuals educated abroad began 
questioning their political conservativism. The main battlefield of the opposing 
political ideas on the future of the state was not the Parliament, but the Serbian Learned 
Society. Apart from arguing for the Society’s work to be the an institution for 
exclusively scientific research, as opposed to promoting the spread of literacy, this 
generation of Serbian intellectuals also advocated establishing closer ties with other 
South Slavs. This was the introduction of the Yugoslav idea to the Serbs in the 
Principality.  
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1.4.1 The road to the South 
From the time of King Milan the cultural programmes in Macedonia and 
Kosovo increased. The Serbian Theology School opened in 1871 in Prizren,126 and a 
number of Serbian primary schools were founded throughout Ottoman Macedonia and 
Kosovo and Metohija.127 However, in the years following the Berlin Congress, the 
position of the Serbian government became. On the one hand, the small Kingdom was 
economically crippled by the conditions imposed on it by Austria-Hungary that 
hindered the development of the cities and industry. The populist measures undertaken 
to ease the burden on peasants resulted in the contraction of the economy and 
impoverished the majority of the population.128 On the other hand, the political support 
of Orthodox Russia towards which the majority of the population naturally inclined, 
was completely re-directed towards the new Bulgarian state which, governed by 
Russian generals, took the initiative in spreading its influence in Ottoman 
Macedonia.129 King Milan (Fig. 1.16), aware of the limited political power of his 
Kingdom and the overwhelming disrespect of both his enemies and friends, initiated 
the disastrous adventure of the two weeks war against Bulgaria in 1885.130 He was 
hoping that this would allay the growing public discontent with his ability to rule, but 
the result was just the opposite. The political struggle between the conservatives, 
liberals and the newly established peasant-orientated People’s Radical Party, only 
increased and lasted until the end of the century.  
Hoping to restore his undermined position, King Milan embraced the ideas of 
national culture and in 1886 issued a decree which raised the Serbian Learned Society 
to the rank of the Serbian Royal Academy. He personally funded the work of the 
Academy “for studying everything that was related to the Serbs, Serbian land, Serbian 
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spirit and Serbian character.”131 This decision silenced his political opponents, the 
liberals, who could no longer express their views through the Academy. The liberals 
were the greatest promoters of closer links between the Serbs of the Serbian Kingdom 
and those who lived outside its borders. Obviously, neither King Milan nor his 
government could support such views openly and there is no evidence that King Milan 
was against such cultural links between the Serbs. Despite being accused to be pro-
Austrian King instructed the Ministry of Education to increase financial aid for 
financing the cultural exchange between the Serbs in the Kingdom and abroad, 
especially those still ruled by the Ottomans.  
        
Fig. 1.16 – King Milan Obrenović                         Fig. 1.17 – King Aleksandar Obrenović 
(1854-1901, ruled 1868-1889)                               (1876-1903, ruled 1889-1903) 
 
Examination of the foreign archives began in the mid-19th century during the 
Constitutionalists, but from the 1870s more effort was put into fieldwork in the 
territories still under Ottoman rule. The emphasis was still on the Serbian Golden Age 
of the mediaeval period. During one such enterprise through Kosovo and Metohija and 
Raška, a Serbian historian Miloš Milojević encountered Sir Arthur Evans, who was 
then travelling and doing his research throughout the Balkans. Evans, interested only 
in the ancient past complained that his Serbian colleague was “obsessed only with 
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Tsarista Milica and King Vukašin.”133 The ancient past, clearly, still did not become 
the main interest of Serbian historians and first archaeologists. Even though the earliest 
attempts to research the pre-Slavic Balkans dated back to the 1865, when Šafárik 
undertook the first archaeological excavation in the mountains of Western Serbia and 
mapped Viminacium in 1866, no serious work was done prior to the 1880s.134 Even 
though Šafárik founded the Society for Archaeology and Ethnography in 1867 which 
aimed to increase awareness of the importance of the material remains of the past, the 
full professionalization of archaeology truly began in 1883, when it was transformed 
into the Serbian Archaeological Society.135 Mihajlo Valtrović (1839-1915), originally 
trained as an architect at the University of Karlsruhe, became its first president and the 
main keeper of the National Museum (Fig. 1.18).136  
The results of fieldwork research on Serbian mediaeval monasteries, undertaken 
in 1871-1884 by Valtrović and Dragutin Milutinović (1840-1900), were published in 
various newspapers (Fig. 1.19). However, in 1884, a specialized periodical 
Antiquarian (Starinar) was established for publishing articles related to archaeological 
research.137 Interest in the Serbian mediaeval past was further increased after the first 
exhibition organized in 1888 by the Serbian Royal Academy which showed the results 
of research on Serbian churches and monasteries since 1846.138 Following the 
exhibition, the Academy submitted to the government the draft of the Act on Protection 
of Monuments, an updated version of the original 1844 Act on Protection of Ancient 
Monuments and in 1889 a new Act on State Archives, originally drafted in 1866.139  
However, 1889 marks the year when Serbian national revival received its full 
confirmation. In this year Milan abdicated in favour of his son Aleksandar (1876-
1903). The date of the coronation of the young king (Fig. 1.17), 28th June 1889, was 
specifically chosen to coincide with the 500th anniversary of the most important battle 
in Serbian history: the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The celebrations that followed the 
coronation represented the climax of the work of all Serbian intellectuals from the first 
appearance of national ideas. 
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Fig. 1.18 - Mihajlo Valtrović (1839-1915)                     Fig. 1.19 - Dragutin Milutinović (1840-1900) 
1.4.2 The Kosovo Myth140 as the core of the Serbian Nation-building 
programme 
Although Vuk Karadžić died in 1864, his legacy continued to dominate the 
cultural space of the Serbs and the rest of the Southern Slavs. The international success 
of the Kosovo epic that he collected and published in the early 19th century influenced 
following generations of Serbian intellectuals concerned with the historical facts 
surrounding the myth. Thus, 19th century research of the old manuscripts discovered 
in monasteries and foreign archives concentrated mainly on the Nemanjić-Lazarević 
period of Serbian history (1166-1427). Subsequent publications of these documents 
contributed to the Kosovo Battle becoming a central theme of interest of Serbian 
historiography by the 500th anniversary of the battle.  
The Kosovo Myth had a threefold value in the state- and nation-building 
programmes of the young Serbian state. Politically, it served to induce a sense of 
patriotism and national pride among the population of the new European state. 
Ethnically, it served as a binding force between the subjects of the kingdom. 
Culturally, its great artistic value was proof that the new state and its people were not 
philistine. As strengthening of the 19th century state in Europe was achieved by the 
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nationalist usage of traditional mythology, in the Serbian Kingdom historiography 
surrounding the Kosovo Myth, coupled with the growing artistic and literary interests, 
provided an excellent starting point for the creation of new national culture, which 
aspired to depart from the overwhelming Ottoman influence. This aspiration was 
evident in comparing the quality of life of the Serbs in the kingdom and those who 
lived in the Ottoman Empire. In the atmosphere of political tensions within the Empire 
in the second half of the 19th century, the suffering of the Christian population in 
Kosovo and Metohija, Raška and Macedonia was conveniently compared to the myth 
surrounding the heroic defence of Christendom and the noble sacrifice of Miloš Obilić. 
The heroes of the epic, thus, became more important than the surviving material 
evidence regarding the battle and central to the new national narrative. 
Prior to its classical decasyllabic form of Vuk Karadžić, the myth was already 
formed. The earliest poetic recordings reflecting the events of 1389 date from 1566, 
when a Dalmatian Renaissance poet Petar Hektorović in his collection of poems 
Fishing and fishermen’s conversations (Ribarenje i ribarsko prigovaranje) noted the 
singing “in Serbian manner” in 14-16 syllabic form.146 This poetic form prevailed on 
the Dalmatian coast, where several poems about the Kosovo Battle and its participants 
were recorded between the times of Hektorović and Karadžić.147  
The myth was not limited to the poetry only. The Serbian Orthodox church 
maintained the notion of Christian martyrdom throughout the Ottoman period. Apart 
from the widespread fresco depictions of the rulers of the Nemanjić dynasty in the 
churches and monasteries, dating back to the time of their rule, some of the mythical 
Kosovo knights also received visual representations. One surviving representation of 
Miloš Obilić, painted by an anonymous painter on the catholicon of the Monastery of 
Hilandar in Athos in 1803, preceding Karadžić’s popularization of the epic poetry, 
illustrates well the influence of the myth in the pre-nationalist period and in lands 
distant from the Serbian core territories (Fig. 1.20).148 
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Fig. 1.20 – Depiction   Fig. 1.21 – The Kosovo Monument       Fig. 1.22 – Detail from the Kosovo Mo- 
of Miloš Obilić in        in Kruševac, erected in 1889-1904 by    nument – Liberated Serbia calling for 
the Monastery of          Djordje Jovanović.                                 liberation of southern Serbian lands. 
Hlandar, Athos, 1803. 
 
Therefore, the Kosovo Myth, as the best remembered among the wide and 
largely illiterate population in the recently established Serbian state was a logical 
choice for the task of the nation-building programme. The coronation of Aleksandar 
Obrenović coinciding with the 500th anniversary of Kosovo proved a powerful tool for 
linking the mediaeval past with the modern state. The day of the coronation, 
deliberately coinciding with the day of the eponymous battle, Vidovdan, 28 June, was 
proclaimed a Bank Holiday. The King attended the memorial liturgy in Prince Lazar’s 
court church in Kruševac and planted the foundation stone for the future monument to 
the Kosovo Battle in the town centre, which still exists (Fig. 1.21). The anointing of 
the King took place in the Monastery of Žiča (1206-1221), where the Nemanjić kings 
were traditionally anointed and where the sarcophagus of the first Serbian King Stefan 
the Firstcrowned (1196-1228, King from 1217) was kept.149  
The Kosovo Monument in Kruševac, designed by Djordje Jovanović (1861-
1953), unveiled on the centenary of the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman 
Empire in 1904, contains all the elements of the Kosovo myth.150 On the northern side, 
there is a representation of a blind bard, a direct link to the epic, on the western and 
eastern sides the reliefs depicting the moments of receiving Holy Communion before 
the battle and the assassination of Murad. The southern side is an allegorical depiction 
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of Liberated Serbia extending its right hand towards Kosovo and Metohija and Raška 
– Old Serbia (Fig. 1.22), whilst the top of the monument is again an episode from the 
epic: a dying standard-bearer leans on Vila,151 who receives the Serbian flag to take it 
to the Kingdom of Heaven.152  
The monument was a powerful message to post-Berlin Congress Serbia. The 
Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina made it almost impossible 
for Serbian intellectuals to spread the message of national awakening amongst Bosnian 
Serbs. Because of this, Serbia turned towards the Ottoman territory in the south 
(Kosovo, Metohija, Raška and Macedonia), which was the subject of the myth and 
regarded as “a still unredeemed Old Serbia.”  
1.4.3 Nation-Building in the late 19th and early 20th century – Western 
Historism versus national Serbian-Byzantine Style  
King Aleksandar actively promoted the modernization of Serbian towns. 
After the initial church (re)building programme in the early to mid-19th century, the 
erection of monumental public buildings became a primary tool for modelling Serbia 
according to European norms. The initially slow penetration of Vienna influenced 
historism in the design of public buildings received a boost in the time of Milan and 
Aleksandar, both great admirers of Central European culture. A number of municipal 
town-halls, influenced by historism were erected in all major Serbian towns. After 
building the National Theatre in 1869, its designer Aleksandar Bugraski (1835-1891) 
was commissioned to build a new Royal Palace in the style of historism in 1882 to 
celebrate Serbia’s new status. Bugarski also built the new town-hall in Smederevo in 
1885 in the same style, which enabled him to become a leading figure of the 
Europeanization of the Serbian cityscape and to influence the next generation of 
architects who built in the same style. For example, Nikola Nestorović (1868-1957), 
who designed the town-halls of Kragujevac and Kruševac and Andra Stefanović 
(1859-1929), an architect of the buildings which now house the National Museum in 
Belgrade (Fig. 1.23) and the Serbian Royal Academy (Fig. 1.24).156  
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Parallel with historism, the Serbian-Byzantine Style developed following 
Šafarik’s and Valtrović’s success in the re-discovery of Serbia’s mediaeval heritage. 
The neo-Moravian school drew inspiration from the Moravska School of the 14th-15th 
centuries, particularly in façade decoration. The churches were built in this style since 
1862, but its full expression within secular architecture was the work of Hansen’s 
student Jovan Ilkić (1857-1917). An early example was a palace of the Grand School, 
built by the Czech architect Jan Nevola in the 1858-1863 period (Fig. 1.25). Even 
though the government established a committee for the evaluation of the proposed 
architectural designs back in 1859, the control of future urban development of Serbia 
was officially sanctioned in 1882, when the Department of Architecture within the 
Ministry of Construction was created. The Department consisted of professionals who 
were openly in favour of the national Serbian-Byzantine Style.157 Not only did the 
Department supervise the urban development in smaller towns in Serbia, it also 
supported the erection of buildings and monuments important for the Serbian 
communities in the deprived areas of Austrian and Ottoman Empires. Beginning from 
the early 1890s, a number of public buildings in the Serbian Kingdom were erected 
following the neo-Moravian school. This style dominated Serbian architecture until 
the First World War, after which it abruptly ended (Fig. 1.26). 
  
Fig. 1.23 – The National Museum in Belgrade, initially the Mortgage Bank building, designed by Andra 
Stefanović (1859-1929) in the style of European Eclecticism (historism) with Neo-Renaissance details, 
erected in 1903. 
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Fig. 1.24 – Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, designed by Andra Stefanović in style of Viennese 
Secession. The works began in the late 19th century, but the building itself was finally erected in 1922. 
 
Fig. 1.25 – The Grand School, designed and erected by Jan Nevola in 1858-1863 represents the first 
attempt in creation of the Serbian national style in architecture. 
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Fig. 1.26 – The building of the New Post Office, erected in Neo-Moravian Style in 1929 after the design 
of Momir Korunović, the main architect of the Serbian national revival. Destroyed during the Second 
World War.  
 
  
Fig. 1.27 – The new building of the Post Office, erected in the style of Socialist Realism after the Second 
World War, as part of the programme of destroying the reminders of “Greater Serbian past.” 
The erection of monuments was another way of building national identity at the 
end of the 19th century. The best use of the national style for monuments was in 
building memorial churches and chapels, which symbolized the sacrifice of 
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forefathers. When the city of Niš was returned to Serbia in 1878 one of the first 
monuments to be preserved as “a reminder to the following generations” was the 
infamous Skull Tower (Fig. 1.28). Built by the Ottomans after the defeat of the Serbian 
rebels during the First Uprising, the Skull Tower was a powerful warning to the 
rebellious Serbs. The façade of the tower had inbuilt the heads of 952 Serbian soldiers, 
which were initially forbidden to be removed by the Ottoman authorities.158 By the 
time of the liberation, the brick and mud tower with the skulls in it deteriorated, so 
King Milan ordered its immediate preservation. A small chapel was built around it in 
Serbian-Byzantine style in 1892, symbolizing the sacrifice of the previous generations 
(Fig. 1.29).  
The pattern was repeated when the decision to build a monumental Memorial 
Church of St.Sava on the Vračar Hill in Belgrade was made. The first Serbian 
Archibishop Sava Nemanjić (1169-1236), founded the autocephalous Serbian church 
in 1204 and was canonized after his death.159 
     
Fig. 1.28 – The Skull-Tower in Niš, built from the heads of Serbian rebels in 1806. From the initial 952 
skulls, only 54 remain. 
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Fig. 1.29 – The memorial church built around the Skull-Tower in 1892 in Serbian-Byzantine Style. 
The Serbian church maintained St.Sava’s cult throughout the centuries and by 
the 16th century Sava was the most venerated saint. The sarcophagus with his remains 
was kept in the Monastery of Manasija, until Sinan Pasha (1506-1596), crushing the 
rebellion of the Serbs, ordered the burning of his body in 1595. The burning took place 
somewhere on the Vračar Hill in Belgrade. As the exact place could not be determined, 
the highest point of the hill was chosen.160 The decision was made in 1895, marking 
the 300th anniversary of the burning of St.Sava’s remains. Because of insufficient 
funding a small chapel was built in the same year, symbolically marking the beginning 
of its construction (Fig. 1.30). However, the events that followed made the building of 
the Memorial Church the most controversial, long-lasting construction project in 
Serbian history which is still under construction (Fig. 1.31).161  
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Fig. 1.30 – Church of St.Sava, erected in 1895 in Serbian-Byzantine style. In the background the 
monumental Memorial Church of St.Sava, still under construction. 
 
 
Fig. 1.31 – The monumental Memorial Church of St.Sava, built in Serbian-Byzantine Style in 1935-
1989, after the design of Aleksandar Deroko. With the space capacity of nearly 11,000 people, it is one 
of the largest church buildings in the world. 
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1.5 The Dawn of Yugoslavia 
The early 19th century romantics’ model of the nation as a people united by 
language and spirit fitted well into the theories of national development. Within the 
South Slavic language regions that later became Yugoslavia there are three main 
dialects: štokavian, spoken in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia, Dalmatia, 
Vojvodina and Macedonia, kajkavian, spoken in Croatia and Slovenia and čakavian, 
spoken in Istria and the islands of the Dalmatian coast. The founding fathers of Slavic 
linguistic studies, J.Dobrovský, P.J.Šafárik and J.Kopitar,162 believed that the Balkan 
regions where the štokavian dialect was spoken were inhabited by the Serbs. This 
prompted Vuk Karadžić to adhere to the idea that in 1825 there were around 5 million 
Serbs, of which 3 million were Orthodox, 1.2 million Muslims and 0.8 million 
Catholic.163 
After the establishment of Matica ilirska in 1842, the leading intellectuals of the 
Illyrian movement164 realized that the only way to withstand the growing 
Magyarization in the Croat lands of the Habsburg Monarchy was through the unity of 
language. They sought to establish closer links with Vuk Karadžić and his circle. In 
1835, the leading Croatian linguist Ljudevit Gaj (Fig. 2.6) began publishing Danica 
Ilirska in štokavian dialect, despite the fact that he himself was a native kajkavian 
speaker.165 The cooperation between Croatian and Serbian intellectuals resulted in the 
signing of the Literary Agreement in Vienna in 1850. The Agreement set the basis for 
future work on the common language of the Croats and the Serbs and adopted 
štokavian as the standard dialect because it was spoken by the majority of the South 
Slav population. Modern revisionists explain this Serbo-Croat cooperation as an act of 
“mutual misunderstanding” on behalf of the signatories of the agreement by stating 
that “the Illyrianists indeed sought to unite the Southern Slavs, but maintained the 
principle of Croatia’s right to statehood.”166 However, the political context at the time 
of the Agreement points to another conclusion. Both Croat and Serb intellectuals in the 
Habsburg Monarchy after 1848 realized that their political (national) goals could not 
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be achieved if pursued separately. The Literary Agreement was the only option through 
which national self-identification of the South Slavs could amass a number large 
enough to counteract the nationalism of the Hungarians or Germans. What was not 
taken into consideration at the time were different historical legacies and religious 
affiliations that would harm Serbo-Croat relations in the 20th century.  
The Illyrian movement did not have much influence on cultural events and the 
nation-building process in the Serbian Principality. However, after 1848, the idea of 
the South Slav unity through closer cultural ties grew into a political movement in the 
Habsburg Monarchy. The term Illyrian, initially forbidden by Vienna, was soon 
replaced by the term Yugoslav167 by Bishop Josip Strossmayer (1815-1905). 
Strossmayer, often called “the first Yugoslav,” believed that Illyrian was an artificial 
foreign word.168 In 1866 Strossmayer founded the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and 
Sciences169 in Zagreb, hoping to lessen the growing influence of the Hungarian, 
Austrian and Italian national aspirations. Initially, JAZU’s main objective was to 
promote the ideas of the national unity of all Southern Slavs and establish close links 
with the Serbian Learned Society. 
The intellectual exchange between Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad, which after 
the transfer of Matica srpska from Pest became the leading cultural centre of the 
Habsburg Serbs, was impressive. Croatian linguists worked with their Serbian 
colleagues on creating a common Serbian-Croatian dictionary and, eventually, a 
common culture. Djura Daničić, a student of Vuk Karadžić, worked in JAZU on this 
project, whilst the great Croatian romantic poet Ivan Mažuranić (1814-1890) wrote in 
1845 an epic The Death of Smail-aga Čengić, inspired by the events from Montenegro. 
The publishing of Mažuranić’s epic coincided with Njegoš’s Mountain Wreath in 
1847, which symbolically meant that all Southern Slavs suffered under the same 
foreign rule, whether they were Roman Catholic or Serbian Orthodox.  
The emerging Serbian state had little understanding of Yugoslavism in its initial 
stage in the late 1840s, mainly because of the political struggle to gain internationally 
recognized independence and organize the state internally. After the Berlin Congress, 
however, the political pressure of Vienna on Belgrade increased. Austro-Hungarian 
aggressive opposition to any Slavic national movement within the Austro-Hungarian 
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borders only accelerated the growth of Yugoslav idea and contributed to closer 
cooperation between Croats and the Serbs in Croatia, Slavonia and Vojvodina and, 
from the mid-1880s, the Serbian Kingdom. The unpopular pro-Austrian policies of the 
last Obrenovićs and equally unpopular Croatian Ban Khuen-Héderváry (1883-1903), 
an ethnic Hungarian,170 created a fertile ground for the growth of the idea of integral 
Yugoslavism or national oneness, which argued that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were 
three names of one ethnic nation.171  
Engrossed in their desire to be freed from any form of the Austro-Hungarian 
influence, neither Serbian nor Croatian intellectuals took into consideration significant 
differences between them. Firstly, the role of religion was seriously underplayed. The 
Yugoslav idea was the idea of South Slav unity, aiming to create a Christian South 
Slav state.172 A significant number of the Muslim Slav population was expected to 
return to their original Orthodox/Catholic faith of the pre-Ottoman conquest or leave, 
as indeed began happening after the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1878. Similarly, the relations between the Catholic and Orthodox churches were not 
properly analyzed. The 18th-19th century’s uniate policies of Vienna kept the two 
churches mutually suspicious throughout the 19th century. Secondly, the unequal 
economic development and different historical circumstances created a different 
perception of the state among the Croats and the Serbs. Thirdly, the Yugoslav idea 
sprang from the intellectual elite, which was small in numbers. Veritably, the Austro-
Hungarian territories had a better educational infrastructure and, despite the languages 
of instruction being German and Hungarian, the overall literacy was more widespread, 
but not universal. On the other hand, despite the enormous work on promoting literacy 
within the Serbian Kingdom, and the introduction of the compulsory primary school 
education in 1882, the majority of the population was still illiterate.173 On the eve of 
the Balkan wars, barely 50% of the population was literate.174 Because of this, the 
Yugoslav idea failed to penetrate the lower classes. However, by the end of the 19th 
century, virtually all leading intellectuals of the Serbian Kingdom accepted 
Yugoslavism, whose idea was interpreted as the unity of language. A common 
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Yugoslav identity still did not exist as such, although certain differences were 
recognized by Croat and Serbian elites.175 Rallying behind the common cause made 
those differences almost irrelevant, particularly after 1903, when the political situation 
in the Kingdom dramatically changed. 
The pro-Austrian policies of Milan and Aleksandar Obrenović were not popular 
among the population. Even less so were their scandalous private lives, which, in the 
eyes of young officers, gathered around the conspiratory group Black Hand (Crna 
ruka), undermined the respectability of the state. Thus, in May 1903, King Aleksandar 
and Queen Draga were murdered and defenestrated, marking the end of the Obrenović 
dynasty. The initial reaction of the Great Powers was horror at regicide and ensuing 
political sanctions which lasted until the beginning of the Pigs War with Austria-
Hungary in 1906.176 The son of Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević, elderly Peter, was 
brought back from exile and crowned King in 1904. The return of the Karadjordjević 
dynasty marked the end of pro-Austrian policies. This was also determined by the 
realpolitik in the wider European context. With the change of the dynasty, the accords 
of the Secret Convention lapsed. The Serbian government, wishing to reduce the 
unequal economic burden turned to other countries. Austro-Hungary duly punished 
this by closing its borders to trade with Serbia.177 Serbian response was to seek 
protection from Russia and France. 
 
1.5.1 Last days of Serbian nation-state 
The politically turbulent decade 1903-1914 crystallized the notion of the 
Balkans as the “powder keg” of Europe and introduced the word “balkanization” in 
the European political language.178 Not only did the European perception of the 
Balkans became fortified in stereotypes, such as the “region cursed with too much 
memory per square mile, protracted hatreds and a proliferation of obstinate and 
incompatible ethnic and religious identities,”179 but created the image of the Balkans 
not as a total “other”, but as an “incomplete self”, formed in the shadow of the 
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“structurally despised alter-ego of the lowermost.”180 In the centre of such perceptions 
were the former Ottoman territories, the new nation states of Serbia and Bulgaria.  
The visual appearance of these two countries at the time contributed greatly to 
the perceptions of incompleteness. As both countries with their newly acquired 
national identity tried to accelerate the Europeanization process, the economic poverty 
inherited from Ottoman times and prolonged by the Great Powers hindered this 
process. This was best illustrated by the urban landscape depicting the European town-
houses and palaces situated amid the mud-ridden streets, without the sewage system 
in function. The town centres were modelled on the European cities, whilst the suburbs 
retained a predominantly Oriental rural character.181 The diaries of the European 
travellers and missionaries depicting the new Balkan Christian states as a caricature of 
Europe endorsed this perception. The famous Le Corbusier in his travelogue Le voyage 
d’Orient written in 1911 described Belgrade as “a capital set in an exquisite place, but 
dirty and disorganized.”182 To the sophisticated eyes of civilized European 
intellectuals, Serbian attempts to acquire some of their sophistication seemed 
grotesque.183 Since Lamartine’s praise of Serbian national heroism as he viewed the 
Skull Tower in 1833 and Le Corbusier’s scathing comments in 1911 the political and 
cultural landscape of Europe had changed dramatically.184 In early 20th century Europe 
the historism and national revivals were slowly being replaced by modernism. Serbia, 
together with other new Balkan states, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, still followed 
national lines. 
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This was best represented by the Serbian Pavilions created for the Great 
Exhibitions of 1889 and 1900 in Paris and in Rome in 1911 and the Balkan Exhibition 
in London in 1907. The pavilions were modelled on Serbian mediaeval heritage. The 
exhibitions’ artefacts aiming to present Serbian culture, history and ethnography 
included artefacts from all territories deemed Serbian. The Monument to the Kosovo 
Battle in Kruševac was one of the central points in the London exhibition (Fig. 1.21). 
However, the 1911 exhibition in Rome was considered provocative by Austro-
Hungary. The support the Serbian kingdom gave to numerous Serbian and Croatian 
intellectuals from Austro-Hungary irritated Vienna. At the turn of the century, the 
Serbian national narrative was fully developed, centred on the Kosovo Myth and 
revival of the mediaeval Nemanjić Kingdom. Despite four centuries of the 
discontinuity of the state, an uneven and slow Europeanization, an underdeveloped 
parliamentarianism and the disdain of the European political elite for the Serbian 
kingdom, academic life was thriving and as such was attractive for the Serbs and 
Croats from Austro-Hungary. Thus, the Great Exhibition in Rome in 1911 was marked 
by the sensational victory of the “barbarous” Serbia over the mighty Austro-Hungary. 
The South Slavs of the Empire, led by the famous Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović 
(Fig. 1.a.14) required a separate pavilion for their works, but when it was denied, they 
turned to Serbia and exhibited their works within its pavilion.185 The choice that 
Meštrović, a Viennese trained artist, made when turning his back on central European 
culture and embracing the Serbian “barbarians” was additionally fuelled by the object 
of exhibition. For the exhibition he created a model for the future Vidovdan Temple 
(Vidovdanski hram), to be built in commemoration of the Kosovo Battle (Fig. 1.32). 
The proposed design combined Catholic and Orthodox elements; it was in the shape 
of the Catholic elongated cross, the dome was Serbian-Byzantine, whilst the outside 
was richly decorated with the secessionist features, such as the caryatides (modelled 
on heroes of Kosovo epic) and sphinxes of classical proportions.186 The monument 
was an epitome of the fusion of the South Slav traditions and the beginning of the 
Integral Yugoslavism. Meštrović created the model of the Temple for the Rome 
exhibition and produced several sculptures in marble that were to be inside the temple. 
The sculpture of Miloš Obilić was central to the series of planned sculptures. The 
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Serbian government accepted the idea, but the decision for the place of its erection was 
not made. Originally, it was planned to be somewhere in Belgrade, or on the Avala 
Hill, just outside the town, but the Balkan Wars interrupted this.187 After the Balkan 
Wars ended in 1913 and Serbia finally put under its control the territory of Old Serbia, 
the decision to build Meštrović’s Temple on Gazimestan, in Kosovo, where the actual 
battle took place seemed logical. This also remained unfulfilled, as war broke out in 
1914. Today, the model of the Vidovdan Temple is kept in the Kruševac City Museum, 
whilst some of the surviving sculptures are in London’s Victoria and Albert Museum 
and the Tate Gallery (Fig. 1.33). 
                  
Fig. 1.32 – The Vidovdan Temple, model for the monument, designed by Ivan Meštrović. Planned 
dimensions were 250m length and 100m height. After the Second World War it disappeared, until it 
was accidentally discovered in the New York port in 1968. It was returned to Kruševac in 1971.      
  
Fig. 1.33 – Torso of Banović Strahinja, a Kosovo Myth hero, made by Meštrović in 1907. Donated to 
the Victoria and Albert Museum by Serbian Government in the same year. 
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1.5.2 The Golgotha of Serbia190 and Resurrection of Yugoslavia – 1914-1919 
When the hostilities began in 1914 the government ordered evacuation of the 
state archives, treasury and other institutions from Belgrade and their transfer to Niš, 
Kragujevac and Kruševac, away from the military lines of advance. When Austro-
Hungary occupied Serbia in 1915, the attempts to remove Serbian national symbols 
were accompanied by plundering and destruction of valuables from libraries, archives 
and monastery treasuries.197 For the state in retreat it became almost impossible to 
preserve all the documents that the Government ordered to save. The archives only 
managed to survive in part, owing to the efforts of individual custodians.198 An 
unknown number of artefacts, old manuscripts and books collected during the 19th 
century by the National Museum and the Library of the Serbian Royal Academy was 
destroyed, looted or lost.199 Writing in 1940 on the 50th anniversary of the academy, 
the then president Aleksandar Belić (1876-1960), reported the severe damage inflicted 
particularly on the mediaeval collections of the Academy.200 After the war and in 
accordance with the Readmission Agreement, the Serbian government required the 
return of documents taken during the war, but in 1940, there was no available data on 
the results of these actions.201 
Damage to the housing, infrastructure and pre-war industry amounted to over 
50%. The public buildings erected in the 19th century were particularly targeted as they 
symbolized the existence of the Serbian state (Fig. 1.34). In November 1915, an 
American journalist Cyril Brown, reporting for The New York Times, wrote about “the 
sorriest of three conquered capitals he had visited…Belgrade is dead….Circling 
around the rock-crested citadel, passed up the avenue of handsome dwellings, facing 
the park behind the citadel not one house survived the cloudburst of steel and fire.203” 
Four years later, in December 1919, the Associated Press reported for the same 
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newspapers that Belgrade was “still desolate and as the Germans and Austrians left it. 
Owing to the lack of materials, money and labour no steps have yet been taken by the 
authorities to restore the scores of residences, public buildings and other property that 
fell under the enemy bombardment. Nothing has been done yet to repair even the royal 
palace, which windowless, scarred and neglected looks like a great empty barrack.”204 
The palace of Old Court, built for Milan in 1884, was not properly repaired until the 
1930s. The works on the erection of the St.Sava Memorial Church were stopped and 
were only resumed in the 1930s. There was a similar situation throughout Serbia. In 
this crippled condition, the “Balkan Piedmont” ventured into the new project: 
Yugoslavia. 
      
     
Fig. 1.34 – Damage to the housing, infrastructure and the little industry that existed before the First 
World War was to such an extent that many were not repaired until the late 1930s or at all. The exact 
date when the photograph of the to the left was taken is unknown, but it is most commonly presumed 
to be some time in the late 1915 or early 1916, whilst the photograph to the right, depicting the Tadeuša 
Košćuška Street was taken in 1922. None of these buildings exist anymore in Belgrade. 
1.6 The First Yugoslavia – 1918-1941 
Borders of the new South Slav state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(SHS),205 were determined during the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. The 
internationally respected Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927) actively 
participated in the debate over the borders of the future unified state (Fig. 1.35). Like 
many of his contemporaries, he received his doctorate in Vienna in the late 19th century 
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and on returning to Serbia became a professor at the Grand School. When the Grand 
School was re-named the University of Belgrade in 1905, he became one of the most 
prominent scientists, publishing his works in Serbian, German and French. Cvijić’s 
research on Balkan geography and geomorphology, for which he was renowned in 
Europe, was accompanied by an interest in the anthropology and ethnology. The 
Annexation Crisis of 1908 prompted him to write about the exodus of the Muslims of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,206 which consequently led to further works on 
anthropogeography of the Southern Slavs and their ethnic spatiality. Some results of 
his work were used by the Entente Powers for partial determination of the borders of 
the new Yugoslav state. During the communist period, his work was re-interpreted for 
the needs of “brotherhood and unity” policies. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s, the majority of non-Serbian academics interpret him as a promoter of 
Greater Serbian expansionism.207  
    
Fig. 1.35 – Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927)                 Fig. 1.36 – Gliša Elezović (1879-1960) 
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The economic situation of the Kingdom SHS, directly influenced educational 
and cultural development, as the former Ottoman territories had hardly any educational 
system in comparison with the former Austro-Hungarian territories. Slovenia, Croatia, 
Slavonia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina and the Serbian Kingdom in their pre-1912 borders had 
longer and better educational traditions and illiteracy continually declined after the 
second half of the 19th century. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Metohija, 
Raška, and to a certain extent Montenegro, schools were almost non-existent.218 
Macedonia, despite the activities of Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek governments did 
not improve literacy rates significantly, because of the frequent political disturbances. 
The new state, thus, had a series of problems ranging from unevenly developed 
economies to the ethnically mixed territories. It also had a major problem of 
reconciling different religious affiliations and cultures into one integral Yugoslav 
culture. This, of course, was best done through a unified educational system, but that 
proved difficult to implement: the schools differed significantly, in terms of teaching 
facilities, school networks, qualified teachers and accessibility. For some parts of the 
country, the expected standards were too low, for others unachievable.219 
Additionally, Serbian expectations that former Austro-Hungarian territories 
would easily accept the Serbian school curriculums were not realised. Serbian 
understanding of Yugoslav unity rested on 19th century postulates of the unity of 
language and history and national pride for self-liberation from foreign oppressors. As 
a result, the Serbian government could distribute its textbooks among the Serbian 
population in the former Austrian territories and in Old Serbia. In Slovenia and 
Croatia, on the other hand, Habsburg textbooks remained in use making no mention 
of South Slav ethnic connections and previously downplayed references to Serbia.220 
Another problem related to the unified educational system existed in areas with 
predominantly Muslim populations. Already in 1908, Cvijić expressed his concerns 
over the state of education amongst the Muslim Slav population.221 He recorded that 
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by 1908 the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was covered by only 253 
primary schools, which was “even fewer than in Old Serbia and Macedonia, four 
secondary schools and no University.” Nearly 100 schools were run by either Serbian 
Orthodox or Roman Catholic communities, whilst the rest were organized by the 
Austrian authorities seeking converts to Catholicism.”222 Apart from the Muslim 
aristocracy which adhered to the Ottoman education, the Muslim Slav population since 
the Berlin Congress was completely illiterate.223  
The inclusion of the Kosovo Albanians into the new Yugoslav state proved to be 
even more difficult. The Albanians attempted some form of national emancipation for 
the first time in 1878 with the formation of the Prizren League, but did not possess an 
educational apparatus for the demanding task of nation building.224 The Albanian clan 
structure continued to dominate the Albanian communities in Kosovo and Metohija. 
The only educational activities amongst the Albanian population occurred through the 
work of Catholic Albanians or Western missionaries and travellers. There were indeed 
some attempts by Serbian scholars to study Albanian culture and society and their 
impact on Serbian culture, before the First World War, but these attempts were under 
the umbrella of Oriental Studies established in the 1860s, when the research 
concentrated on the Ottoman documents relating to Serbia.225 Not until 1923, with the 
work of the Serbian historian and orientalist Gliša Elezović (1879-1960), born in 
Vučitrn,226 did Albanian folklore and ethnology become the focus of studies for the 
interaction between the Albanian and Serbian traditions (Fig. 1.36).227 Because of 
financial difficulties and war losses, the Academy was unable to resume this aspect of 
its work on the pre-war scale until 1925. 
The physical reconstruction of devastated areas, economic stagnation and the 
inclusion of populations which participated in the war on opposite sides into the new 
state structures presented a big challenge to the process of nation-state building. As 
Serbia had come out of the war with huge losses and public declarations of great 
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respect from its allies,228 the Belgrade government did not see the need to change its 
state structures in new circumstances.229 It was assumed that the Serbian national idea 
and cultural concepts were adequate for the future consolidation of the unified South 
Slav state, as the Serbs still represented the largest and politically most powerful group. 
Alternatively, the new state could adopt the amalgam of existing national specificities 
and combine them. The final option was to create a completely new culture, shared by 
the “three tribes” that formed the kingdom. However, the idea of assimilation to the 
Serbian culture was a 19th century model.230 After the devastation of the Great War, 
the Serbian national model was not that attractive to the unaffected former Austrian-
Hungarian territories. 
The 1903 Constitution was updated, declaring the Kingdom SHS as a 
constitutional monarchy ruled by the Karadjordjević dynasty. Peter I (1844-1921, 
ruled 1903-1918) was crowned the King of Serbia in 1904 on the centenary of the First 
Serbian Uprising. Since his accession to the throne, he did not interfere in the work of 
the parliament and dedicated himself to promoting a western-style democratic society.  
Educated in military academies in Switzerland and France and having lived for most 
of his life in exile in Europe, he translated John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty into Serbian 
in his early twenties and was the closest to a royal intellectual that Serbia ever had 
(Fig. 1.37). Aware that his claim to the throne was internationally questioned after the 
coup in 1903, Peter sought to win the support of the Serbian people through his modest 
lifestyle and charitable works.  
Unlike his Obrenović predecessors, he was not involved in great projects of 
nation-building, but he supported them nevertheless. In the year of his accession he 
personally chose the place where the First Serbian Uprising began in 1804 for building 
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a Karadjordjević family mausoleum. The mausoleum church, dedicated to St. George, 
was designed by Kosta Jovanović and executed in the Serbian-Byzantine national style 
in 1910-1912 (Fig. 1.39), according to the recommendation of Mihajlo Valtrović and 
Andra Stefanović. During the war it was severely damaged and looted and extensive 
repairs were needed. 
     
Fig. 1.37 – King Peter I Karadjordjević             Fig. 1.38 – King Aleksandar I Karadjordjević of 
(1844-1921, ruled 1903-1921) was already       Yugoslavia (1888-1934, ruled 1921-1934) was a 
60 when crowned king of Serbia.                       great promoter of Integral Yugoslavism. 
The ageing king withdrew from active politics in 1914, but participated in the 
tragic withdrawal of the Serbian army across Albania. After the war, until his death, 
Peter I’s only interest was to personally oversee the reconstruction works on his family 
mausoleum, living with his workers in a modest house near the building site and letting 
his son, Prince Regent Alexander become the de facto ruler (Fig. 1.38). This move 
earned him enormous popularity among the Serbian peasants, but it was also well 
received among the European powers because of the smooth transition of power. 
However, King Peter died before the mausoleum was completed and was finished by  
Alexander.  
The mausoleum represents one of the last examples of the Serbian national style 
in architecture and the peak of national self-expression. The church was built entirely 
from local white marble, but it is the interior that underlines the national state narrative. 
Built as a Karadjordjević family tomb, the mosaics that cover the inner walls, cupola 
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and the crypt narrate Serbia’s history, as starting from the southern apse, the unbroken 
line of Serbian Nemanjić kings and Lazarević Despots, each of them depicted holding 
in their hands models of their main endowments and offering them to God (Fig. 1.40). 
The last Serbian ruler to offer a church to God was Peter I himself, holding in his hands 
the model of the Mausoleum. Unsurprisingly, none of the Obrenović rulers were 
depicted in the church, even though the Obrenović family from the time of Miloš until 
Alexander I endowed over one hundred churches in the Principality. Nevertheless, 
even this deliberate omission of the Obrenović dynasty from the line of kings could 
not change the accepted and by the 20th century firmly established narrative of the 
resurrection of Serbia in 1804. Another link in the historical narratives was expressed 
by the chandelier, shaped like the mediaeval Nemanjić crown, turned upside-down, 
symbolizing the lost Empire in the Kosovo Battle. The chandelier was moulded from 
the melted rifles of Serbian soldiers who crossed Albania in 1915 (Fig. 1.41). 
    
 
Fig. 1.39 – The Mausoleum of      Fig. 1.40 – The depiction of the       Fig. 1.41 – Chandelier shaped as 
the Karadjordjević dynsty on        line of mediaeval Nemanjić kings    mediaeval crown turned upside- 
the Oplenac.                                   in the bottom row.                           down. 
 
1.6.1 Integral Yugoslavism – 1919-1934 
Prince Regent Alexander I assumed control of the state and the army at a 
critical time. King Peter I was very much a man of the 19th century and since he 
withdrew from power before the unification, his views on the idea of the Yugoslav 
nation remain insufficiently researched. Alexander, however, was openly in favour of 
Yugoslavism. Born in the Montenegrin capital, Cetinje, educated in Switzerland and 
St. Peterburg, he was exposed to Yugoslav ideas from childhood. But it was not only 
Chapter I                                                                                                         The Serbs 
83 
 
his personal affiliations and close friendships with Ivan Meštrović and a number of 
Croat intellectuals that enabled the formation of the idea of integrative national 
models.  
The ideology of Integral Yugoslavism promoted the vision of a common history 
leading towards unification. Since the time of Vuk Karadžić and the Illyrianists, such 
works appeared regularly, as they served as a defence against foreign, primarily 
Austro-Hungarian, cultural influences. In the years before and after the First World 
War many texts following this idea were published, but not all of them had the 
expected impact. The publication of the History of Yugoslavia in 1933 by the Belgrade 
historian Vladimir Ćorović (1885-1941), native of Mostar, Herzegovina, was carefully 
addressing the problem of unified national identity of three Yugoslav nations (Fig. 
1.42). It was noted at the time for its balance, even though it firmly criticized the 
ideology of Integral Yugoslavism.231  
  Fig. 1.42 – Vladimir Ćorović (1885-1941) 
 
During and after the war, the generation of the intellectual elite working on 
building the Serbian nation-state at the turn of the century had died out. The President 
of the Academy Stojan Novaković died in 1915 during the withdrawal of the 
government and other institutions. Mihajlo Valtrović, one of the creators of the Serbian 
national revival in architecture, also died in 1915. Jovan Ilkić died in a Hungarian 
                                               
231
 Ćirković, 2004, 263 
Chapter I                                                                                                         The Serbs 
84 
 
concentration camp in Nezider in 1917. This decimated professional class proved too 
small for the task of re-building the national idea.  
Alarmed by the scope of damage inflicted upon Serbia, the Ministry for 
Construction, on the advice of the Serbian Royal Academy, formed the Conservation 
Committee in 1922 to assess the level of damage on the historic architectural heritage 
and consider the work on restoration projects.232 In the next ten years, all efforts 
concerning heritage were directed towards the preservation and restoration of the most 
important mediaeval and ancient monuments, with little new archaeological or 
architectural research dedicated to the nation-building process. In the atmosphere of 
the newly proclaimed Yugoslav identity, the national revivalist styles that were 
promoted for nearly three decades before the First World War ended abruptly, with 
only the works began prior to 1914 being completed. The extent of works and 
conservation methods applied firmly established conservation as a discipline separate 
from (re)construction. 
However, the preservation of urban landscapes, marked by intensive re-building, 
failed to receive adequate attention because of the urgent nature of works. Some very 
important pre-war aesthetic features were lost forever.233 This was partly because of 
financial difficulties and partly because of the small number of surviving professionals. 
Some relief came in the early twenties when nearly 30,000 Russian émigrés poured 
into Serbia after the October Revolution filling significant vacant posts. Naturally, they 
brought their own aestheticism, which had nothing or very little in common with the 
Serbian national style. All public buildings in Belgrade and other towns were in need 
of intensive repairs; these new Russian architects, however, did not apply simple 
replication methods, concentrating instead on monumentality and classical forms.  
This was best expressed by the government complex near the Old Palace in central 
Belgrade. The building of the new National Assembly (Fig. 1.43), began in 1907 by 
Jovan Ilkić, was finished only in 1936 after extensive re-designing in neo-classical 
style by Ilkić’s son Pavle and the Russian architect Nikolai Krasnov (1864-1939). As 
the original designs were lost during the war, the new classical features were 
considered elegant, supra-national and symbolized belonging to the family of 
European nations. Krasnov went on to design a new building for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finances in 1928-1938 period (Fig. 1.44), whilst 
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another Russian architect, Vasilij Baumgarten (1879 – died after 1945) designed the 
new General Headquarters (1928) and the Russian House (1933).234 Similarly, none of 
the public buildings in other Serbian towns, designed and erected after the First World 
War, were built in the Serbian national style. Ethnically neutral classical forms and 
shy appearance of modernism marked the re-building of Serbian territories and 
foundation of the unified Kingdom SHS instead. Admittedly, there were some attempts 
to create an original Yugoslav Style in architecture, but they never materialized.235 
Prior to the creation of the Kingdom SHS, most of the 19th century public 
monuments in the Serbian Kingdom concentrated on celebrating national heroes, 
historic and legendary, as well as the sites where great battles of the past or important 
political events took place.236 The awareness of the importance of public monuments 
existed amongst the Serbs since the late-18th century, when Dositej Obradović 
recommended the erection of the statue to Zaharije Orfelin, because the message they 
communicated was an easily understandable allegory of a person’s achievements237 or 
a symbol of national suffering and sacrifice.238  
After 1919, however, the monuments (both erected and those which were 
intended to be but never built) were conceptualised around the same premise of equal 
sacrifice of all South Slavs for the Yugoslav idea, in the officially promoted Integral 
Yugoslavism. Ivan Meštrović, owing to his personal influence on the King, became a 
leading figure of Integral Yugoslavism. As a key-court artist, he was commissioned to 
execute the majority of monuments celebrating the South Slav liberation and 
unification. King Alexander’s Integral Yugoslavism was epitomised in his initiative 
for the erection of the Monument to the Unknown Hero (Spomenik neznanom junaku). 
Built on the Avala Hill just outside Belgrade in 1934-1938 over the remains of the 
mediaeval fortress, it was designed by Ivan Meštrović as a re-interpretation of the 
ancient tomb of Kyr II of Persia, in neo-classical form of a Greek temple (Fig. 1.45). 
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The Monument was a memorial to all victims of the Balkan and First World Wars. 
Nonetheless, the caryatides, Meštrović’s signature, were in the form of women from 
all parts of the Kingdom, which symbolized that all South Slavs contributed equally to 
unification.239 Apart from the Monument to the Unknown Hero, another representative  
example of Integral Yugoslavism was the Monument to Victory unveiled in 1928 (Fig. 
1.46). Positioned on the highest point of the Kalemegdan Fortress in Belgrade in the 
shape of a naked warrior, standing on the top of a pillar, holding a hawk in his left and 
a sword in his right hand, and without any national resemblances, the warrior 
symbolized the struggle of all South Slavs in the 1912-1918 wars. His bare 
masculinity, facing Vienna, whilst his back turned towards Istanbul, was a clear 
message to both old empires. 
 
Fig. 1.43 – The building of National Assembly in Belgrade, began in 1907 after the design of Jovan 
Ilikić. As it was destroyed during the First World War and the original designs lost, it was re-designed 
by the Russian émigré-architect Nikolai Krasnov in neo-Classical style and erected in 1936. 
The war devastation created a new form of public monuments, the so-called 
memorial buildings, dedicated to the Great War heroes and heroines. Memorial 
buildings, most commonly hospitals and orphanages (Fig. 1.47), served two purposes: 
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to commemorate those they were dedicated to (Fig. 1.48) and to solve enormous social 
problems caused by the war devastation.243  
 
Fig. 1.44 – The building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finances, designed and 
erected in neo-Classical style by Nikolai Krasnov in 1928-1938. 
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Fig. 1.45 – Monument to the Unknown Hero on Avala,       Fig. 1.46 – Monument to Victory by Ivan by 
near Belgrade, by Ivan Meštrović, erected in 1934-1938.  Meštrović, erected in 1928 on 10th anniver-
For this purpose, the remains of the mediaeval fortress       sary of the winning of the Salonika Front.  
of Žrnov were demolished.                                          
 
         
Fig. 1.47 – Memorial Hospital Dr Elsie Inglis for Women    Fig. 1.48 - Dr Elsie Inglis (1864-1917) 
and children, Belgrade 
 
The slow urban recovery of Serbian towns and their embellishment with 
Yugoslav symbolism was followed by the requirement of the Academy for the new 
Act on Museums. The members of the Academy, led by the President Jovan Cvijić, 
aware that the state would not be able to provide financial support, urged in 1924 for 
a separate Act on Museums which would regulate all museums in the territory of 
Serbia in its pre-1914 borders, with the inclusion of Vojvodina and Montenegro.244 
However, this was not politically plausible and it took another ten years for the 
Ministry of Education to propose another Act that would regulate the relationship 
between the central and local museums and conservation centres.  
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Meanwhile, the Serbian Royal Academy entered the International Research 
Counsel in London and Union Académique internationale in Paris following the 1918 
initiative of the English Royal Society for connecting the works of various academic 
institutions throughout Europe.245 Starting from this time, the Academy began 
reciprocal exchange of materials with other European, mainly French and British, 
academies and established regular publishing of its materials in French. As the state 
was unable to provide the necessary support for research of the Serbian heritage 
anymore – as, indeed, even if it was financially possible, it would have almost certainly 
been directed towards Integral Yugoslavism – the Academy’s research objectives 
turned to the pre-historic and pre-Slavic ancient past. This was prompted as much by 
practical reasons for obtaining the foreign funds, as by the general interest of the 
European scholars for these subjects.  
By the early 20th century, the romantic interests for national self-discovery 
evolved into various theories of the origins of nations and prompted the research of 
the ancient cultures. After Valtrović’s death, his student and successor in the 
University of Belgrade and the National Museum, Miloje Vasić (1869-1956) 
undertook the excavations on the pre-historic site of Vinča on the right bank of the 
Danube. Since the 1890s, local people were finding and bringing into the National 
Museum various artefacts, but the initial excavations were done only in 1908. The 
subsequent political crisis and wars postponed the works until 1924, when Vasić and 
his British colleague John Linton Meyers attempted another excavation, but this was 
halted again because of the luck of funds. The excavations were resumed in 1929 when 
Sir Charles Hyde (1876-1942) took a personal interest in the matter and provided 
funds.246 
Another Valtrović’s student, Nikola Vulić (1872-1945), after being appointed a 
professor of Ancient History at the Grand School in 1897, organized the archaeological 
research of the known Roman sites. Viminacium was already detected in 1866, but 
Vulić’s research concentrated on general aspects of regional ancient history, classical 
philology and epigraphy and the application of the strict scientific principles for which 
he became internationally renowned. Vulić and his colleagues were credited with the 
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excavation of the amphitheatre in ancient town of Scupi (modern Skopje) as well as 
the works on Stobi in central Macedonia (Fig. 1.49). However, neither Vasić nor Vulić 
had sufficient funds to undertake full-scale excavations and mapping of all pre-historic 
and ancient sites, but they established a firm base for future development of these 
disciplines.  
In 1934 the Serbian Academy founded a special institute concerning exclusively 
archaeology – the Institute of Balkan Studies. Its journal Revue internationale des 
Études Balkanique, which had international character, regularly published research 
results.247 The predominant interest in pre-historic and ancient sites in the territory of 
Serbia in its 1914 borders, was not designed to establish the nation’s ancient origins, 
as the national narrative was already formed around its Slavic ethnic roots dating from 
the time of migration in the 6th-7th centuries, with its “Golden Age” epitomised in the 
Nemanjić era of the 12th-14th centuries. It was partly influenced by the available funds 
arriving from abroad and partly by the general trends of European archaeology at the 
time. It also served well as the cultural counter-argument in the increasingly unstable 
Yugoslav Kingdom. 
  
Fig. 1.49 – Partly excavated the ancient city of Stobi in central Vardar Macedonia. 
                                               
247
 Novaković in Lozny, 2011, 392 
Chapter I                                                                                                         The Serbs 
91 
 
1.6.2 Disintegrative Yugoslavism – 1919-1941 
Whilst Serbian, Croatian and Slovene leading intellectuals sought to achieve 
national harmony, both the internal and external political situation severely affected 
the implementation of Integral Yugoslavism. Unfortunately, the former Austro-
Hungarian territories retained old imperial administrative borders until 1922, which 
made it difficult to integrate the legal systems. A similar situation arose in the sphere 
of the economy. Croatian industrialists, bankers and politicians refused to aid the 
economic recovery of Serbian economy, following the dispute over the exchange rate 
between the former Austrian krone and the Serbian dinar, which replaced it as the 
unified currency. Equally, as the war reparations were slow to arrive, the wages for the 
labour employed in the economic recovery of Serbia plummeted. This situation 
enabled the growth of influence of the Communist Party, which took a significant 
percentage of votes in the general elections of 1920.249 
Fearing the spread of Soviet communism, the Yugoslav authorities outlawed the 
Communist Party and imposed strict economic policies which were all sanctioned by 
the 1921 Vidovdan Constitution (Vidovdanski Ustav). The agrarian reforms, which 
included the confiscation and division of the great feudal estates, awarding them to the 
poor peasants, were imposed on the territories in Old Serbia (Kosovo and Metohija, 
Raška and Macedonia), and to a lesser degree in Slavonia and Vojvodina. Feudalism 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia was also abolished. As prior to the war only 
Serbia had no feudal ties and all its peasants owned the land they worked, this measure 
was Belgrade’s attempt to ease the burden of economic disparities. The peasants from 
the inhospitable mountainous areas of Herzegovina and Montenegro moved to the 
abandoned and confiscated land as colonists.250  
Even though hardly affected by the agrarian reform, the Croats immediately 
opposed such measures as they saw them as a violation of their rights.251 Stjepan Radić 
(1871-1928), the leader of the Croat Peasant Party was the chief opponent of these 
policies and openly advocated an independent Croatia, as he had opposed since 
1918.252 The strong political language and frequent verbal provocations led to the 
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assassination of Radić by a Montengrin member of the Serbian Radical Party during 
the parliamentary session in June 1928. The following political disarray was ended by 
King Alexander’s dissolution of Parliament and the abolition of the Vidovdan 
Constitution. On 6 January 1929, the King declared a royal dictatorship and, guided 
by his own vision of Integral Yugoslavism, changed the name of the country into 
Yugoslavia. The whole territory of Yugoslavia was divided into nine districts 
(banovinas) whose borders corresponded to neither the ethnic nor historical 
delineation. Croat and communist nationalists later interpreted this move as a Serbian 
attempt to draw borders in such a way that Serbian political influence from Belgrade 
would prevail. The Serbs were also dissatisfied, as they believed that in order to 
preserve a unified country they had to sacrifice the most important legacy they brought 
to Yugoslavia – their liberal-democratic institutions of the old kingdom achieved in 
the decade preceding the First World War.253 These events caused a poisonous rift 
between Croats and Serbs and influenced all future interpretations of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia as a stage for the “Greater Serbian Hegemony.”254  
In the aftermath of Radić’s assassination, the fascist organization of the Ustaše 
was formed in Zagreb, agitating for an independent Croatia. Its leader Ante Pavelić 
(1889-1959), signed in 1929 an agreement in Sofia with the Bulgarian IMRO aiming 
for the “liberation of Croatia and Macedonia” from the Serbs.255 For these purposes, 
special units were trained in Italy and sent back to target state institutions. Similarly, 
the pro-Bulgarian IMRO bands were regularly raiding across the Bulgarian border. A 
series of high profile murders of nearly 200 Serbian officials and 600 gendarmes, 
including the Minister of the Interior, forced the government to introduce a virtual 
martial law to maintain order.256 This was particularly difficult in Kosovo and 
Metohija, where paramilitary Albanian kaçak units had regularly attacked the Serbian 
gendarmerie since the time of the First World War.257  
However, the turbulent political events of the 1920s and 1930s in Yugoslavia, 
presently viewed as the primitive nationalism of the Balkan nations, cannot be 
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analysed independently from the general political, cultural and even religious 
influence of the rest of Europe.258 The rise of Fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany 
and the Great Economic Crisis of 1929, affected the world on an unprecedented scale. 
The whole idea of the nation-state and national identity changed.  
Croatian Ustaše and the Bulgarian IMRO organized the assassination of King 
Alexander I during his official visit to France in October 1934. The eponymous last 
words of the king: “Preserve Yugoslavia!” were immediately seized upon by the 
regime as Alexander’s political testament.259 Whether the dying king really said those 
words or not is less relevant than the fact that they maintained the support for keeping 
the kingdom unified on the eve of the Second World War. Judging by the sorrow 
expressed throughout Yugoslavia, his autocratic rule was not disliked to the extent 
later officially promoted by the communist regime.260 He was buried in the 
Kardjordjević Mausoleum, completed only four years earlier.   
1.6.3 The first death of Yugoslavia 
Ćorović’s premise that Integral Yugoslavism had failed to achieve its goals 
proved correct.261 As shown earlier, the circumstances surrounding the unification 
were a complex set of problems, difficult to resolve in the short period of time and 
without taking into account external factors affecting the formation and development 
of a country incorporating so many different traditions. The main obstacle for the 
creation of a single Yugoslav nation was a total absence of “founding myths.”262 Both 
Serbs and Croats achieved much during the 19th century process of self-discovery. By 
the time of unification, the myths of “Mediaeval Golden Age” were well formulated 
and described on many occasions, but were used by the 19th century scholars as an 
intertwining narrative for both nations. The religious affiliations were explained by the 
influence of the Holy Roman Empire and Byzantium, respectively, whilst the existence 
of Muslim Slavs was interpreted as the Serbian/Croat conversion after the 15th century 
Ottoman conquest.  
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However, the Croatian lack of statehood and Serbian perception of their great 
sacrifice during the Great War to liberate all Yugoslavs resulted in mutual resentment 
by 1939. As there was no conventional history of Yugoslavia prior to the unification, 
the interpretations of the mediaeval and Ottoman periods and their impact on South 
Slavs concentrated on the Kosovo Battle. The Serbian national myth was celebrated as 
a pan-Yugoslav myth, as the 1389 Serbian sacrifice for Christendom supporters of 
Integral Yugoslavism compared to those in the 1912-1918 wars.263 However, the 28 
June, apart from being a state bank holiday since 1889, was also a Serbian Orthodox 
Church saint’s day, which was quintessentially national and had enjoyed state support 
since the early days of independence. In 1920 the Metropolitanates of Sremski 
Karlovci, Belgrade and Montenegro restored the Serbian Patriarchate, which had been 
abolished in 1766 in the Ottoman Empire and reduced to a Metropolitanate in 1703 in 
the Habsburg Empire. The creation of Yugoslavia, however, meant that the Serbian 
Orthodox Church lost its privilege as the state church, as all religions were proclaimed 
equal. Since the Roman Catholic Church owed allegiance to the Vatican, this required 
a special agreement, Concordat, between the Yugoslav state and the Holy See which 
would regulate the appointment of the catholic priests and bishops in Yugoslavia. The 
Serbian Orthodox Church was suspicious of any such agreement, as it associated the 
Catholic Church with Austro-Hungary and its attempts to create a Uniate Church 
during the 18th and 19th centuries.264 Negotiations with the Vatican began in 1922, but 
the text of the Concordat was agreed only in 1937, when Prince Paul approved it. On 
the day of the vote in Parliament, clashes between the opponents of the Concordat and 
gendarmerie erupted in Belgrade followed by the death of Patriarch Varnava on the 
same evening. This event prevented any future co-operation between the two churches. 
After this unfortunate series of events, the Croats saw the Kosovo Battle not as “the 
founding myth of the Yugoslav nation,” but as an attack on Croat national identity. 
Croat dissatisfaction with the Serbian dominated government and dynasty prompted 
Prince Paul to attempt conciliation. On the eve of the Second World War, in August 
1939, the Banovina of Croatia (Banovina Hrvatska) was created (Map 1.a.14). The 
signing of the agreement enabling the establishment of Banovina of Croatia echoed 
the 1868 Nagodba.265 Serbian intellectuals strongly objected to the Agreement, 
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criticizing the Croatian “habit of signing agreements within the state they lived, 
without any intention of keeping their promise.”266 This Croat attitude was seen as 
essentially anti-statist, negative and destructive.  
The deteriorating relationship between the two political and state traditions, the 
former Habsburg and Serbian territories, led to the rejection of Integral Yugoslavism, 
first by Croat and then by Serbian intellectuals. The co-operation between the JAZU 
in Zagreb and the Serbian Royal Academy in Belgrade, despite being forbidden by the 
Austro-Hungarian authorities, had been the most interactive and productive prior to 
1914. Strangely, when after 1918 these obstacles were removed, the two academies 
reduced their collaboration “because of the change of circumstances.”267 Croat 
intellectuals began perceiving Integral Yugoslavism as an attack on their own national 
identity by an “inferior and barbarous orthodox culture.”268 Already in the early 20th 
century, the leading Croat poet, Antun Gustav Matoš (1873-1914), wrote that “as long 
as our culture is anational, non-Croat, Yugoslav – Serbian culture, though inferior, 
will continue to act and create confusion among us until our culture becomes national 
and free, like the Serbian culture.”269 Matoš wrote about this at the turn of the century, 
influenced by the dominant Austrian and Central European attitude towards Serbia as 
“alien” and inferior. Following the economic and political discord after 1918, old 
Austrian ideas of the inferiority of “Ottomanised” Serbia were reinterpreted. 
Metternich’s remark that “Asia begins at the Landstrasse (in Vienna)” was re-worded 
as “the Black Balkans begin behind the Esplanada Hotel (in Zagreb).”270  
Serbian intellectuals, on the other hand, saw this attitude as disrespectful of 
Serbia’s sacrifice during the First World War. For them, Integral Yugoslavism 
presented too great a compromise in favour of the Croats. In 1937, Slobodan Jovanović 
(1869-1958), a professor at Belgrade University, Cvijić’s co-participant at the 
Versailles Conference and successor as the President of the Royal Academy 1927-
1931, founded in Belgrade the Serbian Cultural Club (Srpski kulturni klub), for 
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Serbian intellectuals who criticised the regime’s policies of Integral Yugoslavism. 
Disillusioned with the growing disparities between the “three tribes” of Yugoslavia, 
Jovanović (Fig. 1.50) and his colleagues advocated “the enlightened patriotism” that 
could be achieved only through “the spiritual mobilization” of the masses.271  
The inability of the regime to solve the political problems in Yugoslavia was 
seen as a direct consequence of the loss of a whole generation of an educated elite able 
to guide the country through the upheavals of inter-war politics. One of the greatest 
problems that Jovanović emphasised was the lack of understanding of the mentality 
and knowledge about the people who lived in Yugoslavia. Authority was given to 
“unprepared and inexperienced people who did not understand the new times.”272 
Jovanović was also suspicious of Croat demands to draw borders within Yugoslavia. 
The creation of Banovina Hrvatska on 24 August 1939 was seen as a great defeat for 
Serbian politicians, as it allowed nearly one million Serbs to be incorporated within 
the borders of the Banovina. Despite calls, dialogue never took place. Within a week, 
the Second World War in Europe had broken out. In Yugoslavia, the war began on the 
6 April 1941.273 
Germany occupied parts of Serbia were subject to strict military laws, which 
only accelerated the growth of the mutually exclusive resistance movements: the 
Communist Partisans and some units of the former Royal Army, Četniks.274 The 
majority of the leading pre-war intellectuals, concerned with the Serbian national 
question, left the country within days after the outbreak of war. Certain that the Nazi-
regime would repeat the tactics used by the occupation forces during the First World 
War, when the elite was the first to be deposed and imprisoned in various concentration 
camps, a significant number of Serbian scholars attempted and managed to escape. In 
the evacuating retinue of the young King Peter II was Slobodan Jovanović, who had 
briefly assumed a ministerial role on 27 March. Vladimir Ćorović, the respectable 
author of the History of Yugoslavia, also joined the king, but his plane crashed 
somewhere over Greece. Aleksandar Belić, the President of the Serbian Royal 
Academy remained in the occupied Belgrade, away from public life. 
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Fig. 1.50 – Slobodan Jovanović (1869-1958), was the Professor of Law at the Belgrade University, 
liberal and anti-Communist. Because he was a founder of the Serbian Cultural Club and Minister in the 
Royal Government after the coup in 1941, the Communist authorities proclaimed him a Greater Serbian 
nationalist. He died in exile in London in 1958. 
Immediately after the partition of Yugoslavia, with key-personalities removed 
from public and political life, a systematic pillage and destruction of Serbian national 
heritage began. Apart from the great number of casualties resulting from the war, state 
institutions and public monuments were deliberately targeted (Fig. 1.51). The whole 
of 19th and 20th century towns were destroyed. Belgrade, a symbol of Serbian national 
identity, was particularly targeted as the Nazi ideology considered it the originator of 
German humiliation after the First World War.275 The Old Royal Palace reconstructed 
only in the 1930s was severely damaged again. The building of the National Museum, 
inaugurated in 1936, following the reconstruction after the First World War, was also 
damaged with an unknown number of artefacts being lost.276 Individually, the greatest 
material loss was the total destruction of the National Library which comprised nearly 
350,000 books as well as its entire historic collection (Fig. 1.52). In the above 
mentioned 1940 report of Aleksandar Belić, the archive of the National Library 
contained 1397 mediaeval manuscripts, written in Serbian redaction of the Old 
Slavonic or in Latin. He also described the additional 8797 “numerals” of which some 
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contained “up to 2000 smaller documents.277” Of 1397 mediaeval documents, only 12 
survived, as they were outside the Library during the bombing. 
 
Fig. 1.51 – Adolf Hitler in front of the war “trophy” from Yugoslavia – a memorial plaque to Gavrilo 
Princip, the Young Bosnia assassin of Franz Ferdinand in 1914 – sent to him as a birthday present in 
April 1941. The photograph was taken by Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler’s official photographer. The 
inscription on the plaque reads: “In this historic place Gavrilo Princip announced freedom on Vidovdan, 
28th June 1914.” The photograph, now kept at the Bavarian State Library, provides an excellent link 
between the First and Second World Wars. – Originally published in the Belgrade weekly Vreme on 31 
October 2013. 
   
Fig. 1.52 – The Neo-Classical building of National Library of Serbia, destroyed on 6 April 1941. An 
unknown number of books and manuscripts, kept and collected since 1832 was destroyed. The ruins of 
the library (right) are still visible in Belgrade. 
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1.7 The Second Yugoslavia – 1945-1991 
  
In 1945, the new federal organization of Yugoslavia left the Serbs most 
dissatisfied, even though the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia had been 
the predominant element in the Partisan army. The prevailing feeling was that the 
federal constitution had harmed the Serbs in a number of ways; firstly, there was a 
notable absence of punishment for Croatian political choice of 1941 and their genocide 
of the Serbs.285 Secondly, the invention of the new nations of Montenegrins and 
Macedonians was seen as undermining the Serbian national core and thirdly, war 
refugees were allowed to return to Croatia, but there was no return for Serbian 
colonists expelled from Kosovo and Metohija and Macedonia (15770 families), 
because they had been awarded land by the monarchy. After the war ended, Kosovo 
and Metohija remained within the framework of Serbia, soon to be awarded a status 
they had never held before: that of a separate autonomous region. Serbs and 
Montenegrins expelled from Kosovo and Metohija during the war by Albanians were 
banned from returning home by Yugoslav authorities, who decided to allow the 
Albanians from Northern Albania, settled there during war by occupational forces and 
their Albanian quislings to remain.286 This asymmetry became a great source of 
dissatisfaction; Serbia was the only republic divided into three units. It was observed 
that Dalmatia was now regarded as the “historic land” of Croatia, even though the 
Serbs were present there in greater numbers and more compact than any of the ethnic 
minorities in Vojvodina. The Serbian Party representatives were outvoted in all these 
matters.287  
1.7.1 The Serbian republic within federal Yugoslavia 
As the Germans retreated, the Allies bombed Serbia repeatedly, from April 
1944 until the end of the war in May 1945. This brought the level of devastation to an 
unprecedented scale. Immediately after the liberation, the main concern of the new 
communist government was the immediate housing of nearly 3,500,000 homeless 
people.288 The surviving residential areas in towns were divided into smaller units, so 
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they could house more people. In Vojvodina, the new authorities confiscated the 
estates of local Germans (Volksdeutsche) accused of collaborationism during the war, 
and re-settled Serbs from the poorest mountainous areas of the Dinaric range.  
The Soviet model of “five year plan” for industrial development was followed 
by the ad hoc construction of cheap utilitarian housing on a large scale. There were no 
attempts to reconstruct the pre-war and 19th century structures. The reasons for this 
were twofold; first, the exact reconstruction was expensive and, secondly, it was a 
reminder of the Greater Serbian bourgeois past.289 All reminders of the monarchy 
were removed, Serbian national style in architecture demolished wherever possible 
and all individuals associated with the old regime were forbidden to participate in 
public life. This particularly affected intellectuals and professionals as they were 
usually of upper middle class background. However, as the rebuilding programmes 
required educated professionals, some of the “unacceptable bourgeois” were allowed 
to retain their posts. University professors and academics who did not emigrate were 
restricted to teaching and research within various institutions, whilst the field-work 
was reserved for those willing to accept the ideological and visual aestheticism of 
Socialist Realism, a Soviet import officiated by the new regime.290  
The transition to Social Realism was performed by a small group of pre-war 
modernists who appeared in the early 1930s. Modernism, like the historism and the 
secession before it, came to Serbia about twenty years after it originally appeared in 
Europe. This was traditionally explained by the lack of modern training at Belgrade 
University and its adherence to conservative academism. Therefore, this slow 
emergence of modernism in Yugoslavia (as indeed in Greece and Romania) was not a 
product of “genuine social needs and painstaking struggles and experiments of the 
avant-garde artists and architects” as was the case elsewhere in Europe.291 Serbian 
modernists were all classically trained in Belgrade, Vienna, Paris and other European 
centres, but their acceptance of modernism was ideological. Modernism, for them, was 
part of the accelerating Europeanization, as they had different aesthetics from those of 
the nation-builders. However, most of the Serbian modernists were not communists 
and after 1945 their careers ended even though they were only in their early forties. 
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They could not accustom themselves to the ideological and visual world of Socialist 
Realism. With some exceptions, they retained respectable social positions; some of 
them became university professors, members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts,292 indulged in scholarly research, wrote books. Opportunities to execute anything 
creative were limited. Unable to understand the new age, those pre-war classically 
trained Modernists who were still employed “made professionally immaculate, but 
cold and uninventive houses that did not reveal a single trace of their former ambition 
or skill.”293 The only pre-war modernist who managed to retain artistic creativity 
beyond Social Realism was Nikola Dobrović (1897-1967), who had studied at Prague. 
He was appointed director of the newly established Institute for Urbanism of the 
Republic of Serbia in 1945, and was responsible for the urban rebuilding after the war. 
His aestheticism, however, was guided by limited resources and imposed ideological 
principles which he managed to combine with the philosophy of modernism. Naturally, 
there were no “national” elements in his work.294 The imposed Soviet style methods 
of industrialization caused massive internal migrations of peasants from mountainous 
areas to towns. Twenty years after the war most towns doubled in size and this 
accelerated urbanization required the expansion of the educational network. 
Parallel with the physical rebuilding, the new regime imposed different value 
systems. The Integral Yugoslavism of King Alexander was immediately re-labeled 
“Greater Serbian Hegemony” despite the fact that its main exponents were actually 
Croat intellectuals. Yugoslav unity was now organized around the harmonization 
principles: all nations and republics were treated as wartime victims; all had made 
equal sacrifices, and all those who opposed the Partisans during the war were 
indiscriminately labeled as servants of the occupying forces. This was particularly 
difficult for the Serbs to accept, as the equality sign was put between the genocide 
committed by the Croat regime of Ante Pavelić and the activities of the royalist army 
of Draža Mihajlović who fought against the Germans in the name of the King.295 
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Instead of an open public and critical debate about the events of the Second World 
War in the light of facts, actual circumstances and against the general European 
political background, the party version of history was imposed.296  
Communist Yugoslavia also needed its founding myths. However, this time it 
was easier to find them in the Yugoslav Committee and the Corfu Declaration of 
1917.297 The romantic ideas of South Slav unity were reinterpreted as the wish for the 
liberation of oppressed masses in order to live in harmony.298 Apart from the Ottomans 
and the Habsburgs, this list of oppressors included all three Serbian/Yugoslav kings. 
The communist version of Integral Yugoslavism was presented in the form of the 
“brotherhood and unity” policy, which after Tito’s famous break with Stalin in 1948, 
concentrated on Tito’s personality cult (Fig. 1.a.20). 
After the initial reforms of 1945, a general reform of Yugoslav education led by 
the Croat Minister of Education Miloš Žanko, confirmed the “fundamental orientation 
towards the proletarian ideology and complete abandonment of the bourgeois 
educational models,” which also included “writing of new textbooks and re-training 
of the teachers.”300 Particularly sensitive language and history syllabuses were re-
organized around the “brotherhood and unity” polices, which were based on the re-
interpreted reform of Vuk Karadžić and the 1850 Literary Agreement. Because of the 
Second World War attempts by Pavelić’s regime to “purify” the Croatian language 
from Serbian words and create a separate language, the new Croatian leadership 
needed to disassociate itself from the wartime Nazi-regime, whose language reforms 
remained in use for some time after the war. Thus, Karadžić’s and the Illyrianists’ calls 
for the unity of the language were re-invented into the text of the new Literary 
Agreement between Matica Srpska and Matica Hrvatska, signed in Novi Sad in 1954. 
The Novi Sad Agreement stated that the language of the Serbs, Croats and 
Montenegrins is one Serbo-Croat/Croato-Serbian language, with three main dialects 
and regional accents, written in Karadžić’s orthography and with equal use of both 
Cyrillic and Latinic script. In 1971 Matica Hrvatska withdrew its signature from the 
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agreement claiming it was given under pressure. The Serbian side retained the 
Agreement until 1993. 
1.7.2 Serbian nationalism defeated 
In Tito’s Yugoslavia, the sensitive issue of history, historical research and 
interpretation were in accordance with Marxist philosophy, economic and social issues 
prevailing over the traditional approaches.301 Marxist theories encouraged the use of 
archaeological evidence in combination with the written sources and as many of the 
written documents were lost, this method moved the general Yugoslav interest of 
research from the late to the early Middle Ages. Therefore, a new Institute of 
Archaeology within the SANU was created in 1947 with its primary aim being to 
organize and co-ordinate fieldwork research through a new network of local museums 
and professionals, as well as to supervise heritage protection and develop strategic 
principles.  
The shortage of professional expertise led to the re-instatement of some of the 
pre-war experts. Miloje Vasić (Fig. 1.53) was re-called from his retirement to resume 
his archaeology teaching at the university, but it was immediately clear that the 
programme needed more professionals. For this purpose, a few other classically 
trained lecturers were recalled from retirement to enhance academic training. After 
Vasić died in 1956, his students Milutin and Draga Garašanin took over his 
responsibilities (Fig. 1.54).302 One of their first projects was a detailed archaeological 
map of Serbia published in two volumes between 1953 and 1956.303 
As research interests after 1945 moved to the early Middle Ages and the time of 
the arrival of the Slavs, two new courses were introduced: Slavic archaeology and the 
archaeology of the Near East. The Garašanins, although limited by the imposed 
ideology, succeeded in increasing the importance of Serbian academic research in 
international circles. From the 1960s the University of Belgrade and the SANU re-
established relationships with a number of European and American institutions, 
initiating a collaborative research. These were, however, interested in pre-historic and 
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ancient sites; the Neolithic Vinča304 and Mesolithic Lepenski Vir305 cultures were of 
interest to Berkley, Harvard and Berlin university experts, whilst the Roman sites306 
attracted the Louvre Museum and French School at Rome, as well as the New York 
University.307  
   
Fig. 1.53 – Miloje Vasić (1869-1956)            Fig. 1.54 – Milutin (1920-2002) and Draga (1921-1997)  
                                                                        Garašanin. Milutin was a great-grandson of Ilija Garaša-  
                                                                        nin, Serbian Prime Minister and the author of the Draft.  
For obvious reasons, national archaeology did not play central role in this period, 
although the surviving mediaeval sites were subject to conservation. The conservation 
of heritage was from 1947 under the authority of the re-established Institute for the 
Protection of Cultural Monuments, which from the 1960s and 1970s transferred its 
work to provincial and local branches. However, conservation principles were not 
strictly applied in the immediate post-war reconstruction. Again, the reasons were 
twofold: insufficient funds and the official party line which required the removal of all 
Serbian national symbols. Like in all communist countries, the public display of 
national pride was concentrated on the personality cult of Tito and the communist 
revolution. This was endorsed through the network of newly opened local museums 
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from 1950s onwards, which dedicated much of their spaces to the celebration of the 
Second World War official history.  
All royal palaces were confiscated, refurbished and given to Tito for his personal 
and official use or became public buildings. After its destruction in the war, the 
National Museum was finally moved into the reconstructed building of the former 
Mortgage Bank309 in 1952, from where it co-ordinated the development of local 
museums on the whole territory of Serbia until the 1970s, when new administrative 
division of Serbia placed much of the heritage in Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija 
under the authority of Provincial governments. The National Library was never rebuilt. 
The new library was temporarily placed in a pre-war hotel, until the decision was made 
to erect an entirely new building on the construction site of the Memorial Cathedral of 
St.Sava on Vračar. It was designed and built in the style of Social Realism by a Croat 
architect Ivo Kurtović (1910-1972) only in 1972 (Fig. 1.55).  
As most religious activities were discouraged, the reconstruction of churches 
demolished or damaged during the Second World War was either stopped or 
postponed. The St.Sava Memorial Cathedral, began in the late 19th century, shared the 
fate of other churches. The building of the cathedral was halted during the First World 
War, slow in the inter-war period and in 1941 had only the base and church walls 
raised to a height of around ten metres.310 Patriarch Gavrilo (1881-1950), after 
surviving Dachau, was not allowed to return to Belgrade until 1946 and address his 
concerns regarding the reconstruction of destroyed orthodox churches and confiscation 
of the church estates, including the area dedicated to St.Sava’s Cathedral. The religion 
was not officially forbidden, but it was side-lined from the main public life.  
The erection of public monuments was, naturally, following the Party lines and 
aestheticism of Social Realism. Generally, large public monuments celebrated the 
Communist struggle against the foreign oppressors and enemies of the people’s 
revolution (Fig. 1.56). Those dedicated to individuals celebrated Partisan heroes and 
were most commonly in the form of bronze busts (Fig. 1.57).  
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Fig. 1.55 – The National Library of Serbia, built in 1972 after design of Croat architect Ivo Kurtović. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.56 – The Memorial Park Šumarice in Kragujevac, erected in 1963, dedicated to the memory of 
3,000 citizens of Kragujevac among which were the pupils and teachers from Kragujevac schools. The 
Germans executed the civilians on 21 October 1941 following the orders to execute 100 Serbs in 
exchange for one killed German soldier. Sculptor Miodrag Živković designed the monument in the 
shape of Roman numeral V, representing the grade V-3 of the Kragujevac Gymnasium. 
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Fig. 1.57 – The Tomb to People’s Heroes on Kalemegdan, erected in 1948 set the trend of celebrating 
Communist leaders. Among the four most respected Communist heroes is Moša Pijade, Tito’s closest 
friend and confidant, who died and was buried there in 1957. 
 
1.7.3 Serbian statehood defeated 
After the announcement of the new nations in 1945, pressure began on the 
Serbian Orthodox Church demanding the consent for the creation of separate 
Macedonian and Montenegrin orthodox churches. As Patriarch Gavrilo (1881-1950) 
was a native of Montenegro himself (Fig. 1.58), it was politically impossible to achieve 
the split of the church immediately. The question of separate churches re-opened in 
1958, when the authorities attempted to establish the autonomous Archibishopric of 
Ohrid within the Serbian Orthodox Church. However, the sudden death of Patriarch 
Vikentije (1890-1958) was too reminiscent of the death of Patriarch Varnava during 
the Concordat crisis of 1937313 that it had to be postponed until 1967 when Tito 
decreed the creation of the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church (Fig. 1.59).314  
The Albanian question posed another problem for Serbia within Yugoslavia. The 
revolutionary year of 1968 brought into focus for the first time the demands of the 
Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija to form a separate republic, based on ethnic borders 
                                               
313
 See p. 93-94 above. 
314
 See Chapter IV – The Macedonians, p. 359-360. 
Chapter I                                                                                                         The Serbs 
108 
 
within the Yugoslav federation. According to the 1961 census, by then they numbered 
around 61% of the population of Kosovo and Metohija.315 In 1968, the Albanian 
demonstrations required removing the name of Metohija316 from the official name of 
the Province, as it was considered to be a symbol of “Greater Serbian hegemony.”317 
           
Fig. 1.58 – Patriarch Gavrilo (1881-1950),              Fig. 1.59 – Patriarch Vikentije (1890-1958), 
a native of Montenegro.                                           born in Vojvodina, then part of Austro-Hungary. 
This upset the remaining Serbian members of the Communist Party and 
prompted a few of them to openly question the sincerity of the “brotherhood and unity” 
policy which since the end of the war coined and widely used the phrase “weak Serbia, 
strong Yugoslavia.” The phrase came into prominence in the early 1960s, when the 
adoption of the 1963 federal constitution finally officially sanctioned it.  
The Croat-Serb dichotomy grew during the 1960s. When the debate about the 
new federal constitution began following the failure of the Croatian Spring in 1971, 
the CPY leadership was forced to make concessions to the Croat members of the Party. 
Serbian philosopher and a law professor Mihajlo Đurić (1925-2011) publicly attacked 
these actions and interpreted proposed constitutional amendments as the foundation of 
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the confederation and “essentially anti-Serbian” (Fig. 1.60).324 He was sentenced to a 
year in prison and a number of Belgrade University lecturers who supported him 
publicly lost their posts. After this, any criticism of the Constitution of 1974 by Serbian 
intellectuals was considered “a resurrected nationalistic call for Greater Serbia.” 
Fig. 1.60 – Mihajlo Djurić (1925-2011) 
 
The Party line for curbing the “Greater Serbian hegemony” after 1945 was 
evidenced in foundation of new universities which would counterweight Belgrade 
arguments, should they cross the official Party narratives. After the University of 
Skopje in 1945, new universities were opened in Sarajevo (1949), Podgorica (1974) 
and Novi Sad (1960).325 Finally, the University of Priština was opened in 1970, with 
the languages of instruction in both Albanian and Serbo-Croat. This Party-organized 
expansion of the network of higher education in the post-war period when the number 
of lecturers was low due to war losses, forced retirement and emigration resulted in a 
decline in the quality of instruction.326 
Following the same party-line, the SANU was undermined by the creation of 
Provincial academies in Kosovo (1978) and Vojvodina (1979). By then, the first 
generation of Albanian intellectuals educated in Albanian language schools that were 
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opened in Kosovo and Metohija after the war, had reached maturity and asserted their 
desire to create closer links with the University of Tirana.327 
In 1971 the Albanian scholar Muzafer Korkuti (Fig. 3.7) had published the 
theory of the Illyrian ancestry of Albanians which was wholeheartedly accepted by 
Albanian students in Kosovo and Metohija. Belgrade academics, already dissatisfied 
with the position of Serbia within Yugoslavia and events from 1968-1971, saw this 
theory as threatening to the Serbian territorial integrity.329 However, the academic 
disagreement did not spread beyond the academic circles until Tito died in 1980. 
Demands for Kosovo to be declared a separate republic were renewed during the 
demonstrations that erupted in the province again in 1981. A series of attacks on the 
Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries escalated with the burning of the 
dormitories of the Patriarchate of Peć complex on 15 March 1981. The army and police 
suppressed the demonstrations, but there was no investigation of the events, as all 
police officials were ethnic Albanians.330 Even though the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
alarmed by the violations of its remaining property in Kosovo and Metohija, recorded 
and reported the abuse of its property on many occasions from 1968, the state 
authorities did nothing to investigate.331  
In the following years, the situation became increasingly tense. The pressure on 
the remaining Serbian population in the southern province increased, causing the 
massive emigration of more than 50,000 the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija into the 
territory of inner Serbia. This silent exodus, followed by a great disparity in the birth-
rate between the Albanian Muslim and Serbian Christian population, resulted in 
reducing the Serbian population to 10% by 1991.332  By 1985, Serbian dissatisfaction 
grew to an extent which prompted the SANU to draft a document aiming to address 
the problems of decentralisation in Yugoslavia that, in their opinion, threatened its 
disintegration. An unfinished document, titled Memorandum, was leaked to the press 
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in September 1986 and immediately launched a ferocious polemical debate throughout 
Yugoslava.333   
1.7.4 The Memorandum 
In general, the Memorandum emphasised the disadvantageous position of 
Serbia within Yugoslavia since the Second World War and the growth of anti-Serbian 
feelings under Tito and Kardelj’s controversial 1974 Constitution. It addressed the 
“subjugated position of Serbia” as the “provinces even entered into coalition with 
other republics, as a result of which the Republic of Serbia invariably found itself 
outvoted at the federal level. This bizarre situation is easier to understand if we 
remember that Tito, a Croat, and Kardelj, a Slovene, had the final say on appointments 
of officials to the provincial administrations.”334 The systematic destruction of the 
Serbian national core since the end of the war was explained by the Croat phrase that 
“everyone should put his own house in order,” which allowed “the republican 
governments to treat the Serbs as best suited their separatist agendas.” A growing 
advocacy for national states and “historical rights of each new nation created after the 
Second World War” were the epicentre of the critique of the Memorandum.335 
The Memorandum also underlined the post-war communist practise of inserting 
a sense of guilt into the Serbian national identity for the “Greater Serbian hegemony” 
of the inter-war period: “The frustration felt by Serbian intellectuals because of the 
position to which they had been relegated was…that both the political and cultural 
leaders of Serbian nationality are suffering from a kind of preordained guilt complex, 
and out of compunction to allow the proscribing of those actions and those deeds, or 
even just intentions, which under normal circumstances are naturally manifested by 
every nation and minority….This unbearable atmosphere of intrigue, scheming, 
slander and mud-slinging from a distance, resulted in many (Serbian) human and 
creative values being trampled upon for no reason.”336 As expected, the response of 
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the non-Serbian parts of Yugoslavia was that the Memorandum represented the re-
assertion of the “Greater Serbian hegemony” and from this period onwards, the 
internal relations within Yugoslav institutions were blocked. 
1.7.5 A brief revival of Serbian national pride – 1986-1991 
The publication of the Memorandum closely coincided with three important 
anniversaries for the Serbs: the 800th anniversary of the erection of the Studenica 
Monastery in 1986, the 200th anniversary of the birth of Vuk Karadžić in 1987 and the 
600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle in 1989. The appropriate celebrations were 
organized to mark these anniversaries ranging from publication of books related to 
Vuk Karadžić’s life, work and legacy, editions of Serbian mediaeval history, to 
television series and films. The anniversaries provided an opportunity for the re-
assertion of national history and state-tradition that had existed prior to the creation of 
Yugoslavia. Karažić’s collection of Kosovo epics were re-printed and received new 
attention. The Kosovo Battle anniversary renewed interest for the Serbian Mediaeval 
history and the battle itself by modern Serbian scholars. New publications were, of 
course, abundant, but the occasion also prompted the re-publishing of the works of 
Serbian historians of the 19th and early 20th centuries, forbidden or side-lined after 
1945. The original works of Vuk Karadžić and his contemporaries, as well as works 
of Stojan Novaković, Jovan Cvijić and Vladimir Ćorović, were also re-printed and 
published. Consequently, interest in Serbian mediaeval history and culture grew 
beyond the anniversary celebrations, resulting in a renewed interest in the whole 
Serbian mediaeval heritage, primarily in its mediaeval monasteries and Nemanjić 
castles. 
 Since 1945 the mediaeval archaeological and architectural sites received the 
best possible conservation, but this was not widely publicized. In 1979, however, the 
first Nemanjić capital Ras337 with its central monastic site of Sopoćani (Fig. 1.61) 
received UNESCO status as “the buildings of Stari Ras represent an impressive group 
of medieval monuments consisting of fortresses, churches and monasteries. The 
monastery at Sopoćani is a reminder of the contacts between Western civilization and 
the Byzantine world.”338 Seven years later, in 1986, following the extensive 
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conservation works, the Studenica monastery (Fig. 1.62), built as a royal tomb by the 
first Nemanjić in 1186, was also given UNESCO status. These works, however, were 
publicized in a series of documentaries on Serbian mediaeval architecture and its 
specific features that included both Byzantine and Catholic influences, as expressed 
by the three mediaeval architectural schools that Serbian architects tried to revive in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Finally, the ill-fated erection of the St.Sava’s 
Cathedral on Vračar that was stopped in 1914 and 1941 was allowed to be resumed in 
1985. 
    
Fig. 1.61 – The Sopoćani Monastery, built around 1260s, is the first example of the Raška School to be 
listed by UNESCO as World Heritage Site in 1979.                 
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Fig. 1.62 – The Studenica Monastery, built in 1186, is the oldest and best example of the Raška School               
of Architecture, which combined Byzantine and Romanesque architectural elements. Listed as a World 
Heritage Site in 1986.  
1.8 The second death of Yugoslavia 
The wars of Yugoslav succession 1991-1999 put into prominence the deliberate 
destruction of national heritage and architecture, both modern and historical, as well 
as the archaeological sites that were associated with the culture of the enemy.342 As 
the whole war was watched by the world media, the destruction of heritage structures 
was explained in terms of destroying the presence of the “alien other.”  Since the 
representational power of the religious buildings associated with one nation on a given 
territory symbolised the presence of that nation in that area, the primary targets were 
churches of both denominations and mosques. The philosophy of destruction of 
religious heritage was, thus, connected with the “correction of historical inaccuracies” 
on territories that were already ethnically cleansed. Militarily and politically, the 
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destruction of heritage was explained in terms of the enemy’s hiding behind the 
heritage in order to manipulate international sympathies and condemn the enemy.  
1.8.1 The Kosovo Battle of 1999 
 
In April 1992, after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina began, Serbia was 
without inquiry singled out for war guilt and put under strict sanctions. The SANU, 
universities and professional institutions were also excluded from any international 
exchange for the next ten years. The presence of war had a negative effect on these 
institutions, as they found themselves in restricted working conditions. Cut off from 
the rest of the world, with severely restricted funds, academic discourse in Serbia was 
limited to debates amongst Serbian academics with their views on the role of history, 
archaeology, architecture and heritage in general, regarding service to the nation. At 
the same time, outside of the academic world, a number of popular pseudo-histories, 
written by journalists and non-academics, appeared  flattering the regime’s abuse of 
Serbian past in order to preserve its power. This is when the legend of Kosovo Battle 
received its final transformation. Whilst during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the 
emphasis was on the “cross against the crescent” and fight for the Serbian freedom, in 
the 1990s the narrative was concentrated on the choice between the “Kingdom of 
Heaven and the Kingdom on Earth” – the epic verse recorded by Vuk Karadžić nearly 
two centuries earlier. The verse powerfully underlined the impossibility of a happy 
ending: whichever kingdom Prince Lazar/Serbia was to choose, the other one will be 
lost forever.343 Naturally, the Serbian choice of the 1990s was, just like in 1389, the 
“Kingdom of Heaven.” It explained all the earthly losses that were taking place at the 
time.344  
Except for the debate between the scholars about the Serbian position in the 
European and wider international context, the actual fieldwork concerning all aspects 
of heritage was reduced to bare survival and minimal maintenance. After the bombing 
of Serbian territories in Bosnia in 1993, most artefacts in Serbian museums were 
removed from display. In 1996, the National Museum in Belgrade closed parts of its 
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permanent exhibitions and stored the collections away. Similar actions were taken by 
the provincial and local museums throughout Serbia. When the hostilities in Kosovo 
and Metohija broke out in 1997 and 1998, the collections and archives from provincial 
museums were evacuated, together with the documents of the Institute for the 
Protection of Monuments in Priština.345 The churches and monasteries in Kosovo and 
Metohija had their treasuries evacuated to the church estates less exposed to the 
hostilities.  
However, the 1999 bombing of Serbia proved to be devastating. The 
Commander of the NATO forces, Wesley Clark, explained that the command and 
control facilities, which included general infrastructure, industrial and administrative 
buildings and bridges were all legitimate targets, regardless of their historical value.346 
The architectural and archaeological heritage damaged or destroyed (Fig. 1.63) was 
considered “collateral damage.” This explanation directly caused a series of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency actions of both Albanian and Serbian forces against 
the cultural and religious symbols of the other nation. The three-month campaign put 
an end to the hostilities in former Yugoslavia and incapacitated Serbia for any national 
re-assertion in the near future. The Serbian army, together with over 200,000 civilians 
withdrew from Kosovo and Metohija, which, supported by the EU and the US, 
proclaimed independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. 
After the withdrawal of the Serbian state from Kosovo and Metohija, the 
systematic destruction of Serbian Orthodox cultural heritage began there. When the 
subject occasionally arose as an issue in the western media, it was explained as an 
“understandable by-product of the processes of revenge for the Serbian misdeeds 
against the Albanian population before and during the NATO intervention.”347 
Following this premise, an American architect Andrew Herscher, who served as 
cultural heritage officer and co-head of the Department of Culture in the new Kosovo 
government in 2001-2005, wrote a book on the destruction of heritage in Kosovo and 
Metohija. Aware of the difficulties that his account would face due to his personal 
involvement in working for Kosovo’s independence, Herscher attempted to balance 
the West-established narrative of the Serbian aggression on Kosovo (and other non-
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Serbian territories), with justifiable destruction of Serbian heritage as understandable 
revenge.348 According to him, Serbian forces “vandalised, destroyed or damaged 225 
out of 600 mosques during their counterinsurgency campaigns in 1998/99.”349 Against 
this data, he gives a number of “151 Serbian churches and other patrimonial sites” in 
the weeks following the withdrawal of the Serbian army and the refugees from Kosovo 
and Metohija in 1999 alone.350  
 
Fig. 1.63 – The Palace of Government in Belgrade, initially the first governmental building of the 
Kingdom SHS, built in 1926-1928, was destroyed in 1999 NATO attack. It was destroyed twice before, 
in 1941 and 1944 and some original features of the building were lost forever. Rebuilt in 2003.  
Unsurprisingly, in the same year 1999, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
rejected any form of collaboration with professionals from the responsible agencies in 
Belgrade. Bernard Kouchner (b.1939), then special representative of the UN Secretary 
General for Kosovo, known as the founder of the organization Médecines Sans 
Frontières, created a new group referred to as Patrimoine Sans Frontières, aiming to 
replace the banned preservation and conservation experts from Belgrade. Neither the 
composition nor the qualifications of this group have ever been revealed. Meanwhile, 
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as the list of damaged or obliterated Serbian monuments continued to grow, a 
“statistical syndrome,” intent on counting and recording the victimized monuments, 
has emerged from Belgrade institutions. These lists, duly compiled and documented 
by various institutions and groups concerned with national heritage, reached a limited 
number of professional organizations in the West, where they were either received 
with reserved consternation or, more commonly, remained quietly ignored.351 
Only by going through the material written by both sides is it possible to estimate 
how much was really damaged and destroyed. In books written by Serbian authors, the 
accent is on the damage caused by the Albanians and NATO, which is obviously a 
logical attribution of blame from their perspective. The time when these destructions 
took place is also significant. The destruction of mosques and many other Islamic 
shrines took place during the campaign of expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo and 
Metohija to Albania in spring 1999. Like in the other wars of Yugoslav succession, 
the mosques were used by the Albanian military and population to hide from the 
Serbian army and that is how some of the destruction of this heritage occurred.352 On 
the other hand, the destruction of the many churches and monasteries took place after 
the war in 1999, when the Albanian refugees returned to their homes in Kosovo and 
Metohija. Having the back-up of the external factors on their side, they began a 
systematic destruction, both in quality and quantity. The Serbian monuments were not 
destroyed in the course of armed conflicts or incidents but rather after the end of the 
war. One third of all the registered monuments in the Serbian heritage in Kosovo and 
Metohija were demolished, damaged or endangered, as well as more than half of 
churches still in use (Fig. 1.64). The destruction of Serbian religious monuments in 
Kosovo and Metohija, was not accidental, but carefully planned.353 
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Fig 1.64 – The Church of St.John The Baptist, 13th century, where, according to legend, Prince Lazar 
and his army received the last Holy Communion on the eve of the Kosovo Battle in 1389. It was 
destroyed during both World Wars, damaged during the Albanian insurgencies in 1981, partly destroyed 
during the NATO attack in 1999 and finally demolished and turned into a scrap heap and public toilet 
(photograph to the right) in March 2001. 
 
1.8.2 Kosovo Myth revisited 
 
The speed of the European Union and the United States to present their 
involvement in the 1990s Yugoslav wars as a success resulted in the province 
unilaterally declaring independence in 2008. By then, the province was virtually 
ethnically cleansed of Serbs. To provide the framework for the legitimacy of Kosovo’s 
independence, a new narrative had to be created. The narrative closely corresponds 
with the construction of the Albanian nation-state in Kosovo, without mentioning the 
centuries-long Serbian presence there. Apart from the Western academics who 
formulated the basic postulates of the Serbian occupation of Kosovo in the late 12th 
century, published in their books before NATO’s military intervention, the US and EU 
officials are still advising the Kosovo government on the implementation of these 
postulates.354 Western apparatchiks in collusion with Albanian historians from the 
University of Priština are still working on further refinements of these new narratives. 
This is best illustrated by an article by Naser Ferri, a professor of history at the 
University of Priština, published for the education of young Albanians in Kosovo: 
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“Their (Serbian) history and their acts have shown that Serbs were and still are 
one of the most destructive people in the world, who, during their migration from the 
Carpathians and occupation of the Balkans, destroyed everything where they stepped. 
One of the few things they accepted without destroying was Orthodox Christianity. 
After they accepted it, a long period began in which they embezzled sacred Dardanian 
objects and adopted them for the needs of the Serb Church. Even today, the traces of 
this assimilation are evident in ancient churches throughout Kosovo…There is 
information that even the Patriarchy of Peć, the Dečani Monastery, Gračanica,355 
St.Marko Monastery, Church of Korish in Lipljan and many other famous ‘Serbian’ 
churches were constructed precisely on the foundation of earlier autochthonous 
churches…”356  
Supporting this narrative, Anna Di Lellio (Fig. 3.25), a sociologist from 
Columbia University and a former UN consultant to Kosovo’s Albanian Prime 
Minister, published a book The Battle of Kosovo 1389 – An Albanian Epic in 
association with the Centre for Albanian Studies in London in 2009. As its title 
suggests, the book argues that the Kosovo Battle was actually fought by the Albanians 
and that the mythical assassin of Sultan Murad I was an ethnic Albanian. The fact that 
there are no existing Albanian interpretations of the myth, except two poems recorded 
by the Serbian historian Gliša Elezović (Fig. 1.36) in the early 20th century, DiLellio 
explains by the “shifting loyalties following the mass conversion of Albanians to the 
faith of the murdered Sultan.”357 For correcting this historic error, DiLellio argues that 
the Albanians are actually “Crypto-Catholics, who only feign to be Muslim” and that 
“being one of the oldest European Christian nations” belonging to Islam for 500 years 
can be perceived as “a temporary interlude.”358 
Part of this programme by the new Kosovo government was the approval in 2005 
of the project for constructing a new Catholic Cathedral in Priština, “the largest in the 
Balkans, despite the fact that over 90% of the population is Muslim.359 According to 
the Catholic bishop of Kosovo Dode Gjegjiu, the size of the cathedral is not 
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controversial. Its erection aimed to show that the new Kosovo was close to Europe 
(Fig. 1.65).360  
 
Fig. 1.65 – A new Catholic cathedral in Priština, the capital of Kosovo and Metohija, dedicated to 
Mother Theresa, an ethnic Albanian, was built in 2005-2010, despite the fact that there less than 4% of 
overall population of the province is Catholic. The tallest Catholic church in the Balkans (bell-tower is 
75m tall) was severely criticized by the Albanian Muslim scholars.361 
 
The building of the new cathedral is accompanied by the re-interpretation of the 
Serbian Orthodox Monasteries as the heritage of Kosovo’s Albanians, built by the 
Albanians before Serbian occupation in the 12th and 20th centuries. The catholic 
influences evident on the three architectural styles362 of the Nemanjić period are 
conveniently renamed the Paleologian Renaissance, so the transition from the Islamic 
Albanian identity could be supplemented by the notion of Albanian proto-Catholic 
Europeanism. Thus, in 2004 the government of Kosovo and Metohija began the 
campaign of presenting Kosovo as a multi-ethnic society. In Priština and other towns, 
the campaign was advertised through the media and billboards which displayed a series 
of historic sites in Kosovo, ranging from the Neolithic and Roman period to the 
Mediaeval and Ottoman. However, the mutual distrust between the Serbs and 
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Albanians is so strong that, even in Herscher’s opinion, the “truths of common 
heritage, instituted by the Western Powers, are a fabrication supplemented by 
architecture.”363 
1.9 Revisionism 
After international sanctions were introduced in 1992, all activities relating to 
nation-(re)building in Serbia were reduced to a minimum. The main reasons were 
financial, but also programmatic. After the initial support for Milošević in 1987-91, 
the majority of Serbian intellectuals became disenchanted with his manipulation of 
Serbian nationalism. The younger generation chose massive emigration worldwide 
and, before the borders with Serbia were completely closed, the estimated brain-drain 
for the 1992-1996 period amounted to 300,000.365 This trend continued to the present-
day with a further 300,000 university educated emigrants leaving Serbia between 1999 
and 2010, leaving the country with only 10% highly educated professionals, too few 
to work on any nation-building programme.366 Those who remained, exposed to 
economic hardship and unable to conduct any intellectual exchange, withdrew from 
public life. As the West singled out the SANU as the ideological supporter of the wars 
in Yugoslavia, it had little influence on the politicians who replaced Milošević in 2000. 
After barely surviving the 1990s, academic research in Serbian institutions 
slightly increased, as the Universities of Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš began re-
establishing the broken relationships with their international counterparts.367 During 
the 19th and 20th century, Belgrade was established as a paramount educational centre 
in the south-eastern Europe and maintained that position until 1992. Even though the 
academic publications were reduced to a minimum in the 1990s, the publishing activity 
is slowly increasing. Some projects related to national reassertion were being presented 
to the public, but they are still relatively small in numbers in comparison with 
neighbouring countries.368 In 2010, a group of Belgrade professors and lecturers 
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presented their Lexicon of towns and market places in the mediaeval Serbian lands – 
according to the written sources with a clear aim of preventing the re-writing of history 
that is currently taking place in former Yugoslavia. In its preface, the editor Siniša 
Mišić underlined that the book was based on the existing written sources and called 
for a new archaeological examination of Serbian mediaeval towns, for which the 
Lexicon was intended to be the basis.369 The Lexicon included the presentation of 
mediaeval towns and cities in the historic Serbian lands: Serbia, Montenegro, parts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Macedonia. This work marked the unobtrusive 
return of mediaeval history to public life for the first time in more than two decades.  
In terms of historiography, the younger generation of Serbian scholars was 
reintroduced to international institutions and, apart from the traditional, new lines of 
research, such as histories of everyday life and women studies, emerged in scholarly 
works. In the 1970s and 1980s, Belgrade scholars managed to produce some seminal 
works on mediaeval architecture, sculpture and painting, whilst at the same time, the 
archaeology school achieved an international status in the Neolithic and Roman 
provincial archaeology.370 There are some positive trends emerging in this field, such 
as the major project of the revitalization of the Roman sites “Following the roads of 
the Roman Emperors” and new excavations in Vinča.371 Being best developed and 
with the longest tradition, it is not surprising that these fields are of major interest to 
the international teams which resumed their work on the sites in Serbia after 2004.372 
 However, the main interest of the Serbian public remained the academic 
(re)evaluation of Serbian historiography, especially the one coming from the West. 
The Wars of Yugoslav Succession caused a tidal wave of quickly written, 
“convenient” histories of Serbs and Serbia, frequently without the knowledge of 
Serbian language and use of Serbian sources and relying on the literature produced 
during the 20th century.373 The immense revision that Serbian history and 
historiography were exposed to by the Western authors in the majority of works 
published since the late 1980s, should be viewed against the political context which 
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treated the Serbs as the new Untermenschen of Europe. The reason for the 
unprecedented enmities expressed by the Western authors was that the traditional 
narrative of the former Serbian allies required disassociation with the Serbs because 
of their new role as main villains of Europe. In that sense, the notions of “Greater 
Serbian nationalism” and “Greater Serbian Hegemony” introduced to the world by 
Austro-Hungary in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which had been dismissed 
then, were redeployed through the works of journalists-turned-academics.374 These 
two notions, resurrected by Tito’s regime, reached international academic and political 
circles in the decades after 1945 as part of the official Yugoslav ideology and remained 
one of the key-arguments during the 1990s wars.375 Since Serbia was denounced as 
the principal generator of the war, the Western narrative equalized the Serbs with the 
German Nazis of the Second World War, further implying that they deserved 
punishment, the reduction of their state-territory and the ongoing de-Nazification and 
de-nationalisation processes.376   
But, it was not only the Serbian historiography that was revised for modern 
political purposes. The entire Serbian culture, from ethnology and literature to the 
national myths, were reinterpreted in a negative light. The roles of Vuk Karadžić, 
Kosovo Myth, the Draft and Njegoš became the favourite subject of current 
revisionism. Taken out of context and analysed through the modern understanding of 
“nationalism,” Serbian culture was not compared to the contemporary processes that 
were taking place elsewhere in Europe.377 This trend of revising Serbian history and 
historiography by Western authors has less in common with the academic quest for 
knowledge than with political intent by their governments. In its essence, such political 
intent aims at adapting the past for the present use, thus confirming the old maxim that 
history is written by victors. It should be noted, however, that such a history has a 
limited expiry date.378  
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The Croats 
The appearance and development of Croatian nationalism in the 19th century was 
largely influenced by the internal policies of the Habsburg Empire, in which the 
majority of the Croats lived until the creation of Yugoslavia. At the time of the birth 
of nationalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a smaller percentage of Croats 
lived on the Adriatic coast which was then ruled by the Venetian Republic. An even 
smaller number of Croats lived in the Bosnian Pashalik, the westernmost part of the 
declining Ottoman Empire. The Habsburg Croats were further divided between those 
who lived in Civil Croatia and those who lived in the Military Frontier.1 By the early 
19th century, the Croat nobility fully recognized Habsburg supremacy and in most 
cases did not accept the ideas of nationalism that spread throughout the Empire after 
the Napoleonic wars.  
The Croat intelligentsia that initiated national awakening amongst Croats in the 
first half of the 19th century was fully aware of its weak position and sought to 
generate wider public support by including as many of the South Slavs as possible. 
This resulted in postponing the formulation of a Croat national narrative until a later 
date, as well as the definition of a common language which would not only include 
three different dialects, but also share a common morphology and grammar with the 
Serbs. This further meant that development of Croat nationalism had three phases. 
Firstly, its initial Illyrian form was a Romantic response of a few literate intellectuals 
to the growth of nationalisms emanating from Vienna and Budapest.  
Its evolution into Yugoslavism from the 1860s onwards received a political 
connotation after the Ausgleich of 1867 which transformed the Habsburg Empire into 
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian response to the growing Slavic 
dissatisfaction within the Empire were internal policies which promoted various 
degrees of favouritism of smaller ethnic groups by keeping them subdued through 
maintenance of their mutual competition. In Croat case, this was manifested 
primarily through the insistence on religious and folkloristic differences from other 
South Slavs, eventually leading to the formulation of Croat nationalism in the 1880s. 
However, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was far too strong to enable the creation of 
an independent Croat state and Croat intellectuals working on national liberation 
readily participated in the creation of Yugoslavia. Consisting of different traditions 
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 See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 31-32. 
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and religious groups, the Yugoslav solution frustrated Croat desire for national self-
definition. Consequently, Croat nationalism underwent three additional changes 
during the Yugoslav period and finally led to the declaration of independence from 
SFRY on 25 June 1991. All transformations of Croat nationalism followed the 
political changes in Europe at the time and have to be examined against the political 
background when those changes occurred. Its modern manifestation stems from the 
wars of Yugoslav succession, which enabled Croatia to present itself to the 
international public as the victim of aggression and acquire a new national history. 
This was overwhelmingly supported by the Western media and academic circles that 
adopted not only close co-operation with Croat academic institutions, but which had 
in their ranks a significant number of Croat émigré scholars who, being associated to 
the NDH regime, had left Yugoslavia after 1945.  
Croat nationalism is thus a convenient case-study of the politically influenced 
re-evaluation of the national past and re-writing of the entire national history in order 
to justify the current political situation in the region.  
2.1 Territoriality of Croatian nationalism 
The territory of the current Croatian state, according to the official census of 
2011, counted just fewer than 4.3 million inhabitants, of which nearly 90% declared 
themselves Croats (around 3.9 million), with Serbs at 4.4% (just over 180,000).2 
These results are in sharp contrast to those of 1991, when the population of the 
Republic of Croatia was at its highest and counted just fewer than 4.8 million, of 
which 3.7 million (78%) declared themselves Croats and 580,000 (12.15%) declared 
themselves Serbs.3 This huge fall in the numbers of the Serbs in Croatia was the 
direct result of the 1995 ethnic cleansing and there are no signs yet of the Republic of 
Croatia allowing the return of the displaced population, despite the declarative calls 
for return (Map. 2.1 and Map 2.2).  
Because the EU and the US sanctioned the expulsion of the majority of the 
Serbs from the territory of modern-day Croatia, the question of borders and the 
territory of the Republic of Croatia are considered to have been finally brought to a 
                                               
2
 http://www.dzs.hr - Final Results of Census 2011 – Accessed on 24/02/2015. The official data from 
2011 Census point to the decline of nearly 150,000 people of the overall population of Croatia in 
comparison with 2001 Census, which counted to 4.43 million. 
3
 CD Rome – Naselja i stanovništvo republike Hrvatske od 1857-2001 godine – Izdanje Državnog 
zavoda za statistiku Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb, 2005 
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close. The only unresolved questions are those of the ownership of personal property, 
as well as the surviving religious and cultural heritage that witnessed the nature of 
the creation of the modern Croatia, now consisting of three historical regions: Croatia 
Proper, Slavonija and Dalmatia. The disappearance of the Serbs from these territories 
in the course of the 20th century found its justification in the academic discourse, first 
developed in the final decades of the Austro-Hungarian period and then in Croatia 
itself. The final argument about the disappearance of the Serbian population in 
Croatia has been asserted in the past twenty years and, against the background of the 
full support Croatia received from the EU and US, it appears that will remain a 
dominant rationale in the future of the Croat historiography and national narrative. 
       
Map. 2.1 – Ethnic and territorial map of Croatia in 1991   Map. 2.2 – Ethnic and territorial map in 2001 
(Territories marked blue represent the Serbian population on both maps in respective years. Author: L. Ilić) 
 
2.1.1 Historical spatial distribution  
Prior to 1991, Croatia was last independent in 1102, when it succumbed to 
Hungarian conquest. Exactly what was the territory of the last independent Croatian 
state is difficult to assert, as there are no surviving documents which could determine 
this.4  The earliest maps of European cartography represent Croatia either as part of 
the Hungarian Kingdom or as part of the Military Frontier.5 Mercator’s Atlas placed 
Croatia in the vicinity of Zagreb, whilst the surrounding territories were marked as 
                                               
4
 Fine,  John V.A. – When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans, Ann Arbor, 2006, 59-60 
5
 Danti’s maps in Florence do not include a reference to Croatia, but Bosina, Servia and Macedonia 
are all depicted. 
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Sclavonia and Hungaria.6 Written documents also place Croatia in the vicinity of 
Zagreb, whilst Dalmatia, known to the Italians as Schiavonia or Sclavonia are almost 
exclusively depicted as separate territories, always under Italian rule.7  Thus, 
between the loss of independence in 1102 and the inclusion of the Austro-Hungarian 
Military Frontier (Map. 1.a.11) into the territory of Croatian-Slavonian crown land 
under Hungarian jurisdiction in 1882, Croatia was confined to the vicinity of Zagreb, 
where the population spoke the kajkavian dialect of the South Slav language group, a 
language close to Slovenian. When Slavonia was added to Croatia in 1882, the 
štokavian dialect spoken by both the Catholic and Serbian Orthodox population 
living there, became a prevalent factor in the development of the common Yugoslav 
idea. Croatia-Slavonia remained within the Hungarian part of Austro-Hungary until 
1918, when it joined the Kingdom of SHS. Dalmatia, a separate region also with 
štokavian speakers, was ruled by the Venetian Republic for most of the period 
between the 13th and 19th centuries. Following the end of Napoleon’s “Illyrian 
Provinces” in 1815, it was controlled by Vienna, under which jurisdiction it 
remained until 1918.  
The abolition of the Military Frontier was a consequence of the Austro-
Hungarian occupation of the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, making the 
inclusion of Slavonia to the joint crown-land Croatia-Slavonia a pragmatic 
administrative decision. Initially formed as a buffer zone against the ever-threatening 
Ottoman Empire, the Military Frontier changed its borders and ethnic composition of 
the population over the centuries (Map. 2.3). Stretching over the territories of the 
present-day Vojvodina, Slavonija, and most of Transylvania, the Military Frontier 
included a myriad of people, of which Orthodox Serbs represented a significant 
percentage.8  
2.1.2 The Migrations controversy – Whose is Slavonija? 
The Ottoman rule between 1526 and 1699 led to the expansion of Islam and 
the Ottoman way of life in these areas. This was accompanied by the re-designing of 
                                               
6
 http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/ttp/mercator/accessible/images/page40full.jpg - Accessed on 
25/02/2015 
7
 Fine, 2006, 20 
8
 See, for example, the extensive Austrian records, such as the Übersichts-Tafeln zur Statistik der 
österreichischen Monarchie, Vienna, 1850. See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 31, See 
Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 21-24. 
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the mediaeval cities of the Hungarian Kingdom into the Oriental-style kasaba (small 
town), which destroyed the majority of the early and late mediaeval heritage in these 
territories. 
  
Fig. 2.3 – Military Frontier in 1868, the year of Nagodba; Croatian territory marked dark red. 
After the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the Muslim population was promptly 
expelled from the areas re-conquered by the Christian Holy Roman Empire and 
almost all traces of the Ottoman presence there were equally promptly annihilated.9 
When the Habsburgs finally militarily secured the territory north of the Danube and 
Sava rivers, they could initiate its economic recovery. This involved not only 
complete rebuilding of urban centres according to Central European models, but also 
draining marshlands that covered significant parts of the Pannonian plain, as well as 
the construction of several main roads and re-establishment of the baronial estate 
                                               
9
 See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 32. 
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system.10 As the Ottoman conquest north of the Danube almost entirely eradicated 
the remains of the previous mediaeval urban and religious life, evidence of its 
existence is based on scarce written documents which indicate overall Hungarian 
control of the area. However, prior to 1526, the Hungarians imposed their rule over 
the north Balkan territories through the lesser Slav, Serbian or Croat, nobility who 
recognized Hungarian suzerainty. 
The colonization of the Military Frontier that lasted from its establishment until 
the mid-18th century was not only caused by the Habsburgs’ need to prevent new 
Ottoman incursions into its territories, but also by the desire of the Christian 
populations of both denominations to escape Turkish rule. As one by one mediaeval 
Balkan Christian states were falling under the tide of the Ottoman conquest, their 
surviving elites and some sections of the lower classes withdrew northwards.11  
Since prior to the Battle of Mohács Slavonija was dominated by the Hungarian 
crown, church and nobility, it is difficult to assess the ethnic and religious structure 
of the territory in the period before the Ottoman advance. Admittedly, early 
mediaeval documents mention the name Slavonia and the Slavs, but without any 
exact geographical description. Porphyrogenitus noted that a part of “the Croats who 
came to Dalmatia split off and possessed themselves of Illyricum and Pannonia.”12 
However, it is unclear what the borders of these two former Roman provinces were 
at the time of Porhyrogenitus or the time of Heraclius to which he refers.13 
Furthermore, no other pre-1102 source, Slavic or foreign, connects Croatia with 
Pannonia.14 All the research points to this obvious imprecision of the sources and 
place early Slavonia much further south: to the territory south of the River Sava and 
south-west of the Croatia Proper, most of which is today in Bosnia and 
                                               
10
 On the nature of the urban landscape of the Military Frontier, see Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 27-28 
11
 Constantine the Philosopher, the biographer of Despot Stefan Lazarević (1374-1427, ruled from 
1389), was a Bulgarian intellectual and a poet who escaped to the Serbian court in 1393, after the fall 
of Bulgaria. The withdrawal to the Hungarian territories north of the Danube of the remaining 
members of the Serbian ruling family and nobility after the fall of the Despotate in 1459 is well 
recorded in the Hungarian historic documents. See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 31 and 
Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 21. This pattern of withdrawal further north and west from the Ottomans 
continued until the Siege of Vienna in 1683. 
12
 DAI, Volume I, 30 
13
 During the Roman period, the Pannonian borders stretched as far west as Austria and Slovenia, 
which is outside the current territory of Slavonija. Similarly, Illyrian borders overlapped with the 
Pannonian over history. As there are no other documents to clear up the matter, this sentence is 
heavily disputed among Croat, Serbian and Hungarian historians. 
14
 Fine, 2006, 72 
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Herzegovina.15 The Croat historian Milan pl.Šufflay (1879-1931) asserted in the 
1920s that “there existed from the 12th to the 16th century from Drava to Zeta a broad 
belt in which was it not customary to use Croat or Serb names, but only general 
ethnic term the Slav. Therefore, Slavonia was a fluid territory and term which 
covered an area between the Drava and the Gvozd Mountain to the north and 
Neretva, Drin and Bojana in Albania to the south; this was what remained from the 
Slavonia of the 7th-10th centuries that included all the territory between Zadar, 
Thessaloniki and the Rhodope Mountains in Bulgaria.”16  
What is called Slavonija today were the marshlands between the Sava and 
Drava and were first dominated by the Avars (6th-9th centuries) and then by the 
Hungarians (from the late 9th century). It seems highly unlikely that many Slavs, 
either Croats or Serbs, inhabited this area in significant numbers before the Ottomans 
started pushing them northwards from the 14th century. This argument is supported 
by the total absence of both written sources and archaeological evidence, as no 
Slavic settlements from the period 7th-12th centuries have yet been identified. The 
archaeological remains, unearthed in parts of northern Slavonija are no earlier than 
the mid-10th century and are associated with the creation of the first Hungarian 
state.17  
Current Croatian historiography insists that the first Croatian king Tomislav I 
Trpimirović (910-928) included Slavonia in his realm after defeating the Hungarians, 
which is proof enough that the Croats inhabited the area from the period of their 
migrations to the Balkans.18 This debate is of immense importance, as a number of 
leading Croat historians insist that the Military Frontier, that is Slavonia, Lika, part 
of Croatia Proper and Srem,19 were predominantly Croat since the early Middle Ages 
and that the Serbian presence there was a consequence of the immigration influx of 
the “Orthodox Slavs and Vlachs after the end of the 17th century, which forever 
shattered the integrity of the Croat people’s ethnic territory.”20  
                                               
15
 The episode of the prince Ljudevit Posavski (810-823) escaping to the Serbs in Dalmatia was 
widely discussed in both Croat and Serbian historiography. However, the easternmost and 
northernmost parts of his princedom, with the capital Sisak are outside of the territory of the modern 
day Slavonija. See Appendix I – Historical background, p.16. 
16
 Fine, 2006, 167 
17
 Curta, F. – Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages – 500 – 1250, Cambridge, 2006, 191-193 
18
 Ibid, 193 
19
 Today part of Vojvodina, area of ancient Sirmium, from which its name derived 
20
 Banac, I.  – The Rediviva Croatia of Pavao Riter Vitezović, Harvard Ukrainian Studies 10, 1986, 
493, quoted in Fine, J.V.A. – When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans, Ann Arbor, 2006, 175. 
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The Ottoman conquest in the 16th century complicated the ethnic situation in 
the conquered Pannonian plain even further, because the conversions in the former 
Hungarian Kingdom took place in a manner similar to that south of the Sava and 
Danube rivers a century before. The Ottomans also practiced the re-settlement of 
population as a means of easier control of the newly conquered territories. From the 
early 15th century the Muslims of Anatolia and Balkan cities were transferred into 
Serbia and Hungary, whilst the Christians from those areas were re-settled mainly to 
Asia Minor and towns dominated by the Muslims.21 The Ottomans carefully 
recorded the population surveys of the new territories through the system of the 
defter record books. However, after the 16th century it became uncommon to record 
the population of the previously conquered land, although some defters were 
produced for the re-conquered land in the 17th century.22  
Whilst Croat historians claim that Slavonia in pre-Ottoman times was 
predominantly Croatian and that the Serbian Orthodox population appeared in these 
areas not before the late 17th century, their Hungarian counterparts claim the 
opposite: Slavonia, as well as Transylvania, were in the same period predominantly 
Hungarian. “While Magyars or ethnic Hungarians constituted some 75 to 80 percent 
of the kingdom’s population before Ottoman rule, they had become a minority by the 
early 18th century. This had fateful consequences for the country in later 
centuries.”23 There are no Hungarian documents that would corroborate this 
argument. Generally, the Hungarians based their estimations on some discovered 
early defeters in the European archives, but wider use of these documents was not 
fully available until the Second World War. It was only after 1945 that the analysis 
of defters was taken more seriously.24 Immediately the question of misuse of defters’ 
interpretation arose. Firstly, the documents dated to the time of the conquest do not 
indicate the difference between the Catholic and the Orthodox Christians. Secondly, 
                                                                                                                                     
This theory, asserted by the Croat émigré historians of the post-1945 period, became dominant in the 
1990s when it was accepted by some Western historians who further advanced it in order to support 
interventionism. See works of N. Malcolm, M.A. Hoare, S. Ramet or M. Vickers, for example.  
21
 Usunçarşih, I.H. – Osman Tarihi, Vol. 1, 181, quoted in Hooper, P.L. – Forced Population 
Transfers in Early Ottoman Imperial Strategy: A Comparative Approach, Princeton, 2003, 23. One 
example of forced population transfer is the Belgrade Forest, 20km outside of Istanbul. It was named 
after the Serbs from Belgrade and its vicinity re-settled there by Suleyman the Magnificent (1494-
1566) in order to safeguard the springs that supplied the city with water.   
22
 Cosgel, M. - Ottoman Tax Registers (Tahrir Defterleri), Historical Methods, Spring 2004, Vol. 37, 
No. 2, ft. 2, 37 
23
 Ágoston, G. and Masters, B. – Encyclopaedia of the Ottoman Empire, New York, 2009, 258  
24
 Cosgel, 2004, 5 
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since the information of the ethnic background of the Christian population is also 
absent, it appears that the Hungarian claim is at least partly accurate. The records of 
transferred population often indicate the place of their origin, but this practise was 
not uniformly used throughout the Ottoman Empire and there is no definite analysis 
on the situation in Slavonia.25 What is known, however, is that both the Ottomans 
and the Habsburgs used the non-Turks or non-Austrians/Hungarians respectively as 
the buffer zone against their principal enemy. Thus, the bordering territories mostly 
exposed to the raids were first populated by the Croat or Serb population, with the 
Ottoman or Habsburg authorities in command. Unless the complete available defters 
related to the territory of Slavonia are analysed simultaneously by all relevant 
national schools a the common consensus is reached, separate Croat, Serbian and 
Hungarian national narratives will remain in stark contrast to each other and prone to 
manipulations. 
Whilst generally ignoring the Hungarian, Croat historiography and those who 
support it insist on the detrimental consequences for the Croat national territory of 
the two particular Serbian migrations that happened between 1690 and 1740.26 The 
Serbian migrations led to the displacement of a large number of the Serbs from the 
territory of Kosovo and Metohija, which after this period saw the spread of the 
Albanian population in the province. Diametrically opposing the Croats, Albanian 
scholars downplay the number of Serbian migrations arguing that the Serbs 
“willingly withdrew” from the territory which they had first occupied only in the 12th 
century.27 Similarly, modern Western historians favouring the Albanian narrative 
argue that no Serbian migrations of significant numbers that would have any impact 
on the ethnic composition of Kosovo and Metohija ever occurred.28 This obvious 
discrepancy in the modern narrative poses the following question: If, as claimed by 
                                               
25
 Hooper, 2003, 81 
26
 Western historiography in the past twenty years accepted this argument, aiming to show that the 
1990s expulsion of the Serbs from the modern Croat state was justified in every aspect: historical, 
political and moral. See Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 23-24, which illustrates the arguments of Noel 
Malcolm and Frederick Ascombe. Neither of them took into account the Hungarian view on historical 
territorial claims. As such, their arguments represent the typical example of the contemporary Western 
revision of Serbian history. 
27
 In the English language literature the argument of “willing migration” during the Habsburg-
Ottoman wars was first promoted by Malcolm in his book “Kosovo: A Short History.” 
28
 Again, this assertion aimed at justifying the expulsion of the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija in 
1999. See Chapter III – The Albanians, p. 297-300 and works of Noel Malcolm, Miranda Wickers or 
James Pettifer arguing the Albanian viewpoint. It is interesting to see how the two opposing views: 
one insisting on the Serbian migrations and one completely denying them, are academically used to 
approve the policies of ethnic cleansing by the Croats and Albanians.  
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the Albanian historians, there were no significant movements from the south towards 
the Croat national territory in the 17th and 18th centuries, would this mean that the 
Serbs from the Military Frontier were native to Slavonija since at least the time when 
both the Croats and the Serbs settled in the area?29 This question remains without an 
answer. Speculation aside, the migrations contributed to the preservation of the 
Serbian ethnic affiliation north of the Danube enabling intertwining with the Catholic 
Croats.  
Although recent attempts to depict the Habsburg Monarchy as tolerant of the 
existence of Orthodoxy in its territories are gaining momentum, the reality was 
somewhat different. Immediately after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, Emperor 
Leopold I issued an imperial charter which sanctioned the union between the Roman 
Catholic Church and those Orthodox Churches that wanted to accept the supremacy 
of Rome.30 The exiled Serbian Patriarchate of Peć, then settled in Sremski Karlovci, 
was strongly against the union. Anticipating problems, the Court in Vienna 
downgraded it to a Metropolitanate in 1703. This enabled the promotion of 
Catholicism in the Military Frontier which become dominant by the late-19th and 
early 20th century. In just sixty years, between 1850 and 1910, the Orthodox 
population fell sharply. In the above mentioned 1850 census31 the population of the 
entire Military Frontier (Croatia, Slavonija, Vojvodina and parts of Transylvania) 
numbered the Serbs as 50%. In the 1910 census, the Serbian population numbered 
around 25% in the territory of the new administrative unit of Croatia-Slavonia alone. 
Because the Habsburg Empire was re-structured in 1867, it is impossible to compare 
the territorial spatiality of the Serbian Orthodox population in Slavonija because the 
geographical census units were different.32 The new administrative units of the 
Empire corresponded with the period of growth of national movements within the 
Empire resulting in the Ausgleich and ruthless unification policies that increased after 
1867. Subsequently, the decrease in number of Orthodox Serbs in Slavonija resulting 
from such policies coincided with the establishment of a separate Croat nationalism, 
based on Catholic exclusivity. This differed from the Pan-Slavic ideas that 
                                               
29
 See Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 21-22. 
30
 White, G. – Nationalism and Territory, Boston, 2000, 123 
31
 See footnote 8, p. 129, above. 
32
 Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények, Budapest, 1912, p. 30–33 
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dominated the first half of the 19th century. In such a complicated political and 
religious atmosphere Croat nationalism began its development.  
2.1.3 Dalmatia 
Napoleon acquired former Venetian territories in the eastern Adriatic coast 
in 1809, incorporating them into the French Empire as the Illyrian Provinces. When 
they were returned to Austria as the Kingdom of Dalmatia in 1816 after Napoleon’s 
defeat, most Dalmatian towns, except Dubrovnik, continued to be governed by 
Italian or Italianised Slavic merchant aristocrats. With few exceptions, urban 
administration, economy and cultural life were in hands of Italians and, after 1815, 
increasingly Germans and Hungarians, with very few native Slavs entering the 
imperial public service. The major coastal towns had a significant percentage of non-
Slavic population, even though the Slavs were not forbidden to live within the cities.  
The towns’ hinterland was, however, overwhelmingly Slav: in the north, they 
were predominantly Catholic, in the vicinity of Dubrovnik and further south, they 
were mainly Serbian Orthodox.33 The Slavic presence enabled the penetration of the 
South Slavic language of the štokavian dialect in the coastal towns, whilst the 
language of the Slavs living on the islands and parts of Istria, evolved into the 
čakavian dialect. Both dialects were exposed to the influence of Italian and 
developed independently from the kajkavian dialect, spoken in Croatia Proper. 
In Dubrovnik itself, four languages were spoken in the Middle Ages: Latin, 
Old Ragusan (a Romance language developed from the corrupt Latin, which 
disappeared by the 16th century), Italian and, finally, Slavic of štokavian dialect, 
which was used more and more from the 15th century. Even though the only 
independent South Slav state in history, Dubrovnik had two chancelleries for 
inscribing the documents: one in Latin and another one in Slavic used for affairs 
concerning the Slavic nobles of the near interior. This Slavic chancellery wrote 
Slavic in Cyrillic.34  
                                               
33
 This distribution roughly corresponded to the first mention of the Serbian-Croat geographical 
position in De Administrando Imperio, and the borders of the 10th-11th century Croatian and 12th-14th 
century Serbian kingdoms. See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 13-16 
34
 This Dubrovnik Cyrillic script became the most contentious issue between the Croatian and Serbian 
scholars in the past two decades, as both use it to claim Dubrovnik as of their own ethnic identity. 
Fine, 2006, 155 
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French rule in Dalmatia lasted less than a decade and was highly unpopular, 
but it presented the inhabitants of Dalmatia with the ideas of the French Revolution. 
Despite the fact that they could never fully develop there, it provided the inspiration 
for a number of national movements that were growing in the Habsburg Monarchy 
later in the 19th century. 
2.2 Historical and academic settings for the formation of Croatian nationalism  
–  Pre-Romantic national period and diverging paths of Croat nationalism  
When nationalism as an idea appeared in the Habsburg Empire, Croatia Proper 
was under the jurisdiction of Budapest. Dalmatia was governed by Vienna from 1816 
until the end of the First World War. Both parts of the Military Frontier were under 
direct imperial rule until 1881, when they were jointly included into the Kingdom of 
Croatia-Slavonia, governed by Budapest. Even though the present-day Croatia was 
technically part of one empire, it was divided between three administrations which 
developed from three differing historical circumstances:  
1. Croatia Proper, nominally part of the Hungarian crown land, was never 
affected by Ottoman expansion and retained the features of the Habsburg 
Empire and its religious and social structure, i.e. Roman Catholic and feudal. 
2. Slavonia, devastated by Ottoman rule which lasted just under two hundred 
years, was developing as a special imperial territory, where both Germans 
and Hungarians represented the governing elite. Whilst the general cultural 
features of the Habsburg and later Austro-Hungarian Empire were at its core 
Central European, the cultural and linguistic differences between Hungarians 
and Germans imposed in varying degrees distinct cultural influences on the 
Croats and Serbs living in Slavonia. Because of the imperial policies of 
settling the mixed Slav population close to the Ottoman border, with the 
additional German settlers and those from elsewhere in the Empire, Slavonia 
never acquired the distinct characteristics of any single ethnic group until 
after 1945. 
3. Dalmatia changed rulers frequently, but its longest lasting influence was 
Italian, both culturally and linguistically. Until the Ottoman conquest became 
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a serious threat in the 15th century, very few Slavs, either Catholic or 
Orthodox lived inside the city walls of rich coastal towns. Only with the 
Ottoman advance, did the towns allow Slavs to become part of their urban 
life. However, those Slavs were soon Italianised and only a few intellectuals 
who adopted the ideas of the Renaissance and Baroque wrote their literature 
in Slavic and Italian/Latin. For this purpose, they often Italianised their 
names.35 
These foreign influences were much stronger than the impact of Croat or 
Serbian culture in the period prior to the national awakening. Neither of the two 
largest South Slav nations had its own state which could support their national 
development at the time when the romantic national movements were developing in 
Europe in the first half of the 19th century. Because of this, Croat nationalism, as 
indeed the nationalisms of other Slavic peoples in Europe, had to be based on the 
rediscovery of national history through language and folklore. However, the 
development of Croat nationalism was opposed by much stronger German, 
Hungarian and Italian nationalisms that were also growing at the time. Serbian 
nationalism in this period, although conceived in the Habsburg territory, soon moved 
to the nascent Serbian Principality south of the Danube, where it could develop 
unhindered from the 1830s onwards. Since the Ottoman threat had weakened, 
Serbian nationalism developing within the Principality did not need to make alliances 
with other neighbouring South Slav nationalisms in order to survive. Croat 
nationalism, on the other hand, had to do precisely that. This need to form alliances 
for mere survival led to the developmental path similar to that of the Serbian 
nationalism. Instead of having a national narrative formulated by the intellectuals 
from the Croat core territories, the initiators of the Croat national awakening drew 
heavily on the works of the pre-nationalist South Slav intellectuals originating in the 
periphery of the Croat ethnic zone.36 These early intellectuals were mainly writers 
and historians from Dalmatia, where the influence of Italian Humanism and the 
Renaissance was stronger than in other parts of the Habsburg Empire. 
 
                                               
35
 Italians regard these Italianised Slavs as part of their own culture. See further discussion. 
36
 See Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 40-43. 
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2.2.1 The “Illyrian language” of the Renaissance and Baroque Periods 
Apart from a few surviving mediaeval documents mainly of a religious and 
legal nature, the secular literature and the first historiography in the territory of what 
is the present-day Croatia, appeared in the 16th century among the humanist 
intellectuals of Dubrovnik, Hvar and Zadar.37 The first independent South Slav 
dictionary was published by a Šibenik-born Faust Veranzio (Vrančić) in Venice in 
1595 under the name Dictionarium quinque nobilissimarum Europae linguarum 
Latinae, Italicae, Germanicae, Dalmaticae et Ungaricae (Dictionary of five most 
noble European languages Latin, Italian, German, Dalmatian38 and Hungarian). 
Bartol Kašić (1575-1650) published in 1604 in Rome the first South Slav grammar 
Insistutionum linguae illyricae,39 in mixed štokavian and čakavian dialects. This was 
of utmost importance, as the majority of the Renaissance writers in Venetian 
Dalmatia and Dubrovnik wrote in Latin and Italian, rarely making distinctions 
between the South Slavs that were later to become known as the Serbs and the 
Croats.  
From the same period were two most important historians of the 16th and early 
17th century, writing about the Western Balkans: Mauro Orbini, the author of the 
influential Il regno degli Slavi, published in Pesaro in 1601, and Johannes Lucius, 
known for his De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae, published in Amsterdam in 1666.40 
However, the first history written in South Slav dialect was by Lucius’ follower 
Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652-1713), of German descent, who published in 1696 his 
Kronika aliti spomen vsega svieta vikov (The Chronicle or the Memory of the 
World). This work was considered to be the precursor of the pan-Slavic idea, 
developed in the early 19th century.41 Like his Serbian counterpart Djordje Branković 
(1645-1711), Vitezović made no sharp distinction between the Croats and Serbs and 
used their common name Slavs or Illyrians interchangeably. Vitezović is considered 
to be an important historian for both Croat and Serbian narratives, because he wrote 
two Latin histories of both peoples: Croatia Rediviva (1700) and Serbia illustrata 
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libri octo (after 1710).42 These early, pre-national writers, are important not only for 
their historical records, but because they introduced the idea of the Illyrian ancestry 
of the Slavs of their time.  
The very idea of the “Illyrian origins” of the Balkan Slavs had its roots in the 
two mediaeval manuscripts that linked the Slavic conquest of Dalmatia with the 
Gothic raids of the Illyrian provinces of the Roman Empire by Totila’s Goths in the 
6th century: the Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea, written by an anonymous Slavic 
monk sometime between the 12th and 13th centuries and the Historia Salonitana, 
written by Archbishop Thomas of Split in the 1250s.  According to the renowned 
Croatian linguist Radoslav Katičić (b.1930), the linking of the two distinct ethnic 
tribes was based on one line in the Chronicle which stated that “the Slavs were called 
Goths, because they came with Totila, as part of his army.”43 This connection of the 
Slavs and Goths, according to Katičić, was asserted sometime in the second half of 
the 12th century, after the Mongol raids of the 1240s.44 In the period of Humanism 
and the Renaissance the Dalmatian towns, influenced by the similar events in Italy 
saw the rise of secular intellectuals interested in the ancient past. The Illyrian 
features of the eastern Adriatic during the Roman period presented an excellent 
opportunity for the flourishing of the Renaissance literature and historiography in 
Dalmatia.   
These early Dalmatian intellectuals provide the core sources for the 
contemporary Croat and Serbian national narratives, but are also subject to mutually 
disputed national claims; the Croats simply label them Croats, because the majority 
of them were Roman Catholic and spoke Latin. The Serbs assert that they were of 
Serbian origin, because they wrote in the local štokavian dialect, used Cyrillic based 
on the Serbian redaction of Old Slavonic and frequently referred to the Nemanjić 
mediaeval past.45 The most striking feature in all written works from this period is 
the absence of national declaration by the authors. This is not surprising considering 
that, with the exception of Dubrovnik, all South Slav territories were ruled by foreign 
empires. Dubrovnik, a small independent city-state, became the place of refuge of 
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various Slavic aristocrats and intellectuals, who all brought their memories and 
customs. Merging these traditions within the city walls prevented a clear national 
distinction among them, so a preferred national self-identification of Dalmatian 
writers and historians was “Illyrian.”46   
The intricate nature of self-identification by Slavic writers from the Adriatic 
coast continued well into the 17th and 18th centuries. Beginning with the Dubrovnik 
poet Ivan Gundulić (1589-1638), whose epic Osman later served as a basis for the 
Illyrian movement of the 19th century, and ending with the extraordinary Rudjer 
Bošković (1711-1787),47 the artists and humanists of the declining Republic of 
Dubrovnik preserved memories of various South Slav mediaeval states.48  
Whilst the argument of the importance of the intellectuals from the pre-
Nationalism era for the cultural development on the Dalmatian coast is 
unquestionable, recent arguments about their ethnic origins brought into prominence 
all the absurdity of the nation-creation processes in the South Slav Balkans. As noted 
earlier,49 Catholics and Orthodox intermarried for several centuries prior to the 
appearance of nationalism in its modern form and the national designation of the 
name Croat or Serb became of importance only in the later 19th century.50  
2.2.2 A Heritage to build upon 
In terms of quality of life, Croats living in Croatia Proper, which was 
unaffected by the Ottoman invasion lived in a feudal society dominated by the high 
nobles of which only a few could trace Slav/Croat origins.51 The old mediaeval 
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 Dubrovnik authors used to refer to their language as: dubrovački (Dubrovnik), slovinski (Slavic), 
srpski (Serbian), hrvatski (Croatian) and naški (“our language”).  
47
 Rudjer Bošković was a scientist and a diplomat whose Theoria philosophiae naturalis redacta ad 
unicam legem virium in natura existentium (Theory of Natural philosophy derived from the single 
Law of forces which exist in Nature) brought him membership of the London Royal Academy in the 
1760s. 
48
 Bošković’s grandfather was a Serbian Orthodox who escaped from Herzegovina to Dalmatia and 
converted to Catholicism in the mid-16th century. With this conversion, his legacy began to be 
considered as exclusively Croat in the 19th century. Antun Sorkočević (1775-1841), the last 
ambassador of Dubrovnik in Paris, wrote Postanak i propast Republike Dubrovačke (The Rise and 
Fall of the Republic of Dubrovnik) which openly called for the unification of Dubrovnik, Boka 
Kotorska, Montenegro and Serbia into one state.  
49
 See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 31-32 
50
 With the adoption of the “divide and rule” policies of the Austro-Hungarian government following 
the periods of Bach’s absolutism and the Ausgleich the designation of the name Croat was linked to 
being a Roman Catholic. Correspondingly, the Orthodox religion determined belonging to the Serbian 
ethnic background.  
51
 Екмечић, М. – Србија између Средње Европе и Европе, Београд, 1992, 60 
Chapter II                                                                                                      The Croats 
  
 
141 
 
towns, consisting of small wooden houses surrounded by city walls, were gradually 
replaced by the Baroque masonry by the 18th century. Before the establishment of the 
Military Frontier, from the 16th century onwards, facing the Ottomans were mainly 
the military fortifications and Central European Renaissance-type towns sach as 
Karlovac (Fig. 2.1).52  
 
Fig. 2.1 – Dubovac Castle overlooking the City of Karlovac (Karlstadt, named after Karl II Franz 
Habsburg, reigned 1564-1590), built in the 16th century. 
The large scale devastation that accompanied the expulsion of the Turks from 
Slavonia and Lika practically erased the Islamic architectural urban features which 
comprised numerous fortified towns, bazaars, secular buildings and a number of 
mosques.53 In the newly formed Military Frontier, these were swiftly replaced by the 
Habsburg military structures with the elements of Baroque-type fortifications.54 By 
the end of the 18th century, the fortifications were losing their significance due to the 
waning Ottoman threat and to the strengthened central power of enlightened 
absolutism which had established a permanent army and prevented powerful nobles 
from conspiring against the crown and each other.55 Just like elsewhere in the 
Habsburg borderlands, the Baroque town architecture was provincial and copied 
Viennese models. Generally, these included public buildings like townhalls, barracks 
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and administrative mansions and private residences of various dignitaries and 
nobility, as well as the houses of an emerging middle-class (Fig. 2.2). 
  
Fig. 2.2 – Eltz Mannor, Vukovar, built in 1749-1751 for the Counts von Eltz of German descent.  
In Dalmatia, ancient and mediaeval urban structures survived intact for 
centuries (Fig. 2.3). After the devastating earthquake of 1667 which heavily damaged 
the coastal towns, Italian Baroque was accepted as a dominant style and a number of 
public and private buildings were erected replacing previous mediaeval buildings 
(Fig. 2.4).56 
 
Fig. 2.3 – Dioclecian’s Palace in Split, peristyle, now the central town square 
                                               
56
 Ibid, 137 
Chapter II                                                                                                      The Croats 
  
 
143 
 
 
Fig. 2.4 – St. Blaise Cathedral, Dubrovnik, built by Venetian architect Marino Gropelli in 1715. 
2.2.3 Illyrianism 
After 1815 the Habsburg Monarchy witnessed the growth of romantic 
nationalisms in its constituent nations. Among them, the Croats of Croatia Proper 
traditionally under the Hungarian Crown began arguing for a higher level of 
autonomy. In 1832, Count Janko Drašković (1770-1856), one of the few native 
aristocrats who embraced the national revival (Fig. 2.5), published a manifesto titled 
Disertatia iliti razgovor gospodi poklisarom (Disertation or Treatise  given to the 
honourable lawful deputies and future legislators of our Kingdoms) which argued for 
the unification of all Croat lands under the common name Illyria.57 One of the most 
important aspects of defining the nation was a language standardization that was 
taking place in the Habsburg Monarchy. However, the dialect of Croatia Proper, 
kajkavian, was limited to a small population living in the vicinity of Zagreb and as 
such was not numerous enough to grow into a strong national movement. Mirroring 
the activities of the Serbian philologist Vuk Karadžić, a Croatian philologist of 
German origins Ljudevit Gaj or Ludwig Gay (1809-1872) published in Buda in 1830 
Kurzer entwurf einer kroatisch-slavischen ortographie (Short Introduction to Croat-
Slavonic Orthography). In 1835 Gaj (Fig. 2.6) initiated publishing the first Croatian 
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newspapers Novine horvatske (Croatian Newspapers) in Zagreb in the kajkavijan 
dialect. In the same year, also in Zagreb, he began publishing a cultural supplement 
Danica Ilirska, printed in both kajkavian and štokavian dialect, despite the fact that 
he himself was a native kajkavian speaker. Gaj and his circle soon became known as 
the Illyrianists. 
   
Fig. 2.5 – Count Janko Drašković (1770-1856)        Fig. 2.6 – Ljudevit Gaj (1809-1872) 
Gaj’s choice to use the štokavian dialect became heavily contested between 
Croat and Serbian scholars in the 20th century, who accused each other of fraud: the 
Croats accused the Serbs for trying to “Serbianize” the Croat lands by expanding 
their dialect to all lands west of the Drina, whilst the Serbs accused the Croats for 
“stealing Serbian culture and language.” Modern Croat historian Ivo Banac asserted 
that “kajkavian was superior to comparable štokavian works….but could not provide 
the basis for standardization, due to its limited extent of territorial use.”58 Even 
though the Illyrian movement played the most important role in the Croatian national 
revival, modern Croat scholars cannot forgive the all-inclusive South Slav orientation 
of its leaders, particularly as they did not use the term Croat, but Illyrian: “The 
Illyrianists, just as in the matter of the most suitable national name, practised self-
denial.”59 In reality, considering the political situation in the Habsburg Empire, the 
Illyrianists were aware that limiting themselves only to Croatia Proper would be 
detrimental to their national ideas and needed the support of as many surrounding 
Slavs as possible. Gaj was painfully aware that low literacy rates among the South 
Slav peasant population enabled the promotion of the Hungarian national 
programmes that were taking place at the time: “…in an illiterate land such as 
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ours…it is most necessary to bring all powers to bear upon awakening an effective 
and noble cultural patriotism…The story of our fatherland has already taught me 
how much it deserves to be lifted out of the miserable Magyar darkness.”60  
Since most of the nobility spoke German, Italian or Hungarian and showed 
loyalty to their respective rulers, it was the bourgeois intellectuals who worked for 
the national awakening. After the publication of the Croatian newspapers, some 
members of the Croat Sabor called for the use of the “Illyrian language” in schools 
and other institutions. The term “Illyrian” was a substitute for South Slavic language 
area that consisted of three main dialects: štokavian, spoken in the Serbian 
Principality, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and 
Metohija and Macedonia, kajkavian, spoken in Croatia Proper and Slovenia and 
čakavian, spoken in Istria and the islands of the Dalmatian coast. The leading 
intellectuals of the Illyrian movement within Croatia Proper concluded that the only 
way to withstand the growing Magyarization was generating a mass-movement of 
the Slav population through the unity of the language. However, different 
administrative divisions in which the South Slavs lived, dialectological differences, 
as well as the small number of “Illyrian” intellectuals prevented a widespread 
acceptance of the Illyrian national movement and an all-Slav national unification. 
Consequently, they sought to establish closer links with Vuk Karadžić and his circle 
and initiated the establishment of Matica ilirska in 1842.61  
The government in Vienna understood well that the all-inclusive Illyrian 
movement could potentially generate a massive national movement of all South 
Slavs, which could eventually undermine the stability of the Empire. The ban to use 
the term Illyrian was a swift response of the authorities in 1843.62 Thereafter, Vienna 
focused its political activities on separating the potential national unification of the 
Catholic and Orthodox Southern Slavs by creating an atmosphere of mutual distrust. 
A similar approach was adopted by the Hungarian Diet, which was already immersed 
in fighting the growing German nationalism. Mutual distrust was manipulated 
through the most sensitive question of all: church unification. Serbian Orthodox 
Metropolitans saw this as the main threat and viewed the cooperation between the 
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Serbian cultural movement centred on Vuk Karadžić and leading Habsburg Slavic 
Catholic philologists as a step closer to the full unification.  
However, Karadžić’s literary victory of 184763 enabled the idea of the unity of 
the language to prevail in the secular circles of South Slav intellectuals, encouraging 
the Illyrianists to embrace cooperation with their Serbian counterparts.  This resulted 
in the signing of the Literary Agreement in Vienna in 1850. The Agreement set the 
basis for future work on the common language of the Croats and Serbs and adopted 
štokavian as the standard dialect because it was spoken by the majority of the South 
Slav population. Some modern accounts interpret this Serbo-Croat cooperation as an 
act of mutual misunderstanding on behalf of the signatories of the agreement: the 
Illyrianists indeed sought to unite the Southern Slavs, but maintained the principle of 
Croatia’s right to statehood.64 However, as no question of right to statehood was ever 
mentioned in the Agreement provisions, the socio-political circumstances at the time 
of the signing of the agreement point to another conclusion. Both the Illyrianist Croat 
intellectuals and their Serbian counterparts after 1848 realized that their political and 
national goals within the Habsburg Monarchy could not be achieved if pursued 
separately. The Literary Agreement was a pragmatic solution that could make 
progress in achieving some form of national self-identification.  
In the 20th century, Croat scholars argued that the Literary Agreement was the 
agreement of “a small group of Croat intellectuals and Serbs who had no mandate to 
sign any agreement related to the Croat language.”65 The fact that the signing of the 
Literary Agreement in 1850 coincided with the closure of the “Illyrian reading 
rooms” in Zagreb and the oppressive policies of Bach’s regime (1849-1859) on the 
“Illyrian culture” in the aftermath of the revolutionary 1848 was not taken into 
consideration. It is also notable that the Agreement was signed by only two Serbs 
(Vuk Karadžić and Djuro Daničić), one Slovene (Fran Miklošić) and five Croats 
(Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski, Dimitrije Demetar (an Orthodox of Greek origins), Ivan 
Mažuranić, Vinko Pacel and Stefan Pejaković), which points to the conclusion that 
more than a “small group” of Croat intellectuals was genuinely concerned by the 
problems of national awakening. In a sense, the signing of the Agreement was a 
desperate measure to preserve a minimum of the national culture and language for 
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both the Croats and Serbs, threatened to be marginalized in the Monarchy. Sadly, 
what none of the signatories of the Agreement took into consideration were different 
historical legacies and religious affiliations that would mar Serbo-Croat relations in 
the 20th century.  
The Illyrian movement did not have a significant influence on the cultural 
events in the Serbian Principality. Nor did it have any influence in Dalmatia, which 
at the time witnessed the development of several parallel national identities: South 
Slav-Illyrian, Slav-Dalmatian, Croatian, Serbian and Italian.66 Dubrovnik, even 
though officially under the rule of Vienna, had a literary tradition much longer and 
separate from that of Croatia Proper. When written in “Slavic,” Dubrovik literature 
was exclusively Cyrillic and based on the štokavian dialect spoken in its immediate 
hinterland and in Herzegovina. As the Viennese policies suppressed the development 
of the South Slav national movements and the Italian and Italianised Slav aristocracy 
of the major coastal towns looked across the Adriatic, the Slav population of 
Dalmatia turned towards those centres that corresponded to their religious 
affiliations. The Serbs of Dalmatia looked towards the Serbian Principality. The 
Croats of Dalmatia looked towards Croatia. However, the physical separation by the 
Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina prevented direct contact between Serbs from the 
Serbian Principality and Serbs in Dalmatia. Communication and cooperation had to 
take place via the main academic centres of the Habsburg Empire. As Karadžić’s 
work became so influential by the 1850s, it acquired followers in Dalmatia. Thus, a 
young Serbian writer from Šibenik, Božidar Petranović (1809-1874), following the 
establishments of Matica Srpska in 1826 and Matica Ilirska in 1842, established 
Matica Dalmatinska in Zadar in 1862.67 It lasted until 1912, when it finally merged 
with Matica Hrvatska resulting from the political circumstances that preceded 1914. 
Generally, the Illyranists’ ideas of the unity of the Southern Slavs within the 
Monarchy grew into a political movement after 1848 and its proponents started to 
use the historical statehood narrative insisting on closer cultural ties behind the 
common Illyrian ancestry. As soon as the Habsburg government prohibited the term 
Illyrian, it was replaced by a newly-coined term Yugoslav by Bishop Josip 
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Strossmayer (1815-1905). “The first Yugoslav,” Strossmayer, even though of 
German origins himself, believed that the Illyrian was an artificial and foreign word 
and that the term Yugoslav was more appropriate for the Southern Slavs.68 However, 
as a Catholic cleric loyal to the Crown, he did not advocate a separate South Slav 
state, but understood that some form of autonomy should be achieved within the 
framework of Austro-Slavism.69  
2.2.4 The Nation-Building programme in the southern Habsburg lands 
In the southern Habsburg lands, Classicism, like the Baroque before it, 
arrived about a generation later.70 As a general pattern, initially conservative 
bourgeois societies in Central Europe, influenced by the ideas of the French 
Revolution, responded to the 18th century aestheticism of the classical forms of 
antiquity by looking into the mediaeval “national” past. Similarly, as the native 
middle classes lacked the strength to fully define new aesthetic expression amidst the 
national revival movements across Central Europe, it took again a whole generation 
to replace the rigid Classicism by the Neo-Romanesque and, from the mid-19th 
century, the Neo-Gothic. Both artistic movements were influenced by the re-
discovery of national histories and the creation of national narratives.  
In Croatia Proper, the national revival occurred about two decades later than in 
Central Europe. One reason for this should be sought in the fact that neither Austrian 
nor Hungarian authorities expressed much interest for the industrial development of 
the southern regions. Admittedly, the road and rail networks were being built from 
the mid-19th century, but were neither widespread nor well-connected like in the core 
lands of the Monarchy. The ruling noble classes of Croatia were little interested in 
the national revival and spreading education amongst the population. Even though 
the Croats were the only Southern Slavs to have national nobility and gentry, they 
showed little interest in advancing national institutions. This is not accidental, as the 
majority of the top nobles were actually foreigners, with the exception of only a few 
Croat families. Of just under 10,000 noble families in 1805, barely five could claim 
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mediaeval origins and even they were not exclusively Croat.71 Naturally, they were 
loyal to the Crown, spoke German or Hungarian and had vested interests only in 
maintaining their privileges. That is why the towns in Croatia Proper and Slavonia in 
the pre-national revival period had no national characteristics, but were reminiscent 
of the other parts of the Habsburg Empire.72  
At the beginning of the 19th century, Zagreb had only a few cultural 
institutions. It had one Royal Academy of Sciences, established by Maria Theresa in 
1776, which consisted of three faculties: Philosophy, Theology and Law, with the 
language of instruction in Latin and German.73 However, this institution was 
abolished in 1850, following reforms of the educational system in the Habsburg 
Monarchy. The Faculty of Philosophy was downgraded to Principal Grammar School 
(Archigymnasium) and the Faculty of Law was turned into the Royal Academy of 
Legal Science (Regia academia iuris), which thus became the only institution of 
higher education in Croatia until 1874, when the University of Zagreb was finally 
inaugurated (Fig. 2.7).74  
 
Fig. 2.7 – The Faculty of Law, original design from 1864. Today, this building is the Rectory of the 
Zagreb University. The architecture of the building has strong Neo-Romanesque features, reflecting 
similar attempts to re-create earlier styles elsewhere in the Monarchy. 
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Apart from the Royal Academy, there was a seminary, a few primary schools, 
two printers, one bookshop and a theatre in its nascent phase, which all used German 
as the language of communication.75 
It was not until the local bourgeoisie grew in the first part of the 19th century 
that the national awakening was possible. The idea for the formation of a Learned 
Society was advanced by an early Pan-Slavist Tomaš Mikloušić (1767-1855), who 
wrote in Izbor dugovanj vsakoversneh in 1821 about the need to educate people in 
their mother tongue. Ljudevit Gaj accepted the idea, developed it further and 
published it in Danica in 1836.76 In the same year, the Illyrianists proposed to 
establish the National Museum in Zagreb. However, both the idea for the Learned 
Society and the National Museum had to wait for another decade to materialize.77 
The National Museum was finally opened in February 1846 in the prestigious Zagreb 
palace of Count Karlo Drašković of Trakošćan (Fig. 2.8).78 The donated artefacts 
acquired before the opening were previously sent to the Royal Academy of Law and 
initially stored in the palace of Baron Daniel Rauch in Zagreb. For the next twenty 
years, the Museum functioned with varying degrees of success. The Archaeological 
department of the Museum existed from the very beginning, but not until Don Šime 
Ljubić (1822-1896) became its director in 1868, were significant advances in its 
work possible. 
The Learned Society for Yugoslav History and Antiquities (Družtvo za 
jugoslavensku poviest i starine) was founded in 1850 by an important member of the 
Illyrian movement and one of the signatories of the Literary Agreement in Vienna in 
the same year, Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski (1816-1889). However, the Learned 
Society had a very restricted manoeuvring space, as all national movements were 
suppressed in the 1851-1860 period, during the premiership of Alexander von Bach. 
Only with the removal of Bach in 1860, were the controls relaxed and Bishop 
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Strossmayer could begin his work on founding the academy. Already in 1861 the 
Sabor passed a bill for founding the academy, but Emperor Franz Joseph I (1830-
1916, ruled from 1848) did not sign the decree of approval until 1866. Immediately 
after the establishment of the Yugoslav Academy in 1866, the Sabor passed a bill 
renaming the National Museum to Landesanstalt Croatia-Slavonia and put it under 
the management of the Sabor and the Yugoslav Academy. 
  
Fig. 2.8 – The Drašković town palace where the National Museum was first housed. Designed and 
erected in the Neo-Classicist style in 1838 by the Czech architect Bartol Falbinger (1785-1871). 
Today it serves as a municipal building Narodni dom (National Home) and houses the Institute for 
Croat Language, Theatre and Music. 
  
After obtaining imperial approval, Bishop Strossmayer (Fig. 2.9) founded the 
Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences (Jugoslavenska Akademija Znanosti i 
Umjetnosti – JAZU) in Zagreb. The academy soon established close links with the 
Serbian Learned Society in Belgrade and promoted the ideas of the national unity of 
all Southern Slavs. Bishop Strossmayer, as its patron, and a historian and theologian 
Franjo Rački (1828-1894) as its first president (Fig. 2.10), dominated the life and 
work of the JAZU for the first two decades of its existence.79  
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Fig. 2.9 – Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905)      Fig. 2.10 – Franjo Rački (1828-1894) 
2.2.5 The Revolution of 1848, “Austro-Slavic patriotism” and Ban Josip 
Jelačić (1801-1859)  
When Hungarian national sentiment erupted in 1848, Vienna sent troops 
under the command of the Croatian general Josip Jelačić (Fig. 2.11) to suppress the 
rebellion. Jelačić was appointed Ban of Croatia in March 1848, just as the political 
crisis was culminating. As an Austrian officer, he was educated at the Viennese 
Theresianum and served in Galicia and the Military Frontier, where he gained respect 
for his administrative abilities.80 The Hungarian political leaders had demanded 
freedom from Vienna, but were not prepared to give the same to the Croats, Serbs, 
Slovaks and Romanians living under the Hungarian administration. Thus, when 
Jelačić was proclaimed Ban, it was the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan Rajačić, who 
gave his blessings as a gesture of support for the common South Slav cause.81 At the 
same time, the Zagreb Catholic Bishop Haulik, a Slovak loyal to the Hungarians, was 
noted for his absence.82 Jelačić severed the relationship between the Sabor and 
Hungarian Diet in April 1848, abolished serfdom and established a court-martial that 
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was aimed primarily at the Madjaroni, the political party founded by the leading 
nobles in 1842 in order to promote union between Croatia and Hungary. He then 
marched his troops across the Drava, but stopped when approached Budapest, which 
signalled that the conflict of the Croats against the Hungarian government was under 
Austria’s control.83  
Hungarian and Croat national historians view the role of Jelačić in the 1848 
revolution from diametrically opposing perspectives. For the former, he and his 
soldiers are remembered as bringers of considerable evil.84 For the Croats, Jelačić 
was the first Croatian statesmen since the Middle Ages who managed to bring under 
his authority most of the regions where the Croats lived.85 The institutions he 
founded whilst in the office are considered to confirm the Croatian right to statehood: 
the Zagreb diocese, until 1848 under the Hungarian episcopate was raised to the level 
of archbishopric, the national theatre was founded, along with increased support for 
the use of the Croatian language and the printing of books in Croatian. However, 
even though a moderate supporter of Illyrianism, Jelačić was first and foremost loyal 
to the crown and did not see Croatia as an independent state. His concept of Croatian 
national identity was firmly based within the framework of Austro-Slavism, as 
envisaged by Czech historian František Palackỳ.86 Following the defeat of the 
national movements in 1848/49 in the Habsburg Empire, a short-lived Austro-
Slavism was also compromised. Jelačić found himself under great pressure by 
Bach’s regime, which attempted to induce Germanization on Monarchy’s Slavic 
nations. He remained Ban of Croatia until his death in 1859, but his role was reduced 
to the mere implementation of Viennese policies.  
In his last years, although very ill, Jelačić retained the aura of a national 
hero, despite the fact that the Croats were in the same disadvantageous position as 
other non-Germans in the Empire. The decision to erect an equestrian statue to Ban 
Jelačić in Zagreb’s new City Square came not from the Croats, but the Austrian 
authorities in 1854, which were re-developing provincial towns according to the 
Viennese model. The original 17th century buildings were already replaced by 
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classicist buildings, based on the Viennese Ringstrasse.87 This was a programmatic 
move of the Habsburg authorities after the 1848 revolution to urbanize the southern 
Habsburg lands aiming to strengthen loyalty to the state.88 Originally laid in the 17th 
century, this new City Square, previously known as Harmica,89 was renamed Jelačić 
Square to honour the loyal servant to the Crown.90 The Viennese sculptor Anton 
Fernkorn created an equestrian statue, finally unveiled in 1866 – the year of the 
establishment of the JAZU (Fig. 2.12). The sculpture of the Ban, holding his sabre 
high above head pointing towards north (Hungary) dominated the Jelačić Square 
until 1947, when the authorities of Communist Yugoslavia removed it. It was 
reinstated in 1990, but this time facing south (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The 
monument to Ban Jelačić was one of the first monuments to be erected to an ethnic 
Croat in Croatia, albeit on the initiative of the Habsburg authorities.  
     
Fig. 2.11 – Ban Josip Jelačić (1801-1859)              Fig. 2.12 – Monument to Ban Jelačić, Zagreb, 1866 
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2.2.6 Nagodba 
The policies of Germanization imposed after the revolution 1848/49 were 
seriously challenged after the Austrian defeat by Prussia in 1866. The Hungarians 
used this political situation to force the Ausgleich in the following year, whilst the 
Croat national revivalists in the Sabor sought an opportunity to acquire more 
freedom for their goals. In January 1867, the Sabor passed a bill which sanctioned 
the use of Croatian or Serbian language as the official language in Croatia and 
Slavonia.91 This decision also included the implementation of Karadžić’s language 
reform. As the expected Ausgleich between Austria and Croatia did not materialize, 
closer ties with the Serbs were needed in order to prevent the total collapse of the 
Croatian national movement. On their part, the Serbs in the Principality, used the 
moment of Austrian weakness to connect with their co-nationals in the Monarchy as 
that would ease the Austro-Hungarian encroachment that was expected after the final 
Ottoman withdrawal.92   
The foundation of the academy coincided with the political turmoil in the 
Habsburg Monarchy during the Ausgleich. Aiming to curb Hungarian influence, 
Vienna advocated the state-right for Croatia which was the basis for the Hungarian-
Croat agreement of 1868.93 The Nagodba between the Hungarian and Croatian diets 
sanctioned joining Croatia Proper and Slavonia for the first time in history under the 
name of the Kingdom Croatia-Slavonia. Istria and Dalmatia remained separate 
provinces under Vienna. In theory, the Nagodba allowed the Croats to maintain their 
own local administration, educational and religious systems. However, the 
administrative ruler of Croatia, the Ban, had been appointed by Vienna since 1526. 
With the Nagodba, this right was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Hungarian 
Diet, which quickly aquired full-control over the Sabor and its autonomy.94 With 
only few exceptions, the Croatian Bans appointed after 1868 were almost exclusively 
conservative nobles, either foreign or of mixed ethnic origins, who unconditionally 
supported the union of Croatia and Hungary and favoured Hungarian supremacy. 
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Immediately after his term began, the newly appointed Ban of Croatia, Baron Rauch 
de Nyék (1867/68-1871), one of the leading advocates of unification with Hungary, 
was given a free hand to start the policies of Magyarisation. Strict Hungarian control 
and German undermining of this control by open national favouritism led to the 
appearance of Croat nationalism which opposed both the Illyrianists‘ and 
Strossmayer’s concepts of Yugoslavism.  
2.3 Establishing the Croatian national programme 
The failure of the Illyrian movement to generate overall South Slav support and 
failure of the Nagodba to secure minimum autonomy resulted in a generation of 
frustrated Croat intellectuals, disenchanted with the romantic ideas of their Illyrian 
predecessors. Even though the Illyrianists formed the People’s Party in 1841 that was 
supposed to counter-act the Madjaroni, they were never more than a cultural 
movement with only superficial interest in daily politics. From the mid-19th century, 
however, the political landscape began to change, with the appearance of the first 
modern political parties formed around exclusively political, rather than cultural 
ideology. During Bach’s absolutism any form of national revivalism within the 
Habsburg Empire was suppressed. In Croatia-Slavonia, the People’s Party’s political 
platform was greatly reduced to manoeuvring between Vienna and Budapest.95 This 
enabled Strossmayer to assume the role of de facto People’s Party leader between 
1860 and 1873. Being a powerful personality, after the abolition of the term Illyrian, 
he concentrated on Yugoslavism, as the main party programme. An open call for the 
unification of all South Slavs alienated him from both Vienna and Budapest and 
contributed to the party’s defeat in the overwhelmingly pro-Hungarian Sabor. After 
the failure to achieve political goals, Strossmayer withdrew from politics and 
continued his work on cultural development in Croatia-Slavonia, still advocating the 
union between Serbs and Croats.  
2.3.1 Strossmayer’s Yugoslavism 
Strossmayer, of German descent, was born in Osijek in 1815. Catholic 
educated from the early age, he achieved two doctorates in the universities of 
Budapest and Vienna in Philosophy and Canon Law. In 1847 he became the 
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Habsburg Court Chaplain, only to be appointed bishop of the rich diocese of 
Djakovo in Eastern Slavonia in 1849. Strossmayer immediately sought to establish 
the cultural policies that would guide the Habsburg Slavs albeit under the influence 
of the Catholic Church. He directed the revenues from the diocesan estates towards 
rebuilding churches and cathedrals in the style of Historism, the aesthetic movement 
promoted by Vienna in its desire to return to traditional values. In 1866, Strossmayer 
commissioned two Viennese architects, Karl Rösner and Friedrich von Schmidt,96 to 
rebuild the Djakovo Cathedral in the combined Neo-Romanesque and Neo-Gothic 
style which were then dominating Habsburg Historism in architecture. The building 
of the cathedral lasted for more than two decades, 1866-1882, and was at the time a 
landmark of Eastern Slavonia, as it could be seen from afar (Fig. 2.13).  
Strossmayer personally supervised the works. He desired the re-building of the 
Djakovo cathedral to send his political and ideological message to all the South Slavs 
of Austro-Hungary. Yugoslavism, which he envisaged within the Austro-Hungarian 
political constitution and devoted to Roman Catholicism, was best presented in the 
two key-frescoes painted inside the cathedral; one of them, Adoration of the Kings 
(Fig. 2.14), shows five South Slav peoples bowing before the baby Christ. Each of 
the five peoples were presented in their national costume and doing their national 
work: A Croat man carrying grapes in his hands, a Slavonian woman with wheat, a 
Dalmatian woman with olives, a Bulgarian with fruit and a Serbian man as a 
shepherd. In the later 20th century, the differing costumes were interpreted as 
belonging to the Croat nationals from different parts of the Balkans.97  The second 
fresco, The Coronation of St.Mary (Fig. 2.15), is even more significant, as it depicts 
an Orthodox woman and a Muslim man in Bosnian costume bowing before the Papal 
throne.98 The latter represented Strossmayer’s strong belief that the union of the 
Southern Slavs was not possible without a single faith, which could only be the 
Roman Catholic. Needless to say, this attitude raised suspicions in the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, which then put all its efforts in protecting its believers from 
Catholic proselytism.  
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Fig. 2.13 – Djakovo Cathedral, re-built in 1866-1882 by Karl Rösner and Friedrich von Schmidt from 
Vienna on the initiative of Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer. 
 
Fig. 2.14 – The Adoration of the Kings, painted by a German artist Ludwig Seitz in 1878. Different 
traditional regional costumes were explained in the late 19th century as those of the various South Slav 
peoples.  
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Fig. 2.15 – The Coronation of St.Mary, painted by Alexander Seitz, father of Ludwig in 1879-1880. 
Bottom right corner represents a Muslim man and an Orthodox woman coming to bow before the 
Papal throne. To the left is Bishop Strossmayer himself, holding in his hands a small model of the 
Djakovo Cathedral. 
Strossmayer was solely responsible for founding the JAZU, but also had a final 
word in deciding how the future palace of the academy should look. His choice was a 
palace in the Neo-Florentine Renaissance, built by Friedrich von Schmidt in only 
three years, 1877-1880 in the Zrinski Square in Zagreb (Fig. 2.24). He personally 
oversaw the Academy’s first periodical, Rad, published in 1867 by Franjo Rački. In 
the year of Nagodba, 1868, the JAZU began publishing mediaeval manuscripts 
entitled Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium, collected and 
translated into contemporary language and printed in Vuk Karadžić’s orthography. A 
year later, the JAZU published the first volume of its annual periodical Starine 
(Antiquities).99  
Strossmayer endorsed the foundation of the Croatian Archaeological Society in 
1878, which followed the financial collapse of the Learned Society for the Yugoslav 
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History and Antiquities.100 The newly founded Society limited its activities to 
archaeology, as it was created as a separate department within the Museum. The 
appointed Committee took care of the organizational work.101 Both the Museum and 
the Archaeological Society were under the JAZU umbrella, closely observed by the 
watchful eye of Bishop Strossmayer. In 1884, Strossmayer donated to the Academy 
235 paintings of old masters that he collected all his life. This event marked the 
foundation of the Academy’s Gallery.102 
When the JAZU opened, its first secretary was Karadžić’s closest follower, a 
Serbian linguist Djuro Daničić. He was invited personally by Strossmayer and Rački 
to work on a common language and, subsequently, a Dictionary of Croatian or 
Serbian Language was published in 1882. The publishing of the Dictionary 
expressed the ideology of the leading scholars of the JAZU that the language of the 
Serbs and the Croats was one and the same, written in both Latin and Cyrillic script. 
2.3.2 Ante Starčević (1823-1896) and distinct Croat nationalism – 1868-
1883 
The failure of the People’s Party to win full autonomy from the Hungarians 
aggravated some former members of the Illyrian movement and prompted them to 
re-think the cultural policies in political terms. This was a significant divergence 
from the romantic views of the national history promoted by the Illyrians of the first 
half of the 19th century. The new ideas of national identity among the Croats were 
now linked to the exclusively Croat, Catholic and Central European concept of 
nation-state. 
Strossmayer and Rački wanted unification of all South Slavs based on the 
policies of Austro-Slavism and under the influence of the Catholic Church.103 
However, a very few Habsburg Serbs were willing to accept the union of two 
churches. Naturally, the Serbian intellectuals who had good connections with the 
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Serbian Learned Society104 sought to improve cooperation with their counterparts in 
the Serbian Principality. As the Serbian Principality was showing signs of economic 
growth, accompanied by an unhindered cultural development, it was natural for the 
Serbs of Austro-Hungary to turn their attention towards the newly awoken Serbian 
state, rather than towards the more developed, but alien, Vienna or Budapest. Many 
of them actually moved to Serbia and became professors at the Grand School and 
held other important posts in the new Serbian national institutions.105 Strossmayer’s 
failure to attract the majority of the Orthodox Slavs convinced some Croat 
intellectuals that Illyrian and Yugoslav ideas were inadequate for the salvation of the 
Croats. 
Witnessing political struggle for the Italian unification in 1861, the chief notary 
of Fiume,106 Ante Starčević (1823-1896), desired the same for Croatia. Of mixed 
Croat-Serbian origins, Starčević (Fig. 2.16) graduated at the Roman Catholic 
theological seminary at Pest, but rather than becoming a priest, he pursued a legal 
career and held several posts in the Austro-Hungarian state bureaucracy. From 1848 
to 1853 he wrote literary essays and advocated the etymological alphabet. His 
literary endeavours, however, did not mirror his political activism. Between 1857 
and 1868, Starčćević worked on the theory that the Serbs and the Croats were not 
only two different people, but two different races. In his 1868 book Ime Srb (The 
Name of the Serb), he developed the idea that the Croats belong to the Nordic race of 
warriors, whilst the Serbs were their slaves.107 Even though it is impossible to 
establish to what extent Starčević was acquainted with the emerging racial theories 
of Joseph Gobineau, the similarity of the ideas was startling.108  
However, his voice was not heard until well into the 1870s, when the political 
situation in Croatia Proper and the Military Frontier changed, and when the 
transformation of intellectual thinking throughout Europe affected the Monarchy 
itself. In general, the nationalism of the second part of the 19th century began its 
transformation and national ideas based on the “golden age” and ethnic folklore of 
the previous generation were replaced by calls for an exclusive and self-sufficient 
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nation-state. The appearance of anti-Semitism in Europe and Russia, influenced 
Starčević to form his idea of Croat supremacy among Balkan Slavs.109  
    
Fig. 2.16 – Ante Starčević (1823-1896), the             Fig. 2.17 – Josip Frank (1844-1911), a close  
founder of Croat nationalism.                                   associate of Ante  Starčević.                      
 
Starčević was a bitter opponent of Strossmayer’s calculated tolerance of 
Orthodoxy. He failed to recognize that growing exploitation of the religious 
differences between the Serbs and Croats was a key policy for preserving Hungarian 
supremacy in their part of the Dual Monarchy, had a profound influence on his own 
political thinking. The Hungarians saw that tolerance towards Serbs could weaken 
Croat separatist tendencies. On their part, the Austrians fully endorsed the union of 
two churches, which led some Croats to favour Vienna. This frequent change of 
support to each ethnic group created political divisions that forever affected relations 
between the two South Slav nations.110  
Apart from internal political reasons, geo-strategic interests were also involved 
in creating this irreconcilable division between the Croats and Serbs. Banac has 
argued that the “route of Drang nach Osten ran eastward across Slavonia at the time 
when Berlin was instructing the adherents to this policy among the Austrian ruling 
class” to insist on its implementation. At the same time, Hungarian interests were 
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heading westwards, towards the Adriatic across the same territory.111 The clash was 
inevitable and securing the loyalty of the local Slavs was necessary. Maintaining a 
bitter religious rivalry between the Croats and Serbs enabled both Vienna and 
Budapest to pursue their own political and national agendas.  
These deliberately divisive internal policies in Austro-Hungary affected the 
formation of Croatian nationalism precisely when nationalism as an ideology was 
developing characteristics significantly different from the emancipating role of the 
pre-1848 romantic nationalism. Starčević’s inability to recognize that both the Croat 
and Serbian position in Austro-Hungary were parts of a complex political situation, 
led him to focus his political programme exclusively on the denial of the existence of 
Serbs or Orthodoxy in the territories he considered historically Croat. However, 
unlike the Illyrianists or Strossmayer and Rački, Starčević was the first to assert an 
idea for an independent Croatia that would include all territories held by the Croat 
state under King Tomislav in the early 10th century.112 His definition of Croat 
nationalism was deeply rooted in the idea of devotion to the Roman Catholicism of 
the early mediaeval Croatian kingdom. 
Starčević became additionally embittered after the uprising in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1875.113 The rebels, predominantly Orthodox Serbs, demanded 
liberation from the Ottoman Empire. The support they received from Serbia and 
Montenegro led to the 1876-1878 war between the Ottoman Empire and two Serbian 
principalities. After Serbia and Montenegro entered the war, the Bosnian rebels 
demanded not only the liberation from the Ottomans, but also unification with 
Serbia. This was not well received by Starčević and his followers with their newly 
formulated concept of Croatian statehood which perceived Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as the core lands of the Croat mediaeval kingdom.  
Together with his friend Eugen Kvaternik (1825-1871) Starčević founded in 
1881 the Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava), better known under its 
later name the Pure Party of Rights (Čista stranka prava).114 The party’s programme 
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was centred on the idea of state right, introducing the claim that the migration to and 
the conquest of the 6th-7th centuries “established the eternal and natural Croat right 
to the ownership of the land.”115 Starčević and Kvaternik interpreted De 
Administrando Imperio as Porphyrogenitus’ confusion and simply stated that the 
Serbs were actually “Orthodox Croats” and the Slovenes “Highland Croats.” For 
them, the mere name of Serbs meant the “unclean race of various origins, dating to 
ancient times, which was bound together only by its servile nature; their very name 
derived from the Latin servus (servant, slave).” Starčević’s denial of the Serbs went 
as far to claim that “the mediaeval kings of Doclea were the most ancient and 
illustrious family of Croats – the Nemanjić family.”116  
Starčević was staunchly against the language reform of Vuk Karadžić, even 
though he used the ekavian dialect himself and strongly opposed the Literary 
Agreement of 1850. He believed that the Orthodox population in what he considered 
Croatian territory was “the oldest and purest Croat peasantry that converted to 
Orthodoxy and mixed with the Orthodox Vlachs who became Croats.”117  
Although Starčević did not advocate the Gothic origin of the Croats, his 
followers later developed the idea of the non-Slavic origins of the Croats.118 These 
views coincided with the period when ideas of racial superiority were penetrating the 
mainstream social thinking of intellectuals in the major European Powers. They 
generated many supporters in the last decades of the 19th century, especially amongst 
students and young intellectuals.119 From a modern perspective, understanding his 
anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox feelings, especially as his mother was Serbian 
Orthodox who converted to Catholicism on marrying his father, falls into the domain 
of psychology.120 To use the bold assessment of the modern Western scholar Sabrina 
Ramet, Starčević presented a classic case of a disturbed personality with low self-
esteem.121 
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2.3.3 Croat nationalism as a political construct of the later 19th century122  
Starčević’s Croatian Party of Rights won popular support when the political 
influence of the People’s Party failed to successfully oppose the policies of 
Magyarization, ruthlessly implemented by the much hated Ban Khuen-Héderváry 
(1883-1903). During his time in office, Hungarian was introduced as the official 
language in Croatia and Slavonia, while Hungarian national symbols took 
precedence over Croatian. Simultaneously, the Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia received 
from Khuen-Héderváry some small concessions regarding their religious rights, 
which additionally aggravated Croat politicians who, unable to achieve political 
equality, turned against the Serbs.123  
The enforcement of Khuen-Héderváry’s policies resulted in the growth of 
Croat dissatisfaction with Strossamyer’s ideas of Yugoslavism and the radicalization 
of Croat national feelings. Starčević’s re-modelled political programme now openly 
argued for an independent Croatia consisting only of ethnic Croats, which included 
both “Orthodox Croats” (Serbs) and “Mountain Croats” (Slovenes). This resonated 
well amongst fervent Catholics. However, after Starčević’s death in 1896, the 
Croatian Party of Rights split into several factions of which the most prominent 
became the Croatian Pure Party of Rights, led by Josip Frank (1844-1911), a Jewish 
convert to Catholicism (Fig. 2.17).124 The so-called Frankists of the Croatian Pure 
Party of Rights were solely interested in preventing the Serbs from participating in 
the political and cultural life of Croatia and Slavonia. Blinded by their hatred, they 
quickly became a tool in the hands of Vienna, which by then expressed interest in 
expanding its influence across the borders of the Drina into the Serbian Kingdom.125 
Modern Croatian historiography insists that the national programme created by 
Ante Starčević and his followers was a response to the nationalistic and “Greater 
Serbian” ideas of Vuk Karadžić and Ilija Garašanin. In the early 1980s, Ivo Banac, 
the internationally most prominent Croat historian for the past three decades, relying 
on the writings of nationalist-scholars belonging to the period of the Croatian Spring 
of 1971126 and some extreme-right Croat émigré authors, asserted that Vuk Karadžić 
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was “a vociferous Serbian nationalist, who brought forth a modern Serbian national 
ideology, the purpose of which was to assimilate the vast majority of Catholic Croats 
and all Bosnian Muslims, whose dialects were akin to the štokavian spoken by the 
Serbs.”127 According to Banac, “Karadžić’s linguistic Serbianism followed the 
erroneous teachings of the earliest Slavic scholars, beginning with the German 
historian August von Schlözer (1735-1809) who distinguished between Croatian 
(kajkavian), Bosnian, Dalmatian and Illyrian (štokavian) which Schlözer called 
“Illyrisch oder Serbisch.”128 All subsequent pioneers of Slavic philology in the early 
part of the 19th century, according to Banac, followed this “false” premise. 
Karadžić’s linguistic “vociferous nationalism,” Banac found to be mirrored 
politically in Garašanin’s Draft of 1844, which “laid foundations of the Great 
Serbian policy of Yugoslav unification, which remained axiomatic among the 
conservative circles and individuals in Serbia until 1941.”129 To underpin his 
argument, Banac juxtaposed Starčević’s disquieting anti-Serbianism and anti-
Semitism against Karadžić’s short linguistic essay Serbs, All and Everywhere, by 
arguing that the “cudgels of controversy (the attempt of Serbianization) were picked 
up by Ante Starčević, a peasant like Vuk” and successfully compared two 
incomparable cultural and political ideas.130  
 Karadžić’s public activities (1814-1867) and Starčević’s rise to prominence in 
Croat political life (1851-1894) were politically and culturally one generation apart, 
coinciding with significant transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy.131 Primarily a 
scholar, rather than a politician, Karadžić lived and worked during the romantic 
nationalism of the late 18th and early 19th century, when nationalism as a novel idea 
had a largely positive, emancipatory, role.132 Being a student of the German/Austrian 
school of linguistics and philology, he shared great enthusiasm for national revival of 
his European contemporaries.133 Karadžić’s Srbi, svi i svuda, written in 1836, was 
only published as a linguistic polemic on the territoriality of Serbian national revival 
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during the revolutionary 1848/49.134 The interpretation that Starčević’s anti-Serbian 
rhetoric was in response to Karadžić’s assertion of the territoriality of Serbian nation 
is essentially incorrect as it omits to notice that the Croat response to the contents of 
Karadžić’s article did not appear in 1849 when it was first published. Nor did it 
appear in the year 1850, when the Literary Agreement in Vienna was signed.  It came 
only in 1861 when a young Croat politician Josip Miškatović (1836-1890), a loyal 
employee of the Habsburg administration, protested to the notion of the “Serbs of all 
three creeds” that Karadžić, used in his writings based on linguistic analysis some 
twelve years earlier, as inaccurate.135  
On his part, Garašanin was the first modern Serbian politician to accept the 
idea of the nation-state according to the French and German models. His Draft of 
1844 was copied almost a word-for-word from the article of the influential Pan-Slavs 
Adam Czartoryski and František Zach.136 At the time of writing the document, 
Karadžić’s language reform was still not accepted by the Serbian government; 
indeed, his reformed alphabet was still forbidden and Karadžić had many enemies 
among the senior Constitutionalists, including Garašanin himself. Therefore, even 
though they both shared Pan-Slavic ideas, there are no indications that Karadžić 
politically influenced Garašanin. As a pragmatic politician who understood well the 
insecure and weak position of the still dependent Serbian Principality, Garašanin was 
in no hurry to alienate Vienna. It seems illogical that laying down a “Greater Serbian 
programme in 1844” when full independence of the Serbian Principality was still 
more than thirty years away, could be anything more than the wishful thinking of a 
politician educated in the same climate of romantic nationalism. The mere fact that 
the Draft remained unknown to the Serbian public until 1906 indicates that the 
document itself could not have had any influence on creating any national 
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programme amongst the Serbs in the 19th century. In other words, the premise that 
the Draft was the basis of Greater Serbia should be seen as a simple 
misrepresentation of the facts.  
On the other hand, Karadžić’s work on language reform and his collection of 
Serbian folk poetry brought him great respect among the Croat revivalists such as 
Ljudevit Gaj and other Illyrianists. Arguing that both the Illyrianists and Croat 
signatories of the Literary Agreement in 1850 were all misled by a single individual, 
even one as influential as Karadžić, seems very unreasonable. Since the first Croat 
intellectuals to disagree with Karadžić belonged to a three or even four decades 
younger generation, the attempts to link them without taking into account the 
changed political circumstances within the Habsburg Monarchy between 1815-1848 
and 1868-1894 represents a typical example of normative historiography.137 Within 
the Monarchy, the latter period differed drastically politically from that of 1815-
1848, when Karadžić was at his most active. The nature of the nascent party politics 
in the Sabor required political programmes to focus on the political struggle. 
Initially, Strossmayer’s cultural Yugoslavism presented the only challenge to the 
Hungarian and Austrian national policies and it naturally prevailed amongst the 
Croat intellectuals. As the political pressures from Budapest and Vienna increased, 
cultural Yugoslavism was not a satisfactory solution, especially as it argued that 
Croatia-Slavonia and other South Slav lands should remain within the Habsburg 
Monarchy. Inevitably, Starčević’s political programme remained the only alternative 
to the pro-Hungarian Magyaroni and politically impotent Strossmayer’s People’s 
Party. Simultaneously, Serbian influence, either political or cultural, was marginal, 
as the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy were constantly looking towards the Obrenović 
government in Belgrade, despite its inability to avoid influence of Vienna. This 
Serbian attitude was understandable considering Austro-Hungarian neglect of the 
economic development of Croatia-Slavonia paired with the extremely difficult 
cultural position of the South Slavs in the Monarchy whose national movements 
were either minimised or completely forbidden. Starčević thought this Serbian 
political malaise was equal to treason, which only increased his deep hatred for the 
Serbs and Orthodoxy. His failure to render any significant opposition to much 
stronger German and Hungarian political influences, focused his political activism 
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against the “less developed and uncivilised Slavo-Serbs.”138 His personal 
frustrations, therefore, became the basis for a Croat national programme that collided 
with a Serbian national narrative in the 20th century. Thus, by comparing two 
different cultural and political concepts from two different timelines, the origins of 
Croat nationalism were defined on a fallacy of composition.139 
2.4 The road to the South 
Starčević’s ideas, based exclusively on the denial of the existence of the 
Serbian identity, became the leading rationale of the Croat national narrative at the 
end of the 19th century. They gained prominence after the 1878 occupation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the international recognition of the independent Serbian 
Principality. As the number of Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not exceed 
20%, whilst nearly 43% of Orthodox Serbs of the overall population constantly 
looked towards Belgrade for support, the Croat national ideologues sought to 
neutralize this disparity by expanding Starčević’s claim that the “Bosnian Muslims 
were Croat by nationality” and “the oldest and purest nobility of Europe.”140  
The underpinning for this assertion was sought in the division of the Roman 
Empire by Theodosius the Great in 395: Since all territories west of the Drina 
automatically belonged to the Western Empire which was under the Pope’s 
jurisdiction, the Slavic population that lived there was originally Catholic, that is, 
Croat.141 To support this claim, first Starčević and then Frank after him, evoked the 
term Red Croatia that appeared in chapter 9 of the Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea. 
Red Croatia assigned the territory of “Upper Dalmatia” to the narrow coastal strip of 
land that included cities south of Dalma142 and Drač in Albania (Map. 2.4).143 
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Extrapolating the division of the Roman Empire in 395 to the selective reading of the 
Chronicle through the term of Red Croatia, a late 19th century definition of Croat 
ethnic territory, stretching from Slovenia eastwards to Belgrade and along the Drina 
to Skadar, established a narrative based on the total denial of anything Orthodox, that 
is, Serbian. Starčević and his followers took the notion of Red Croatia as an accurate 
fact and ignored that the Priest of Doclea stated in the same place in his chronicle: 
that the said territory “in which the rivers flow northwards into the Danube is called 
Serbia.”144 
 
Map. 2.4 – Red Croatia, as envisaged by Starčević and Frank. 
Vienna saw these Croat efforts as a useful tool to control the rebellious Serbs 
within Austro-Hungary and impose additional pressure on Belgrade, which was 
dissuaded from influencing the Serbs in the Dual Monarchy. As Croat nationalism in 
Croatia-Slavonia was under the firm control of the leading Magyaroni, the frustrated 
national aspirations of the Croats turned their full attention towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where the majority of the Serbs kept their Orthodox tradition even 
                                                                                                                                     
(the text of the Chronicle within this work was quoted as the Chronicle, whilst the explanations were 
quoted as Mijušković's work 
144
 Ibid, 113 – The notion of the rivers that flow north and into the Danube determines the Danube 
watershed, which includes modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Slavonia and Serbia. 
Chapter II                                                                                                      The Croats 
  
 
171 
 
more ardently than the Serbs in the Serbian Kingdom. This new Croat national 
narrative gained momentum during von Kállay’s administration of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, resulting in the alienation of the Serbs, who hoped to attract the 
Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the common cause against Austro-
Hungary.145 Whilst Khuen-Héderváry led the policy of appeasement of the Serbs in 
Croatia-Slavonia in order to subdue the Croats, von Kállay in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina favoured the Croats there in order to win their support against the 
Serbs. In this way, the Austro-Hungarian authorities managed to induce a Serbo-
Croat clash over Bosnia and Herzegovina and shift the main Croat aim of winning 
equal status with Hungary after the Nagodba towards the non-existent threat from the 
Serbs and their Orthodox faith. The “Divide and Rule” policy as a common practice 
in Austro-Hungarian internal politics finally succeeded. From the early 1880s 
relations between the Croats and Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia seriously deteriorated.146  
2.4.1 Austro-Slavic Historism in Croatia Proper and Slavonia 
Except for the appearance of nationalism, the Napoleonic wars also 
accelerated the spread of industrialization in Europe, which in turn resulted in the 
growth of the existing towns and founding of new ones. The Neo-Classical features 
of the grand aristocratic town houses and stately homes in the countryside were soon 
surpassed by the appearance of modern urbanization guided by the needs of the new 
bourgeois classes that strove to emulate the aristocrats by building their own houses 
modelled on the grand palaces of previous centuries, albeit on a more modest scale.  
In Austria itself, industrialization began after 1840 in the form of Gründerzeit, 
the economic concept followed by the appearance of the nouveau riche which 
generated the economic growth that enabled re-building and re-shaping the 
townscapes across the Habsburg Empire. However, Austrian Gründerzeit did not 
attempt to impose the new aesthetic, but to imitate the grandeur of the previous 
epoch. Richly decorated facades, reminiscent of the palatial architecture of the 
previous centuries, referring to the perceived national characteristics first occurred in 
                                               
145
 The establishment of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1881 was followed by the 
appointment of the Croat Archibishop Josip Štadler (1843-1918) in Sarajevo, to further the unionist 
policies of Austro-Hungary. Štadler introduced Jesuits in Bosnia and Herzegovina and worked 
ardently to convert Muslims and Serbs to Catholicism, thus, making them Croats. Simultaneously, the 
rights of the Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were severely restricted. See Chapter V- The 
Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 400-401. 
146
 Banac, 1994, 92 
Chapter II                                                                                                      The Croats 
  
 
172 
 
Austria, Moravia and Bohemia. In other parts of the Empire this concept was 
developing at a much slower rate as the growth of the nationally aware bourgeoisie 
was directly proportionate with the economic growth of a particular province. The 
economic development of the southern Habsburg territories was affected by the often 
restrictive policies within the Military Frontier, where industrialization did not 
properly begin until its abolition in the 1880s. 
The aesthetic adopted by various national movements in the Habsburg 
Monarchy was firmly based in the re-discovery of the national “Golden Age” which 
served as an inspiration to painters, composers, poets or novelists and coincided with 
the beginning of industrialization. In the southern Habsburg lands, centuries of rule 
by non-Slavic kings and a predominantly Germanized or Magyarized aristocracy 
who followed metropolitan tastes and the supra-national influence of the Roman 
Catholic Church, left few traces of anything “national” in the visual landscape of the 
South Slav territories, which had suffered cataclysmic population losses and religious 
transformations in the previous centuries. With a few exceptions, the great 
aristocratic landowners rarely spoke Croatian or were of foreign origin and readily 
expressed loyalty to the crown. 
The inspiration for the national “Golden Age” was nevertheless sought in the 
only part of the Balkans that remained unaffected by the Ottoman conquest: Civil 
Croatia or Croatia Proper, reliquiae reliquiarum regni Croatia, Slavoniae et 
Dalmatiae, where the remaining South Slav aristocratic families took refuge and 
built their fortresses and castles as the defense system against the Ottomans in the 
fortified towns of Varaždin, Zagreb, Križevci and Samobor.147 After the Habsburg-
Ottoman wars ended in the 18th century the towns, together with those in the Military 
Frontier, were re-modelled on Baroque principles. Consisting of a converging street 
grid directed towards the most prominent and socially significant buildings 
(churches, town halls, schools, markets), these towns reproduced the visual nucleus 
of the Austrian town.148 In residential areas, the rich palatial facades frequently hid 
smaller buildings, often divided into several floors. 
The early tastes of the new middle classes was to imitate those of the nobility 
which lacked national characteristics. Neo-Classical forms of the later 18th century 
with their strict Palladian proportions were slowly replaced by Neo-Romanesque and 
                                               
147
 Mohorovičić, 1994, 23 
148
 Ibid, 23 
Chapter II                                                                                                      The Croats 
  
 
173 
 
Neo-Gothic features in the period of Romanticism, only to be surpassed by the Neo-
Renaissance of the second part of the 19th century.149 Together these styles formed 
the continuum of the Austrian Historism and were applied eclectically throughout the 
Empire. Croatia Proper and Slavonia were not exempt, especially as their visual 
features were the work of predominantly Austrian architects, commissioned to 
emulate metropolitan tastes.  
Chronologically, the best examples of Classicism were represented by the 
Januševac Castle (Fig. 2. 18), the City Hall in Samobor (Fig. 2.19), both designed by 
the German architect Bartholomeus Felbinger, and the Mausoleum at Trsat near 
Rijeka, built in the Doric style for the Irish general Laval Nugent in the service of the 
Habsburg crown (Fig. 2.20).150  
The Neo-Gothic style was the inspiration for the complete re-modeling of 
Zagreb cathedral in 1881-1902 by the Viennese architects Friedrich Schmidt and 
Hermann Bollé (Fig. 2.21). The Trakošćan Castle of the Drašković family re-
modelled in the mid-19th century is another good example of the Neo-Gothic (Fig. 
2.22). So are the New Palace built for Ban Jelačić and the Jurjaves Chapel in Zagreb 
(Fig. 2.23).  
The Neo-Renaissance was an inspiration for the JAZU (Fig. 2.24), as well as 
for the theatre buildings in Zagreb and Varaždin (Fig. 2.25). The Mirogoj Cemetery 
(began in 1876 by Hermann Bollé on the land owned by Ljudevit Gaj, but finished in 
1929), the central Railway Station (built by a Hungarian architect Ferenc Pfaff in 
1890-1892) and the Grand Gymnasium – today the Mimara Museum (Fig. 2.26), all 
modern Zagreb landmarks, are also good representations of the Neo-Renaissaince. 
The Zagreb buildings of the National Theatre (Fig. 2.27) and the Palace of Gavella 
are the best representations of Neo-Baroque. 
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Fig. 2.18 – Januševac Castle near Zagreb, built around 1830 by Bartholomeus Felbinger. A typical 
example of Neo-Classicist architecture, it houses today the Croat National Archives. For the most of 
its history, the castle was used by those aristocrats who followed the metropolitan tastes of the 
Habsburg Empire and had little interest in national emancipation outside of Austro-Slavism. 
     
Fig. 2.19 – City Hall in Samobor, built in 1826 by Bartholomeus Felbinger.    
Chapter II                                                                                                      The Croats 
  
 
175 
 
 
Fig. 2.20 – Mausoleum at Trsat, near Rijeka, built for General Nugent in the 1850s. The inscription on 
the pediment reads Mir junaka (The Pece of Heroes). 
  Fig. 2.21 – Zagreb Cathedral, re-built in 1906 in the Neo-Gothic style. 
 
Fig. 2.22 – The Trakošćan Castle of the Counts Drašković. The original mediaeval castle was re-
modelled in the mid-19th century in the Neo-Gothic style. 
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Fig. 2.23 – The Neo-Gothic Jurajaves Chapel, built by Josef Vӧnstadel for Archbishop Juraj Haulik in 
1864. 
    
Fig. 2.24 – The building of Yugoslav Academy, built in the Neo-Renaissance style by Friedrich von 
Schmidt in only three years, 1877-1880 in the Zrinski Square in Zagreb.                                                  
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Fig. 2.25 – National Theatre in Varaždin, designed and built by the famous Viennese architects 
Herman Helmer and Ferdinand Fellner in 1873. 
 
Fig. 2.26 – The Grand Gymnasium (today the Mimara Museum) built in Neo-Renaissance style by 
German architects from Leipzig and Berlin, A. Ludwig and L. Th. Hülssner in 1895 for the occasion 
of the official visit of Emperor Franz Joseph II. 
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Fig. 2.27 – The National Theatre in Zagreb built in Neo-Baroque style by the Viennese architects 
Ferdinand Fellner and Herman Helmer in 1895. It replaced the small theatre that existed since 1836 in 
the Old City Hall. It was opened by Emperor Franz Josef I during his official visit to Zagreb in 1895. 
 
This Austrian Historism, dictated by the political and social order in the 
Habsburg Empire, was usually reserved for monumental public buildings. The 
transformation of Zagreb and other towns of Croatia Proper and Slavonia in the 
revivalist historical styles, did not begin until the mid- to late-19th century. In none of 
these provinces, including Dalmatia as well, were key-public buildings executed by 
ethnic Croat architects. One rare example was the original building of the Zagreb 
Županija, built in 1849 by Aleksandar Brdarić (1813/14-1872), a student of the Lviv 
University and a follower of Classicism. As the building was shared between the 
Sabor and Zagreb Županija, only a few decades later it became inadequate and was 
re-modeled in 1911 by the Czech architects Lav Kalda and Karlo Susan in the styles 
of Classicism, Neo-Renaissance and the Viennese Secession (Fig. 2.28).151  
Creating a national style that would symbolically present “Croat” in 
architecture was additionally impeded by the absence of educated Croatian 
architects. Brdarić was unique in his lifetime, as he was one of the few university 
educated middle class Croats. Not until 1882, when for the first time the City of 
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Zagreb Chief Architect became a graduate of the University of Graz, Milan Lenuci 
(1849-1924), were ethnic Croats directing the urban development. Even then, they 
were following the tastes initiated in the imperial capital. When an earthquake 
seriously damaged Zagreb in 1880, Lenuci demolished the old street-grid in order to 
form the so-called “green horseshoe,” a series of city parks and avenues, based on 
Viennese and Paris models.152  
 
Fig. 2.28 – The Croatian Sabor, re-built in 1911 by the Czech architects Lav Kalda and Karlo Susan in 
the styles of Classicism, Neo-Renaissance and Viennese Secession.  
The new Landestheater opened in 1895 during the state visit of Emperor Franz 
Joseph I, who personally contributed by the symbolic last stroke of the silver 
hammer, specially made for that event (Fig. 2.27).153 The construction of the theatre 
was initiated in 1871, but approval was not given until 1893, as part of the 
preparation for the Emperor’s visit. Ban Khuen-Héderváry personally recommended 
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the location outside the old city and engaged two Viennese architects Ferdinand 
Felner and Hermann Helner to design the building in the manner of Viennese 
Historism. Even though carefully planned, the Emperor’s visit was marred by 
disturbances. A group of students openly opposed the Magyarazing policies of 
Khuen-Héderváry by burning the Hungarian flag in front of the monument to Ban 
Jelačić.154 The event showed deep disappointment at the position of Croatia-Slavonia 
within the Empire. 
2.4.2 Nation-sculpting 
Until the second half of the 19th century, the impact of the Croat national 
revival was limited to literary activities and occasional cultural events. There were no 
attempts to create a separate “Croat national style” in architecture as there were no 
surviving uniquely national models from the Middle Ages which could serve as the 
basis for such an enterprise. The erection of the large public buildings, aristocratic 
estates and town houses was dominated by Austrian and German architects. 
However, from the mid-19th century, a series of young Croat sculptors came into 
prominence, mainly through the patronage of Strossmayer who ensured that large 
sums generated by the Djakovo Diocese were partly used for their education.  
The first Croat sculptor to embrace and celebrate the national past was Ivan 
Rendić (1849-1932), from the island of Brač, where world renowned marble was 
quarried and where he began his career (Fig. 2.29). Educated in Venice and Florence 
in the traditional school of realism, Rendić was soon noticed by Strossmayer, who 
became his patron. From 1871, when his portraits received acclaim, Rendić lived in 
Zagreb. During the next twenty years, he worked on a series of monuments dedicated 
to famous Croats from the past. His monument to Ivan Gundulić (Fig. 2.30) was 
unveiled in Dubrovnik in 1893.155 It was soon followed by one to Petar Preradović, 
an early Illyrianist, which was unveiled in Zagreb in 1894. The monuments of 
famous individuals of Croat history and public life, such as those of Ban Krsto I 
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Frankopan (1482-1527)156 and Ante Starčević were erected in Zagreb in the same 
period.  
           
Fig. 2.29 – Ivan Rendić (1849-1932)           Fig. 2.30 – Monument to Dubrovnik’s poet Ivan Gundulić 
                                                                      (1589-1638) was unveiled in 1893 on initiative of the Serb 
                                                                      Catholic Youth, local movement of Dubrovnik Serbs. 
In 1894, on the initiative of the Party of Rights in Zagreb, city authorities 
approved building a house in for Ante Starčević (Fig. 2.31). Although initially 
forbidden by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, the house was built in a magnificent 
Italian Neo-Renaissance style by German architects Leo Hönigsberg and Julio 
Deutsch. The chosen location was a newly designed prominent Zagreb square,157 
worthy of the “Father of the Nation” as Starčević came to be called by his followers. 
When he died in 1896, Rendić was commissioned to design Starčević’s tomb. The 
monument was a composition of Starčević’s bust and a personification of Croatiae in 
the form of a woman with fists stiffened in pain and tired of the attempts to release 
herself from the shackles at the bottom of the pedestal (Fig. 2.32). Croatiae stands 
above a replica of the Pro Duce Trepimero inscription of the endowment of Croatian 
duke Trpimir from 852, the oldest charter relating to the Croat history. The symbolic 
meaning of the monument was to confirm Starčević’s assertion of Croats being the 
oldest and noblest of all Southern Slavs. Accordingly, Rendić’s monument to Ante 
Starčević, revealed the respect that Starčević’s national programme had gained by 
the end of his life. 
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After Rendić, several younger Croat sculptors continued producing monuments 
of famous historical persons and events, making sculpture a key-element for 
expressing Croat nationalism. 
 
Fig. 2.31 – Starčević’s town house, erected on the newly built Starčević’s Square in Zagreb. Funded 
by donations of his followers, the house was designed by German architects Leo Hönigsberg and Julio 
Deutsch in Italian Neo-Renaissance style. The archival photograph was taken by the first Zagreb 
photographer immediately after the completion. 
  
Fig. 2.32 – The tomb-monument to Ante Starčević in Šestine, which incorporated a copy of a 
fragment of historical monument Pro Duce Trepimero from the 9th century, the allegoric figure of 
Croatia above which towers the “Father of the Nation” – Ante Starčević. 
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2.4.3 The Slavo-Dalmatians  
After acquiring Dalmatia in 1815, Vienna retained Italian as an official 
language of administration, culture and education. In Istria, the port of Fiume158 with 
the status of separatum sacrae regni coronae adnexum corpus remained the only 
Hungarian port in the Adriatic159 until the end of the Habsburg Monarchy.160 In 
Dalmatia, the national revival activities before 1848 had little contact with Croatia 
Proper and Slavonia. In 1848 an Illyrianist enthusiast Ante Kuzmanić (1807-1879) 
asserted in the short-lived magazine Zora Dalmatinska (The Dalmatian Dawn) that 
in one territory can live only one nation.161 Kuzmanić championed the ikavian 
pronunciation of the štokavian dialect of his native Split, but never proclaimed 
himself a Croat. This was in accordance with the view that many štokavian speaking 
intellectuals of the period held. They were primarily concentrated on developing 
Slavo-Dalmatian national consciousness which would, in case of some future 
independence, create a connection between the Catholic West and the Orthodox East 
Slavs. In the same year, 1848, an old Dubrovnik aristocrat Ivan Dživo Natali (1775-
1853) wrote, but never published, a document titled Ristretto which argued for the 
establishment of an independent state of Dalmatia which would consist of Dalmatia, 
Dubrovnik and Boka Kotorska.162  
The development of Slavo-Dalmatian identity, let alone Croatian or Serbian 
was frustrated by the much stronger Italian nationalism which intensified in the 
period following the Italian unification in 1861. One of the most prominent 
representatives of Italian nationalism, Niccolo Tommaseo (1802-1874), a native of 
Šibenik argued against the Illyrianist assertion that Dalmatia belonged to the 
historical Slavic Kingdom of Croatia since the conquest of the 7th century. 
Tommaseo (Fig. 2. 33) argued that no Byzantine document ever confirmed that the 
Greeks willingly surrendered Dalmatia to the Croats. In an article Parnica 
dalmatinska razvidjena s njezinih novih pogledah, published in Zadar in 1861, 
Tommaseo suggested that “if the Croats won their right to Dalmatia in the 7th century 
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by force, the same right was won by the Venetians in the 11th century.”163 Tommaseo 
drew heavily on the difference between the Croats and Dalmatians, not only because 
the “Dalmatians struggled to understand the language created in Zagreb,” but also 
because throughout their history, the Dalmatians were politically separated from the 
Croats; they did not participate in the 1527 Sabor of Cetin,164 when a Habsburg was 
chosen to be a Croat king, neither were they asked if they agreed to the 1712 
Pragmatic Sanction which re-confirmed the Habsburgs as the ruling dynasty of 
Croatia.165 
                
Fig. 2.33 – Niccolo Tommaseo (1802-1874)         Fig. 2.34 – Antonio Baiamonti (1822-1891) 
Unsurprisingly, Dalmatian Italians wished for unification with Italy. Both 
Italian and Croat modern historiography disagree about the Italian presence in 
Dalmatia in the 19th century. Whilst Italian scholars argue that the Italian population 
comprised as much as 30% of Dalmatia, their Croat counterparts estimate that this 
number could not be higher than 7%.166 The Croat argument is based on the notion 
that the Italians included into their ethnic core all the people who spoke Italian, 
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without taking into account that many Slavs spoke Italian. The Italians, on the other 
hand, argue that the Italians of Dalmatia were exposed to aggressive Slavification 
after 1882.167  
The Orthodox population lived predominantly in southern Dalmatia and 
Dubrovnik and expressed interest in having closer connections with the nascent 
modern Serbia.168 The Dalmatian Slavs, who identified themselves as the Serbs, 
irrespective of religion, founded in 1862 Matica dalmatinska, an organization 
mirroring the work of Matica srpska. Dalmatian Serbs adopted Karadžić’s language 
reform and argued for the unification of all Dalmatian Slavs.  
Responding to the growing Slavic nationalism, the Italian mayor of Split, 
Antonio Bajamonti (1822-1891) asserted that the Roman influence was a key-
element in creating the early Mediaeval Dalmatian communes: “the barbarians, that 
is, Slavs, did not participate in the transformation of the Roman antique heritage into 
a new mediaeval system that the Dalmatian coast was based on.”169 Much as his 
Istrian contemporary Carlo Combi (1827-1884), Bajamonti (Fig. 2.34) advocated 
Italianization of “the diffused and unconnected Slavic mass”, which was “without 
history and culture.”170 After the unification of Italy in 1861, Italian nationalism in 
Dalmatia received much stronger support from the new Kingdom of Italy.  
The Catholic Dalmatian Slavs resented Italianization, despite sharing the same 
faith as the Italians. When Strossmayer criticized the doctrine of Papal infallibility in 
1871, they supported his conflict with Rome and embraced his political 
Yugoslavism.171 The influence and respect the Bishop of Djakovo enjoyed among 
the South Slavs of Austro-Hungary enabled his concept of a unified South Slav front 
opposing the Germans and Hungarians in Croatia-Slavonia to become a role-model 
to the isolated Dalmatian Slavs in their struggle against Italian nationalism. This 
further influenced the Catholic Dalmatians to begin to accept the notion of Croat 
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national identity developed around the idea of Catholicism in Croatia-Slavonia in the 
last quarter of the 19th century.172 
On the other hand, integrative processes amongst the Dalmatian Orthodox 
Serbs had already been centered on the Serbian Orthodox Church as had their 
newspapers and cultural societies. The printed materials in the Srpski list (Serbian 
Newspapers, published in Zadar) or Srpski glas (Serbian Voice) or Srpski magazin 
(Serbian Magazine, published in Dubrovnik) were orientated on Serbian cultural 
history: Karadžić’s legacy of folk epic, Serbian Mediaeval History or works of 
contemporary Serbian writers. There was little cooperation with their Croat 
counterparts.173 
2.4.4 The Italian features of Dalmatia and Istria 
When the early 19th century and the Greek revolution prompted West 
European intellectuals and travellers to redirect the route of their Grand Tours further 
east, the Adriatic coastal towns became important stopping points. This increased 
interest in the Roman heritage of Split, Trogir, Zadar and Dubrovnik and initiated 
some early assessments of the Roman remains in these places. Since the 
Renaissance, foreign travellers and local scholars were attracted by the rich 
archaeological remains on the Adriatic coast; the Palace of Diocletian (Fig. 2.35) or 
the arena of Pula (Fig. 1.a.5) had been known to the European “Grand Tourists” 
since the eighteenth century.174 The upsurge in interest in antiquity was such that 
many objects of importance and exceptional beauty were sent not only to the royal 
collections in Vienna or Budapest, but were acquired by these travellers, who then 
dispersed them throughout Europe.175  
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The growing interest in the ancient past prompted the Dalmatian Provincial 
government to establish the Archaeological Museum in Split in 1820.176 The first of 
its kind in Dalmatia, the role of the Split Museum was to collect artefacts of the 
ancient Romans in Dalmatia, epigraphic remains (mainly Latin inscriptions) and 
coins and place them under the supervision of the Imperial Museum in Vienna. 
Diocletian’s Palace was, of course, a place of exceptional interest. By the early 19th 
century, significant parts of the palace were not only incorporated in the core of the 
city that grew within the palace walls after the Slavic invasions of the 7th century, but 
were also reused as building materials for the houses of the local population. The 
authorities in Vienna decided not only to inaugurate the Archaeological Museum, but 
also to preserve the palace’s remains. In a very unusual decision for Vienna, the 
appointed architect-conservator of Diocletian’s Palace was a native of Split, Vicko 
Andrić (1793-1866), the first educated architect of Slav origin in Dalmatia. Andrić 
(Fig. 2.36) designed the original museum building, which was built next to the 
eastern wall of the palace in 1821.177   
 
Fig. 2.35 – Palace of Diocletian, as reconstructed in 1912 by French architect and archaeologist Ernest 
Hébrard (1875-1933) 
                                               
176
 The initiative to found the Museum in Split was put forward by the Habsburg authorities after a 
visit by Emperor Franz I in 1818. http://www.mdc.hr/split-arheoloski/hr/FS-povijest.html - The 
official web-page of the Split Museum – Accessed 16/05/2015 
177
 Andrić was a true pioneer of conservation of cultural heritage in Dalmatia. He went on to supervise 
the conservation of the Šibenik cathedral and construct a number of new roads along the coast. 
Chapter II                                                                                                      The Croats 
  
 
188 
 
    
Fig. 2.36 – Vicko Andrić (1793-1866), an              Fig. 2.37 – Frano Bulić (1846-1934), the first     
architect, surveyor and a pioneer conservati-          Croat director of any archaeological museum in 
onist in Dalmatia.                                                     Dalmatia. 
In 1878 the Museum began publishing Bullettino di archeologia e storia 
dalmata and established the Museum’s Library.178 However, there were no 
Dalmatian Slavs, either Croats or Serbs, in charge of the Split museum until 1886, 
when Frano Bulić (1846-1934), a Catholic priest, archaeologist and conservator 
became its director (Fig. 2.37).179 Bulić studied classical philology and Slavic studies 
at the Vienna University, when Alexander Conze180 persuaded him to abandon the 
latter and engage in archaeology. On his return to Split, he worked at the Italian High 
School in Split and as a professor at the Dubrovnik High School, until he was 
appointed the Museum director.181 In Dubrovnik he met Arthur Evans, who was then 
a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian.182  
Bulić excavated large areas of Split and its surroundings and conserved the 
discovered monuments so they could be presented to the public. The most important 
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sites he worked on were in Solin – the ancient Salona.183 At the beginning of his 
career, Bulić was interested in both Classical and Early-Christian periods, but as the 
overall interest in the national history grew, he turned his interests towards the early 
Croat state.184  He was among the founders of the Bihać Society in 1894 which had a 
mission to excavate monuments and sites dating from the time of the Slavic rulers of 
Dalmatia.185 The earliest inscription that contains the name of the Duke Trpirmir, the 
single most important document of Croat history, was his discovery (Fig. 2.38). 
Bulić was appointed the conservator of the Split Classical monuments, with the 
official title of the Conservatore dei monumenti antichi di Spalato in the same year 
when he became the director of the Split Museum, 1886. His attention was centred, 
understandably, on the most endangered but also the most valuable monument – the 
palace of Diocletian.186 Bulić considered Andrić’s original museum building to be 
inadequate and initiated its rebuilding in 1914.187 However, despite his energy in 
protecting the unexcavated heritage, he was unable to establish full cooperation with 
the national movements beyond the immediate borders of Split. 
  
Fig. 2.38 – Trpimir’s inscription Pro Duce Trepimero from the 9th century. A fragment from the 
church in Rižnice near Solin was discovered by Frano Bulić in 1891. The inscription instantly became 
the most venerated material evidence of the longevity of the Croat state. It was replicated by Ivan 
Rendić on the tomb of Ante Starčević a few years after its discovery. See Fig. 2.32 above. 
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The second Provincial Museum in Dalmatia was founded in Zadar in 1832 on 
the initiative of an Austrian Lieutenant in Dalmatia, Vetter von Lilienberg, who 
encouraged collecting flora, fauna and objects related to life in the region, in addition 
to classical antiquities. Despite the campaign, throughout the 19th century, Zadar 
museum fell behind the Archaeological Museum of Split which was granted title 
Museo Nazionale by Vienna.188  
The circumstances which led to the foundation of these first museums in 
Dalmatia raise the question of the definition of national museums in the 
multinational states of the 19th century and in the period of nation building in Europe. 
Modern Croat scholar Nada Guzin-Lukić concluded that due to their local 
perspective, nature of collections and their diversity, these museums were regional or 
provincial museums of the Habsburg Empire, rather than national museums in 
Dalmatia.189  
2.4.5 The discovery of the Croat national heritage in Dalmatia 
In the village of Gornji Muć, between Split and Sinj, the Latin inscription 
dated to 888 during rule of Prince Branimir (879-892), the founder of the local 
church dedicated to St. Jerome, was discovered in 1871 (Fig. 2.39).  
 
Fig. 2.39 – The inscription bearing the name of Duke Branimir, dated 888. 
 
The discovery prompted the local adherents of the Croat national revival to 
collect as many monuments as possible, primarily those of princely inscriptions, as 
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irrefutable proofs of a millennium-long presence of Croats in Dalmatia.190 This 
increased interest in early Mediaeval Croat archaeology coincided with the struggle 
against the official policies of Vienna in Dalmatia and with the growing respect for 
the writings of Ante Starčević.  
The champion of the Croatian national revival in Dalmatia was a catholic priest 
Don Lujo Marun (1857-1939), an amateur archaeologist and enthusiast, who 
undertook a number of excavations in Knin and its surroundings, aiming to collect as 
many artefacts and inscriptions related to the Croats as possible. Marun’s interest in 
the national heritage was influenced by the writings of Starčević, as well as by the 
strong opposition to the Austrian proposal to build a railway line to Knin over a 
number of local mediaeval churches and graveyards.191 Immediately after work on 
railway tracks began in 1885, Marun wrote to the local Narodni List (People’s Press) 
and the Dalmatian Diet about the need to preserve these monuments. The initiative 
received great support from the Croat members of the Dalmatian Diet. Encouraged, 
Marun organized a Committee for the promotion of excavation of Croatian 
monuments in Knin in 1886.192 The Committee was renamed the Knin Antiquities 
Society in 1887.193 Marun worked diligently on excavating and collecting early 
mediaeval inscriptions and stone reliefs.  
In 1893, he founded in Knin the first Museum of Croatian Monuments (Muzej 
hrvatskih spomenika) which housed most of his finds. Marun, in his enthusiasm to 
prove Croatia's identity through researching the archaeological heritage, visited 
numerous villages and archaeological sites in Dalmatia, parts of Lika and south-west 
Bosnia. At a number of these sites he, alone or through his assistants, conducted the 
preliminary excavations, gathered the finds and brought them to Knin Museum.194 
The museum, housed in a building designed by Josip Slade, opened despite the 
opposition of the local authorities which saw this as a political threat and demanded 
all the activities and speeches of the members of the Antiquities Society to be sent for 
                                               
190
 Zekan, M. – Četiri zaslužna velikana hrvatske nacionalne arheologije Srednjeg vijeka u 20. 
stoljeću (Lujo Marun, Lovre Katić, ljubo Karaman, Stjepan Gunjača) in Group of authors – Hrvatska 
arheologija u XX stoljeću, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb, 2009, 22 
191
 Zekan, M. – Fra Lujo Marun (1857 -1939), Founder, Missionary and Visionary of Croatian 
Archaeology, Science and Patriotism in Starohrvatska prosvjeta, III/34, Muzej Hrvatskih Arheoloških 
Spomenika, Split, 2007, 40 
192
 Ibid, 41 
193
 The Committee initially received some support from Frano Bulić, who, conscientious of his public 
role, avoided public exposure. 
194
 Zekan, 2007, 41 
Chapter II                                                                                                      The Croats 
  
 
192 
 
their approval.195 On opening, it changed its name into the Croatian Antiquities 
Society, the first time that a Croatian national institution was named in the territory of 
Dalmatia.  
However, Marun’s initiative did not receive the approval of the existing 
museums and institutions in Dalmatia. One of the greatest opponents of the Museum 
of Croatian Monuments and its publications was Frano Bulić who disagreed with the 
activity of the Society in the wider area of Dalmatia and was against the change of 
name to the Croatian Antiquities Society. He saw the foundation of the Society's 
collection and the Museum dedicated to housing the Croatian national monuments, 
the foundation of the library and its own publishing activities in Croatian, as 
weakening the role of the central museums and thus of his own role.196 Bulić refused 
the publication and the acknowledgement of Marun’s work.  
On his side, Marun did not even entertain the idea of publishing anything in 
Bullettino di Archeologia e Storia Dalmata. This was mainly because of the clash of 
identity between the Croatian Antiquities Society and the Italian language. Similarly 
hostile reception of Marun’s activities occurred in Zagreb, where leading historians, 
such as Rački, Tkalčić and Smičiklas, opposed the idea of Knin taking precedence 
over Zagreb. Seeking help, Marun turned to Sarajevo where he received some 
support from the historians of the newly established Landesmuseum there: director 
Constantine Hörmann and archaeologists Karl Patsch and Ćiro Truhelka, all charged 
with the task of building provincial Bosnian consciousness among local Muslim, 
Serbian and Croats.197 In 1895, Marun published the first issue of Starohrvatska 
Prosvjeta (Old Croatian Education), the first bulletin of any museum in the Austro-
Hungarian lands that bore in its title the name “Croatian.”198 Its contributors were 
predominantly local enthusiasts and amateur archaeologists, with the notable absence 
of the contributions of the professional experts of the time. 
2.4.6 Nation-building programme in Dalmatia and Istria 
As most important civil posts in Dalmatia and Istria were in the hands of 
Italians or pro-Italian aristocracy, the concept of building Croat or Serb national 
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identities by erecting public monuments and buildings was hindered as it was in 
Croatia-Slavonia. The better preserved coastal towns already bore Italianate features 
of the pre-national era. The 19th century national revival in Dalmatia and Istria 
characterised by historism drew heavily on the Italian concept of nation-building. By 
the 1890s, Dalmatian Italians were receiving regular financial and political support 
from the Kingdom of Italy, prompting the first national parties of the Croats and 
Serbs to appear on the Dalmatian political scene and begin a period of cooperation. 
Based on Strossmayer’s Yugoslavism, this cooperation was, similar to that in 
Croatia-Slavonia in the 1848-1883 period, also driven by the need to form an alliance 
against a much stronger non-Slavic nationalism. Little attention was given to the 
religious differences and the appearance of the different interpretations of historical 
sources.  
In Dalmatia and Istria, Italian nationalists began erecting monuments to 
different personalities of Italian history and culture and, especially towards the end of 
the 19th century, to the prominent individuals of the Risorgimento. A monument to 
Niccolo Tommaseo, for example, was erected in Šibenik in 1894.199 Šibenik’s Italian 
mayor Antonio Bajamonti personally initiated twenty eight public projects: the new 
theatre and business buildings, new docks and water-supply system.200 Bajamonti 
insisted on the Italian version of historism, but unusually for the time, employed an 
Italian educated native of Trogir Josip Slade (1828-1911) to design the theatre 
building.201  
On the other hand, no public buildings bearing either Serbian or Croat national 
characteristics were erected in Dalmatia and Istria. Similar to the trend in Croatia-
Slavonia, the nation-building process of these local Slavs was seen in the occasional 
erection of monuments to poets or artists such as the monument to Ivan Gundulić by 
Ivan Rendić, erected in Dubrovnik in 1893.  
Simultaneously, a number of monuments dedicated to members of the imperial 
family and other imperial dignitaries, designed by the Viennese sculptors, were 
publicly displayed in the towns on the initiative of the authorities loyal to the crown. 
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2.5 The Dawn of Yugoslavia 
Two decades after Strossmayer founded the JAZU, the majority of Croat 
intellectuals were in favour of Karadžić’s language reform. Their concept of 
Yugoslavism was based on the thesis asserted by Rački: the Serbs and Croats were 
originally one nation with two names, separated by different histories, state traditions 
and cultures.202 When a leading Slavic philologist of the second part of the 19th 
century, Vatroslav Jagić (1828-1923), accepted Karadžić’s reformed orthography, it 
became a dominant cultural movement in Croatia-Slavonia. They introduced the 
phonetic principles and invited Karadžić’s follower Đuro Daničić to JAZU to work 
on the new Dictionary of Croatian or Serbian language.203 Further affirmation of the 
Karadžić’s reform was followed by the 1901 publication of the Dictionary of 
Croatian language by Croat linguists Ivan Broz and Franjo Iveković, which was 
based on Karadžić’s dictionary of 1852.204 The term Serbo-Croat was still not in use, 
although it was first recorded as early as 1867, when a Dubrovnik Catholic Serb, 
Pero Budmani (1835-1914) published in Vienna Grammatica della lingua serbo-
croata, a manual for the Dalmatian gymnasiums.205  
The oppressive political situation and the economic mismanagement by Vienna 
in Dalmatia and by Budapest in Croatia-Slavonia won growing support for the 
Yugoslav programme amongst the leading Croat and Serb politicians in Austro-
Hunagry. In 1906 in Croatia-Slavonia they formed the Croat-Serb Coalition and 
entered the Sabor. The Croat-Serb Coalition remained the main political force of the 
united Croats and Serbs until the creation of the Kingdom of SHS in 1918.206 The 
Yugoslav idea was particularly strong amongst the intellectuals and artists who 
sought freedom of national expression by leaving Austro-Hungary.207 A significant 
number of them chose either Belgrade or other European towns where they could 
continue their work. The Great Exhibitions in 1889 and 1900 in Paris had already 
created great interest in the Serbian Kingdom, but the sensation of the 1911 
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Exhibition in Rome left Austro-Hungary humiliated again by a small Serbia, which 
had already won the Pig War in 1910.208 
As open political struggle with Austro-Hungarian authorities was severely 
restricted, a group of younger Dalmatian Croat sculptors gathered around the newly 
founded Medulić Circle in Split in 1908. Headed by Ivan Meštrović, a graduate of 
Vienna University (Fig. 1.a.14), they began working on themes inspired by the 
mythical past of the South Slavs. Meštrović was so completely immersed in the 
Serbian Kosovo Cycle of epic poetry that he produced a series of sculptures of 
mythical Serbian heroes and produced a design for the never executed Vidovdan 
Temple (Fig. 1.32).209 For the 1911 Great Exhibition in Rome he and his compatriots 
demanded a separate pavilion for the South Slavs of Austro-Hungary and when they 
were denied it, they decided to exhibit in the Serbian pavilion.210 The controversy 
that arose from the change of sides by the Austro-Hungarian South Slav artists 
earned Meštrović the winning award for sculpture in Rome and made him famous in 
wider European circles. He remained in Rome for the next four years, but when Italy 
entered the First World War he moved to London, where he actively participated in 
the work of the Yugoslav Committee.211 Whilst in London, Meštrović was the first 
living artist to have an individual exhibition in the Victoria and Albert Museum. 
Some of the sculptures he produced for this exhibition remained part of a permanent 
display to the present day.212 
With the exception of some artists who maintained good relations with 
Belgrade and Serbian intellectuals, building a national culture in Croatia-Slavonia 
was hindered by Khuen-Héderváry and subsequent pro-Hungarian Bans. The 
struggle for national liberation and building national identity was limited to the 
political activities inside and outside the Sabor. In the public domain there were no 
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visible symbols of Croat or Serb national identity. This could only be expressed 
through the printing activities of the JAZU and Matica Hrvatska, but these were 
limited to the literate South Slav elite.  
The Croat-Serbian Coalition spent most its existence in opposition, whilst its 
leaders were tried for treason. However, the coalition was the main initiator for the 
unification and strongly argued for signing of the Corfu Declaration in 1917. The 
Croat politicians in favour of unification were in a hurry to create a common state, 
because of the fear of Italian and Hungarian pretensions.213 However, not all Croat 
politicians were in favour of Yugoslavia. Stjepan Radić (1871-1928), the leader of a 
small People’s Peasant Party founded in 1905, believed that the union should be 
decided after a separately formed Croatian state would hold a popular referendum 
(Fig. 1.a.15).214 Yet, he was in minority. 
2.6 The First Yugoslavia – 1918-1941 
Unlike in the Serbian Kingdom, the former Austro-Hungarian South Slav 
provinces did not suffer war destruction to any great extent. Whilst at least half of 
Serbian pre-war industrial facilities were destroyed, no significant damage occurred 
in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.215 The recovery was 
difficult and followed by the immediate dispute over the agrarian reform in former 
imperial lands and the debate over the exchange rate between the Austrian kronen 
and Serbian dinar. The disappointment with the new government, which expected 
former Austro-Hungarian South-Slavs to show solidarity with a devastated and 
unevenly developed Serbian Kingdom was quickly employed by Radić, who 
immediately asserted his republican ideas. A staunch anti-monarchist, Radić used a 
populist approach among the people who, for the first time in history, were given the 
right to vote. 
Whilst the central government in Belgrade was focused on re-building parts of 
the country destroyed in the war and re-distribution of land to war veterans and 
impoverished peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia-Slavonia 
continued their development unhindered, albeit at a slower rate than expected. 
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Buoyed by greater industrial growth, this time without Austrian or Hungarian 
involvement, the local authorities of Zagreb and Ljubljana planned to transform the 
former Austro-Hungarian provincial towns into modern centres.216 However, by 
then, the problem of nation-building faced two obstacles. Firstly, focusing on the 
national narrative in a new common state was difficult due to the different religious 
and state traditions and, secondly, the Historism and national revivalist architecture 
of the 19th century on which many new European nation-states were built, were 
considered outdated by the end of the First World War. The Viennese secession that 
had influenced the first generation of university educated Croat architects was 
replaced by Modernism, which stylistically had nothing in common with building 
national identities. Unsurprisingly, the monuments celebrating Austro-Hungarian 
emperors and national heroes that existed in the former imperial provinces were 
removed by the new authorities, amidst the promotion of the new nation-building 
programme: Integral Yugoslavism. The pre-war pro-Yugoslav intellectuals from 
Croatia were its main executors. 
2.6.1 Fully developed Croatian nationalism 
Josip Frank had led a faction of Starčević’s Party of Right under the name 
Pure Party of Rights (Čista stranka prava) until his death in 1911. Frank’s close 
associate, Aleksandar Horvat, re-launched the party under its old name in 1913, who 
chose a young lawyer from Herzegovina, Ante Pavelić (1889-1959), to be party 
secretary. During the First World War the Party of Rights was condemned both by 
the Croat-Serb Coalition, who hoped for the unification with Serbia and by Radić’s 
Croat Peasant Party who opposed the Party of Rights devotion to the Habsburgs. 
Eventually, the pro-unionists won when the majority of the leading Croat 
intellectuals supported Strossmayer’s and Rački’s concept of Yugoslavism.  
The situation dramatically changed after the creation of the Kingdom of 
SHS and the event that put Croat nationalism firmly behind the anti-Serbian 
argument was the assassination of Stjepan Radić in the Belgrade Skupština in 1928, 
after a heated parliamentary debate in which the opposition, gathered around the 
Croat Peasant Party, accused the government of corruption, whilst the Serbian 
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Radical Party accused the Croat opposition of treason.217 This crime played into the 
hands of the Party of Right which immediately resurrected the nationalist doctrine of 
Croat supremacy of Ante Starčević. Prominent party members, historians Ivo Pilar 
(1874-1933) and Milan pl. Šufflay (1879-1931) furthered the idea of Croat state-
right, based on Starčević’s premise that all lands east of the Drina were ethnic Croat 
lands. In the years prior to the First World War they had argued that the Croat nation 
and state could survive only within the Austro-Hungary. The anti-Serbian rhetoric, 
originally initiated by the Austro-Hungarian politicians and historians in the 1880s, 
fitted well with Vienna’s official policies towards Serbia. The Croat adherents to 
these former Austro-Hungarian state-narratives were still alive and well at the time 
of Radić’s assassination and witnessed Croat dissatisfaction with the new state. The 
immediate redeployment of these anti-Serbian narratives as a threat to the Croat 
nation was not incidental; both Pilar (Fig. 2.40) and Šufflay (Fig. 2.41) were Austro-
Hungarian public servants loyal to the former state who favoured the official conduct 
of the old imperial bureaucracy. 
        
Fig. 2.40 – Ivo Pilar (1874-1933)                            Fig. 2.41 – Milan pl. Šufflay (1879-1931) 
 
Šufflay, together with the Hungarian historian Lajos Thallóczy (1857-1916), a 
close friend of Benjamin von Kállay and his principal advisor, between 1913 and 
1918, worked on the Acta et diplomata res Albaniae mediae aetatis illustrantia 
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(Documents and Diplomatic Affairs illustrating the Middle Ages in Albania), a key 
work for the establishment of the Albanian national narrative in the years of creation 
of the Albanian state.218 Pilar, on the other hand, under the German pseudonym L. v. 
Südland, published in 1918 in Vienna Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg. 
Übersichtliche Darstellung des Gesamt–Problems (The South Slav Question and the 
World War. The General Presentation of the Entire Problem). He argued that one of 
the main reasons for the beginning of the war was Serbian desire to take Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from the Croats.219 The book was poorly received by the leading Croat 
intellectuals who advocated unification, as well as by Vienna because it also pointed 
to the Austrian failure to earn Croat loyalty. Both Pilar and Šufflay were 
marginalized after 1918 and they saw the Party of Rights as a platform to continue 
their anti-Serbian rhetoric. The Yugoslav authorities tried them for treason, but their 
sentences were short and they were allowed to resume their writing. 
The Party of Rights used the difficult political crisis that arose after Radić’s 
assassination to pursue its goals militarily. They were unintentionally aided by the 
introduction of the Dictatorship by King Alexander I on 6 January 1929 which also 
brought the change of the country’s name. As a soldier and a king at the beginning of 
his reign, Alexander was greatly respected by his subjects regardless of their 
ethnicity. However, Radić’s assassination and dictatorship that followed greatly 
affected his personal popularity and set Croat-Serbian relations on collision course. 
Alexander banned all anti-Yugoslav parties that openly advocated the break-up of the 
country and proclaimed Integral Yugoslavism as the official cultural policy of the 
country. In response, the Party of Rights led by Ante Pavelić founded the Ustaše 
(Resurgents) units for terrorist attacks on Yugoslav officials. Soon Pavelić emigrated 
to Italy where Mussolini provided financial support for Ustaše activities. Five years 
later, in collaboration with the pro-Bulgarian VMRO, they assassinated King 
Alexander in Marseilles.220 
By the end of the 1930s, the European geopolitical map had changed 
significantly. The growth of Nazism in Germany prompted the British government to 
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interfere in the affairs of all Balkan states and soon the entire Balkans became a stage 
for confrontation between Britain and Germany.221 Regent Paul (Fig. 1.a.17) 
attempted to ease the tense relations between the Serbs and the Croats by negotiating 
a political compromise which led first to the Concordat with the Catholic Church in 
1937, and then to the Sporazum (Agreement) which enabled the creation of the 
Banovina Hrvatska in 1939.222 This is when, for the first time in history, Croatia-
Slavonia and Dalmatia were placed under the authority of Zagreb and were given the 
common name of Croatia. Dubrovnik became part of Banovina Hrvatska under the 
provisions of the same agreement.  
The Sporazum can be viewed as an attempt to resolve an increasingly 
dangerous position of Yugoslavia, with its many ethnic groups, on the eve of the war 
in Europe. In Yugoslavia, having fought alongside the victorious allies 1918, the 
Serbs leant towards Britain. The Croats, dissatisfied by the pre-war economic 
policies despite their insignificant impact on the former Habsburg lands, turned 
towards their former allies, the Germans and Austrians. When the Second World 
War began, this political division turned into an ethnic division, after the Axis 
invasion of 1941. Initially, the Serbs supported the remains of the Royal army that 
fought guerilla campaigns in the mountains of south-western Serbia, Montenegro and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Croats supported the Ustaše movement that 
assumed leadership in creating the Independent State of Croatia in April 1941.223 At 
the beginning of the war, a small number of both the Serbs and Croats joined the 
Partisan movement of the Communist Party that also opposed the Axis. The 
Partisans grew into a formidable force, especially after 1943, when the Allies 
withdrew support for the remains of Royalist army. 
2.6.2 Ivan Meštrović (1883-1962) 
The turbulent interwar years in Yugoslav culture were marked by one 
remarkable man: Ivan Meštrović. After 1918, Meštrović became a close friend of 
King Alexander I and was commissioned to build the majority of the monuments to 
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the fallen in the First World War, thus becoming the main promoter of Integral 
Yugoslavism.224 Apart from the allegorical monuments dedicated to all the South 
Slavs (Monument to the Unknown Hero, Fig. 1.45), he also worked on monuments 
celebrating the “founding fathers of Yugoslav idea.” In 1926, he produced an 
imposing sculpture of Bishop Strossmayer to be placed on the Strossmayer Square in 
Zagreb (Fig. 2.42). In the same period, Meštrović began working on themes that 
were later proclaimed exclusively Croatian. In 1929 he produced a monumental 
statue of Bishop Gregory of Nin, a 9th century bishop who opposed the Papal statute 
that only Latin should be used as the language of service in the Catholic churches 
(Fig. 2.43).225  
As Integral Yugoslavism heavily drew on the most glorious episodes of the 
national histories, in 1932 Meštrović produced a bronze monument History of Croats 
to be placed in front of the University of Zagreb Law Faculty (Fig. 2.44). Clearly 
inspired by the ancient Egyptian statue of the Scribe from the Louvre, the History of 
Croats, modelled on the artist’s mother, sits with its crossed hands over the writing 
board which holds an inscription “history of the Croats” in Glagolitic letters. 
However, the original of the monument, executed in marble, was done specially for 
King Alexander and it is now placed in the National Museum in Belgrade. 
By this time, Meštrović was a world renowned sculptor. However, he also 
experimented with architectural design. In 1922 he bought and redesigned a 17th 
century house in Zagreb, where he lived until 1942 when he fled Croatia.226 Between 
1934-1939 he also designed a building for the Association of Croatian Artists in 
Zagreb (Fig. 2.45). Originally intended to be dedicated to King Peter I 
Karadjordjević, the building was turned into a mosque during the Second World 
War, only to be used by the artists again after 1945. 
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Fig. 2.42 – Monument to Strossmayer, erected in        2.43 – Monument to Gregory of Nin, erected 
1926 in front of the JAZU.                                                in 1927 in Split. 
      
Fig. 2.44 – The History of the Croats, 1932            Fig. 2.45 – Association of Croatian Artists, 1939 
 
After the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, Meštrović lost the position 
of a “court-artist.” He continued working on The Monument of an Unknown Hero on 
Avala and the Croatian Association of Artists, but his public prominence was 
overshadowed by the political crisis in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.227  
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2.7 The Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945) 
Croatia gained “independence” for the first time since 1102 on 10 April 1941. 
On that day, the leader of the Ustaše, Ante Pavelić assumed the role of the Poglavnik 
(Leader). His close associate, Slavko Kvaternik (1878-1947) son-in-law of Josip 
Frank, proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska – 
NDH), incorporating some of the territories of Banovina Hrvatska, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the county of Srem in Vojvodina.228 This territory incorporated 
around 6 million people of which around 2 million were Serbian Orthodox.229 The 
new regime adopted the 16th century Coat-of-Arms, a white and red checkerboard 
representing the Kingdom of Croatia, as its main state-symbol (Fig. 2.63).230 Even 
though the Croat Coat-of-Arms had changed through the centuries, it remained 
quintessentially Croatian and as such was imposed over all the territories included 
into the NDH.231 
Barely four days after the bombing of Belgrade on 6 April 1941, the German 
troops entered Ljubljana and Zagreb where they were greeted as liberators.232 
Immediately after the proclamation of the NDH, a programme of extermination of 
the Serbs, Jews and Roma began. Already in May 1941 the newly formed police and 
military units began expelling as many Serbs as possible to German occupied Serbia, 
but when the German occupational authorities in Serbia closed the borders, the 
Croatian Culture and Education Minister, Mile Budak (1889-1945), stressed that 
those who remained should convert from Orthodox to Catholic and become true 
Croats or be killed.233 Budak is often cited to have coined the statement that of “all 
Serbs who live in Croatia, one third should be deported, one third converted to 
Catholicism and one third killed.234  
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Following the proclamation of the new state in May 1941, the Ministery for 
Education decreed the closure of the JAZU and its transformation into the Croatian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts (HAZU).235 On 14 August, the NDH government 
decreed an “act for the cleanliness of the Croat language” which forbade the use of 
Karadžić’s phonetic orthography and grammar.236 A few days later, on 26 August, 
the use of Cyrillic was officially forbidden.237 This was followed by the publications 
of the Etymological Syntax in 1942 and the Croatian Punctuation in 1944.238  
By the end of 1941, a series of anti-Semitic and anti-Serbian laws were passed, 
accompanied by the systematic murder of Serbs, Jews and Roma. The Jews were 
branded by wearing a yellow band around their arm, whilst Serbs were forced to 
wear a blue one. A series of concentration camps were established throughout the 
NDH territory from the beginning of the war, where genocide against the Serbs, Jews 
and Roma took place over the next four years.239 The most notorious concentration 
camps were Jasenovac, Jadovno (near Gospić), Jastrebarsko, Kerestinac, Lepoglava 
(an old Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav prison) and Stara Gradiška (unique in its 
role as the only European concentration camp made exclusively for women and 
children).  
 2.7.1 The NDH narrative 
Pavelić (Fig. 2.46) and Kvaternik (Fig. 2.47) adopted Starčević’s ideas 
about Croat supremacy among the South Slavs. To prove their loyalty to the Aryan 
theories of the Third Reich, the NDH leadership promoted the idea of the Gothic 
origins of the Croats, based on the spurious interpretations of the Historia Salonitana 
and The Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea, which had appeared in the later Austro-
Hungarian period. The eastern and southern borders of the NDH were drawn 
according to Starčević’s idea of the Croat lands west of the Drina River and included 
the notion that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were “the best of the Croats.”  
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In order gain Muslim support, in 1941 Pavelić’s regime awarded the post of 
Vice-President of the NDH to a Bosnian Muslim, Džafer Kulenović (1891-1956), 
which he held until 1945, when he escaped from Zagreb (Fig. 2.48). The Muslims of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina who joined NDH army were organized into separate units 
under the command of Muslim officers who had declared themselves Croats. As a 
goodwill gesture, in July 1941, Pavelić decided to convert Meštrović’s round 
pavilion (Fig. 2.46), an Association of Croatian Artists, into a mosque. The name of 
the square where it stood was renamed from King Peter’s Square to Kulin-Ban 
Square, because Kulin-Ban was considered to be the Catholic founder of the 
mediaeval Bosnian state. Architect Stjepan Planić designed the internal decorations 
and 45m tall minarets. The mosque first used on 14 January 1943 (Orthodox New 
Year), whilst its official inauguration took place in August 1944. After the war, the 
minarets were dismantled, the internal Islamic decorations removed and the building 
returned to the Association of Croatian Artists. 
                
Fig. 2.46 – Ante Pavelić                  Fig. 2.47 – Slavko Kvaternik          Fig. 2.48 – Džafer Kulenović 
(1889-1959)                                    (1878-1947)                                     (1891-1956) 
 
Since the Croatian historical narrative included a significant number of 
Orthodox Serbs, especially among the Dalmatian Slavs and the members of the 
Illyrian movement, the NDH regime decided to create a state Croatian Orthodox 
Church. Already on the 18 June 1941, a government decree forbade the term 
“Serbian Orthodox Church” and returned to the old Austro-Hungarian term “Greek-
Eastern Church.” By the end of the year, the Julian calendar used by the Orthodox 
population was banned and in February 1942 Pavelić decreed the establishment of 
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the Croatian Orthodox Church. A Russian émigré and a former Metropolitan of New 
Moscow, Germogen (1861-1945), was installed as its Metropolitan.240  
The foundation of the Croatian Orthodox Church, however, did not prevent the 
systematic destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries on the territory of 
NDH. According to a report produced by the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
in March 1947, 23 churches destroyed in the Gornjokarlovci Eparchy had been badly 
damaged out of total of 220 churches and chapels from various periods of history. In 
Srem, the seat of the Metropolitanate under the Habsburgs, 28 destroyed and 62 
damaged churches were recorded. On the whole territory of NDH all but 3 
monasteries had been destroyed. In Dalmatia, only the monasteries of Krka (built 
c.1350 by Jelena Šubić-Nemanjić), Krupa (built in 1317 by King Milutin of Serbia) 
and Dragović (built in 1395) survived, owing to the fact that this part of Dalmatia 
was under Italian occupation. In the Eparchy of Banja Luka in north-west Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 20 churches were completely destroyed, and 11 damaged, whilst in 
Banja Luka itself, both Orthodox churches were razed to the ground.241 
During the existence of NDH, historical narrative justifying the existence of the 
large Croat state was supported by the government. The most significant Croatian 
cultural institution, Matica Hrvatska, became the primary publisher of approved 
works of Croat historians who advocated the idea of an independent Croatia free of 
Serbs. Additionally, Austro-Hungarian and German works written on the eve of the 
First World War that supported anti-Serbian statements, such as Pilar’s The South 
Slav Question, were finally translated from German into Croatian and published by 
Matica Hrvatska.242 The old Austro-Hungarian arguments of the non-existence of the 
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were reiterated by Ćiro Truhelka in his final work 
Studije o podrijetlu. Etnološka razmatranja iz Bosne i Herzegovine, published by 
Matica Hrvatska in 1942.243 Truhelka, the first curator of the Land Museum in 
Sarajevo during the mandate of Benjamin von Kállay was not only responsible for 
coining the phrase bosančica for the mediaeval Cyrillic script used in Bosnia, 
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Herzegovina and Dalmatia, but also for the assertion of the purity of the Croats and 
Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.244  
2.7.2 The Genocide  
After the Second World War, the new Communist authorities, based on the 
1948 census, asserted that the total population loss in the whole of Yugoslavia was 
around 1,7 million of people or nearly 11% of the pre-war population.245 700,000 
people had been exterminated in Jasenovac alone, of whom nearly 500,000 were 
Serbs, with the rest Jews, Roma and Croats who disagreed with the Pavelić’s 
regime.246 The barbarity of the crimes committed in Jasenovac and other 
concentration camps throughout the NDH were such that even the German military 
representatives present at the time were disapproving.247 Yet, little was to stop the 
genocide, because of the anti-Slavic racism of the Wehrmacht.248 
Tito ordered the bulldozing of the Jasenovac concentration camp immediately 
in 1945 hoping that, by erasing the physical remains of the camp, Serbs and Croats 
would forget their deep mutual resentment. Tito himself never visited the site, not 
even when a Memorial Centre with distinctive sculptures of Social Realism opened 
in 1966 (Fig. 2.49).249 The monument erected on the Jasenovac site bore no national 
characteristics; instead, abstract concrete flower was chosen as a symbol of hope in 
the new Yugoslavia, rather than the reminder of the notorious crimes committed by 
the Nazi-regime of the NDH.  
One of the most controversial roles in the genocide against the Serbs and other 
non-Croats during the existence of the NDH was that of the Roman Catholic Church. 
The majority of the clergy, led by the Cardinal Alojz Stepinac (1898-1960) supported 
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the formation of the NDH.250 Some Catholic priests even actively participated in the 
Ustaše military corps or were in charge of the concentration camps.251 After the war, 
the Catholic Church denied its role in the genocide. It was questioned whether 
Stepinac and the top echelons of the Roman Catholic clergy were really not aware of 
the committed crimes. After the war, Stepinac (Fig. 2.50) was tried for treason and 
spent most of his remaining life under house arrest. His imprisonment was viewed by 
the majority of the Croat-émigré and some Western scholars as a consequence of 
political naivety and communist persecution.252  
          
Fig. 2.49 – Jasenovac Memorial, unveiled in 1966.       2.50 – Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac (1898-1960), 
The idea of the Belgrade architect Bogdan Bogda-       head of the Roman Catholic Church in NDH.  
nović was executed by the Croat architect Lavo-  In recent years, Stepinac became a figure of                                                                    
slav Horvat.                                                                    veneration in Croatia and was beatified by Pope  
                                                                                       John Paul II in 1997.253 
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2.7.3 The Bleiburg massacre 
Ante Pavelić had ordered withdrawal of the remnants of the Ustaše armies 
to Germany through Austria in early May 1945. The advancing British troops 
captured and turned them over to Tito’s Partisans near Bleiburg in Austria. After 
complicated and unsuccessful negotiations, the Partisans executed a heavily disputed 
number of the Ustaše. This event became a convenient excuse for the anti-Serb, anti-
Yugoslav and anti-Communist rhetoric generated by the Croat émigré community 
which emerged after the Second World War, first in Argentina and then in the United 
States and Western Europe. A number of these émigrés were open supporters of the 
NDH who had managed to escape the new Communist regime in Yugoslavia.254 In 
1951 Croat emigres began publishing the Croatian Review in Buenos Aries, a 
quarterly magazine supposedly concerned with Croat history, culture and language. 
The review quickly became the main Croatian magazine abroad. Vinko Nikolić 
(1912-1997), a former adjutant to the Supreme Ustaše Headquarters during the war 
(Fig. 2.51), after escaping to Argentina in 1947, briefly lived in the house of Ante 
Pavelić. He became a lifelong editor-in-chief of the Croatian Review in 1951. 
 
Fig. 2.51 – Vinko Nikolić, first editor of the Croatian Review, a magazine for Croat history, culture 
and language, first published in Argentina, photographed during the Second World War in front of the 
monument to Ante Starčević. 
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2.8 The Second Yugoslavia – 1945-1991 
Communist Yugoslavia was reorganized as a federation of six republics. The 
internal borders of the federal republics were determined in 1945 along lines that 
would became internationally recognized in 1991. The new borders in the west of the 
country corresponded with the Austro-Hungarian administrative borders drawn at the 
end of the 19th century. In the south, Macedonia was proclaimed a separate republic 
of the state, while Serbia was partitioned into three territories: Serbia Proper (roughly 
corresponding to its pre-1912 borders), the Province of Vojvodina (roughly 
corresponding to its short-lived 1848 borders) and the Province of Kosovo and 
Metohija (the remaining territory of Serbia in its post-1912 borders). The borders of 
Croatia followed approximately the boundaries of the Banovina Hrvatska determined 
by the 1939 Sporazum, whilst Bosnia and Herzegovina had its borders established 
according to the Austro-Hungarian delineation of 1878.255  
Those parts of the Istrian Penisula that had been under Italian rule after the 
Treaty of Versailles were finally included into the Yugoslav state and added to the 
newly proclaimed People’s Republic of Croatia. Immediately after the inclusion of 
Istria and parts of Dalmatia that belonged to Italy before the war, a process of the 
expulsion of the remaining Italian population began. In Istria alone, the exodus of the 
Italians between 1945 and 1954 numbered between 200,000 and 210,000, forever 
changing the demographic structure of the eastern Adriatic coast.256 
Concurrently, the exodus of the Germans from Vojvodina and Slavonia was 
compensated by the forced re-settlement of the Serbs from the poorest parts of Lika 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina on land formerly belonging to Germans. Under the 
pretext of a better life, the Communist authorities further reduced the number of 
Serbs in the newly proclaimed socialist Croatia. Together with the atrocities 
committed by the Ustaše regime during 1941-1945, these forced resettlements 
reduced the number of Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia by 5%.257 
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2.8.1 The Croatian republic within federal Yugoslavia 
In order to maintain a unified state, the Yugoslav Communist Party, did not 
allow open public debate about internal Yugoslav divisions during the Second World 
War. No distinction was made between the Ustaše regime of the NDH and the 
Serbian Royalist army that had fought against the Germans, Partisans and Ustaše.258 
As the destruction in the former NDH territories had mostly affected the towns 
along the lines of withdrawal of the German and Croat armies, the most important 
towns of Zagreb, Sisak, Varaždin and Djakovo in Slavonia-Croatia had not suffered 
the same devastation seen in Serbian towns. Just as after the First World War, the 
physical recovery of Croatia-Slavonia and Slovenia was much quicker than the 
recovery of Serbia. All visible reminders of the NDH were removed from public 
display and all individuals associated with the quisling regime, as the NDH was now 
renamed, were forbidden to participate in public life. Symbolically, the most 
sensitive was the removal of the equestrian statue of Ban Jelačić from the central 
Zagreb square, where it had stood since 1866. 
The new Croatian authorities established a network of public institutions, 
similar to those in other Yugoslav republics. Official historical narratives, historical 
research and education followed the Yugoslav version of Marxist ideology, centred 
on the new policy of “brotherhood and unity.”259 For obvious reasons, archaeological 
and historical research were subject to the new institutions controlled by the 
Communist Party. All books published by the NDH authorities that propagated Croat 
superiority in the Balkans and Gothic origins of the Croats were duly banned. All 
acts of the NDH government were overthrown and Karadžić’s language was restored 
to either Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serb. The Academy’s name was returned to its 
original the Yugoslav Academy, JAZU, in 1945 and an act of 1947 enabled JAZU to 
found and organize cultural institutions on the territory of Croatia, to enable it to 
become the central scientific and artistic institution of Croatia.260 Matica hrvatska 
was reorganized in the same manner as Matica srpska and was required to follow the 
cultural policies of “brotherhood and unity.” 
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The University of Zagreb was expanded by creating several new faculties 
between 1946 and 1981. This was followed by the opening of new universities at 
Zadar (1955), Rijeka (1973), Split (1974) and Osijek (1975).261 The network of 
Austro-Hungarian and Royal Yugoslav museums that had existed prior to the war 
was reorganized and put under the authority of the National Museum of Croatia. The 
experts that worked in the University, museums and other cultural institutions before 
and during the Second World War were initially retired by the new Communist 
authorities, but as there were no easily available experts and intellectuals amongst the 
new authorities, these were quickly recalled from their enforced retirement. After 
Šime Ljubić, the Archaeological Museum in Zagreb was led by a succession of 
Viennese graduates until 1953.262 All subsequent directors of the Archaeological 
Museum in Zagreb were educated at the University of Zagreb.263 
The Restoration Institute was initiated in 1948 as a special branch of the 
JAZU.264 Similar regional institutes were founded in Split in 1954 and Zadar in 1958. 
In 1966 the Restoration Institute of Croatia was established as an independent 
cultural institution for care of cultural heritage on the territory of the republic.265  
Since the former Habsburg lands, excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina, had a 
significant number of privately owned manor houses and castles, the new regime 
confiscated most of those and converted them into public institutions: schools, 
hospitals, orphanages, homes for the elderly or administrative buildings. Very few 
were turned into museums and opened to the public.266 Furthermore, the new 
Communist elite frequently used some former aristocratic houses as official 
residences of the Party leaders. Naturally, ordinary people had no access to those 
places. 
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2.8.2 Croat intellectuals – reluctant Communists 
As the new state narrative required compliance with the policies of 
“brotherhood and unity,” the founding myth of the Second Yugoslavia was based on 
the Strossmayer’s idea of Yugoslavism and the Corfu Declaration of 1917. Because 
of the role of the Matica hrvatska and the HAZU during the Second World War, the 
Yugoslav authorities decided to redefine the relationship between the Serbs and 
Croats by establishing a new common culture based on Marxist principles. The ideas 
of Integral Yugoslavism were dismissed as they were interpreted to promoting 
Greater Serbian hegemony. However, the idea of the unity of the language remained. 
So, basing the argument on the Vienna Agreement of 1850, a new literary agreement 
between Serbs and Croats was signed in Novi Sad in 1954. This act was meant to 
heal the resentment between Croats and Serbs and neither Croatian nor Serbian 
signatories dared to challenge that. 
A number of prominent Croat artists and intellectuals of the pre-war era 
managed to survive the war either by carefully working with the NDH regime (such 
as Miroslav Krleža, 1893-1981) or by leaving Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 
Second World War (Ivan Meštrović). During the war, Krleža (Fig. 2.52) refused to 
join the Partisan movement, but had chosen to remain in Zagreb where he lived 
unmolested by the regime. After the war, those academics and intellectuals who had 
stayed in Yugoslavia, nominally accepted Communist rule and many gained 
prominent public positions. Immediately after the war, Krleža became the vice-
president of the JAZU. Unlike Ivo Andrić, the only Nobel Prize Laureate from 
Yugoslavia (Fig. 2.53), who led a quiet life in Belgrade with little involvement in the 
politics, Krleža, the most prominent Croatian writer of the 20th century and a strict 
opponent of the Royal Yugoslavia and the policies of Integral Yugoslavism, soon 
became Tito’s most important state artist.267  
Ivan Meštrović emigrated to the United States in 1946, where he continued his 
career as a professor at Syracuse University. The former close associate of King 
Alexander and a venerated figure of Integral Yugoslavism, Meštrović became closely 
connected with the Croat emigration associated with the Ustaše movement.268 He 
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regularly contributed to the Croatian Review, which sought to maintain the narrative 
of Croatian history as put formerly by Starčević, expanded by Pilar and maintained 
by the NDH regime. Meštrović initially refused to return to Yugoslavia, but 
eventually did so in 1952 to give support to Cardinal Stepinac and endow his work to 
the people of Croatia. On Stepinac’s death in 1960, Meštrović produced a relief that 
was placed on his tomb in the Zagreb Cathedral.269 When Meštrović died in 1962, his 
remains were buried in the family mausoleum that he had had built in the inter-war 
period. 
       
Fig. 2.52 – Miroslav Krleža (1893-1981).              Fig. 2.53 – Ivo Andrić (1892-1975), the Nobel Prize  
the most prominent Croat writer. Tito’s                 for Literature winner in 1961. A member of the  
favourite, he held a cynical attitude towards          Young Bosnia organization which assassinated the 
Yugoslav unification in 1918.                                 Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 in Sarajevo.                                                          
When the first cracks in the fragile Croat-Serbian relations occurred in the 
1960s, most Croat intellectuals supported the new upsurge of Croat nationalism and 
abandoned the “brotherhood and unity.” Even though Tito suppressed this early 
outbreak of Croat nationalism, he did so only by conceding to the Croats by 
weakening the federation and further reducing Serbian influence.270 This opened the 
way for the Croatian Spring of 1971. 
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2.8.3 The Croatian Spring 
In April 1967, a group of Croat intellectuals published a Declaration 
Concerning the Name and Position of the Croatian language, a document which 
denounced the notion of a unified Serbo-Croat language. The declaration, signed by 
members of Matica hrvatska and a number of prominent Croatian intellectuals, 
asserted that the Croatian language had been reduced to the status of a dialect and 
thus demanded the introduction of four official languages in Yugoslavia: Slovene, 
Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian.271 Krleža, even though Tito’s favourite, also 
joined the signatories, revealing his old anti-Yugoslav attitude from the pre-war 
period when he described the Croats’ struggle against Belgrade as “the search of a 
new master” and a replay of an old theme of the 1526 union with the Habsburgs.272 
The situation was further complicated in 1971 with the beginning of the 
Croatian Spring. Complaining that significant financial profits created in Slovenia 
and Croatia were being directed towards the less developed republics of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and the province of Kosovo, the Croat 
political rebels demanded the purge of Serbs from the police, army and the Party.273 
By then, the percentage of the Serbian population on the territory of Croatia had 
fallen to just below 15%.274 These demands for a separate language and the purge of 
Serbs from state institutions revived memories of the NDH. Instead of celebrating the 
“brotherly” struggle against the “foreign occupiers and domestic traitors,” which was 
the official narrative after 1945, the Croat Massive Movement (MasPok) as the 
Croatian Spring became known sought the revival of the Croat national narratives.275 
For example, in Šibenik in 1971 instead of the planned erection of the monument to 
the victims of the Ustaše regime, the city council decided to erect the monument to 
the 11th century Croat king Petar Krešimir IV.276 There were even calls for the re-
instalment of the monument to Ban Jelačić in his square in Zagreb, but Tito soon 
energetically crushed the rebellion. 
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In 1971, Matica hrvatska withdrew from the Novi Sad Agreement arguing that 
it had been signed under the coercion of the authorities. A new Croatian 
Orthography by Milan Moguš was published in Zagreb, which re-asserted some of 
the linguistic solutions used during the NDH and claimed that Serbian and Croatian 
were two distinct languages that had been forcefully united. In the same year, as a 
result of the MasPok, the publication of the Croatian Weekly (Hrvatski tjednik) 
began and, for the first time since 1945, the position of the Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was debated.277 As Tito found these public assertions subversive to the 
official policy of “brotherhood and unity,” the work of Matica hrvatska was 
suspended in 1972 and its members, amongst whom was a dissident Franjo Tudjman 
(Fig. 2.54), were dispersed.278  
 
Fig. 2.54 – Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999) rose through the Party ranks until 1971 when he joined the 
Croatian Spring. In 1991 he became the first President of the new independent Croatia. 
Further concerns were raised when the younger generation of historians, such 
was Bruno Bušić (1939-1978) asserted in 1971 that the real number of victims in all 
NDH concentration camps had not been higher than 60,000. Bušić’s mentor at the 
time was none other than Franjo Tudjman, former Yugoslav army-general-turned-
historian. Tudjman led for several years the Institute of the Worker’s Movement of 
Croatia. After clashes with the authorities during the Croatian Spring, his work on 
modern Croatian history was possible to continue only with help from the Croatian 
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Disapora that maintained the cults of Starčević and Pavelić after 1945. His efforts 
culminated in the publication of the controversial Wastelands of Historical Reality 
(Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti) in 1989, in which Tudjman reasserted Bušić’s denial 
of genocide in the NDH. 
After the suppression of the Croatian Spring in 1971, the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution dissolved Yugoslavia into a set of confederate states with administrative 
borders that did not correspond to the ethnic groupings. The disillusioned 
participants of the Croatian Spring, among whom was Franjo Tudjman, sought to 
establish connections with the Croat diaspora. Links with the former members of the 
Ustaša regime of NDH secured significant financial aid that enabled the formation of 
the Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – HDZ) in June 1989 
– the party that would lead Croatia to independence. Consequently, when the newly 
independent Croatian Republic was proclaimed in 1991, several prominent Croat 
emigres became ministers in Tudjman’s new government.  
With the growing economic problems that had engulfed Yugoslavia from the 
late 1970s, the confederate nature of the state combined with Serbian dissatisfaction 
with the inability to make decisions over its entire territory, let alone to influence 
federal decisions due to the absence of high political representatives in key-state 
positions, the road to the disintegration was fully open.279 
2.8.4 Croatian national narrative in diaspora  
Supported by the Catholic Church and the Pontifical Croatian College of St. 
Jerome in Rome,280 a significant number of former NDH officials and members of 
the Ustaše movement and their adherents managed to emigrate and form a strong 
Croatian diaspora that continued to actively propagate the idea of an independent 
Croatia. One of the key figures in maintaining the Croatian national narrative of the 
NDH period abroad was a Catholic priest from Herzegovina, Dominik Mandić 
(1889-1973), who had opposed the Yugoslav idea from the beginning of the First 
World War (Fig. 2.55). With a doctorate in Church History awarded at the 
University of Fribourg in Switzerland, Mandić was a strong supporter of the late 19th 
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and early 20th century concept of South Slav history promoted originally by German 
and Austrian historians and supporters of Austro-Slavism: Starčević, Pilar, 
Thallószy, Šufflay and Truhelka. In 1939 he was made an administrator for Slavic 
countries for the Franciscan Order at Rome, a post he abandoned in 1951 when he 
emigrated to the US. On his arrival in America, Mandić became fully engaged in 
organizing the Croatian disapora, becoming the President of the Croatian priests of 
America and a chief contributor to the Croatian Review until his death in 1973.281   
From his base in the United States, Mandić began the rehabilitation of the idea 
of the NDH, arguing that an independent Croatia was a political necessity for which 
many Croats had sacrificed their lives. From the mid-1950s, he wrote several books 
related to the Croatian early Middle Ages in which he asserted the idea that the early 
Croatian kingdom roughly corresponding to the territory of the NDH.  
                           
Fig. 2.55 – Dominik Mandić (1889-1973)       Fig. 2.56 – Ivo Banac (b.1947) 
Mandić’s works were based on the selective reading of the De Administrando 
Imperio and the Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea. Gaps and discrepancies in these 
original historical sources were supplemented by the invented mediaeval Croatian 
chronicle, Methodos, a product of his own imagination. Mandić claimed that the 
Methodos, written in the 8th century but long since lost, had still existed at the time of 
the Priest of Doclea and contained the notion of Red Croatia stretching from Duvno 
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in north-west Herzegovina to Durrës in Albania.282 According to Mandić, the 
Methodos was written after 753, in the time of the alleged Duvno Council, and 
represented a manual of the state administration written in the Slavic language.283 
Except for the invention of the “mediaeval sources”, Mandić produced genealogies 
of lost Croat noble families, the years of their rule and the events impossible to 
corroborate in any of the existing mediaeval sources.284  
Mandić’s narrative included the drawing of the mediaeval state borders with 
the Croats west of the Drina River and the Serbs to the east.285 The existence of 
Orthodoxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was explained by the great number of 
autochthonous Vlachs, “Roman veterans originating from Mauritania, of dark hair 
and complexion.”286 He asserted that there were no Serbs in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but Vlachs who were later “Serbianized,” as well as that the Croats and 
Serbs, based on their physical, political and social characteristics, were two different 
races. Quoting Austro-Hungarian historians from the late 19th and early 20th century, 
Mandić asserted the idea of the Iranian origins of the Croats, based on the similarity 
of the names Choroáthos, first recorded in the 3rd century BC.287 Similarly, Mandić 
argued that the Serbs were not of Indo-European origins and that the tribe of Serboi 
recorded by Pliny the Elder in the 1st century AD were servants of Rome of Kurdish 
origins.288 Mandić also reasserted the idea of the Catholic origins of the Bosnian 
Church. 
Mandić’s writing was banned in Yugoslavia until the late 1980s and his 
research methods and arguments were questioned not only by Serbian, but also by 
some Croat historians. Nada Klaić (1920-1988), one of the most prominent figures of 
the Croatian historiography of the mid-20th century, criticized his methods, yet 
Mandić, being based in the United States, presented his writing as anti-Communist, 
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thus influencing both the American scholars of Croat origins and some later Western 
academics who wrote about the Balkans.289  
All these writings were disputed by official Yugoslav historiography, as well as 
most historians in the West during the Cold War, when Yugoslavia was considered 
to be a balance between the East and the West. With the changes that took place in 
Europe in the late 1980s, however, the Croatian narrative based on the racial theories 
of Starčević and Frank and the Austro-Hungarian view of Serbia from the late 19th 
century, were carefully revised and redeployed. This revisionist Croat national 
narrative, now presented as based on the Central European tradition and Western 
democratic values, was the product of the second generation of the Croat émigré 
scholars and their Western supporters.  
One of the key figures in the reinterpretation of the “Croat question” in 
Yugoslavia was Ivo Banac (1947), an American historian of Croat origin, whose 
interest in the national question in Yugoslavia placed him in a prominent position 
during the 1990s wars in Yugoslavia (Fig. 2.56). In The National Question in 
Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, published in 1984 in the United States, Banac 
compared the period of Romantic national awakening of Vuk Karadžić from the 
1840s to the fully developed racial nationalism of Ante Starčević of the 1880s. By 
equating the two distinctly separated political and cultural concepts of nationalism, 
Banac established a platform for future interpretations of the genocide committed 
during the period of the NDH. Incorporating the communist ideology which adopted 
the Austro-Hungarian concept of Greater Serbian expansionism towards the non-
Serbian ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, the argument of the Croat émigré scholars 
gained additional support as it enabled the racism on which the early Croat national 
ideology was based to be branded as essentially non-communist and democratic.290 
The introduction of the émigrés linked to the remnants of the Ustaše movement 
in the public life of Croatia in the early 1990s, firmly determined the contemporary 
path of the Croat national narrative. In 1991, Vinko Nikolić, a lifelong editor-in-chief 
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of the Croatian Review (Fig. 2.51) returned to Zagreb after a long exile. His return 
signalled the Croatian Review as one of the official publications of the renewed 
Matica hrvatska.291 
2.9 The Second Independent State of Croatia – 1991 until the present 
The prevailing interpretations of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s tend to 
downplay the role of external intervention. According to this view, the breakup of 
Yugoslavia resulted entirely from internal factors, while the dominant international 
powers, the US, Western Europe and the United Nations, stood aside.292 Supported 
by the major Western governments, sizeable and influential Croatian expatriate 
communities in the US, Canada and Germany easily presented the Yugoslav 
Communist government dominated by Serbs, even though until the end of 1991, 
nearly six months after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, federal 
appointments still maintained ethnic parity among its ranks.293 Just as in 1941, the 
ethnic Croat and Slovene officers of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska 
narodna armija - JNA) defected and formed their respective ethnic armies, which 
enabled the presentation of the remaining units of the JNA as the tool of Serbian 
“aggression.” The image of “red Serbia” was soon established in the leading western 
media and was continuously reinforced and embellished by hack-journalism.294 
Prior to proclaiming independence, the political situation in Croatia had 
changed in 1990, when the right-wing HDZ won a majority in the first multi-party 
elections since 1945. Its leader, Franjo Tudjman, became the first elected president of 
Croatia. In the years following Tito’s death, Tudjman and his associates had openly 
argued that the Republic of Croatia was a state of ethnic Croats.295 He had adopted 
this narrative during the Croatian Spring when he established close contacts with the 
Ustaše emigration. Upon assuming power in 1990, the HDZ introduced 
constitutional changes that downgraded the status of the Serbs from the constituent 
nation to that of the minority.296 Immediately, a campaign to purge Serbs from key 
state institutions began, justifying its actions on the assertions dating back to the 
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Croatian Spring, which argued that the proportion of Serbs in the civil service and 
the army was disproportionate to their 12% overall population in Croatia.297  
On 24 May 1991, the JAZU changed its name once again. Assuming the 
name Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, HAZU, which had been used once 
before during the NDH period, the members of the JAZU claimed this change was to 
be “in response to Serbian aggression.”298 Sabor sanctioned the new name and 
promoted Milan Moguš, the controversial author of the Croatian Orthography, 
banned in 1971, to HAZU’s Secretary General.299 A number of Croat émigré 
scholars, including those associated with the problematic Ustaše movement, joined 
the HAZU in the same period.  
The fighting began within days of the declaration of independence in June 
1991. The war had two phases, which were marked by the hostilities between 
summer 1991 and early spring 1992 and the period up to summer of 1995. A fragile 
ceasefire in-between was used to re-arm the new Croat army and to increase pressure 
on Belgrade as the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was unraveling. The territories of 
Lika and Eastern Slavonia with a majority of the Serbian population proclaimed 
themselves autonomous provinces (Map 2.5) and expressed the wish to remain in 
Yugoslavia. The war resulted in the deaths of an estimated 23,000 people.300 German 
recognition of independence for Croatia was soon aided by the international media, 
which in the beginning focused on the destruction of two historic towns that became 
the reason for blaming Serbia as the master-mind behind Yugoslavia’s disintegration. 
These towns were: Vukovar in eastern Slavonia, with no majority for either Serbs or 
Croats prior to 1991 and Dubrovnik, a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1979. 
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Map 2.5 – The self-proclaimed Serbian autonomous provinces (Republika Srpska Krajina), with the 
majority of the Serbian population in 1991. 
 
2.9.1 The abuse of Heritage in the 1990s 
In 1991 the city of Vukovar had no surviving mediaeval heritage. After the 
Ottoman withdrawal in the late 17th century the town was rebuilt by the Habsburgs 
into a provincial baroque town, populated by Croats, Serbs and Germans. Because of 
its strategic position on the confluence of the River Vuka with the Danube, it became 
part of the Military Frontier network. There was no significant damage to the city in 
the First World War, while in the Second World War, it suffered some damage 
during Allied bombing raids in 1944/45. The greatest destruction that the town 
suffered since the Ottoman-Habsburg wars in the 17th century was the shelling by 
autumn 1991 (Fig. 2.57 and Fig. 2.58). The destruction of 90% of all Vukovar 
buildings, including its Baroque core, became a blueprint for media war coverage.301  
Generally, during the wars of Yugoslav succession, cities under siege were 
divided into ethnic districts that hosted opposing armies. The typical tactics involved 
positioning of military equipment on the most prominent buildings, especially those 
on heritage lists, aiming to provoke a response from the enemy. The inevitable 
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consequent damage was calculated and aimed at provoking the international media 
outrage and a sense of victimization. “Exposing the damage to the historical cities 
exclusively as responsibility of one party in the conflict” by the majority of western 
journalists stemmed from a journalism of attachment political doctrine, devised for 
the purpose.302 Supporting the narrative which depicted the war as “European 
Croatia” versus “Asiatic Serbia,” the destruction of historical heritage served to 
generate public’s approval for western interventionism.303 
    
Fig. 2.57 – Damage to the Eltz Manor in Vukovar in 1991. Built in 1749-1751 for the German noble, Karl 
von Eltz-Kempenic.                                     
 
Fig. 2.58 – Damage to the Serbian Home in Vukovar, erected in 1905 in place of the 1733  Serbian-
Russian-Church-Slavonic School.  
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The siege of Dubrovnik (Fig. 2.59) by the Montenegrin forces of the JNA set 
another example of the misuse of heritage in all wars in the Former Yugoslavia, 
regardless of the level of destruction. According to the Institute Report produced by 
Dubrovnik’s Institute for the Protection and Conservation of Historical Monuments, 
which was publicly used without full verification by the UNESCO observers, the 
shelling brought a “widespread destruction” of 3% to both old and new buildings.304 
The UN acknowledged that the Institute Report “may suffer from a tendency to 
exaggerate the gravity of some impacts on facades and the stability of the greater 
buildings, as much of the work was carried out under extremely difficult conditions,” 
but insisted that the level of the inflicted damage should be expressed by a number of 
shells used on the historic core, rather than by the actual damage sustained.305 
Eventually the number of buildings that the Institute Report suggested were damaged 
or destroyed was reduced from 116 to 52, but despite this correction, the initial 
Institute Report, has proved an enduring basis for all subsequent data claims.306 The 
problem was further exacerbated by western media which presented the siege of 
Dubrovnik in deliberately exaggerating terms, aiming to win public support for 
intervention.307 
 
Fig. 2.59 – Dubrovnik Walls, UNESCO Heritage Site since 1979 
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Nearly twenty years after the war, some British journalists who reported from 
Dubrovnik admitted that: “in terms of the buildings themselves, the city was looking 
pretty much unchanged. It was only when one went outside the old city that you saw 
that the damage had been done on new Dubrovnik rather than old Dubrovnik; partly 
because there was a gross shelling of Dubrovnik, partly because it is easy to destroy 
modern pre-fabricated buildings.”308 However, during the war, leading western and 
especially British media regularly reported that the old city had been significantly 
damaged or destroyed.309 Even though some of the journalists later admitted that 
deliberately exaggerated reports were influenced by the UK Foreign Office and the 
Military, Dubrovnik presented a precedent which revealed the close 
interconnectedness between modern propaganda and modern state-politics.310 
2.9.2 Media as a tool for creating a new national narrative 
The language used by media to describe the entire Serbian nation in the 
conflict in Croatia as an alien other was what Milica Bakić-Hayden defined as 
nesting Orientalism.311 Based on Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism, Bakić-
Hayden described it as “a tendency of each region to view the cultures and religions 
to its South and East as more conservative and primitive.”312 Her argument was 
supported by this typical representation of the Serbs during the siege of Dubrovnik in 
the western media: “the barbarian hordes advancing on Rome…forfeiting any right 
to be termed more than a lawless mob, and seem determined to take Dubrovnik, even 
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if they destroy the city and the population in the process.313 Other comparisons 
between Dubrovnik and British cities during the Blitz, or the transposition of conflict 
to the days of the Second World War, had the rhetorical effect of dividing 
combatants into convincing ethical/moral categories: the Serbs as Nazis, the Croats 
as British.314 With combatants divided into these clear categories and supported by 
pictures of damaged heritage, sympathy for the Croats grew, as well as the public 
support for military intervention.315  
The war reports re-asserted the concept of “barbaric Serbia” propagated in the 
years preceding the First World War. Evoking the narrative of the Carnegie 
Endowment Report, paid for and procured by Austro-Hungary in 1914, western 
media and academia set in motion a complete revision of Serbian history and 
historiography.316 They reports which qualified the Serbs as “demons” enabled the 
modern Croat government to re-assert Starčević’s premise that east of the Drina and 
Danube is the Oriental, Byzantine and Ottoman Other.317 The overwhelming 
Western support for Croat independence accepted the Croat argument for “Serbian 
aggression,” firmly establishing in the process the concept of nesting Orientalism in 
the European public opinion. Similarly, the case of Dubrovnik established a pattern 
of reporting in the subsequent wars in Former Yugoslavia, reaching its culmination 
in the reporting of the siege of Sarajevo and the Kosovo war. 
Simultaneously, the Western media completely neglected the destruction of the 
Serbian heritage during the Yugoslav wars. Already in 1991, the systematic 
destruction of Serbian property and especially Orthodox heritage began. In the 
Croatian republic, most of these churches and monasteries had been destroyed once 
before in 1941-1945 and only partly rebuilt after the Second World War (Fig. 2.60 
and Fig. 2.61). In the territory of the Eparchy of Pakrac in central Slavonia, for 
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example, during the Second World War 54 churches, dating from the 15th to the early 
19th century were raised to the ground. The reconstruction of some of them was 
finished only in 1990, only to be destroyed again in 1991-1995. In the same eparchy, 
39 churches were destroyed and the Monasteries of Orahovica and Pakra were 
demolished in 1991. The Episcopal residency, one of the early Baroque buildings in 
Slavonia, dating from 1732, was destroyed.318 
Whilst the destruction of Vukovar and its Baroque Catholic heritage received 
due attention from the international media, public and academia, the decimation of 
Serbian Orthodox property was rarely mentioned in either official Croat or 
international reports.319 This allowed the Croatian authorities to incorporate the 
narrative created by Starčević and his followers into the official national history 
curriculums, thus legitimizing chauvinism as struggle for national liberation. 
         
Fig. 2.60 – The Church of St. Trinity in           Fig. 2.61 – The second Church of St. Trinity in 
Nova Gradiška, erected in 1738 in Baroque     Nova Gradiška, erected in 1982 in neo-Moravian style, 
style, destroyed in 1941.                                   destroyed in 1992; the ground turned into a green field. 
2.10 Revisionism  
Immediately after the hostilities in Croatia began in the summer of 1991, the 
Croat state not only gained political and military support from the West, it also 
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welcomed Croat academics and scholars. The HAZU and other cultural institutions, 
supported by the influential Croatian diaspora and its Western allies, began the 
process of historical revisionism. The old racial theories of the late 19th and early 20th 
century, forming the basic argument for the territoriality of the Croat nation-state in 
Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Srem, revised 
and re-phrased, presented Croatia as a thoroughly European and democratic state 
with an anti-fascist past. Starčević’s chauvinism was significantly downplayed and 
explained in terms of defense against the “Greater Serbian nationalism of Vuk 
Karadžić”, as was originally asserted in the 1980s by Croat scholars in diaspora.320 
Both Croat and foreign scholars uncritically adopted this view as one of the main 
premises of the modern Croat national narrative. 
Since Croatia did not have full national independence until 1991, the early 
mediaeval period became central part of the Croat national history. The exceptional 
importance was given to the short-lived connections to the early 9th century Frankish 
Empire and Roman Catholicism, which were both used to emphasize Croatia’s ties to 
Central Europe, as well as identify the country with western democratic values. To 
support this claim, the few fragments of old Croat Latin inscriptions dating from the 
9th to 11th centuries were proclaimed as the authentic achievements and originality of 
the early Croat nation-state.321 The remains of only a few interlace ornamentation 
engraved in stone became proof of the unique Croat nature of the pre-Romanesque 
architecture.322 
Much more problematic was the re-naming of the heritage built in the pre-
national period by the Romanized population in Dalmatia and Istria as exclusively 
Croat.323 Since these towns did not have a significant Slavic populations until the late 
14th and early 15th century and even after were exposed to a strong Italian cultural 
influence, the simple solution to this problem involved re-naming of the Italian artists 
and architects as Croat by Slavicizing their names; for example, the sculptor Giorgio 
da Sebenico (1410-1475) became Juraj Dalmatinac; the painter Nicolo Raguseo 
(?1463-1517) was renamed Nikola Božidarević, whilst Lorenzo di Marino (1420-
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1478), considered to be one of the finest Dubrovnik fresco painters in the early 
Renaissance, is now known as Lovro Marinov Dobričević. Although it cannot be 
denied that there was considerable mixing of the Romanized populations with the 
surrounding Slavs in Dalmatia and Istria, distinguishing their ethnic affiliations is 
impossible because Italian claims that Dalmatia and Istria belong to their national 
heritage, for Italian education and use of the Italian language through history is 
equally valid.  
The greatest problem of the modern Croat national narrative, however, 
remained the question of language and religion. Since Cyrillic was denied official 
status in 1991, the question of the Dubrovnik archives, which store a significant 
Cyrillic heritage, had to be adapted for the new arguments. Conveniently, the 
assertion of Dominik Mandić in the mid-20th century that the Orthodox population of 
Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was of Vlach origin that 
was forcefully Serbianized after the 16th century, revived the claim that the Serbs do 
not any claim to any heritage in the territory formerly known as the NDH. The 
surviving Bosnian and Dubrovnik Orthodox mediaeval chronicles, with the obvious 
Catholic miniaturist influence, but written in the Nemanjić Serbian Minuscule were 
simply renamed as the Croatian Cyrillic or Bosančica.324 Since the newly founded 
Bosniak nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina laid its claims to Bosančica as well, apart 
from the ongoing dispute between the Croats and Serbs regarding the script, there is 
a growing dispute between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims about the claim to the 
script and the surviving manuscripts. Similarly, Croatian academics played a major 
role in the creation of the new Montenegrin alphabet, relying on the notion of Red 
Croatia from the mid-20th century.325 However, since it is impossible now to re-
assert the claim of the Croat origins of the Montenegrins, the full separation of the 
Montenegrins from the Serbs, attempted once before in 1944 by the NDH authorities, 
would be equally satisfactory for Croat national policies.326 
Finally, after the attempt of the NDH to form a Croatian Orthodox Church in 
1942, the idea was revived in 2010, when the Croat government announced the 
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establishment of the Croat Orthodox Church (Hrvatska Pravoslavna Crkva – HPC), 
separate from the Serbian Orthodox Church.327  
In 1990, the Croat Sabor removed communist symbols from its state insignia. 
An old Mediaeval Croat Coat-of-Arms, the white and red checkerboard, used by the 
NDH authorities during the Second World War, was once again proclaimed the 
official state symbol. Because of the international pressure to disassociate itself from 
the Ustaše movement, the colours on the checkerboard changed places. Thus, the 
first field of the Coat-of-Arms, traditionally painted white, was marked red and vice 
versa (Fig. 2.62 and Fig. 2.63).328 
                        
Fig. 2.62 – Croatian Coat-of-Arms since 1990          Fig. 2.63 – Croat Coat-of-Arms during the NDH 
Since then, the majority of accounts by Croat émigré historians and their 
Western colleagues written against the background of Yugoslav disintegration were 
based primarily on old Austro-Hungarian accounts and Starčević’s ideas, revised in 
the 20th century and promoted during the NDH. The Nazi nature of the NDH regime 
was not officially denied, but significantly downplayed and selectively presented. 
This enabled the Ustaše movement to be presented as an anti-Communist struggle, 
while the Croat role in the genocide against the Serbs and other non-Croats during 
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the Second World War was re-interpreted as Greater Serbian propaganda and 
Yugoslav Communist oppression.329  
This revised narrative was followed by newly erected monuments to famous 
events and individuals in Croatia’s recent past. Apart from the monuments to 
historical personalities, artists and scientists considered significant for Croat culture, 
such as the Monument to King Krešimir IV (1058-1074) erected in 2000 in Šibenik 
(Fig. 2.64) or that to Franjo Tudjman, “the Father of the Nation” (Fig. 2.65) erected 
in 2013 in Split, there were others dedicated to the ideologues and leaders from the 
NDH era (Fig. 2.66).330  
Simultaneously, the majority of the monuments dedicated to Communists from 
the Second World War were either removed or re-branded as monuments to the 
Croat anti-fascist struggle, together with the revised numbers of the participants in 
the Ustaša movement during the NDH. The Bleiburg incident was re-interpreted as 
the killing of innocent Croat patriots, rather than the casualties inflicted upon the 
Ustaša soldiers. In 1994, a monument celebrating the “Communist victims at 
Bleiburg” was unveiled at the Mirogoj Cemetery (Fig. 2.67). 
  
Fig. 2.64 – Monument to King Krešimir IV (1058-1074), erected in Šibenik in 2000, after design of 
Marija Ujević. 
                                               
329
 A number of books and publications justifying the existence of the NDH and the Ustaše were 
printed and distributed to the European libraries in all the major European languages.  
330
 For now, these attempts were prevented by the Croat authorities under the pressure from the EU 
officials. For example, a plaque to Mile Budak, unveiled on the local church in Budak’s hometown 
Sveti Rok in August 2009, was removed by the authorities a few days later.  
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Fig. 2.65 – Monument to Franjo Tudjman, after Zoran Jurić and Branko Sidjan, erected in 2013, in 
Split is one in a series of monuments to the “Father of the Nation” erected in several Croat towns.  
 
Fig. 2.66 – The memorial plaque to Jure Francetić (1912-1942), a prominent Ustaša from the Pavelić 
government; erected in Slunj in 2000 by the Society of the War veterans (Croat Domobrani), removed 
in 2004. The plaque was re-erected in the Split suburbs in 2005. 
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Fig. 2.67 – The monument to the killed Ustaše fighters at the Mirogoj Cemetery. The inscription 
reads: To the Croat victims at Bleiburg and surrounding roads.  
The Jasenovac Memorial to the victims of the NDH genocide was razed to the 
ground once again by the Croat army at the beginning of war in 1991.331 A newly 
built Memorial Centre opened in 2006, with a significantly revised number of 
victims. Official Croat historiography, based exclusively on the few surviving 
incomplete documents, insists that there were only 82,129 victims of Jasenovac, 
excluding those disposed of in the crematoria, because there is no evidence of their 
remains, while the recordes were burnt shortly before the Ustaše abandoned the camp 
in 1945.332 Similarly, the most gruesome artifacts of torture, such was the notorious 
Srbosjek (literary, Serb-cutter, a special knife designed for quicker throat-cutting) 
were removed from the display (Fig. 2.68). In many of the exhibitions related to 
Jasenovac concentration camp, ethnic Serbs are usually referred to as “Orthodox 
Croats and Bosniacs” in accordance with the accepted narrative which denies the 
existence of the Serbs west of the Drina River.333 Furthermore, on the memorials 
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 Ignatieff, M. – Blood and Belonging – Journeys into the New Nationalism, BBC Books, 1993, 22 
332
 http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=6284 – the official web-site of the Jasenovac 
Memorial Site – Accessed on 20/03/2013 
333
 http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Srbi-u-Norveskoj-sprecili-pokusaj-revizije-istorije.sr.html - 
When the programme of the revision of the number of victims in Jasenovac started, the director of the 
Jasenovac Memorial Site, Nataša Mataušić, was its main promoter, both in Croatia and abroad – The 
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dedicated to the victims of the 1991-1995 wars, especially those in Vukovar, the 
names of local Serbian victims are described as Croats, despite the considerable 
amount of written evidence for their ethnic origins.334  
When the Croat army, with overwhelming US support, regained control over 
the Serbian held territories in August 1995, it immediately initiated systematic ethnic 
cleansing. Over 200,000 Serbs were driven out of Croatia without any sign that they 
would be allowed to return, reducing the Serbian population in Croatia to just over 
3%. The local Serbian governments that existed in the self-proclaimed Republic of 
Srpska Krajina withdrew to the Republic of Serbia.335 The documents and archives of 
the Srpska Krajina authorities from 1991-1995 detailing the events in the war from 
their perspective, including losses in human lives and material wealth, are still 
unavailable to the public. This, of course, makes any discussion of the nature of the 
war much more difficult and controversial. 
  
Fig. 2.68 – The Srbosjek (Serb-cutter) tool, used for killing the victims in Jasenovac and other 
concentration camps. The artefact does not appear in the Jasenovac Museum, neither as an object nor 
on the photographs. 
                                                                                                                                     
article in Politika was related to one such exhibition in Norway in February 2013 – Accessed on 
20/03/2013  
334
 According to the Information Centre Veritas, the case of inscribing the names of the Serbs from 
Osijek killed by the Croat army in 1991, as the defenders of Osijek was one such case. The 
information was obtained in the interview with Savo Štrbac; the official announcement of the Veritas 
was given in the Belgrade daily Politika on 26 July 2012. This is usually explained by the notion that 
Croatia belongs to the Western state-concept, based on citizenship. See Introduction, p. 1. 
335
 Later, the majority of them were sent to The Hague on charges of genocide as part of the 
punishment of Serbia. None of the Croat officials were brought to The Hague. 
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The mass expulsion of Serbs from Croatia was followed by the systematic 
clearance of the Serbian heritage. Those Orthodox churches and monasteries that 
were not destroyed in 1991, were demolished after 1995. Only in Dalmatia and Lika, 
where pockets of the Serbian population remained, were some of the monasteries 
allowed to remain. Although the 14th century Monastery of Krka in Dalmatia was 
partly demolished (Fig. 2.69), after being ruined for several years, a few monks 
returned to begin the repair works.336 However, the surviving Orthodox churches and 
monasteries lack the attendants as legal restrictions and usurpation of the property 
remain the main obstacle for the return of the expelled Serbs. 
 
Fig. 2.69 – The Monastery of Krka, erected in 1345 on the old Roman ruins as endowment of Princess 
Jelena Nemanjić-Šubić. Built partly in the Romanesque style, with later additions. Survived the 
Second World War and partly demolished in the 1990s. Renewed in 2001. 
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 http://www.eparhija-dalmatinska.hr/manastiri-krka-l.htm - The offical web-site of the Eparchy of 
Dalmatia of the SPC – Accessed on 20/03/2013 
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The Albanians 
 
The small state in the southwest of the Balkan Peninsula, Albania, formerly an 
Ottoman province, proclaimed its independence from the Ottoman Empire on 28 
November 1912. Even though Edward Gibbon described Albania as a “land within 
sight of Italy but less known than the interior of America,” a very few European 
diplomats, travellers, Catholic missionaries and intellectuals, expressed an interest for 
Albania and the Albanians until the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although scarce, 
writing about Albania and the Albanians coincided with the accumulating political 
tensions preceding the First World War. The collision of the Great Powers’ interests 
prompted Austro-Hungary to engage a number of its scholars and civil servants to 
research and formulate a credible argument for the creation of a new Balkan state.1 
The ensuing historiographical narratives by the non-Albanian authors laid foundations 
for the future Albanian national narrative. However, the years of the First World War 
followed by the internal disturbances, political assassinations and frequent changes of 
governments after the war, prevented the Albanian state from developing its own 
national narrative and national culture in the interwar period.  
Only after the Second World War, when the new Communist regime introduced 
a programme of compulsory education to eradicate endemic illiteracy, the building of 
the Albanian national identity could properly begin. By the 1970s, when the Albanian 
national narrative was fully established, Albanians lived divided among the states of 
Albania, Yugoslavia and Greece; a significant number of the Albanian Diaspora also 
lived abroad. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Albanians there now found 
themselves divided amongst the former Yugoslav republics of Montenegro, Serbia 
(predominantly in its southern province of Kosovo and Metohija) and Macedonia. The 
political problems between the Yugoslav successor republics enabled the ethnic 
Albanians to assert their idea of national unification that had first emerged during the 
1925-1943 Italian domination over Albania. With Western support the concept of 
national unification has remained a main objective of Albanian foreign policy for the 
past twenty years. This stimulated the development of Albanian studies in various 
European and American universities, most of which were employing the methods of 
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normative historiography to justify the involvement of their own governments in the 
region.  
The main concern of the current Albanian studies is the revision of available 
historical facts and surviving material heritage to produce a justifiable national 
narrative which would correlate with the projected state-borders. Discussing cultural 
aspects of Albanian nationalism in the context of surviving material heritage must, 
therefore, include current perceptions of both external political factors and the 
Albanians themselves, as there are no surviving accounts of the perception of the 
material heritage within their environment by either the elite or wider population, 
prior to the mid-20th century. 
3.1 Territoriality of Albanian nationalism 
The ethnic Albanians in the Balkans number just over 5 million spread over the 
territory of the Republic of Albania, Greece and the territories of former Yugoslavia, 
which include Kosovo and Metohija, Macedonia and Montenegro. The Republic of 
Albania itself is inhabited by 2.8 million people.2 The second largest Albanian ethnic 
territories are the Serbian break-away province of Kosovo and Metohija with its 
estimated 1.74 million of overall population and the Republic of Macedonia with 
approximately half a million ethnic Albanians living predominantly in the region west 
of the Vardar valley.3 Smaller numbers of ethnic Albanians live in the far south of 
Montenegro and north-west part of Greek Epirus.4  
With a young population and a newly established democracy, the re-evaluation 
of the Albanian national question resulting from the geo-political changes in the wider 
                                               
2
 Republika Shqipërisë, Instituti Statistikës, Population and Housing Census 2011, Tirana, 2011, 40 – 
Of the 2.8 million people who inhabit Albania, 2.3 million declared themselves ethnic Albanians, while 
approximately 390,000 people refused the declare their nationality, following the controversial protest 
of the Orthodox Church of Albania that claimed that the Greeks and other Orthodox population in the 
country were forced to declare themselves ethnic Albanians. The Government in Tirana, naturally, 
dismisses these accusations. 
3
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html - Accessed on 20 April 
2013 – This number is still subject to controversy. The authorities in Priština still do not control the 
north of the province where the concentration of the Serbs is the greatest. The Serbs refused to 
participate in the 2011 census, similar to Greek objections to the census in Republic of Albania. 
Similarly, over 210,000 Serbian refugees (This number is taken from the Ministry for Refugees and 
Internally Displaced People of Republic of Serbia)  from Kosovo and Metohija are now in collective 
centres in central Serbia and are still not allowed to return, despite formal invitations coming from the 
Albanian authorities and the EULEX Forces. 
4
 Being the nation with the highest birth rate in the region, the average age of the Albanians is less than 
30 years, which significantly differs from all other countries in the Balkans. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook - Accessed on 10 October 2010 
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European context, the reshaping of the Albanian national legends for territorial gains 
is now taking place at an unprecedented speed. Here, as well as in the other Balkan 
countries, the full endorsement of the Albanian national discourse is more a matter of 
the political aims of the major world powers than the evolution of the Albanian 
national movement itself. The creation of the first Albanian state in its current borders 
in November 1913 was more a consequence of the sensitive balance of political power 
on the eve of First World War, rather than the result of the strength of the national 
struggle of the population. In order to prevent Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria acquiring 
too much of the remaining Ottoman Balkan provinces, the Great Powers led by 
Austria-Hungary, Germany and supported by Italy, allowed the creation of the new 
national state, albeit leaving a significant number of Albanian nationals outside the 
Albanian borders.5  
Even though its creation coincided with the period when the debate on the 
importance of nation-states and national self-determination was at its peak, there were 
no unanimity in the Albanian-speaking lands over the political course which the new 
state should take. This was particularly difficult in conditions when the literacy rate of 
the overall population was less than 5% and tribal loyalties still dominated society.6 
Very few Albanian intellectuals of the time, literate and able to publish their work for 
the outside world, eagerly embraced the idea of national self-determination. However, 
arguing for the Albanian cause was a difficult task, as it was promoted almost 
exclusively by exiles, mainly in the USA. Thus, the Albanian intellectuals abroad 
were not only the first creators of the Albanian national discourse, but also their first 
lobbyists.  
By the end of the 20th century, ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia developed a 
strong sense of national “oneness” with the Albanians in Albania. When Yugoslav 
disintegration began, the Albanians who lived predominantly in Serbia’s southern 
province Kosovo and Metohija, used the opportunity to assert their wish to form an 
independent republic. Following the war in 1998-1999, the province was placed under 
the protectorate of the United Nations, which sanctioned the unilateral proclamation 
of the independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. So far, 96 out of 195 states in 
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the world recognized the independence of Kosovo.7 This led to the situation that the 
Albanians are the only people in Europe who currently live in two nation-states. As 
the political situation in the region is very sensitive, due to the great pressure of the 
West on Serbia to recognize the independence of Kosovo in exchange for membership 
in the EU, the question of the unification of Albania and Kosovo is still several years 
away. However, as the border between Albania and Kosovo and Metohija is 
practically non-existent and the primary school textbooks introduced in May 2012 are 
the same for both countries, there should be no doubts that this will inevitably 
happen.8  
The relations between ethnic Albanians and Macedonian Slavs in the Republic 
of Macedonia are also far from idyllic. Following the Albanian uprising in the part of 
Macedonia bordering Kosovo in 2001 which sought the federalization of the state on 
its Albanian and its Slavic parts, the EU pressed the political leaders of both ethnic 
groups to negotiate some form of co-habitation. With the promise of Macedonian 
membership in the EU, open warfare has been avoided so far by the creation of a bi-
national state, with two equal official languages, Slav Macedonian and Albanian, and 
an educational system divided along the same ethnic lines. That the aim of the 
Albanian political parties to federalize Macedonia is still very strong is corroborated 
by the recurring ethnic violence between the Albanians and Macedonians in the last 
ten years. This suggests that the Albanian question in Macedonia will reopen again in 
the near future.9 
In Montenegro, 30,500 Albanians in the south of the country, after giving full 
support for Montenegrin separation from Serbia in 2006, now ask for full autonomy, 
creating in the process a certain level of disquiet among the Orthodox population.10   
All these events currently taking place are accompanied by strident rhetoric by 
Albanian politicians in all these territories calling for “a natural Albania.” This is a 
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 http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=3,33 – The official web-site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Kosovo – Accessed on 21/04/2013  
8
 http://www.masht-gov.net/advCms/?id=20,1735,82,05,2012&lng=Ser#id=20,1735,82,05,2012 – 
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euphemism for the politically sensitive term “Greater Albania” originally created by 
the Axis Powers during the Second World War in the same territories. Clearly, the 
problem of the territoriality of the Albanian nation is very much connected to the 
contemporary political interests of the only international powers currently dominating 
the Balkans: the US and the EU. On their part, Albanian politicians and scholars 
accept the current political climate as beneficial for their national goals and seek to 
promote a concept of national narrative that corresponds to the designed territory of 
“natural Albania.” In this perspective, the disintegration of Yugoslavia significantly 
contributed to the strengthening of the Albanian national goals and led to the creation 
of a new narrative that denies the existence of a Slavic or Greek population on this 
territory. 
3.2  Imagined aspects of the Albanian national narrative – The origins of the 
Albanian Question 
Writing in 1918, at the beginning of Albanian statehood, an Albanian author 
from the US, Christo Dako (1876-1941), asserted that “the Albanians were the oldest 
and most beautiful race of the Balkan Peninsula and had, until the Middle Ages, 
occupied all Balkan countries.”11 Dako (Fig. 3.1) argued that Albanian “national 
consciousness was stronger than any of their neighbours” and added that “they were 
not only an Aryan people, but European in their national instincts” and whose sense of 
family in particular was “European, not Turkish.”12 The rationale behind Dako’s 
arguments was to assert Albanian rightful place amongst the other sovereign Balkan 
nations on the eve of Albanian statehood for the first time in history. Dako’s statement 
that the Albanians were “the most ancient people of the Balkans in the circle of the 
family of nations” was accompanied by the political assertion that the Albanians were 
“the element of order and peace in the Balkan Peninsula.”13 Dako’s Christian 
background was certainly in tune with the Austrian and Italian political goals in the 
region in 1913 that, wishing to prevent Serbian access to the sea in the aftermath of 
the Second Balkan War, enabled the creation of the Albanian state.  
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Fig. 3.1 – Christo Dako (1876-1941), laid foundation      Fig. 3.2 – Mihal Grameno (1871-1931), co-au- 
of the Albanian national narrative in 1918.                       thored the “Albanian Memorandum” in 1918. 
However, by the end of First World War, when Austria-Hungary ceased to exist, 
Christo Dako and Mihal Grameno (1871-1931), another American Albanian of 
Christian background, co-authored the memorandum entitled Albania’s Rights and 
Claims to Independence and Territorial Integrity in 1918 that was sent to the 
American President Wilson and other key foreign leaders.14 In ten pages of the 
memorandum, Dako and Grameno (Fig. 3.2) established two leading lines of the 
future Albanian national myth: that of the unbroken continuity of the Albanian nation 
from the time of the “Albanian king Alexander the Great in the 4th century BC” to the 
present day and the request for the territory of the Albanian nation that corresponded 
to that one where the Albanians lived in their lifetime. The problem, however, was a 
total absence of both written and material remains that would corroborate this 
assertion. Not until the second half of the 20th century would a work on creating the 
material evidence to support territorial claims begin. By then, the nature of 
nationalism and a whole process of nation-state building came under the academic 
scrutiny which perceived the concept of nation-state as an artificial construct.15   
Dako’s and Grameno’s evocation of the famous names of the ancient past as 
ancestral kin achieved the main goal for the newly established country without 
coherent social structures and written traditions: the raison de ȇtre of the state itself. 
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 Dako, C. and Grameno, M. – Albania’s Rights and Claims to Independence and Territorial Integrity, 
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This acquisition of belief in an unbroken continuity of the Albanian nation served 
several purposes: it legitimized the existence of Albania, provided a sense of national 
pride and self-respect for the newly emerging national identity and, finally, it laid the 
foundations for the future refutation of contesting claims by the neighbouring nations. 
Dako’s and Grameno’s national exuberance stemmed from pride of their ancestral 
homeland in the time when nationalism as political ideology still had largely positive 
connotation. The display of emotions in the memorandum was strongly influenced by 
their personal sense of injustice towards the Albanians. Following the idea of a 
nation-state that would include all Albanians in the region, they wrote: 
“The Albanians justly demand all lands in the west of the Balkan Peninsula, 
which are inhabited by Albanians. The boundary can easily be followed on any map. 
From the Boiana River, it keeps to the former Montenegrin frontier on the north till it 
reaches the Novibazar, south of Berane, whence it follows the river Ibar to Mitrovitza. 
It includes the railway line as far south as Kupruli taking in Ferozovik and Uskup.16 
From Kupruli the boundary runs south to the angle of Monastir17 railway near 
Florina between lakes Prespa and Ostrovo and then strikes east to a point nearly 
south of Lake Prespa, leaving out Kastoria, whence it runs due south to the old Greek 
frontier.”18 
The Memorandum thus clearly defined the Albanian territorial claims, which 
remained unchanged during the 20th century. Postponed by historical and political 
circumstances, a new opportunity for their advance came along during the wars of 
Yugoslav succession and overthrow of the communist regime. The pattern of 
Albanian territorial demands resembles those of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries: The oppressed population deserved the right to self-
determination. However, claims of these three countries with predominantly Christian 
populations resulted from the regional geo-political interests of the then Great Powers 
during their attempt to oust the Ottomans from the Balkans. Today, the overwhelming 
support for Albanian national claims derives from the interests of modern powers 
involved in the Balkan ethnic patchwork, albeit with a different rhetoric: there is no 
need to save the Christians from the oppressive rule of the “backward” Ottoman 
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Islamic state. On the contrary, modern Western support for the predominantly Muslim 
Albanians represents “convenient externalization of the political, ideological, cultural 
and religious frustrations stemming from the regions and societies outside the 
Balkans.”19 As Western concept of multicultural Europe gained momentum, 
supporting Balkan Muslims generally, in the words of the Bulgarian scholar Maria 
Todorova, “exempts the West from charges of racism, colonialism, eurocentrism and 
Christian intolerance against Islam.”20  
The distance of one century does not make much difference, except that 
addressing national problems now employs a different tone and includes terms such as 
human rights, democracy, cultural and gender issues. Hence, discussing Albanian 
territorial claims, and those of other Balkan nations, involves modern debate about the 
specificity of the national identity and national cultural heritage. Since the Albanian 
national consciousness developed in the shadow of the oppressive regime of Enver 
Hoxha (1944-1985), religion played a secondary role. Hoxha aimed at strengthening 
national identity through the ideology unveiled on the eve of the official prohibition of 
all religions in February 1967: “Albanianism is the only true religion of the 
Albanians!”21  
Still, even the fiercest attempts of the regime to detach the population from the 
traditional role of religion and tribal loyalties did not fully succeed in changing its 
mentality. The educational programmes imposed in 1945 aimed at embedding the 
concept of the unique character of the Albanian nation, which is exactly what Dako, 
Grameno and a few other Albanian-American writers argued in the early 20th century. 
Most of the founding fathers of the Albanian national narrative were of Christian 
background: works of Fan Noli (1882-1965), the founder of the Albanian Orthodox 
Church in 1922 (Fig. 3.3), Faik Konica (1875-1942), a Muslim convert to Catholicism 
and a founding-founder of the Albanian literature in 1896/7 in Brussels, as well as 
Kostandin Ҫekrezi (1892-1959), author of the first Albanian history book (Fig. 3.4), 
published in English in New York in 1919, served as a basis for Hoxha’s educational 
reforms introduced in 1945 to the Albanian population which had not seen any 
improvement in literacy rates since the proclamation of independence in 1913. One of 
the first decisions of Hoxha’s government in 1945, apart from compulsory reading 
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and writing classes for adults and children, was the establishment of new Albanian 
state institutions promoting the national narrative and a sense of identity. 
      
Fig. 3.3 – Fan Noli (1882-1965), the founder of      Fig. 3.4 - Kostandin Ҫekrezi (1892-1959), author of 
the Albanian Orthodox Church in 1922.                  Albania, Past and Present, the first Albanian history 
                                                                                  textbook, published in New York in 1919. 
In 1947, the Institute of Sciences was created in Tirana to promote education. A 
year later, a joint Archaeological and Ethnographical Museum was established to 
work on the development and care of the Albanian national heritage. However, as 
qualified staff in crucial disciplines was lacking, any serious work was postponed 
until the late 1950s, when the first generation of Albanian scholars, educated mainly 
in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, returned to work on this programme. This first 
generation of Albanian scholars and intellectuals helped to establish the first 
University in Albania, in Tirana in 1957. From the 1960s, when Albania entered the 
period of self-imposed isolation, a special theory of the uniqueness of the Albanian 
nation was promoted by Hoxha’s regime aiming to distinguish Albania from the rest 
of the Balkans. This politically motivated decision was in contrast with Dako’s initial 
arguments and had great influence on the Albanians both in Albania and in the 
neighbouring countries.22 
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Following this course, the first volume of the History of Albania was published 
in Tirana in 1959. As the development of historical and archaeological theory was 
strongly influenced by directives of the Hoxha regime, the research was based on 
Marxist principles, which insisted on “material culture history.” Albania was no 
exception to other communist countries at this time.23 The main concern of both 
disciplines was to interpret how the ordinary people lived and produce the narratives 
that depicted their role in society in relation to Marxist social theory.24 This approach 
required the existence of the material heritage corroborating the theories initiated by 
the early 20th century American-Albanian writers which served as a basis for building 
Albanian national consciousness. 
3.3 Cultural aspects and material heritage in the context of Albanian nationalism 
Every ethnic group that aspires to become a nation within its own state borders 
requires an unbroken continuity of the clearly defined ethnic territories.25 The 
evolution of ethnic nationalism usually coincides with the simultaneous construction 
of the state, nation and corresponding national myths. Because of the unique position 
of the Albanian language, surrounded by Greek and South Slav linguistic traditions, 
and absence of written tradition, the construction and spread of the national narrative 
was possible only when a nationally conscious intelligentsia was formed after 1945. 
For the definition of the Albanian ethnic territory, the grand narrative of the 
continuous Albanian presence in the Balkans was asserted by linking the modern 
Albanian language to that of the ancient inhabitants of the peninsula: the Illyrians.26 
Since no written documents in the Illyrian language exist and the first record of 
the Albanian language was dated in the mid-17th century,27 it was impossible to 
support this assertion without documentary or other material evidence.28 Even though 
the formation of the first Albanian alphabet took place in November 1908 in the then 
Ottoman Monastir,29 the real pioneering work on Albanian linguistic heritage was not 
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undertaken by Albanian scholars, but by foreigners, mainly from Central European 
intellectual centres from the mid-19th century onwards. The Romantic period that 
coincided with the re-discovered Christian population of the Ottoman Balkans, 
brought into focus for the first time some interest in the languages and ethnography of 
the region as a whole. Since by that time the majority of the Albanian population were 
Muslims, the main interest of these early scholars remained with the Greek or Slavic 
languages. Some first remarks on the Albanian language and its connections to Latin 
were noted as early as 1829 by the great Slovenian linguist Jernej Kopitar, the Censor 
for the Slavic languages in Vienna (Fig. 1.6). However, Kopitar’s pan-Slavic 
aspirations directed him towards a very close collaboration with the Slavic scholars of 
the Habsburg Empire and today he is primarily known for his work with the Serbian 
linguist Vuk Karadžić (Fig. 1.5).  
In 1854 German diplomat Georg von Hahn (1811-1869) published in Jena three 
volumes of Albanian Studies (Albanesische Studien) on Albanian history, language 
and culture, focusing on the Indo-European origins of the Albanian language.30 
Contemporary Albanian scholarship considers Hahn to be a founding father of 
Albanology – the studies of the Albanian language, culture and history – even though 
most of his works had been critically contested and surpassed long ago. 
After Hahn in the mid-19th century, there were no significant attempts to write 
about Albania or the Albanians prior to decade leading to the establishment of the 
independent Albanian state in 1913. Arguing for the creation of the Albanian state, the 
Austro-Hungarian government employed two of its most prominent historians who 
studied the Balkans at the turn of the 20th century to present to the outside world a 
collection of documents and related sources on mediaeval Albania, in order to support 
its argument for the necessity of creating a new state in the Balkans. A Czech 
historian Konstantin Jireček (1854-1918), his Hungarian colleague Lajos Thallóczy 
(Fig. 5.2) teamed up with the Croat historian Milan pl. Šufflay (Fig. 2.41) and in 1913 
in Vienna published the first book of Acta et diplomata res Albaniae mediae aetatis 
illustrantia (Diplomatic and Other Documents on Medieval Albania).31 The second 
book was published in 1918, whilst the third and final one, Codex albanicus was 
written by Šufflay alone in 1931, on the demand of the then Albanian government. 
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Because of Šufflay’s strong anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav attitudes, this book was 
never published. Thus, Hahn, Thallószy, Šufflay and, to a lesser extent, Jireček could 
be considered to be the real founders of Albanology.  
Their efforts were accompanied by the works of British traveler-turned-
anthropologist, Edith Durham (1863-1944), who wrote about the north-Albanian 
tribes in the early 20th century. Durham’s (Fig. 3.5) documentary work on customs 
and life in the Albanian highlands remained valuable source for research of the 
Albanian folklore from that period.  
The 19th century early comparative linguistics established the uniqueness of 
Albanian in the Indo-European language group, with no close etymological relations 
to other neighbouring languages, except for loan words. Interestingly, one of the first 
writers to claim the certainty of Albanian descent from the Romanized Illyrians was 
not a linguist, but a famous British archaeologist, Sir Arthur Evans (1851-1941). 
Before he “discovered” the Minoans and still in his early twenties, Evans (Fig. 3.6) 
lived and worked in the Balkans during the Eastern Crisis of the 1870s. Writing in 
1885/86 for the Society of Antiquaries in London, Evans stated: 
“The relics of the Roman provincials who survived the Slavonic conquest of 
Illyricum were divided in Dalmatia at all events, into two distinct classes, the citizens 
of the coast-towns, who retained their municipal and ecclesiastical institutions and 
something of Roman civilization under the aegis of Byzantium, and the Alpine 
population of the interior, the descendants for the most part of Romanized Illyrian 
clansmen recruited by the expropriated coloni of the municipia, or at least that part 
of them who had been forced to give up fixed agricultural pursuits for a semi-nomad 
pastoral life. Both classes spoke the Latin language, approaching in various stages of 
degradation…”32 
As for the Albanian scholars themselves, very few of them were able to write in 
Albanian, as the alphabet and grammar were not standardized. These intellectuals 
usually belonged to both Christian denominations, lived abroad and mostly wrote in 
French, Italian or English, thus addressing the readers of these languages. Even if 
books in Albanian had existed, no one could read them because of the endemic 
illiteracy of the population. 
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Fig. 3.5 – Edith Durham (1863-1944), the         Fig. 3.6 – Sir Arthur Evans (1851-1941), creator of the 
champion of Albanian cause in the early 20th      idea of Albanian Illyrian descent.  
century. 
However, modern advanced studies in comparative linguistics immediately 
identified a serious discrepancy in the hypothesis of the Illyrian ancestry of the 
modern Albanian language. In a general division of the Indo-European language tree, 
the Illyrian belongs to the western group comprising Germanic, Venetic, Illyrian, 
Celtic, Italic and Greek, whilst modern Albanian has all the characteristics of the 
eastern group. This includes Slavic, Baltic, Albanian, Thracian-Phrygian, Armenian, 
Iranian and Indian, as based on the most recent common denominator of each related 
language group.33 Because there is no evidence that Illyrian belongs to the eastern 
group as is the case with modern Albanian, the discrepancy between the two is crucial 
for the argument that Albanian is directly descended from the Illyrian. Furthermore, 
since Illyrian words survive only in personal and geographical names and there are no 
discovered writings in the Illyrian language and letters, the most frequently cited 
argument about the connections between the languages is that of the few direct 
correspondences of the vocabulary.34 
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Dako accepted and introduced the idea of the Illyrian origin of the Albanians in 
1918. Since then, the unaltered version of this theory was centred on the unbroken 
descent of modern Albanians from an Illyrian ethnic group formed in the Bronze Age, 
but on a territory that roughly corresponds to the territory occupied today by Albanian 
speakers: the states of Albania, Kosovo and Northern Epirus.35  
The search to prove this theory was conducted in archaeological and onomastic 
efforts to provide material evidence. The archaeological research, based on the results 
of excavations of the prehistoric burials, supplemented evidence for the distinct 
Illyrian culture, separate from its Greek and Thracian neighbours. Evidence of the 
earliest Illyrian presence in the Balkans and relations with the Greek and Roman 
worlds formed the main focus of the analysis of the ancient authors who distinguished 
the Illyrians from the latter. Since both Greek and Roman historians in typical fashion 
represented the Illyrians as the barbarian “other,” an accurate assessment of the 
Illyrian world is difficult. The archaeological evidence related to the Illyrians covers a 
much larger area than Albanian scholars are prepared to examine (Map 1.a.4) because 
defining the territoriality of ancient Balkan peoples proved to be equally difficult as 
doing so in the case of modern nation-states formed after the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire. The population of the Balkans was since the ancient times, due to the 
geographical and climatic characteristics, accustomed to the seasonal movements. The 
frontiers had often been flexible or even meaningless. That is one of the reasons why 
Greek writers were so vague in description of the boundaries of the Illyrian peoples. 
Herodotus implied to the greater Illyria to be beginning from Epirus, going inland to 
the great Morava Valley and expanding all the way to the Veneti.36 Later accounts 
show significant variations in description of the Illyrian tribes and territory. Thus, 
Appian’s description of the Illyrian territories places a southern boundary with 
Chaonia and Thesprotia where ancient Epirus began, south of the River Aous (Vijosë) 
and north across the Danube.37 This vast area produced the archaeological evidence 
for twenty or so groups defined by the material remains inhabiting the Illyrian 
territories during the Early Iron Age (8th-4th century BC). None of them give 
conclusive definitions of Illyrians, either through a compact unity of the 
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archaeological finds or through any apparent consistency in rituals and daily life.38 
Modern Albanian scholars energetically challenge this argument, and focus their 
research on tracing similarities between the archaeology and the surviving 
ethnography.  
As with the scientific systematization of linguistics, a similar pattern was 
adopted for the analysis of the archaeological and architectural remains. The intricacy 
of the material evidence with little or no reference to the written documents and 
customs was demarcated by using the comparisons with the much better documented 
ancient and mediaeval heritage of the area. In Albania proper, the first systematic 
record of ancient sites was conducted in 1904 by Carl Patsch (1865-1945), Jireček’s 
successor as a professor at the University of Vienna, and subsequently by Camilo 
Praschniker (1884-1949) and Arnold Schober (1886-1959) in 1919 who concentrated 
their work on the Illyrian heritage.39 The topographical studies of Patsch and 
Praschniker-Schober remain to this day the basis of modern studies of Illyrian sites.  
However, after the demise of Austro-Hungary, a young Albanian state did not 
have the capacity to undertake any research of its heritage. The National Library of 
Albania (Biblioteka Kombëtare e Shqipërisë), initiated in 1920, opened two years 
later. Until the end of the Second World War there were no other educational and 
cultural institutions working on the development of national narrative. This was a 
direct consequence of a dire financial situation which put the entire Albanian 
economy in the hands of Mussolini’s Italy.40 There were no investments in education 
of the Albanian youth and no finances for undertaking the archaeological research 
which would corroborate the initial thesis of the Illyrian ancestry of the Albanians. 
On their part, the representatives of the Italian authorities in Albania were 
particularly eager to identify classical Roman sites as it was part of the Italian political 
agenda of the Mussolini era whose fascists saw themselves as the legitimate 
successors of imperial Rome and laid claims to Albanian territory; the leading 
argument being that where the Romans once ruled, they could rule again. The Greek 
and Roman sites in the coastal areas were first examined by Italian and French 
archaeologists starting from the mid-1920s, but their focus was exclusively on the 
Classical period. A young Italian archaeologist Luigi Maria Ugolini (1895-1936) was 
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sent in 1924 to excavate sites of Appolonia, Saranda and Butrint, and until the 
contemporary international teams resumed the works on some of these sites in the 
1990s, much that was uncovered is owing to his efforts.41   
Only after the establishment of the Archaeological and Ethnographical Museum 
in Tirana, first as a joint institution in 1948 and then as two separate institutions in 
1976, could the process of creation of national narrative begin. When the Albanian 
Academy of Sciences (Akademia e Shkencave e Shqiperise) in Tirana, established in 
1972, created the Centre for Archaeological Research, the main objective of Albanian 
scholarly efforts was to achieve accordance with the political aims of the Hohxa 
regime. The separation of the two institutions coincided with the increased efforts of 
the regime from 1975 onwards to vigorously promote the idea of Albania’s peculiar 
national individuality. Even though research by Albanian scholars, educated at the 
newly founded University of Tirana in 1957 and further trained at Soviet (mainly 
Moscow) and Chinese universities, started in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1970s was the 
decade when the state fully supported the development of national archaeology.42  
The beginning of the field-work research of the Albanian national past was 
marked by the 1969 symposium Illyrians and the Albanian genesis which pointed to 
the future direction of the Albanian national discourse. One of the long lasting 
outcomes of the symposium was the beginning of periodicals Illyria and Monument, 
mostly concerned with the Albanian Illyrian past, which began being published in 
1971. The same year witnessed the publication of the first archaeological map by the 
eminent Albanian academic Muzafer Korkuti (1936), who devoted his life’s work to 
the problems of Albanian ethno-genesis. Thus, the year 1971 can be considered as the 
beginning of state’s focus on the academic interpretation of the material heritage of 
Albania and the turning point in constructing of the Albanian national narrative.  
3.4 Historical and academic sources on Albanian heritage 
After Ana Komnena, written accounts referring to the Albanians are rare and 
reveal little. The Serbian Emperor Stefan Dušan in the 14th century styled himself 
“Emperor of the Serbs, Greeks and Albanians,” but nothing more about the Albanians 
survived in either Serbian or Byzantine documents. In the 17th century, a valuable 
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Ottoman historian Evliya Çeleby (1611-1682), shed some light on the life of 
Albanians but his travelogue did not comment on Albanian history. Documents 
concerning Albanian history and Albanians only appeared in the 19th century, when 
the Grand Tour included parts of the Balkans.43 
There are still ongoing debates in dating the earliest document written in the 
Albanian language. The majority of contemporary authors maintain that it was the 
Meshari (Missal) dating from 1555, and written by Gjon Buzuku in Latin for the 
needs of the Arbëreshë community of exiled Christians of Albania in Italy. It contains 
a single line in Albanian, incorporated within the Latin text and written in the Latin 
alphabet. From the same period dates the Chronicle of the Musachi family, in the 
Gheg dialect of Albanian and written in Latin orthography. It refers to the exiled 15th 
century noble Teodor Musachi44 and his ancestral possessions lost to the Ottomans.45 
The book does not contain information on land, towns, castles or buildings. There are, 
however, some documents on Episcopal Sees in the region written during the decline 
of Byzantine rule, but they do not refer to Albanian nationals and for the most part, 
some of the names and locations are difficult to identify, particularly those with Slav-
sounding names of origin.46 
Except for these scarce documents from the pre-nationalist period, no other 
sources related to Albania and the Albanians, were found prior to the mid- to late-19th 
century, when educated European travellers began recording Albanian customs and 
contemporary political events. By then, ideas of nationalism penetrated intellectual 
thinking and not even the (arguably) most objective scholars and writers were exempt 
from its influence.  
3.4.1 The problem of the validity of the sources 
The 19th and early 20th century accounts of Albania and Albanians come 
from foreign authors, primarily concerned with describing the terrain and 
ethnography. Few reflected on the history of the Albanian ethnic place and the 
Albanian people. Only occasionally they referred to the historical background and 
archaeological remains of the land they were visiting. However, by the time of the 
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Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878), the majority of the European writers were affected 
not only by the phenomenon of nationalism within their own countries, but by the 
impact that the ideas of nationalism had on the development of historiography and a 
number of humanist disciplines. These undoubtedly affected their writings, resulting 
in the produced works reflecting more their own times, intellectual thinking and 
political circumstances, rather than objective views on the past. Nevertheless, 
imperfect as they are, these 19th century accounts represent a valuable source for the 
examination of the nation building processes not only in Albania itself, but for the 
whole of the Balkans. 
In that sense, Sir Arthur Evans’ account Ancient Illyria – An Archaeological 
Explanation (1886), despite its frequently erroneous conclusions and referring mainly 
to the modern Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohija 
and Macedonia, records the surviving heritage dating from ancient times and depicts 
only the Albanians living in those territories which Evans visited. Another valuable 
source for the ethnographic features of Albania came from Mary Edith Durham, who 
wrote extensively in the early 20th century. Following the usual western pattern of the 
time, she had found her Albanian “pet nation” and became an important source for 
modern Albanian historiography.47 Undoubtedly, she has earned her place for the 
quality of her ethnographic and tribal depictions of the Northern Albanian and 
Montenegrin highlanders, but the fierce criticism that almost transcended into open 
chauvinism towards the Serbs, the Greeks and Orthodox Christianity in general, 
excluded her work from the list of sources valuable for the comparative analysis of 
early 20th century Balkan history.48  
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3.4.2 The establishment of the national narrative 
Recording the history of Albania by Albanian authors began only with the 
publication of the first volume of the History of Albania in 1959. Clearly, the 
development of historiography in this period was strongly influenced by directives of 
the Hohxa regime which, like most communist countries, based historical and 
archaeological research on the principles of Marxist doctrine that insisted on “material 
culture history.”49 The main concern of both disciplines was to excavate, read and 
interpret how the ordinary people lived and produce the narratives that depict this 
people’s role in society and their situation in relation to Marxist social theory.50  
As elsewhere in the Balkans, the absence of written documents placed an 
emphasis on archaeology and its interpretations, but as Hohxa’s paranoia engulfed the 
country and its borders, there was no possibility for professional academic exchange 
either with scholars with an international background (including neighbouring 
countries) or with Albanian nationals living and working in Yugoslavia and Greece. 
Even though the prevailing communist ideology officially suppressed nationalism, 
particularly in Yugoslavia, the old enmities between the Balkan ethnic groups had 
survived and transformed themselves into the battle between the different variants of 
communism, as expressed through the personality cults of Hohxa (Fig. 1.a.23) and 
Tito (Fig. 1.a.20). The differences between their characters and upbringing inevitably 
led to different national aspirations under the aegis of communism. Whilst Hohxa 
persevered in shaping and constructing Albanian national identity based on the 
uniqueness of the Albanian language in the Balkans, Tito did everything to curb 
various Yugoslav nationalisms and particularly the Serbian one, as he saw it as a main 
threat to the existence of the unified state. In order to achieve this, Tito took two 
incredibly important decisions: to proclaim several new nations within the Federal 
State of Yugoslavia and to forbid the return of 15,770 Serbian families expelled from 
Kosovo and Metohija during Second World War.51 Both decisions had a long lasting 
effect on Serbian nationalism. As two new nations were introduced by the 1946 
Yugoslav Constitution52, the Macedonian and the Montenegrin, the percentage of the 
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population described as Serbs within the Federation fell considerably. Simultaneously, 
the ethnic map of Kosovo and Metohija was irreversibly changed.  
Parallel with the establishment of the new regime in both Albania and 
Yugoslavia in 1945, the efforts to build the educational networks were taking place on 
an unprecedented scale. In Albania, in 1952 the southern Tosk dialect was 
standardized as official Albanian and the first dictionary of the Albanian language 
was printed in 1954. This was followed by the foundation of the University of Tirana 
in 1957. In Yugoslavia, the main centres of Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana had 
inherited universities and educated classes, but the southern republics that did not 
have institutions of higher learning, were the first to receive them. As Kosovo and 
Metohija was economically the least developed part of Yugoslavia, with a nascent 
infrastructure, the University of Priština was established as late as 1970, with the 
language of instruction being both Serbo-Croat53 and Albanian. However, this rapid 
expansion of the academic network, influenced by the communist ideology, had a 
negative effect on the quality of studies, especially in the new institutions. This was 
significant because the period after 1945 became crucial for Serbian-Albanian 
relations.54  
Books published in the post-war period, openly admitted influence of the 
Marxist ideology of both countries. Some of them do show a genuine attempt to 
address the problems of perceptions of nationalism and the national question 
objectively. However, the absence of developed academic traditions, combined with 
political agendas of both the Albanian and Yugoslav regimes, often marred the 
objectivity of arguments. Despite that, the communist period between 1945 and 1990 
provided necessary support for the establishment of national goals and narratives 
suitable for the developmental needs of the new states. These goals and narratives 
continued in the post-communist transition era, but this time heavily influenced by 
international policies of modern Great Powers involved in the Balkans. Subsequently, 
academic objectivity once again underwent a general revision which gave books 
written and published in the past three decades significant academic bias. 
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3.4.3 The Illyrian Theory  
The first Assembly of Illyrian Studies was held in Tirana in 1972 and 
presented the results of work of the first generation of the native Albanian academics, 
educated at the University of Tirana and Soviet universities. The central argument was 
asserted by the first and most important Albanian archaeologist in the field of pre-
historic research, Dr Muzafer Korkuti (Fig. 3.7). On this occasion, he presented the 
first detailed map of Albanian pre-historic sites and set the basis for all future 
Albanian arguments by his work On the Formation of the Illyrian Ethnos.  
The thrust of Korkuti’s argument emphasized the unbroken continuity of the 
pre-Illyrian→Illyrian→Arber→Albanian line of descent. His interpretation of the 
pre-historic finds was based on the claim that the Illyrians were settled in the Balkans 
before the Indo-Europeanization took place during the Bronze Age.55 Basing his 
conclusions on the excavations from the tombs of Mat (Middle Albania), Pazhok 
(Central Abania), Vajza (South-Western Albania), Dropulli (Southern Albania) 
Korkuti’s conclusions asserted that the Illyrians were not only the carriers of the Iron 
Age culture in the territory of Albania but also they had lived in the same territory 
even in the Bronze Age.56 Even though Korkuti was aware that generalisation of the 
material finds had to be corroborated by the coordinated conclusions from various 
disciplines concerned with the problems of ethno-genesis, he still maintained that 
archaeology provides the most important conclusions as opposed to the studies of 
linguistics and anthropology. Insufficient factual evidence for the proper 
anthropological research, such was the absence of pre-historic skeletons, Korkuti 
challenged by a counter-question: 
“When one takes up the issue of the origins of the Illyrians, the first problem 
which needs solving, is the cultural continuity from the early bronze period to the 
middle, and later to the late bronze and iron epoch. Let us consider as solved (and to 
a certain extent it is) the problem of the cultural continuity during the Bronze and 
Iron Age in the western territory of the Balkan Peninsula in the lands where the 
proper Illyrians had spread. But is this fact sufficient, or this preliminary conclusion 
on this problem? (sic) Is it necessary to prove the cultural continuity since the 
beginnings of the Bronze Age and say that the process of the creation of the Illyrian 
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ethnos starts there? The continuity of living in a definite territory constitutes one of 
the basic premises for the formation and consolidation of a culture, an ethnos or a 
language. As a consequence, the study of the cultural continuity constitutes the first 
condition and the key support in treating the problem of the ethno-genesis of the 
Illyrians.”57 
The concept of cultural continuity provided a convenient argument for linking 
the historic Illyrians with modern Albanians. As Korkuti’s research coincided with the 
state version of the Albanian uniqueness championed by Hohxa’s regime, the support 
for the claim was additionally expressed through the premise that: 
“In the Albanian archaeological literature, enough data has been offered to 
prove the uninterrupted cultural continuity in the land of our country since the early 
Bronze Age. This has served to back up the view that the Illyrian ethno-genesis starts 
here. According to this view, the beginnings of the autochthony coincide with the 
beginning of the ethnos. Closely related to this conclusion, the link between 
autochthony and the formation of the ethnos is the first issue that comes up for 
discussion. The formation of the Illyrian ethnos could not be understood without 
autochthony and the fact that they develop parallel to each other but their starting 
points do not coincide in time. Autochthony has been in existence for a longer stretch 
of time whereas the true Illyrian ethnos was formed on the basis of autochthony only 
after it has been existing for a long time.”58 
  
Fig. 3.7 – Muzafer Korkuti (b.1936) formulated the hypothesis of the cultural continuation between the 
ancient Illyrians and modern Albanians in 1971. 
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This view echoes the 1910 writings of Edith Durham “to whom we owe 
essentially the first in-depth interest and study on Albania’s customary law”, who 
wrote that the Albanian mountaineer “boasts and believes that he is the oldest thing in 
the Balkan Peninsula.”59 
Considering the fact that Korkuti’s pioneering work during the 1960s and 1970s 
created the basis for the Albanian school of archaeology, it remained unclear to which 
literature he refered, other than his own or that of Dako, Grameno and a few foreign 
travellers from the early 20th century. His guiding principles of archaeological 
research were based primarily on the excavation of the prehistoric burial tumuli in 
order to supplement evidence for the prehistoric Illyrians from the Korcë basin. The 
main objective of these projects was to define more clearly their relations with the 
prehistoric cultures of Greece, Italy and the countries that were parts of former 
Yugoslavia.60 However, about twenty groups that were defined by their material 
remains on the whole of the Illyrian territory during the Early Iron Age, show various 
levels of similarity among them, primarily through the burial or pottery patterns, thus 
exceeding the territory claimed to be authentic Albanian.61  
Amidst the modern controversy over the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, 
special attention was paid to the ethnic background of the Dardanians, the ancient 
inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija and what is now northern Macedonia. Whether 
the Dardanians were of an Illyrian or Thracian origins has been the main focus of the 
Albanian-Serbian academic debate since the 1970s. The eastern border of the Illyrian 
lands ran through the Morava valley and encompased a wide contact zone between the 
Illyrian and Thracian tribes (Map 3.1).62 For Albanian scholars that the Dardanians 
were a tribe homogenous with the rest of the Illyrians is a non-negotiable fact. 
Supported by the onomastic derivitive of the modern Albanian word for pear 
(dardhë), Albanian science is adamantly conclusive about the Illyrian origin of the 
Dardanians. On the other hand, most Yugoslav scholars held them to be a hybrid of 
the Illyrians and Thracians, as the traces of their culture were found in the territory 
considered to be Thracian. 
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Korkuti’s thesis on the Illyrian origins of the Albanian nation, appeared just as a 
major exhibition about the prehistoric tribes living in what was then Yugoslav 
territory took place at the National Museum of Belgrade. In the catalogue for the 1972 
exhibition, the archaeologist Draga Garašanin (Fig. 1.54) of the National Museum, 
published results of her research on prehistoric tribes in the Balkans.63 In it she juxta 
posed the findings of the several different burial sites examined in the area of the 
Morava valley and around the natural communication pass between Niš and Lezha 
(Naissus-Lissus). Her interpretation of the findings was that: 
 
Map 3.1 – The remains of Dardanian culture proved to be a great controversy for both the Albanian and 
Serbian archaeologists. 
 “The cultural development of the area in the Morava valley in the Bronze Age 
is also closely related to the region of Kosovo. It is evident that the region of Kosovo 
in this period already had close cultural contact, and also ethnic contacts with the 
west Balkan Illyrian area…Unfortunately, on the basis of the archaeological 
information at our disposal, it is not possible with certainty to offer a complete 
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picture of the Kosovo region during the Bronze Age64. However, on the basis of the 
known sites from this region (Ljušta near Kosovska Mitrovica and Gladnica near 
Priština) we seem to have a culture that is very similar to the Mediana group65…On 
the other hand the urn from Ljušta, unfortunately a solitary find, seems to indicate 
influences from Pannonia66 on the basis of its shape and decoration. It is quite clear 
that no widespread conclusions can be based on one solitary find….In any case it is 
only future systematic archaeological excavations that will allow us to take a definite 
stand of this question.”67 
Although not numerous, the systematic archaeological excavations in the 
territory of Kosovo and Metohija were carried out until the early 1990s, only to be 
abruptly interrupted by the Yugoslav wars which prevented any major archaeological 
activities in the region. At present, the National Museum in Belgrade has been 
completely closed to the public for nearly a decade, but the National Museum in 
Tirana held on a display since 1992 one section dedicated to Kosovo’s Illyrian-
Dardanian origins aiming to secure wide support for the Albanian cause north of the 
official border of the state of Albania. 
3.5 The Illyrians Ancestry narrative 
Similar arguments of the ethno-genesis of the Albanian nation were used for the 
border territories of southern Albania and northern Greece. Disputes between Greek 
and Albanian academics about the ethnic affinities of the ancient Epirotes, have 
persisted for approximately the same length of time as disputes between Albanian and 
Serbian scholars. However, this dispute had a different outcome, as Greek scholars 
successfully emphasised the documented period of the 4th-3rd centuries BC which 
enabled them to argue that the ancient Epirotes had been, by that time, completely 
Hellenized. Furthermore, this debate involved academics from the academic 
institutions from all major European countries, as the research of Ancient Greece 
represented, ultimately, the research of European civilization. The objectivity of the 
foreign authors was frequently questionable because they showed a tendency to side 
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with either Albanian or Greek arguments, which was a direct consequence of the 
influence of contemporary politics towards individual states in the Balkan region. In 
the Greco-Albanian debate, Albanian scholars insist that the southern border of 
Illyrian influence was not the right bank of the Shkumbini River, but much further 
south, penetrating the province of Epirus to the line which roughly corresponded to 
the Greek border prior to the 1913 London Agreement (Map 3.2). 
 
Map 3.2 – The dispute about the ethnicity of the ancient Epirotes between the Albanian and Greek 
scholars implies dissatisfaction with current state-borders. 
Eager to disassociate the Ancient Epirotes from Greeks, Albanian scholars 
insisted that most ancient authors regarded Epirotes as barbarians, thus non-Greek 
speakers. On the other hand, Greeks insisted on the resemblance of the burial patterns 
of Mycenae and those of Albanian sites, which Albanian science dismissed as 
coincidental or non-existent.68 Owing to the presence of the Greek colonies on the 
coast, there was undoubtedly a mixed Greco-Illyrian culture.69 The imprecise primary 
sources and their diametrically opposed interpretations complicate debate on the 
nature of early Epirus. The increased archaeological activities on both sides of the 
contemporary Albanian-Greek border have revealed a great deal about the identified 
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groups in the area, but the satisfactory answer to the question of the nature of their 
ethnic affinities is far from being resolved.70  
The Illyrian urban settlements played a central role in the efforts of Albanian 
archaeologists trying to prove the Illyrian character of northern Epirus. As in the case 
of the Dardanians, the focal point of research was directed to the study of origins, 
growth, political and social organization, and interactions with the surrounding 
territories.71 The earliest identified urban settlement, dated to the 5th century BC in the 
area of Shkodër, was placed far to the north of the disputed southern districts of the 
region. The walls of an enclosed area were built from the unworked stone blocks 
without defensive towers and with two entrances at the most.72 This unsophisticated 
settlement could hardly be called a town, since the southern regions developed 
distinctly urban characteristics by the mid-3rd century BC. The intricate nature of the 
Greco-Albanian discourse arose over the general question of the extent of mutual 
influence between the Illyrian and Greek worlds. Korkuti, adamant that the Illyrian 
culture was autochthonous, asserted that as such it had spread to the southernmost 
parts of the Illyrian world, the area of Epirus by the 3rd-1st centuries BC.73 Korkuti 
pointed out that: 
 “The urban settlements of Byllis, Nikaia (Klossi) or Albanopolis74…did not 
differ much from its southern and eastern neighbour’s economic and cultural 
development as well as political organisation. The ancient manufacturing crafts had 
spread to almost all the southern Illyrian regions. The ancient Greek and Roman 
authors tell us about the dynamic urban life in the numerous Illyrian cities they 
describe when writing about the political events of the time. The picture they 
described becomes ever more complete from the material and testimonies the 
archaeologist’s pickaxe has brought to light.”75 
This was challenged by the British author John Wilkes who cautiously noticed 
that it is not possible to determine precisely “to what extent the urban development 
was a direct consequence of external stimulus,” notably in the period of King Pyrrhus 
(319/318-272BC), and whether there is “any genuine evolution from the ‘pre’ or 
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‘proto’ urban phases.”76 For Wilkes, “the matter will be resolved only by systematic 
excavations in the interior of discovered settlements, which so far has not been 
attempted” and that evidence so far points towards the negative conclusion.”77  
Wilkes’s work was published in the early 1990s and since then a series of 
international teams came to Albania to undertake excavations of ancient sites that 
were until then exclusively under the management of Albanian archaeologists. 
Establishing a number of offices in the region, with particular interest in ancient 
coastal towns and pre-historic sites in the hinterland, an abundance of the documented 
research programmes appeared in all major European languages.  
One such project was undertaken in 2007 on the pre-historic site of Kamenica in 
the Korçë region. The discovered tumulus, dated between 13th and 6th century BC, 
was organized as a museum with the help of the Packard Humanities Institute from 
California (Fig. 3.8). In the year of opening, a special seminar celebrating the 95th 
anniversary of Albanian independence was organized in order to further the Illyrian 
theory. The director of the Kamenica site, Skënder Aliu, wrote an essay titled 
Characteristics of the Illyrian culture in the proto-urban and urban periods in 
southeast Albania which confirmed the generally accepted argument by Albanian 
scholars of their Illyrian ancestry. His colleague Sonila Bitincka joined the debate 
with her work Elements of the iliro-arbërore culture in the archaeological and 
ethnographic material in the same manner.78 As the tumulus itself does not contain 
definite confirmation of the presence of the Albanian ethnicity, the interpretation of 
the site by modern scholars cannot be based on the material evidence. 
     
Fig. 3.8 – The main excavations of the Tumulus of Kamenica – a link to the Illyrian past?  
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The numerous works by foreign academics in the past thirty years have failed to 
achieve the desired effect of changing established perceptions. Works related to the 
debate on Illyrian ethnicity and its Albanian descendants have only contributed to the 
more divisive and, in some cases, completely polarised professional opinions, as they 
had been based exclusively on scholarship dating from the 1970s onwards.79  
3.5.1 Promoting the Illyrian narrative the West 
An increased academic interest in the region during the period of the 
Yugoslav wars triggered by the political need for European and US governments to 
provide for their voters the satisfactory reasons for their involvement. Thus, much of 
the foreign research from the early 1990s onwards was written frequently by non-
academics with some experience in the area or by those scholars who chose to follow 
the political agendas of their governments and support Albanian national re-assertion. 
The links between the Albanian and foreign authors who argue the same cause are 
clearly visible through the background activities of publishing houses and their 
financiers.  
The most obvious example for modern political engagement in historical 
revision of the Albanian national narrative derives from the Centre for Albanian 
Studies in London and its associate publishers. Apart from several books that relate to 
the problems of the modern Albanian national question, one of its associates, historian 
Bejtullah Destani (b.1960), initiated publishing of re-prints of the earliest writers on 
Albania from the 19th century.80 As the number of foreign authors who devoted their 
academic life to the question of the ethno-genesis of the Albanians was limited, 
Destani used the introduction to those reprinted works to assert an argument about the 
damaging historical influence of the Serbs and Greeks for the Albanian national 
territory. For example, instead of pointing out to the positive views that Evans held 
for the Albanians in his travelogue through the lands of Dalmatia, Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohija and Macedonia, written when 
Kosovo and Metohija were still an Ottoman province, Destani insisted that “the 
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Serbian army tried, by burning the mosques and villages, to destroy any evidence of 
the fact that the Albanians lived in Kosovo since ancient times.”81 Such terminology is 
a clear political effort to academically justify current political affairs in the region. 
Evans himself did not spend much time either in Northern Albania or in Kosovo and 
Metohija and his writings are often confused, erroneous82 and full of guesswork. A 
typical passage that illustrates Evans’ youthful self-confidence when describing 
remote towns and churches that he visited, reads:  
“The mere insertion of Turkish inscription into the outside wall of a building 
does not necessarily prove that it was the work of a Turkish dignitary, thus honoured, 
and some of the buildings, especially in the North-East quarter of the town, may well 
date83 from pre-Turkish and even pre-Slavonic times…”84 
Evans’s frequent change of emotions and objects of observation, so apparent in 
his travelogue, do not display methodological research. However, its value is mainly 
in careful recording of the historical towns, old buildings and walls he visited. His 
book is mainly about the territories of former Yugoslavia and there is little reference 
to the territories inhabited by the Albanians. As such, it is more valuable for research 
in the territories of these countries, rather than as a eulogy to the missing link of the 
Illyrian-Albanian ethno-genesis. Finally, as Arthur Evans is much better known for 
his often criticised interpretation of the famous site in Crete, most modern academics 
give him credit for enthusiasm, rather than his academic techniques.85  
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3.6 The establishment of the Albanian national narrative  
During the 1970s and 1980s, when academic clashes between Albanian and 
Serbian scholars were becoming more prominent, the states of Albania and 
Yugoslavia had different political and economic circumstances. Because Yugoslavia 
was regarded as a “special case of communism” and enjoyed relative freedom and 
economic prosperity since the mid-1960s, Yugoslav scholars of all ethnic 
backgrounds enjoyed frequent contacts and academic exchange with their 
international counterparts in both blocs of the bipolar world. Albania, however, was in 
constant economic decline until the mid-1970s, when it entered into a self-imposed 
isolation. This state of affairs was reflected in the process of the academic exchange. 
Albanian scholars had severe restrictions in promoting their academic achievements 
and most published works from that period were by a small number of foreign authors 
who rarely had an access to Albania.  
3.6.1 The Continuation Theory – Komani-Kruja culture 
To justify the isolationist policies of the Hoxha regime, a theory arguing that 
the cultural and ethnic identity of the Illyrians continued through the Arbërs (in 
Byzantine sources after the 11th century referred to as Arbanitai or Arvanitoi), later 
renamed Albanians, was devised in the 1970s.  This became part of every educational 
syllabus in a programme designed to eradicate illiteracy after the Second World War. 
It was loosely based on the continuity thesis first formulated by Christo Dako in 1919. 
However, Hohxa’s persistence was responsible for its full implementation. The 
consequence of this is the deeply rooted idea of national continuity in the Albanian 
collective psyche.86 
Since the evidence of “material culture of purely Albanian origin” is difficult to 
verify, linguistic theories developed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
formed the basis for the argument of continuity. The academic debate, however, has 
identified two main hurdles. Firstly, there is a total absence of the written Illyrian 
language: only a few names survive in Greek and Latin sources, an insufficient data 
about the vocabulary, grammatical structure and phonetics of the Illyrian language. 
Secondly, by the time the Albanian language was written down, Illyrian had ceased to 
exist as a spoken language for over a millennium. For Albanian archaeologists, even 
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as remarkable as Dr Korkuti, this deficiency was overcome by “highlighting the 
historical fact of primary importance: Albanian is spoken nowadays in the territory 
that was inhabited by the proper Illyrians in the ancient times and where Illyrian and 
one of its dialects were spoken. This is a fact of primary importance that scholars who 
have proved the Illyrian origin of the Albanian language have been starting from in 
laying out their arguments and proof.”87 
The absence of material evidence of undisputed Albanian origins is usually 
explained by the narrative of the “undisturbed life of the Romanized Illyrian 
population.”88 Conveniently, little is known about the Balkan interior beyond the 
hinterland of the coastal cities after the Roman conquest. From the excavated and 
analysed sites so far, it appears that the Balkan provinces enjoyed a period of stability 
and prosperity up to the 3rd and 4th centuries AD, during which time the native 
inhabitants were Romanized. As elsewhere in the Empire, the Illyrian lands were 
included in the imperial administrative system only to gain some prominence in the 
period of decline of the Roman Empire. Even though the name Illyricum survived 
several administrative reorganizations including the division and reshaping of the 
Empire, there were no clear references to the inhabitants of the region after the major 
influx of the Slavs in the 6th-7th centuries who penetrated the peninsula as far south as 
the Peloponnese. Subsequent struggles between the Byzantine and Bulgarian Empires 
over control of the territory of Albania up to the 11th century were recorded in various 
Byzantine chronicles, but no mention of Albanians appeared until the 1080s, when 
Anna Comnena first used the term Albania. Albanian research explained this absence 
of reference by asserting that since there was no great disturbance in the way of life of 
the Romanized Illyrians, both in the coastal cities and in the interior, there was no 
need to mention them by the contemporary writers.89  
After the division of the Roman Empire in 395 AD, the Romanized Illyrians 
were split between the provinces of Prevalitania, the New Epirus and the Old Epirus, 
which corresponded to the territory of present-day Albania.90 Albanian archaeologists 
insisted from the beginning that the Illyrian population led an undisturbed life of 
cultural continuity and that “the elements of the old social relationships are still 
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present.”91 Listing the cities of Skodra, Lisi, Dyrrah, Bylis, Kanina, Onhezmi, 
Buthrotus, Berat, Pogradeci, Symiza in Korce, Korkuti mantained that “such 
continuity” is proved by the mere fact that they continued being inhabited. 
Furthermore, the Albanian land experienced some revival, particularly in the period of 
late antiquity and the rule of Justinian, “another Roman Emperor of Albanian 
origin”92 which witnessed a “widespread creative activity in the field of monumental 
church constructions, which can be seen in their architecture, their mosaics and the 
decorative and architectonic structure.”93  
For Albanian scholars, the argument about the continuous undisturbed life of the 
Romanized Illyrians is crucial, because it has a double role: firstly, it is a convenient 
substitute for the missing link between the Illyrian and Albanian ethnicities and, 
secondly, it confirms the notion of the Albanians as true inheritors of Roman 
traditions, as opposed to the Greek monopoly on ancient autochthony and the Slavic 
usurpation of the territory.  
Recently, the research of an American academic of Romanian origin, Florin 
Curta, based on the comprehensive analysis of the primary sources, archaeological 
findings and accompanying interpretations dating from the 1950s onwards, challenged 
the Albanian arguments entirely. Curta asserted that by the time of the 3rd-4th centuries 
there was a sharp decline in the Balkan population as a whole because of the scarce 
evidence of peasant settlements and complete disappearance of villae rusticae.94 
Similarly, the disturbances over the Danubian limes and along the line of the main 
roads suggest a great decline in the economy and population.95  
Curta concluded that by 500 AD most of the major cities in the Balkans had 
contracted and regrouped around the fortified precinct of its major church. The 
traditional street grid of Roman urbanization “was altered without any respect for the 
accessibility to the neighbouring houses, the forum was filled with smaller houses of a 
poorer quality of construction, whilst public baths were usually abandoned. Large 
houses were divided into smaller dwellings and, especially after 500 AD, public 
buildings had ceased to have their previous function.”96 The erection of “monumental 
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churches” took over the role of public buildings and became the touchstone of urban 
prosperity. However, the presence of monumental churches could not hide the fact 
that the region suffered serious depopulation, “witnessed both by the absence of any 
significant agricultural tools and the contemporary legislative measures which aimed 
to improve the situation by tax exemptions.”97 Curta’s conclusions suggest that 
beyond the coastal cities, after the 4th century, there was not only stagnation, but a 
rapid decline in all aspects of human activities, except the military. General 
depopulation resulted in recruitment shortages and made barbarian invasions easier.  
Procopius recorded Justinian’s attempts to secure Balkan imperial territories in 
the mid-6th century by creating a network of nearly 600 newly built or renewed 
fortifications98 as a defence line along the Danube, main roads and important 
mountain passes.99 Because of the required urgency, these structures were basic both 
in the material used and execution techniques. Decorative stone plastic was non-
existent in the most of the identified sites from this period.100 Justinian’s fortification 
programme for the protection of the Balkans did not achieve the expected results, 
because small numbers of people could not support the network of military outposts 
on such a vast territory for long. Ultimately, Justinian’s programme only exhausted 
the treasury and postponed the consolidation of the Empire until well into the 7th 
century.101 Furthermore, it enabled the invading Slavs and Bulgars to settle in the 
depopulated Roman territory. 
The invasion of the Slavs and the Avars and the final settlement of the Slavs in 
the early 7th century marked the beginning of the end of over two hundred years of 
permanent political and economic disturbance for the Balkan part of the Empire.102 
Roman rule survived in the eastern Adriatic coastal cities, because they could be 
protected by the still strong Roman/Byzantine navy. However, there is no evidence on 
the situation in the interior. The establishment of the Bulgarian state at the end of the 
7th century and its subsequent struggle for territories with the Byzantines in the course 
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of the next three centuries did not improve this picture, but, for Albanian scholars this 
period is important, because it witnessed the appearance of the Komani-Kruja culture 
around Kruja and in Dyrrachion hinterland.103  
The Komani-Kruja culture, originally dated from the late-6th/-early-7th to the 
late-8th/early-9th centuries, was analysed primarily through its burial patterns, with 
stone-lined graves and multiple skeletons, which Albanian scholars interpreted as 
representation of the kin ties of the autochthonous tribe named the Arbërs.104 They 
associated these finds with the Albanian tribal loyalties of the later periods and, 
subsequently, as evidence of the survival of the Illyrians in the post-Roman period. 
For Korkuti and his followers, this was undoubtedly a proof of the self-achieved 
cultural development of the autochthonous population that survived the tide of the 
Slavic incursion. Korkuti summarised this process of transformation of the Illyrians 
into Arbers as: 
“The national and medieval name of Arbër and Arbëri (Albani) has been 
inherited by the Illyrian. The historical sources, especially the works of the ancient 
authors, write about names of place, people and populations formed with the root arb 
(alb). These names are encountered chiefly in the territory of South and Central 
Illyria; arbaios – means for Arbers in an inscription of the 3rd century BC found in 
Finiq; the city of Arbon is mentioned by the historian Polibius in the 2nd Century BC; 
the city of Albanopoli as well as the Albans one can run across in the works of 
Ptolemy, 2nd century BC; the population called Abroi and the city of Arbon, with its 
inhabitants called Arbonios and Arbonites are mentioned by Stephen the Byzantine in 
the 6th century AD.  
Out of these data, fragmented as they are, the remark of Ptolemy that in the rear 
of Dyrrah there lived an Illyrian tribe by the name of Alban, arbanite, constitutes the 
basis of the dissemination and use of this name with a wider implication. During the 
7th-8th century AD and later, this population became ever more important. The local 
medieval population that had preserved its ancient name gave the name to the region, 
Arbanon, Arberi. Initially, it was the name of a definite territory limited in space. 
Later it spread even to the other inhabitants of the provinces, which shared the same 
characteristics with the people of arbanon, including Prevalitania, New Epirus, Old 
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Epirus and Dardania. Arbanon was initially the name of a small territory, which kept 
growing until it became a general denomination. The generalisation of the name was 
favoured by numerous converging economic, cultural, linguistic and ethnic factors, 
which were the same for all the population of the provinces we mentioned and which 
consequently were called by the same name, Arbëri.”105 (sic!) 
The usage of the burials of the Komani-Kruja culture as the evidence of 
continuum between the Illyrian and Albanian ethnicities faced a problem of its 
relatively limited distribution in the area of central and northern Albania.106 
Furthermore, similar finds were discovered in the territory of modern Macedonia and 
Bulgaria, along the route of the famous Via Egnatia, far beyond traditional Illyrian 
borders.107 Although the long established theory that the Via Egnatia was completely 
abandoned during the early Middle Ages, there is evidence that some segments 
between Ohrid and Edessa and along the present Bulgarian-Greek border were 
repaired during the 8th century, when the most important cemeteries of the Komani 
culture were dated. The matter was further complicated after the resemblance of the 
burial artefacts (dress accessories, weapons and belt fittings) with discoveries in the 
Late Avar cemeteries in Hungary was noticed, which prompted some researchers to 
point to the association of the Komani-Kruja culture with the Avar ethnicity.108  
The heated debate between Albanian and scholars from neighbouring countries 
on the Komani-Kruja culture is of primary importance for the ethnic territoriality of 
the mediaeval Albanians. The Croat author Džino argued that a relatively small 
presence of Christian artefacts reflected that, except for the some members of the 
elite, the population was not Christianised or had lost it by the time of the invasion of 
the Slavs.109 If correct, this assertion disputes the Albanian argument of Romanized 
and Christianized Illyrians/Arbëri in its entirety.110 
Petty principalities that existed in the Albanian territories under Byzantine, 
Norman or Serbian nobles throughout the Middle Ages did not leave a notion of the 
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ethnic Albanian noble class. However, the Albanian scholars maintain the belief in a 
Christianised Arbëri population continuing its existence throughout the Middle Ages 
until the Ottoman conquest. Even though there are no remains of architectural 
structures, such as churches and monasteries dating from the period that could be 
closely associated with the Komani-Kruja culture and corroborate this theory, the 
Albanian official narrative maintains their Christian autochthony. For that purpose, 
the majority of the museum displays in Albania proper contain the small grave 
artefacts from this period, all presented in a manner that supports this argument. Thus, 
the insistence on the Albanian ethnicity of the Komani-Kruja culture by the Albanian 
scholars represents the only evidence for the Continuation theory. Furthermore, the 
significant quantity of findings of the Komani-Kruja culture, discovered around the 
city of Kruja, conveniently continue the national narrative to the rise to power of the 
only uncontested Albanian of the Late Middle Ages: Skanderbeg. 
3.6.2 The noble Albanian  
The central square of the Albanian capital Tirana, the Skanderbeg Square, is 
dominated by the equestrian monument to Skanderbeg, erected in 1968 on the 
occasion of the 500th anniversary of Skanderbeg’s death (Fig. 3.9). When Enver 
Hohxa proclaimed Albania an atheist state in 1967, almost all surviving churches and 
mosques were closed, demolished or converted into public buildings for the use of the 
socialist regime. An American catholic missionary and a great supporter of the 
Albanian cause, late Edwin Jacques stated that the religious persecution by May 1967 
totalled: “2169 various religious establishments, of which 600 Orthodox and 327 
Catholic.”111 Only a few religious monuments were left intact, albeit without religious 
services. 
As the religious prohibition coincided with state promotion of archaeological 
theories of the continuous presence of Albanians in the Balkans, the historical 
character of George Kastrioti Skanderbeg (Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu, 1405-1468) 
was prominently displayed as the embodiment of national feelings. The celebration of 
Skanderbeg ran parallel with the newly introduced Albanian policies of severe self-
isolation, which relied on a strong message: “We stayed once alone in this part of the 
world to face our enemies and we will stay alone to do the same again!” Additionally, 
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Skanderbeg was a national hero who embodied both the Christian and Islamic 
traditions of the Albanian past. Even though religion was officially forbidden, 
Skanderbeg’s unquestionably Albanian ethnic background directly influenced the 
collective subconsciousness, as he was one of the last Balkan knights who stood 
against the Ottoman conquest. Juxtaposing the national myth of the continuous 
presence of Albanians in the Balkans with the solitude of Skanderbeg’s noble 
resistance, Hohxa attempted to impose another figure solely responsible for Albania’s 
survival – himself. Building his own personality cult, Hohxa represented himself as a 
natural successor of Skanderbeg, prepared to lead his people to another noble fight for 
national independence.  
 
Fig. 3.9 – Monument to Skanderbeg in Tirana, work of Odishe Paskali (1903-1985), first Albanian 
sculptor and the founder of the School of Painting in Tirana. The majority of monumental sculptures in 
other Albanian towns and cities were his work.  
  
Skanderbeg’s name is most frequently linked to the town of Kruje, established 
in 1190 as the centre of the principality headed by archon Progon.112 Whilst modern 
Albanian historians are adamant that Progon was an ethnic Albanian, there is nothing 
to suggest whether either Progon or any of the few nobles with seemingly Albanian 
names linked to the period of the 4th Crusade, actually were, since they all bore Greek 
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names. They were certainly related to Byzantium, but there are no records of their 
family ancestry, loyalties or allegiances.113 In the course of the following three 
centuries, the Kruje town walls were added and expanded, only to become the site of 
the famous 1450 siege in which Sultan Murad II was defeated by Skanderbeg. 
Throughout the 15th century, the city was captured and lost to the Ottomans four 
times, only to be taken over completely in 1478. Little of the original structure 
survived intact and was additionally destroyed by the earthquake in 1617 and 
subsequent warfare (Fig. 3.10). However, in 1982 it was restored to the point of 
“disneyfication,” featuring prominently the newly inaugurated Skanderbeg Museum 
(Fig. 3.11). The display within the museum is “a triumph of political museology, 
showing in concrete form the accepted story of Albania’s mediaeval genesis.”114 
   
Fig. 3.10 – The remaining original         Fig. 3.11 – The Skanderbeg Museum at Kruje erected in the 
watchtower at Kruje.                              1990s. 
3.6.3 Five centuries of the “Ottoman interlude” 
The Ottoman period brought a swift conversion to Islam and much of the 
previous Christian heritage was quickly transformed for the needs of the new religion. 
As the Ottoman state supported neither social nor cultural development of its 
Christian subjects, the only way for an individual to advance his prospects was to 
adopt entirely the Ottoman way of life. Thus, the entire pre-Ottoman Albania 
underwent significant change and amongst the pockets of the remaining Christian 
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population only a few, now abandoned, ruined Byzantine churches survived. Some 
coastal and mainland towns took on Oriental features, but the urban architectural 
achievements bear no signs of authentic Albanian national style.   
In the course of the five centuries, Albania was one of many Ottoman provinces, 
ruled by the numerous Ottoman officials. Frequently, these Ottoman bureaucrats were 
natives of Albania, but when nationalism did not manifest itself as it did in the 19th 
and 20th centuries, it is unclear how much they contributed to the creation and 
development of the Albanian sense of national identity. It is often claimed that the 
unique clan-system was the bearer of the Albanian national identity under the 
Ottomans. Similar to Montenegro, the tribal structure of society persisted until well 
into the 20th century.115 The tribal loyalties, reinforced by the patriarchal oral 
Dukagjini Code, up to a certain point petrified the mediaeval highland mentality and 
prevented any social restructuring and educational development.  
It is not fully clear whether tribal loyalties enabled the development of 
Bektashism, a less strict form of Islam, or whether it was a natural evolution of the 
faith caused by the geo-climatic conditions of the region. Whatever the case, for the 
19th and early 20th century foreign authors, educated in the classical manner, the in 
situ observations gained an aura of a romantic antiquity.  
After Skanderbeg, Albanian history records several notable characters, most of 
whom lived between the 18th and 20th centuries and were subject to the historical 
circumstances in the period of Ottoman decline. The dynamic personality of Ali Pasha 
of Yanina (1740-1822), romanticized and immortalised by the writings of Lord Byron 
and Alexandre Dumas, was an important figure for both Greek and Albanian national 
histories of the early modern era (Fig. 3.12). However, his rise through the Ottoman 
ranks and service to the Porte did not contribute to the Albanian national awakening. 
Rather, his demise in 1822 accelerated the beginning of the Greek War of 
Independence.   
Throughout the 19th century, there were no nationally enlightened personalities 
that could unify various tribes behind the attempts to exert any Albanian national or 
territorial claims. In reality, most were pursuing personal aims to acquire more land 
and power. Moreover, their Muslim faith kept them tied to the Ottomans and there 
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were no thoughts of creating a separate Albanian nation state.116 Additionally, 
difficult mountainous terrain prevented autochthonous cultural development in the 
critical period of national awakening. Naturally, the Muslim Albanians sided with the 
Ottoman policies, whilst the Christian subjects tried to re-assert their religious rights.  
  
Fig. 3.12 – Monument to Ali Pasha in Tepelenë by Mumtaz Dhrami (b. 1936) was erected in 1972 on 
150th anniversary of Ali Pasha’s death. 
3.7 Albanian national awakening  
The turmoil surrounding the Eastern Question resulted in the foundation of the 
Prizren League in 1878, in the town of Prizren in the Ottoman Kosovo Vilayet. Most 
of the 300 delegates attending the meeting of the 18 June 1878 were primarily 
conservative Muslim landowners from the Kosovo Vilayet, whose main interest was 
to maintain strong Ottoman control of Kosovo against increasingly hostile Balkan 
neighbours. The League, admittedly, included a few intellectuals, such was Abdyl 
Frashëri (1839-1892), a Bektashi Muslim who, inspired by European ideas of 
nationalism, was interested in unifying the Albanian people within the framework f 
the Ottoman Empire. The Prizren League proceedings did not initiate calls for 
national awakening, did not consider any educational and social reforms needed for 
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the Albanians and did not issue any national programme. Instead, it focused on a 
military organization, ready to fight for the Sultan and prevent the penetration of 
foreign troops into the province.117 The Porte initially supported the League because it 
wanted to install pan-Islamic ideology as a counterbalance to Christian and Slavic 
influences, coming from Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.   
The Albanian national narrative considers the Prizren League to be the 
beginning of the Albanian national movement because of the presence of Abdyl, the 
oldest of the Frashëri brothers (Fig. 3.13). The Frashëris, Abdyl, Naim and Sami, 
originating in the south of Albania, spent most of their lives in Constantinople and 
other larger Ottoman cities, trying to obtain support for the Albanian national cause. 
They saw Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek national movements as a threat and perceived 
that only the protection of the Ottoman Muslim state could help Albanian national 
assertion. However, as the Ottoman Empire weakened and the Porte withdrew its 
support, the League embraced ideas of national autonomy.   
 
Fig. 3.13 – Abdyl Frashëri (1839-1892) envisaged Albanian national unity within the Ottoman Empire. 
During the Congress of Berlin, Abdyl Frashëri sent a letter to the European 
participants pleading for the Albanian question to be resolved. His efforts were 
ignored. Overlooked by Europe, the Albanian intellectuals became disappointed, 
whilst the League itself became increasingly anti-Christian, causing considerable 
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anxiety among Christian Albanians and especially among the Serbs.118 However, as 
the tensions grew between the Great Powers prior to the First World War, the 
Albanian national movement conveniently became yet another tool in the hands of the 
competing European empires. Russia, Austro-Hungary, Great Britain and France had 
enormous vested interests in the declining Ottoman Empire and played the emerging 
Balkan nation-states against each other well.119 Kosovo and Metohija became the 
centre of discontent after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austro-
Hungary in 1908. Curbing the Serbian nationalism in the territories under Austro-
Hungarian direct control and obtaining the full control of the foreign policy of the 
Serbian Principality, Vienna began a programme of dividing the Southern Slavs and 
preparing the slow penetration into the bordering Ottoman provinces of Sanjak and 
Kosovo and Metohija.  
The extensive diplomatic and propagandistic activities of all Great Powers and 
the Balkan states emerging from the Ottoman decline contributed to the contradictory 
reports written in this period. Trying to maintain some balance in the region, 
European observers in the region, especially after the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 
took the positions of their own governments and produced reports that still resonate in 
the current fragile state of balance in the Balkans.120 For example, following the 
Treaty of London and on the eve of Albanian independence in May 1913, Wadham 
Peacock, Consul-General in North Albania in Scutari,121 wrote for The Fortnightly 
Review:  
“Happily the Serbian attempt to ignore the Albanians and to represent Scodra, 
Durazzo, and the plains near them as Slav because the Serbian Czars held them at 
intervals from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries, has failed, chiefly, it must be 
admitted, owing to the assertion by Austria-Hungary of her own interests, and not to 
any love for historical justice on the part of Europe. Except that they have not one 
chieftain over all the tribes, and have had a much wider extent of territory to defend 
against more numerous enemies, the case of the Shkypetars is exactly parallel to that 
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of the Montenegrins. The Montenegrins held their own for five hundred years in a 
little block of mountains against the Turks only; the Shkypetars have held their own 
for considerably over a thousand years against successive waves of Slavs, Bulgars, 
and Turks….They are the last remnants of the oldest race in Europe, for they 
represent peoples who preceded the Greeks. They were deep-rooted in the soil of the 
Balkan peninsula ages before the first Slav crossed the Danube, and if the Serb and 
the Bulgar have acquired a right to the lands from which they drove the ancient 
tribes, at least those original inhabitants have justified their claim to the rocks and 
shore, from which no enemy, Slav, Bulgar, or Turk has been able to dislodge 
them.”122 
A little earlier in his writing, Peacock argued that the hatred between the 
Albanians and the Serbs dates from the time when the Slavs settled in the Balkans 
and that “this explains why the modern Albanian has always been friendlier with the 
Moslem Turk than with the Christian Slav. The brutalities committed by the Turks 
were trifles compared with the atrocities of the Slav.”123 
Peacock’s writings represented the typical arrogance of the superior civilised 
Westerner of the time, as they perceived “all South Slavs as inferior and semi-
barbarous” and persisted in their opinion that they “were a stumbling block for any 
solution of the problem of Turkey and her European provinces.”124 Bearing in mind 
the efforts of the British Government to maintain the existence of the “Sick Man of 
Europe” over the Balkans as long as possible, Peacock’s reports corresponded well  
with this doctrine. Simultaneously, it benefitted diplomatically the policy of 
appeasement to Austro-Hungary’s anger over the Serbian and Greek success in the 
Balkan Wars. 
3.8 The Albanian state 
The London Conference of 1913 and the establishment of an independent 
Albania on 28 November brought into existence for the first time an Albanian nation 
state. This outcome was convincingly argued by Austro-Hungary and Italy which 
both had their political reasons for supporting the Albanian cause. The adopted state-
flag was designed to resemble that of Skanderbeg: a black double-headed eagle on a 
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red background (Fig. 3.14). However, most of the surviving representations of the 
Skanderbeg’s coat-of-arms dating from before 1913 depict a white double headed 
eagle, which was traditionally the imperial insignia of the Byzantine Emperors. As 
most of the Balkan princes on the eve of the Ottoman conquest regarded themselves 
as the legitimate heirs to the Byzantine throne, Skanderbeg was no exception; after 
all, in his own lifetime Constantinople was conquered and there were not many 
generals around able to undertake the defence of Christendom. Thus, his acquisition 
of the Byzantine eagle as his own emblem was both natural and understandable. Five 
centuries later, the eagle of Skanderbeg changed its colour from white into black. 
This was not accidental. Albania was formed under the patronage of another Empire 
which bore the mark of a black double-headed eagle, so the imposed heraldic solution 
of that state indicated her political intentions.  
 
Fig. 3.14 – The first Albanian flag, designed and used in 1912-1914. With various modifications, it 
remained in use until the present. 
3.8.1 The Albanian nation-building 
Ismail Qemali Bey (Fig. 1.a.18) advised the provisional Albanian 
government to choose Elbasan as the new capital due to its central geographical 
position and its central position among the Albanian dialects. His proposal was 
refused as the provisional government was not recognised by the Great Powers and 
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Shkodër was chosen instead.125 However, even Shkodër did not remain the capital for 
long. As was the case when Greece, Bulgaria and Romania gained independence, the 
designated ruler Wilhelm of Wied (1876-1945, ruled March-September 1914) was 
German but fled his throne within six months after a series of local revolts. Wilhelm 
had preferred Durrës as his capital, but after the outbreak of the First World War, 
most of the remaining Albanian leaders withdrew to Tirana because of its distance 
from the fighting and foreign armies. That is when Tirana acquired the status of 
capital. 126 
Founded in the 17th century along the Ottoman caravan routes, Tirana was until 
the early 19th century a small provincial town. It bore all the traditional Ottoman 
characteristics which included the main mosque in the city centre, erected in 1614 by 
Sulejman Pasha, as well as a hammam and a bazaar. The houses were in traditional 
oriental style, with wooden structures and tiled roofs.127 In the 1820s, the great-
grandson of Sulejman Pasha, Haxhi Ethem Bey, finished the reconstruction of the 
mosque (Fig. 3.15). Still existing, Et’hem Bey mosque is one of the very few 
structures in use in Albania built earlier than the 20th century. However, when British 
illustrator Edward Lear (1812-1888) visited Tirana in 1850, he drew the centre of 
town (Fig. 3.16) and the comment on its sad appearance:  
“I entered the town (whose streets, broader than those of Elbassan, were only 
raftered and matted half way across), it was at once easy to perceive that Tyrana was 
as wretched and disgusting as its fellow city, save only that it excelled in religious 
architecture and spacious market places.”128 
When Albania became an internationally recognized state, a tribal warfare 
erupted and lasted until the end of the First World War, preventing the modernization. 
Frequent changes of governments and constant violence did little for the development 
of national culture. Thus, little had changed in the appearance of Tirana between the 
time of Lear’s visit and 1917, when an occupying Austro-Hungarian army engaged a 
team of surveyors to produce the first plan of the city. Nothing more on the town’s 
urban and architectural features was done until 1923 when a need arose to modernize 
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the city. When Ahmet Zogu (Fig. 1.a.19), a member of the powerful Muslim Mat 
clan, won power in 1925, a programme of modernization could begin.  
  
Fig. 3.15 – Et’hem Bey Mosque, built in 1614, reconstructed 1789-1823, one of the few pre-20th 
century structures in Tirana. 
 
Fig. 3.16 – Edward Lear’s drawing of Tirana city centre and Et’ham Bey’s Mosque in 1850. 
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Despite some modest developments since 1920, “the new capital was actually 
little more than an enlarged Moslem village... ...and consisted primarily of a bazaar 
used for hanging offenders of the peace, four mosques, several barracks and a 
number of legations. Tirana gave the appearance of a gold rush town in the late 19th 
century American West, with its saloons, gambling casinos and ever present guns and 
gun-belts. A rickety Ford progressing slowly along the muddy unpaved unlit streets 
was the only sign of the twentieth century. The buildings of the town were rather 
unostentatious. Most of them consisted of old shanties interspersed with an occasional 
small villa, belonging to some Moslem worthy, many of which were in such a state of 
disrepair as to give the visitor the impression that the whole town had been recently 
under shell-fire. Two such unassuming buildings, dating back to Turkish times, 
became the presidential office building and Zogu's residence.”129 
Because Albania suffered endemic illiteracy and lacked trained architects and 
artists, King Zogu invited a number of Italian architects to work on the transformation 
of Tirana into a proper European capital. The choice of Italian professionals was not 
accidental. According to the Treaty of London of 1915, Italy was granted rights to 
conduct the foreign affairs of Albania.130 The Italians quickly took over the entire 
economy and internal affairs and effectively turned Albania into a colony. 
The main projects that Zogu’s government undertook under Italian patronage 
were related to the construction of infrastructure and improvements of the road 
network, primarily in urban areas. Italian plans for urban centres included changing 
the oriental features of towns. Florestano de Fausto (1890-1965) and Armando Brasini 
(1879-1965), prominent architects of the Mussolini era (Fig. 3.17 and Fig. 3.18), were 
charged with the task of creating a new Tirana, envisaging monumental governmental 
buildings in the Italian colonial style and with Neo-Classical influences.131  Several 
plans were developed, but only Brasini’s idea of the Skënderbej Square was partly 
executed (Fig. 3.19). The planned equestrian monument of Skanderbeg was not 
erected until 1968, but by then, the first generation of Albanian architects was ready 
to undertake the nation-building programme. 
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Fig. 3.17 – Florestano di Fausto (1890-1965)                       Fig. 3.18 – Armando Brasini (1879-1965) 
 
Fig. 3.19  – The archival aerial view of the first nucleus of Tirana with the mosque of Sulejman Pashë 
Bargjini at lower left. The Skanderbeg Square in the lower centre, after Bleta, 2010, 30. 
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3.8.2 Zogu’s dictatorship (1928-1939) 
Supported by the Italians, Zogu proclaimed himself king in 1928. To 
strengthen the economy and legitimise his prestige among the rival clan leaders, he 
sought support from Italy to begin the urbanization of major towns and building royal 
palaces and residences around the country. Mussolini’s bureaucracy that ran Albania 
was already engaged in a project for creating a “New Roman Empire” and the 
significant sums that Fascists spent on erecting royal palaces for Zogu, aimed to 
secure his loyalty.132 Despite publicly proclaiming that priorities were to build the 
infrastructure, much needed by the growing population of Tirana, Zogu pursued 
building large governmental buildings and even planned to erect a royal palace on the 
outskirts of Tirana.133  
In 1929, Zogu inaugurated works on the first boulevard in Tirana, conveniently 
named Zogu I. At the same time, the works on the construction of the first royal 
palace began. The palace, designed by the Italian architects, was not completed until 
the end of the Second World War and Zogu never lived in it.  During Zogu’s reign, 
the most important public buildings in Tirana were built by Italian architects: the 
National Bank Headquarters (Fig. 3.20) in the manner of provincial Modernism, and 
the Circolo Italo-Albanese Scanderbeg (Fig. 3.21), a centre for culture. Inaugurated in 
1938, the National Bank building, located on the western side of Skenderbej Square, 
was designed by Vittorio Ballio Morpurgo (1890-1966). Morpurgo, an exponent of 
the Roman school of architecture, was infamous for designing the initial protective 
building around the Augustus’ mausoleum of Ara Pacis (now demolished) and 
Palazzo della Farnesina in Rome on Mussolini’s orders. In Albania he designed the 
ranches of the National Bank in other cities, like Durrës, Korçe and Vlore.134 
Clearly, none of the institutional buildings in Albania erected in the interwar 
period were constructed to celebrate the Albanian nation. On the contrary, Italian 
economic and then military occupation supported Mussolini’s colonial policies, 
marked by the words which described Albania as quinta sponda (fifth shore).135 
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Fig. 3.20 – The National Bank in Tirana, designed by Vittorio Morpurgo in 1938, after Bleta, 2010, 52 
 
 
Fig. 3.21 – Perspective drawing of the building of Circolo Italo – Albanese Scanderbeg, the first 
building where prefabricated construction techniques were applied in a rationalist design by Pater –
Costruzioni edili speciali, 1938, after Bleta, 2010, 52. 
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3.8.3 Hoxha – the nation-builder 
The period of Italian occupation 1939-1943 envisaged giving Albania Italian 
colonial features in accordance with Mussolini’s policies of creating the “New 
Rome,” but little was done during the Second World War. However, after 1945 the 
Communist regime embarked on an enormous task of building both the country and 
the nation simultaneously. As economic and financial circumstances did not allow any 
grand scale public projects, the focus of nation building was on the Marxist 
refinement of the early continuation theories and their practical implementation. The 
Soviet style industrialization of the country centred on the creation of industry and 
expansion of social housing which symbolized nation-building suitable for the 
working class. However, the educational programmes that sought to achieve national 
homogenization required the story of a “founding father.” The natural choice for a 
founding father was, of course, Skanderbeg.  
The use of Skanderbeg’s extraordinary character was logical and reasonable, 
following the changing fortunes of the Albanian people in the late 19th and first half of 
the 20th century. His choice as a prime national hero was the best example of the 
politicization of a national myth: Skanderbeg was brought up a Muslim, but in order 
to regain his father’s possessions, he converted to the Catholic faith.136 The 
conversion of Skanderbeg’s religious beliefs was interpreted as a strong unifying 
factor for the Albanians wherever they live. The proclamation of Albania as “the first 
atheist state in the world” coincided with the 500th anniversary of Skanderbeg’s death. 
On this occasion, an equestrian figure of Skanderbeg was unveiled in Skanderbeg 
Square in Tirana. It was the work of the first Albanian sculptor educated in Italy, 
Odhise Paskali (1903-1985) and marked the beginning of erecting such monuments to 
the important personalities from the Albanian history.  
Since all religions were condemned from 1945 and officially banned in 1967, 
the interpretation of the dual character of Skanderbeg was to reiterate the unique 
position of the Albanians surrounded by hostile Greeks and South Slavs. In the same 
year when “Albanianism” was proclaimed “the only true religion of the Albanians,” 
Hoxha began the programme of construction of military bunkers all over the country 
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in order to protect Albania from possible invasion not only from neighbouring Greece 
and Yugoslavia, but also NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Some 700,000, popularly 
called “pillboxes” were built in the next twenty five years, costing the country money 
which could have been spent in more productive way (Fig. 3.22). 
 
Fig. 3.22 – Concrete bunkers of the Hohxa era (1967-1987). Popularly called “pillboxes,” their 
estimated number of nearly 750,000 – each one for four people – now represent a tourist attraction. 
The isolation and badly managed economy hindered the development of national 
style in architecture. When the first generation of Albanians educated to university 
level was finally ready to begin work on nation-building in the 1970s, their 
achievements contained no references to the earlier historical epochs, in accordance 
with Hoxha’s interpretation of Communism. Thus, when the building of the National 
Historical Museum of Albania (Muzeu Historik Kombëtar), designed by the leading 
architect of the Hoxha era, Enver Faja (1934-2011), was finally inaugurated in 1981, 
its design followed the prescribed aesthetics of social realism (Fig. 3.23). The gigantic 
mosaic above the main entrance (Fig. 3.24) clearly refers to the guiding ideology of 
the national partisan struggle in the Second World War which enabled the prosperity 
of the communist Albania.  
Hoxha died in 1985. Soon after, the situation in Europe and in the Balkans 
began to change rapidly. Albania, still under heavy oppression by Hoxha’s successors 
did not begin to relax its regime until 1991. By then, the war in Yugoslavia had 
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already commenced putting into focus Albanian interests in the Albanian minority in 
Yugoslavia, primarily inhabiting the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and 
Metohija and western Macedonia. As the international political situation changed, the 
time for the assertion of Albanian national claims had come. 
   
Fig. 3.23 – National Museum, built in Tirana in 1976-1981, after the design of Enver Faja (1934-2011), 
leading Albanian architect of the Hohxa period.                                                                
 
Fig. 3.24 – The mosaic above entrance depicts Albanian national costumes in the Soc-Realist manner. 
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3.9 The (inter)national assertion of the Albanian national narrative 
The first multi-party elections in Albania were held 1992, resulting in the 
change of the regime and violent disturbances that lasted until 1997. After the anarchy 
ended, all efforts of Albanian politicians and scholars alike have been focused on 
securing the Western political and military support. The international response was 
positive and followed by the increased interest in the Albanian Studies. Aware that 
basing arguments on highly polemical evidence, often openly disputed, particularly by 
neighbouring Serbian and Greek scholars, Albanian scientific research objectives 
were directed to a full re-assertion of the Albanian nation in the European family of 
nations. This effort received political support from the West, which sought to protect 
its own interests in the region.  
The greatest number of published works on Albanian history and archaeology 
concerning the Albanian autochtonous presence in the Balkans was published exactly 
in the years after 1992 and involved a number of authors writing on the subject in 
both Albanian and other major languages. Unfortunately, historiography concerning 
the Balkans at the end of the 20th century did not advance much beyond political 
propaganda. As was the case at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, 
when western scholars praised Balkan Christian struggles against the Ottoman 
Empire, modern western academia is fully employed in promoting the pan-Albanian 
struggle against the “hostile” Slav regimes in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. As 
Greece traditionally represented European values on the peninsula, the Greek 
argument always commanded strong support from the West. However, with the 
apparent change within the EU in recent years, it appears that the Greek argument is 
slowly losing its influence. This is most evident in the academic analysis of the 
problem of the expelled Albanian Chams from Greece after the Second World War.137 
So far, it has been completely neglected in academic literature. With the increased 
European involvement in the Balkans, there is a slow shift towards this issue.  
This contemporary change of attitude in the Western academic circles had as a 
direct consequence not only a full acceptance of the Albanian national narrative 
developed in the 20th century, but also its refinements, including a full reinterpretation 
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of the political and historical events of the 19th and 20th centuries when Albanian 
nationalism began. The support that the Albanian Muslim population in Kosovo and 
Metohija received in the 1990s against the Serbian Christians is to be viewed in the 
light of the wars that are currently fought far away from the Balkans. Following the 
outcomes of the “War on Terror” and growing anti-Islamic feelings in Europe and the 
US, the Western governments sought to present their overwhelming support for the 
Balkan Muslims as moral defence of democratic values irrespective of religious 
adherence.138 The political rhetoric resulted in the creation of several new theories 
explaining the special character of the Balkan Muslims. Both the Albanians and the 
Bosnian Muslims have been presented as holding deeply rooted Christian values 
below their Islamic features. 
3.9.1 Balkan Muslims – true bearers of original Christian values 
During the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the American and 
European involvement was followed by a strong propaganda which had since become 
an official narrative in the senior academic instituttions of these countries. Preceding 
the unilaterally proclaimed independence of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo 
and Metohija in 2008, the objective of the Anglo-Saxon and German academic efforts 
began with the works of journalists turned historians. Preparing the involvement in the 
Yugoslav cauldron, Noel Malcolm (b.1956), a British historian working for The 
Spectator and the Daily Telegraph at a time, was charged with the task of revising the 
history of the region. In 1994 he published a book Bosnia, A Short History which set 
the course for the future revisionism of Balkan history. In 1998, a year before the 
open war between NATO and the remainder of Yugoslavia escalated, Malcolm (Fig. 
5.23) published a second book Kosovo, A Short History, in which he formulated the 
basic postulate according to which the “pagan mediaeval Serbs” only occupied 
Kosovo in the late 12th century.139 Using the research methods that neglected the 
majority of the primary sources and the scholarship from the period of Austro-
Hungarian expansion through the Balkans in the later 19th century, Malcolm created 
the narrative since followed by the Albanian scholars in both Albania and Kosovo and 
Metohija. Because the majority of the bureaucrats responsible for the implementation 
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scholarship of former Yugoslavia is further discussed in Chapter V – The Muslims of Bosnia and 
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of the Western policies within the post-war Balkan institutions are obliged to adhere 
to the revisionism of the 1990s, those sent to work in the post-conflict areas of former 
Yugoslavia actively propagate the refinements of these newly invented narratives.  
The most telling argument about the deeply rooted Christian values amongst the 
Albanians, was forced by the academics close to the political leadership of those 
Western countries backing the Albanian cause. Unsurprisingly, the notion of Christian 
values among predominantly Muslim Albanians came not from scholars of Albanian 
background, but from the West. The term “Crypto-Catholicism,” invented by an 
American scholar Anna Di Lellio (Fig. 3.25) plainly argued that the Albanians are 
actually “Crypto-Catholics, who only feign to be Muslim.”140 As such, it resonated 
well with contemporary western supporters of the Albanian national claims. The term 
“Crypto-Catholic” itself served to obfuscate the lack of logic behind Western support 
for the growing Islamic fundamentalism among the Balkan Muslims. Consequently, 
Skanderbeg’s historical conversion from Islam to Catholicism was conveniently used 
as an example of Crypto-Catholic national feelings among the Albanians since the 
Ottoman conquest. In defending the decision for the proclamation of Kosovo’s 
independence, Anna Di Lellio in 2008 wrote: 
“In the 1990s, when Kosovo started to aspire to independence, there was an 
open discussion on converting en masse to Catholicism, the faith of ancestors, in 
order to correct the error of mass conversion to Islam. The plan for a mass 
conversion to Catholicism was shelved till the spring of 2008, when the public 
adhesions to the Church by an extended family revived the debate about the Christian 
origin and identity of the Albanian nation.”141 
No such arguments ever came from the Albanian scholars, particularly not from 
inside Albania, whose Catholic population is situated mainly in the North, around the 
town of Shkodër and in coastal areas. The Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija, 
predominantly Muslim, had to have this claim re-interpreted in the light of the 
existing material heritage. As the debate on Dardanian-Illyrian original inhabitants of 
Kosovo and Metohija was far too controversial and difficult for explanation to the 
general public because of lack of material evidence, the territorial extension of the 
Albanian ethnic core in the lands which bear no Albanian heritage had to be justified 
through the creation of a new myth: that of the Serbian “illegal occupation of 
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Kosovo” in the past century. Serbian Christian monuments dating from the Middle 
Ages in Kosovo and Metohija were simply declared to be of Albanian Catholic 
origins, overtaken by the Serbs during the Middle Ages. The discrepancy related to 
their peculiar characteristics of Serbian mediaeval Orthodoxy were simply renamed as 
“Paleologian Penaissance” (Fig. 3.26 and Fig. 3.27).142 
  
Fig. 3.25 – Anna Di Lellio, a US Sociologist, formulated in 2009 a new Kosovo Battle myth which 
negates the participation of the Serbs in the battle and negates most of the historical and folklore 
sources.  
 
Fig. 3.26 – Monastery of Dečani, built 1327-1335 by Vito of Kotor for King Stefan III Nemanjić, as his 
mausoleum. It is one of the last examples of the Raška School of Architecture, which contains visible 
Romanesque influences.                    
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Fig. 3.27 – The Charter of the Monastery of Dečani, issued by King Stefan Uroš III in 1330, now in the 
National Library of Serbia in Belgrade.    
Malcolm’s theory of the Serbian occupation of Kosovo and Metohija served the 
purpose of justifying the Western interventionism in the 1990s. Merged with Di 
Lellio’s invention of the Albanian Kosovo Battle myth,143 it was designed to solve 
both the problem of the Albanian territorial expansionism and the perceived threat of 
Islam in Europe. The Albanian scholars wholeheartedly accepted this help for their 
own national purposes, particularly as there is no surviving material heritage that 
would corroborate any of the claims, emanating from the prestigious international 
academic institutions.144 After Malcolm’s initial assertion in 1998, the Albanian 
scholars argued that the existing Serbian Christian heritage in Kosovo and Metohija 
was actually acquired by the Serbs only in the 12th century.145  
As the surviving founding charters of the churches and monasteries in Kosovo 
and Metohija are either in the Belgrade archives or inscribed in stone in the buildings 
themselves, this remark is usually countered by the assertion that back in the 12th-14th 
centuries Serbian rulers of Kosovo and Metohija simply produced the forged 
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documents.146 As this claim is again impossible to prove, the evidence is sought in the 
surviving characteristic architectural features of the monuments.    
3.9.2 The Crypto-Catholic theory – The Western justification for the creation 
of a second Albanian state  
Amidst growing disquiet over the question of Islam and its place in Europe, 
the Western supporters of the Albanian national cause are currently establishing a 
second myth: that Christian values amongst Albanians had never been lost, despite 
five centuries of Ottoman rule. The presentation of the Crypto-Catholic theory, first 
asserted by Di Lellio, derives again from the Western authors: 
“The identification of the Albanians with the Christian world….is not surprising, 
although the majority of Albanians are identified as Muslims, particularly in Kosovo. 
At different times in the modern history of the Albanians, anxiety about historical 
discontinuity and perceived backwardness has been expressed through a Manichean 
vision of the Islamic East (bad) and Christian West (good)...”147 and “Albanians are 
one of the oldest European Christian nations and they can bracket 500 years of their 
Ottoman past as a temporary interlude.”148  
The “temporary interlude” is relatively frequent in the Albanian historical 
timeline. Just as the Continuation theory sought to bridge several centuries between 
the Illyrian kingdoms and the Albanian mediaeval lordships using the scientific 
descriptors of linguistics, ethnology, anthropology and those few written documents 
that refer to the Albanian lands since their entry into written history in the mid-11th 
century, the Crypto-Catholic theory attempts to connect the newly devised narrative 
about Albanian Christian identity to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.149 Because 
there are neither surviving material evidence that the Albanians inhabited Kosovo and 
Metohija in great numbers prior to the 18th century nor the Ottoman defters 
confirming this, and especially, as there are no recorded folk traditions in the forms of 
epic, legends and fairytales, the Albanian scholars and their Western supporters are 
forcibly converting the Serbian myths and legends linked to the territory. Generally, 
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their new narrative is firmly based on the principles laid down by the Austro-
Hungarian writings of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which continued to serve 
as sufficient reference to the historical accuracy. 
As mentioned earlier, the Centre for Albanian Studies in London is currently 
undertaking a costly enterprise in re-printing comments of travellers and visitors to 
the Balkans of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The original comments of these 19th 
century travellers, usually taken out of context, is frequently followed by the flyleaf 
assertions of the “megalomaniac neighbours” and their “appetite for Albanian 
lands.”150 The 19th century European calls of the travellers and diplomats151 to “help 
and liberate” the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, were redeployed as 
today’s “cry for human rights” by the international community and as such supported 
by a number of books, written and published by politically engaged intellectuals and 
journalists.152 Majority of these modern authors used as their sources the Austro-
Hungarian and German official documents produced for the European political 
climate on the eve of the First World War which sought to justify intervention against 
Serbia, by pointing to Serbian atrocities against the Albanian and Turkish Muslim 
population in the Balkan Wars.153  
Unfortunately, the sheer number of authors who wrote and still write 
explanatory articles of the situation in the Balkans create additional confusion for the 
public of their own linguistic backgrounds and instead of helping better 
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understanding, directly contribute to some future conflicts that may arise as a result of 
the unbalanced political approach. An unhidden example of particularism, expressed 
by the historian James Pettifer (b.1949), openly endorsed the creation of a larger 
Albanian state, the one that would include Albania, Kosovo and Metohija and western 
parts of Macedonia:  
“Since the onset of the ground war in Kosovo in 1998, the national question has 
become increasingly important in pan-Albanian politics. It continues to remain 
central to the future stability of the southern Balkans…The roots of the new national 
question lie in this period. The Kosovo war posed the issue for the international 
community in a concrete form, something that was repeated in 2001 with the conflict 
in Macedonia. This opened the historic ‘Macedonian Question’ in a new context, with 
the Albanian minority actively participating in addition to traditional Greek – 
Bulgarian dichotomy. Some regional spectators, principally Serbia and its allies, 
have claimed that these developments indicate the emergence of a so-called ‘Greater 
Albania’ as a threat to peace in the region. It is our argument that this is not the 
case…”154 
Arguing the case for the unification Albanian ethnic territories, Pettifer insisted 
that “Serbian destruction” of the “ancient monuments, mosques and houses in order 
to commit the culturcide of the Albanian ethnicity” had to be “rightfully punished by 
the International Community”. He continued that “churches and mosques have 
continued to be rebuilt and have growing observant congregations, but to date 
religion has been a moderate and sensible aspect…”155 
For those not familiar with the situation, it might be a well placed argument in 
the aftermath of the media’s coverage of the Kosovo conflict. However, this argument 
is false. As a result of the conflict, Kosovo and Metohija were entirely ethnically 
cleansed of its Serbian Christian population. Furthermore, a number of churches and 
monasteries that remained as a reminder that this was once a predominantly Christian 
territory, are of the confirmed Serbian ecclesiastical architecture of the High Middle 
Ages.156 Following the end of the NATO aggression in June 1999, when Kosovo and 
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Metohija were put under the Protectorate of the UNMIK,157 the Serbian Heritage 
came under questionable foreign military protection, as there was a reasonable fear 
that Serbian Christian Orthodox landmarks would be further targeted by the Albanian 
Muslim extremists (Fig. 1.64).158 Most of the Christian heritage became inaccessible 
to the local population, let alone scholars, conservationists and tourists, and following 
the exodus of the majority of the remaining Serbs, most of them fell into disuse or are 
attended by small numbers of the Serbian Orthodox priesthood. Visits to those sites 
are possible only with a military escort.  
3.10 Finalization of Albanian nation-building 
As re-shaping of the Balkans took place once again as a result of the re-
arrangement of international policies, a need arose for a new historical explanation 
resulting from the changing borders. Unlike scholars from the state of Albania, the 
Albanians from Yugoslavia held Yugoslav passports and could travel freely until 
1992. They enjoyed the full advantage of educational exchange and could maintain 
learning programmes in the Albanian language until the wars of Yugoslav succession 
began in 1991. High level of autonomy that Kosovo and Metohija had within 
Yugoslavia created conditions advantageous demanding an independence. The 
development of Albanian national narrative under Hohxa attracted Yugoslav Albanian 
scholars whose territorial claims were met by a fierce opposition of the Serbian and 
Greek academic circles. As Yugoslav disintegration in the 1990s was followed by the 
exclusion of Serbian academics from the majority of international institutions,159 
lobbying for the re-writing of national history by Albanian scholars and their western 
supporters is reaching its mature phase and is very much a contemporary process.160  
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On 17 March 2004, in a massive uprising, the Albanian Muslim extremists 
targeted and completely destroyed 35 mediaeval churches and monasteries. During 
the summer of the same year, UNESCO included four of the Kosovo monuments in 
its list of World Heritage Sites, under the criteria (ii), (iii) and (iv).161 The Dečani 
Monastery (Fig. 3.26), built in the mid-14th century for the Serbian king Stefan 
Dečanski as his mausoleum, the Patriarchate of Peć Monastery (Fig. 3.28), a group of 
four domed churches featuring a series of wall paintings, the 13th-century frescoes of 
the Church of Holy Apostles painted in a unique, monumental style and early 14th-
century frescoes in the church of the Holy Virgin of Ljeviška are all listed under the 
summary name of “Mediaeval Monuments in Kosovo”, in the Serbian section.162 In 
July 2006 all four of the monuments were transferred into the List in Danger 
following concerns for their survival due to the frequent targeting by the Albanian 
Muslim extremists.  
 
Fig. 3.28 – The Patriarcate of Peć, Monastery church, erected in 1346 in the Raška Style of architecture. 
Unlike the rest of the World Heritage Sites in Serbia, these monuments were not 
described as Serbian architectural heritage. There are no indications of their origins, 
except that they belong to the Byzantine-Romanesque tradition, as described by the 
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newly coined vague architectural term of Paleologian Renaissance style. The term 
Paleologian Renaissance so far usually referred to the general cultural conditions in 
the period of restoration of the Byzantine Empire under the Paleologue dynasty 
(1261-1453) and never as a classification descriptor of the Byzantine architecture.163 
The term itself does not appear in the official documents of the Greek Ministry of 
Culture, a country which has the most right to claim authentic Byzantine cultural 
ancestry.164 Since Serbia was excluded from participation in UNESCO in the period 
1992-2003 (it was re-admitted into a full membership in 2006), there were no legal 
opportunities to defend Serbian cultural heritage through international professional 
and experts’ institutions. Thus, the terminology used to describe these monuments in 
an ethnically and religiously contested territory is deliberately vague and ambiguous, 
and as such part of the process of building a new Albanian national narrative and 
subsequently new Albanian borders. The last assertion can be confirmed by the 
comparison with the terminology used for the UNESCO World Heritage Sites within 
Serbia proper: dating from the same period and of the same architectural style, similar 
mediaeval monuments there are simply described as “Serbian” mediaeval 
ecclesiastical architecture.165  
Thus, the notion of Albanian Crypto-Catholic national feelings are evidently 
contradicted by the Serbian Orthodox features of the monuments.166 In order to 
overcome these discrepancies in the material evidence, the Albanian government of 
Kosovo and Metohija supported a major construction project in the capital, Priština, in 
the town district renamed Dardania.167 The project comprises the erection of the tallest 
Catholic cathedral in the Balkans, dedicated to Mother Teresa (Fig. 3.29), a Skopje-
born Albanian. The cathedral that was consecrated in September 2010 features the 
Neo-Romanesque architecture, particularly on the exterior, glaringly similar to the 
facades of the nearby Serbian mediaeval ecclesiastical monuments (Fig. 1.65). Such a 
large and expensive project undertaken by the Kosovo government represents a 
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political statement aiming to prove Kosovo’s multiculturalism to the world. However, 
the fact that less than 4% of the population of Kosovo and Metohija is Catholic, the 
building itself has only a function of giving Kosovo a European face.168 
  
Fig. 3.29 – Mother Teresa (1910-1997), a Skopje born Albanian Catholic missionary in India and the 
Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1979. Except for the new cathedral in Priština, the central airport in Tirana 
is named after her. 
Newly written school syllabuses of history of the semi-independent Kosovo 
state read that the majority of the Christian monuments in Kosovo and Metohija were 
originally built by the Albanians when they were still Christian and only later 
occupied by the invading Serbs.169 This assertion stems directly from the modern 
writings of Noel Malcolm, who was the first to state that the Serbs converted to 
Christianity as late as 12th century, “when they occupied Kosovo.”170 His writings 
influenced subsequent works of Albanian authors from Kosovo, but the problem 
arising for the support of this premise is that all of these works were published from 
the late 1990s until the present and did not produce convincing connection to the 
existing material heritage. 
Similarly, as there were no conservation and archaeological activities in either 
Kosovo or in western Macedonia in the past two decades, most of the research in the 
regions inhabited by the ethnic Albanians was executed in the period of stability of 
the Yugoslav state. Thus, all the archives on the excavations and preservation of 
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known heritage sites are in the museums and heritage institutions in Belgrade and 
Skopje, often authorised and signed by the archaeologists from the non-Albanian 
ethnic backgrounds. As the number of the professionals in these fields from the 
Albanian ethnic background was insignificant prior to the 1970s, there is greater 
attention now in training the new generations of students, particularly at foreign 
universities, who will be able to continue the construction of the national myth. 
Muzafer Korkuti, “the father of the Albanian archaeology and heritage studies” after 
receiving a corresponding membership of the Archaeological Institute of America in 
January 2010, proudly announced that: “45% of Albania's archaeologists are young, 
having completed their postgraduate degrees (mostly abroad) over the past 5 years or 
so…”171  
Only a year after the proclamation of independence of Kosovo and Metohija, the 
Albanian government in Priština dedicated a 6m tall bronze monument to the former 
American President Bill Clinton (1946, president 1993-2001) as a sign of gratitude for 
his support during the war of secession from Serbia in 1999. The work of a Tirana 
sculptor Izeir Mustafa, representing the former President holding a signed document 
which enabled the American troops to enter Kosovo and Metohija, was unveiled on 1 
November 2012 (Fig. 3.30).172 Together with the former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair (1953), Bill Clinton is now considered as one of the “saviours” of the Albanians.  
  
Fig. 3.30 – Monument of gratitude to the former American president Bill Clinton in Priština, unveiled 
on 1 November 2009. 
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In May 2012, the celebration of the centenary of the creation of an independent 
Albania began. Various appropriate programmes that continued nationwide 
throughout 2013 also included the erection of a monument in central Tirana dedicated 
to the centenary of Albanian independence (Fig. 3.31). The contemporary two-part 
open structure in the form of a broken cuboid, designed by two young German 
architects of Albanian origin, Visar Obrija and Kai Roman Kiklas, “combines 
symbolic cultural characteristics of the traditional architecture of an Albanian living 
and defense tower (kulla) with historical elements, such as the Albanian double-
headed eagle and an engraving of the Declaration of Independence.”173  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.31 – The monument of 100 Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of the Albanian 
State, unveiled in Tirana on 28 November 2012. 
Albania joined NATO in 2009 together with Croatia. By entering the Western 
sphere of influence which aims to incorporate the whole of the Balkans in the EU in 
the foreseeable future, it is to be expected that the Albanian, as well as Croatian, 
national narratives will receive further revision from the Western political and 
academic circles. Such an outcome would fit well within the Western framework of 
achieving rapprochement among former political adversaries.174 The traditional 
skepticism of scholars interested in serious academic inquiry will remain silenced by 
the geo-political requirements for the time being. However, such practice will 
inevitably bring more discord among the West Balkans states and prepare the ground 
for future potential conflicts. 
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 http://beautyofconcrete.wordpress.com/2013/02/23/100years-of-indipendence - Accessed on 
28/02/2013 
174
 See Introduction, p. 3-4. 
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The Macedonians 
 
The small landlocked country in the central Balkans, declared its independence from 
the SFRY on 8 September 1991 assuming the name Republic of Macedonia. 
Although it was spared large-scale military campaigns during the wars of Yugoslav 
succession, its existence was disputed in varying degrees from the very beginning by 
all its neighbours. Even the use of the name “Macedonia” ignites passionate polemics 
across the country’s borders, as it is considered to be a threat to the territorial 
integrity of Greece, or a suppressor of Albanian national and ethnic feelings by the 
Macedonian Slavic population. Similarly, Bulgarian and, to a lesser extent, Serbian 
denial of a separate Macedonian national identity undermines the country’s attempts 
to forge its own nation. The cultural aspects of nationalism in the modern 
Macedonian state are entirely the product of the 20th century, as they arose from the 
competing Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian nationalisms of the late 19th century. The 
appearance and growth of Macedonian nationalism in the first half of the 20th century 
coincided with the emergence of Albanian nationalism, but it lacked the compactness 
of the Albanian national mobilization. The reason for this should be sought in the 
uniqueness of the Albanian language which, in the Macedonian case, was non-
existent until 1945. As it will be discussed later, the post-Second World War period 
was long enough for consolidation of a separate orthography and codification of 
grammatical principles of the Macedonian language, but the larger and stronger 
Bulgarian and Serbian cultural traditions will continue to influence the academic 
polemics about the ethnic origins of the Macedonian Slavs. 
4.1 Territoriality of Macedonian nationalism 
The historic name of Macedonia exists much longer than the modern 
Macedonian state and the territory of historic Macedonia encompassed a much larger 
area than the country that exists today. The problem of territoriality is narrowly 
linked to three questions: 
1. Who are the contemporary Macedonians?  
 
2. What is the justification for the use of the name that has little in common with 
the ethnic background of contemporary Macedonians? and  
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3. How to reach a compromise to the mutual satisfaction of the Macedonian state 
and its neighbours? 
From the moment of the proclamation of the People’s Republic of Macedonia 
as an integral part of the Yugoslav Federation on 2 August 1944, a strong Greek 
objection to the use of the name “Macedonia” arose. However, as the official name 
for the northern Greek neighbour was Yugoslavia, these objections were less 
prominent than they are now, when Yugoslavia no longer exists. The creation of the 
southern Yugoslav federal unit at the end of the Second World War was a political 
move by the new Communist authorities in Yugoslavia which Greece interpreted as a 
threat to its territorial integrity. Tito’s support of the Greek Communist fighters 
during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) had certainly contributed to such feelings 
amongst the Greeks, but the real reason behind the proclamation of a new nation and 
the creation of a state for it within the Yugoslav Federation had little to do with the 
Greek territory: it was a move that aimed to settle internal Yugoslav disputes. Trying 
to curb Serb-Croat dichotomy, Tito, a half-Croat, half-Slovene himself, re-designed 
the ethnic structure of Yugoslavia in order to reduce the proportion of population 
defined as Serbs.1 In the immediate aftermath of war, two new nations, Macedonians 
and Montenegrins, were formed. Prior to that, the inhabitants of Montenegro were 
identifying themselves as Serbs, whilst the inhabitants of Macedonia were considered 
to be “the Serbs of Old Serbia,” referring to the core of the mediaeval Serbian state, 
which was re-incorporated into the Serbian Kingdom in 1913 (Map 4.1).  
In the first Yugoslav census conducted after the Second World War in 1948, the 
newly proclaimed nation numbered just under 800,000 people2. In comparison with 
4.6 million of Serbs from the same census3, it is clear that this move decreased the 
percentage of the Serbian population by nearly 17%. By reducing the Serbian 
influence in Yugoslavia, Tito could implement his policies hidden behind the 
“brotherhood and unity” slogan, facing less opposition from the previously most 
numerous constituent nation in the country. Probably unintentionally, the creation of 
the Macedonian nation under the communist regime that was intended to solve the 
                                               
1
 See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 51 and Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 99. 
2
 http://www.stat.gov.mk/PXWeb2007bazi/Database/Censuses/databasetree.asp - The official data 
from 2011 Census of the Republic of Macedonia – Accessed on 05/09/2011  
3
 http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/Zip/VJN3.pdf - The official Census data of the Republic of Serbia – 
Accessed on 05/09/2011 
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major nationalist movements within Yugoslavia, caused growth of an entirely new 
nationalism and spread beyond the frontier into Greece.  
 
Map 4.1 – The formation of the territory encompassing contemporary Republic of Macedonia. After 
the Second Balkan War and the division of Macedonia between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, the part 
that was given to Serbia in 1913 represented the basis for the creation of the modern Macedonian 
republic. 
The contemporary ethnic Slav Macedonians number around 1.3 million, 
according to the 2002 census, whilst the overall population of the country is just over 
2 million.4 The ethnic composition of the country, according to the same census, is: 
Macedonian (64.2%), Albanian (25.2%), Turkish (3.9%), Roma-Gypsy (2.7%), Serb 
(1.8%) and other (2.2%). It is interesting to note that the census list completely omits 
the Greek minority, whilst the Bulgarian minority counts at 0.1%.5 After proclaiming 
the independence and the subsequent growth of Albanian nationalism in the west of 
the country, strengthening the idea of national unity by the re-evaluation of narratives 
created during the Yugoslav state became the main objective of all Macedonian 
governments since independence. 
The first problem that faced the definition of the state-name and ethnic 
identification of its inhabitants was the relation between the historic land and the 
people who live on it. The name of Macedonia exists since at least the 8th century BC 
                                               
4
 http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/knigaXIII.pdf - Final results of 2002 Census in the Republic of 
Macedonia, published in 2005 – Accessed on 05/09/2011. The planned census in 2011 never took 
place. The same data could be found on the https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mk.html - Accessed on the same day, 05/09/2011 - The CIA data is assembled from the 
official statistics from each Balkan state and it is used here for clarity, as the information obtained 
from the state statistics had been disputed by the Albanian minority and some neighbouring states. 
5
 ibid 
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and denotes the wider geographical area that incorporated the so-called Lower 
Macedonia, a huge coastal plain around the Thermaic gulf in the north-western 
Aegean, and Upper Macedonia, a sequence of rugged highland plateaux, stretching 
from the Dinaric range on the west to the Balkan range to the east (Map 4.2). In 1913 
this territory was partitioned among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. What was then the 
Serbian proportion of Macedonia is the territory occupied by the modern Republic of 
Macedonia.6 Until then, the population of this territory was under Ottoman rule, 
extremely mixed and without any clear delineation among the Slavic, Greek, 
Christian or Muslim communities. Immediately after partition, both Greece and 
Bulgaria rapidly adopted the policy of enforced ethnic and linguistic assimilation.7  
 
Map 4.2 – Geographical Macedonia. Approximate borders of the modern republic marked black.  
With the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey, following the 
Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922, the Greek part of Macedonia received an influx of 
ethnic Greeks from Anatolia, which in turn significantly reduced the percentage of 
the South Slavs. As Bulgaria received only 11% of the whole of Macedonian 
territory, assimilation was swift and irreversible. Within a generation, Greek and 
Bulgarian parts of Macedonia were incorporated into the national cores of these 
states. However, the Serbian part of Macedonia followed a different path. Indeed, the 
Serbian authorities tried to introduce the policy of assimilation similar to the 
Bulgarian one, but as after the First World War Serbia ceased to exist as a separate 
                                               
6
 Price, S. and Thonemann, P. – The Birth of Classical Europe – A History from Troy to Augustine, 
London, 2011, 138 
7
 Ibid, 138-139 
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nation-state, the difficulties of implementing such a policy were immediate and 
unpreventable. The creation of the Kingdom of SHS was led by the romantic ideals of 
the 19th century pan-Slavic movement and realpolitik in the wider European context, 
but there was no serious consideration of the possible negative outcomes that the 
unified state could face. Haste unification immediately imposed on the Kingdom of 
SHS a series of internal problems resulting from the different national ideas and 
expectations. 
The incorporation of the part of Macedonia into the Kingdom of Serbia was 
short lived; it lasted for less than two years in 1912-1913 and was discontinued 
during Bulgarian occupation of 1915-1918. Even though this part of Macedonia was 
officially called Southern Serbia and its people considered to be Serbs, the population 
was not integrated into the Serbian national core anywhere near as much as in other 
Serbian areas, such as those acquired in 1878. A strong Bulgarian substratum 
remained, but there was a considerable portion of population that felt a strong sense 
of loyalty towards their own native territory.8 Based on these loose ties with Serbia, 
after another 1941-1944 Bulgarian occupation, the Communist regime of the post-
Second World War Yugoslavia was able to introduce in 1944 a nation separate from 
the Serbs, aiming to reduce the percentage of ethnic Serbs in Yugoslavia, but also 
separate from the Bulgars, in order to secure loyalty to the Yugoslav territorial 
integrity. Tito’s nation-creators adopted the old Austro-Hungarian method of inciting 
the local patriotism by creating a link between the local populations to the 
geographical determinants of the region.9 So, they called the newly proclaimed nation 
“Macedonian” because they lived in geographical Macedonia. We even know its 
birthday: 2 August 1944. 
4.1.1 Creation of the new nation 
As the Second World War drew to its close, the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the 
National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) gathered in the confines of the 
mediaeval monastery of Prohor Pčinjski, in southern Serbia,10 and on 2 August 1944 
                                               
8
 Ćirković, S. – The Serbs, London, 2004, 259 
9
 This method of nation-creation was attempted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1878-1918. See 
Chapter V – The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 387-389. 
10
 This monastery is still within the Serbian borders, and every year a Macedonian state delegation is 
sent there to celebrate the “Day of the State”. In recent years, the gatherings on 2 August bring into 
focus the tensions between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the ecumenically unrecognized 
Macedonian Orthodox Church 
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decided of the future organization of the Macedonian republic. One of the main 
outcomes of this meeting was to introduce the Macedonian language that would be in 
use in the future Macedonian state. From the proceedings of this meeting, the 
standardization of the language was completed within a year: the alphabet was 
adopted on 3 May 1945 and orthography on 7 July 1945. “This act marked the 
realization of the efforts to create a common Macedonian language, based on dialects 
most different from Serbian and Bulgarian,” maintain all Macedonian school 
textbooks.11 The fact that the adopted orthography is barely modified Serbian 
orthography, based on the orthographic solution of 19th century Serbian philologist 
Vuk Karadžić (Fig. 1.5), is carefully omitted.12 The Macedonian alphabet differs 
from the Serbian in three graphemes and the morphological rules are following the 
Serbian principles. The sentence structure maintains articles and the past participle, 
but loses almost completely the case declension. This is similar to Bulgarian, but non-
existent in Serbian. Macedonian is mutually intelligible to both Serbs and Bulgars. A 
less sensitive commentator would describe the language spoken in Macedonia as a 
dialect where Serbian and Bulgarian languages meet. However, Bulgarian linguists 
consider the language as a Bulgarian dialect, whilst the Serbian linguistic had been 
silent on the matter since 1945. The Macedonian linguists, naturally, insist on 
distinctive character of their language.  
During that ASNOM meeting on 2 August 1944, among other committee 
members was Blaže Koneski (1921-1993), a young partisan communist and former 
student of Serbian Language and Literature at the University of Belgrade (Fig. 4.1). 
Considered to be the best cadre who could execute the swift implementation of the 
Party’s decisions, Koneski quickly assumed the leading role in the standardization of 
the Macedonian language and orthography and went on to become one of the first 
professors of the Macedonian language and literature at the newly founded University 
of Skopje (1949). When the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU) 
was inaugurated in 1967, Koneski was its first president. For his services to the 
Macedonian republic, the Faculty of Philology in Skopje was named after him. In 
1993, he received a state funeral and is regarded as one of the most important figures 
                                               
11
 Павловски, Ј. и Павловски, М. – Македонија, вчера и днес, Книгоиздателство, Скопје, 1996 – 
Pavlovski, J. and Pavlovski, M. – Macedonia, yesterday and today – Knigoizdatelstvo, Skopje, 1996, 
10 – Bilingual, Macedonian and English  
12
 In Macedonian, Ѓ replaces Serbian Ђ, Ќ replaces Serbian Ћ, but have equal pronunciation, whilst 
Latin S was added for the use of consonants that are not written, although present in Serbian. 
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of modern Macedonian culture. In 1952 and 1954, Koneski assembled and published 
two volumes of Macedonian grammar. In collaboration with Krum Tošev, Koneski 
published in 1950 the initial orthography and dictionary, intended as a complement to 
the 1946 Macedonian Grammar (Македонска граматика) by Krume Kepeski 
(1909-1988).  
 
    
Fig. 4.1 – Blaže Koneski (1921-1993)         Fig. 4.2 – Krume Kepeski (1909-1988) 
 
In the Introduction of the Macedonian Grammar, Kepeski (Fig. 4.2) defined the 
programme for the creation of Macedonian nation:  
“Who are your people? They are called the Macedonians. What is a nation? A 
nation is a big group of people that live together in one place, maintain the same 
customs, speak the same language, have similar economic wealth and same 
psychological characteristics – the same mentality. Do Macedonian people have all 
these characteristics? Yes, and that is why they are recognized as a separate people 
who live together with the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia…..”13 
For achieving the plan of the same language, customs and psychological 
characteristics, appropriate educational institutions were needed. Thus, the first 
faculty within the new University was the Faculty of Philosophy which consisted of 
two schools: History and Philology, which supported by the Communist regime in the 
                                               
13
 Kепески, К. – Македонска Граматика, Скопје, 1946, 5 – My translation. Part of the text, 
emphasised in bold by myself,  underlines the principles applied during the proclamation of 
Macedonian nation. 
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following two decades, began work on the creation of literature and written history in 
the Macedonian language. The majority of the initially employed stuff of the 
University of Skopje were graduates from Belgrade and Zagreb and organized the 
educational curriculum which followed the approved lines of the Yugoslav central 
administration.  
As the creation of the Macedonian republic was taking place, the response of 
the neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria was swift. In 1953, the foundation of the 
Institute for Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki prompted the establishment of a wide 
network of cooperation with various academic institutions worldwide, which later 
enabled the discovery of the Royal Macedonian tombs at Vergina in Greek 
Macedonia in 1978 to be largely publicised. After the fall of the junta in 1974, the 
Thessaloniki Institute for Balkan Studies was placed under the direct supervision of 
the Greek Ministry of Culture which guaranteed the state support for Greek defence 
of their own national policies. On the other hand, the scholars from the leading 
Bulgarian University St. Clement of Ohrid in Sofia14 already had an established 
tradition of nation-building which maintained that the outcomes of the Balkan wars 
unjustly deprived Bulgaria of its ethnic territories and accused Belgrade for 
attempting to “Serbianize” ethnic Bulgarians in Macedonia. However, after 1945, 
Serbian arguments were silenced by Tito’s government in Belgrade. This transferred 
the 19th century Bulgarian-Serbian polemics about the character and history of 
Macedonian Slavs from Belgrade-Sofia to the Skopje-Sofia line. The polemic 
remained throughout the Yugoslav period and was exacerbated by the independence 
of Macedonia in 1991.  
4.1.2 The Ambiguity of Macedonian identity 
Four critical points between the historical narratives emanating from 
Macedonia and those of its neighbours could be identified: 
1. The question of the ethnic character of Ancient Macedonia and the ethnic 
affiliations of modern Macedonians. This question poisons Athens-Skopje 
relations and has grown from a local academic dispute into a serious 
international problem with strong political consequences. 
                                               
14
 The University of Sofia, St. Clement of Ohrid was named after one of the fathers of Slavic literacy. 
See Appendix I – Historical background, p. 18 
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2. The question of the name and ethnic character of the short-lived 9th century 
Samuil’s Empire in relation to the Bulgarian historical perspective. Whilst 
Sofia maintains the thesis of the exclusively Bulgarian character of Samuil’s 
state and denies the existence of any separate Macedonian Slavic state in the 
mediaeval period, Skopje points to certain discrepancies that appear in the 
Bulgarian theories.  
3. The ethnic affiliation of the 14th century rulers of Macedonia, especially 
King Marko Mrnjavčević (1371-1395), legendary Kraljević Marko. Whilst 
for the Serbian scholars Marko is unquestionably Serbian, Skopje regards 
him as a Macedonian.  
4. Finally, the fourth academic dispute is directed to Tirana and relates to the 
problem of the hypothetical border area between the ancient Illyria-Dardania 
and Ancient Macedonian state and the nature of the link between the ancient 
inhabitants of Dardania with the Illyrians and modern Albanians. The 
dispute sours Skopje-Tirana relations and is currently growing into a heated 
debate which can have as a consequence the federalization of the republic 
into two parts: one Slavic – Macedonian and the other Albanian. 
These four problems that the modern Macedonian Republic faces today clearly 
arise from the geo-strategic position which was so violently contested between its 
neighbours over the past hundred and fifty years. It is not surprising, then, that the 
academic rhetoric employed by all sides involved, echoes the national interests of 
each respective nation. Amongst them, the Macedonian argument, amplified after the 
proclamation of independence, attempted to gain prominence and support by the 
relevant international academic and political institutions. But the outcome was only 
partially successful. Instead of reaching consensus about the critical questions listed 
above, it divided academic opinions and it appears that overall consensus will never 
be reached.  
4.2 Imagined aspects of the Macedonian reality – The origins of the 
Macedonian Question 
The “scramble for Macedonia” began in the 19th century, when the re-assertion 
of the nation-states of the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgars was supported by the Great 
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Powers. When in 1870 the Russian Empire enforced the foundation of the Bulgarian 
Exarchate, a Bulgarian Orthodox Church independent from the Greek Patriarchate in 
Constantinople, the latter, as the only legitimate Christian Church within the Ottoman 
Empire, strongly objected as it feared that the spread of the Exarchate’s influence will 
place the Macedonian Slav population under its control. The response of the Serbian 
Principality was equally negative, as the Serbian national narrative had already been 
formulated around the notion of “Old Serbia” which regarded the north of 
geographical Macedonia as its core ethnic territory.  
The Great Powers saw the formation of the Exarchate as Russian attempt to 
establish its dominance over the Balkan Peninsula through the Orthodox Church. 
Greece was Orthodox, but not Slavic and was, by then, under the influence of Britain, 
so Russian manoeuvring space was limited to the Slavic lands.15 This was not a new 
political approach to the Balkans by Russia, as Russia had regarded itself as a 
defender of Orthodoxy and the oppressed Slavs within the Ottoman Empire since the 
early 18th century. But the 1870 event had little to do with religion or support of Slav 
brothers. By mid-19th century, the world trading routes and natural resources were 
exclusively controlled by the Great Powers, which made the position of the Turkish 
Straits vital to Russian strategic interests. Of the two Orthodox Slav Balkan nations, 
Bulgaria was closer geographically, still without its state and more reliant upon 
Russian support. Serbia already had a certain level of independence and its internal 
dynastic problems exposed her to the Austro-Hungarian influence. Between the two, 
Russia’s choice was naturally in favour of Bulgaria.16 Even though the Pan-Slavic 
ideas of the 1840s were still strong both within Russian society and the other Slavic 
lands without nation-states of their own, Russian national interests had priority.  
The following decade was the most turbulent in the Balkans, since the 
beginning of the 19th century. The great Eastern Question that opened with the 
Serbian uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875 continued with Serbian-Turkish 
and Russo-Turkish wars of 1876-1878. Turkish defeat sanctioned de facto Serbian 
and Montenegrin independence and expanded their territories. However, the Treaty of 
San Stefano in March 1878 which ended the wars, envisaged the existence of a large 
Bulgarian Principality which would include not only a vast part of Macedonia, but 
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 Barker, E. – Macedonia – Its Place in Balkan Power Politics – Re-print of the 1950 Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, London 1980, 7 
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also a great part of Thrace, southern Serbia and smaller parts of Albania and Kosovo 
and Metohija. Alerted to the possibility of such a large sphere of Russian influence, 
Austro-Hungary, France and Great Britain forced Russia to abandon this treaty at the 
Congress of Berlin three months later. The size of the Bulgarian Principality was 
significantly reduced and Macedonia was restored to the Ottoman control.  
In relation to Balkan nation-state building, the outcomes of the Congress of 
Berlin were twofold; firstly, it tied the nascent Bulgarian state to Russia and 
secondly, it placed Serbia under the direct patronage of Austro-Hungary which 
immediately imposed on her economically exhausting duties.17 This meant that the 
Serbian economy, as well as educational exchange which was until then distributed 
between Russian and Habsburg/Austro-Hungarian influences was now completely 
turned towards the latter. Even though finally formally free from the Ottomans, both 
Serbia and Bulgaria fared badly under the Austria-Hungary and Russia, respectively. 
Both countries were forced to allow their great “protectors” the free use of their 
resources and had little liberties in deciding their foreign policies.18  
Because the land road to the Thessaloniki port ran through Serbia and down the 
Vardar valley (along the southern branch of the ancient Via Militaris), where it 
diverted to the east towards Constantinople (along the line of ancient Via Egnatia) the 
crucial geo-strategic clash erupted in the place where Via Egnatia met Via Militaris: 
Macedonia (Map 4.3). Both Russia and Austro-Hungary wished to avoid open 
warfare, so the struggle to control this key crossroad was transferred to their client 
states, Serbia and Bulgaria. Similarly, British interests in Greece were carefully 
observed and protecting the Thermaic gulf and the hinterland of Thessaloniki became 
the corner-stone of the British activities in Greece. This distribution of interests of the 
three powers anticipated the future partition of the traditional Macedonian territories 
after the Balkan Wars. Whilst the official diplomacy of the Great Powers advocated 
peace and confirmed it through the series of treaties signed after the Congress of 
Berlin,19 their economic and political influence in the Balkans was maintained not 
only by the political pressure on the local governments, but through the means of soft 
power.
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Map. 4.3 – Since the Roman times, southern branch of Via Militaris and eastern of Via Egnatia 
(marked red) crossed on the territory of Macedonia. The road route followed the major Balkan river 
valleys and remained in use in modern period. 
The soft power included cultural influence through scholarships awarded to 
local students to be educated at their universities.20 After graduation, these young 
Balkan scholars usually returned to their native countries and actively participated in 
organizing nascent Balkan educational and university systems, modelled on those 
acquired in their universities.21 They also brought with themselves ideas assimilated 
during their studies, embedded within the specific mind-set that can be understood as 
political mentoring of the Great Powers in order to protect their interests.22 The 
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 See Appendix II – The Theories of Nationalism, p. 66-68 
21
 For example, those who studied History in Vienna and Graz accepted the Austrian interpretation of 
the distinction between the Ancient Greeks and Ancient Macedonians. Similarly, the students of St. 
Petersburg and Moscow accepted the preferred Russian interpretation of the Bulgarian nature of the 
Macedonian Slavs which was asserted during the first part of the 19th century. See Chapter I – The 
Serbs, p. 37-38 for the general pattern of educating young Balkan elites abroad. 
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See Appendix II – The Theories of Nationalism, p.66-67 – When client-states of the Great Powers have 
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acquired academic knowledge and skills, through the dissemination of ideas played 
directly into the hands of the realpolitik of the Great Powers. As a consequence, the 
building of the nation-states in the Balkans in the later part of the 19th century was as 
much an artificial construct by the Great Powers, as it was the natural desire of the 
Balkan population to achieve a settled and self-fulfilling existence. As suggested by 
modern Macedonian scholar Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska: “The Balkan peoples 
did not realize they were not masters of their own fate, but that decisions concerning 
them were being made in St. Petersburg, Vienna, London or Paris.”23 As the territory 
of Macedonia became important to both Russia and Austro-Hungary, their 19th 
century scholars, relying on the then prevailing academic methods, began producing 
first interpretations of the surviving historical documents on Macedonia. However, all 
these interpretations were related to the nascent national narratives of Greece, Serbia 
and Bulgaria. No native intellectual of what was to become a modern Macedonian 
Republic produced any work related to a separate Macedonian Slav nation. 
4.3 Cultural aspects and material heritage in the context of Macedonian 
nationalism 
The first scientific works about Macedonia were produced either from outside 
the region in the first part of the 19th century or from the neighbouring countries, 
from the 1850s onwards. As the distinct Macedonian orthography and a recognized 
language did not exist, most of the written sources belong to the linguistic traditions 
of these early authors.  
The first author to mention the exclusively Slavic characteristics of the 
Macedonian region was from the 19th century Russian professor of Slavic philology 
and linguistics at Kazan University Victor Grigorovich (1815-1876). In 1845 he 
travelled through the Balkans and on his return to Russia published his travelogue 
under the title “Outline of a Journey through European Turkey.”24 Drawing 
exclusively on Byzantine sources, he wrote extensively about the Balkan Slavs and in 
1859 published a volume “Serbia and Its Relations with Neighbouring Powers, 
                                                                                                                                      
future conflict of ideas. This theory received the best confirmation in the Balkans as the methods learnt 
were frequently used against the very same academic theories that served as the educational models for 
the nascent Balkan states. 
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Principally in the 14th and 15th Centuries”, where he called the population of 
Macedonia – Serbian.  
A few years before Grigorovich (Fig. 4.3), another Slavic scholar from the 
Habsburg part of Ukraine, Yuri Venelin (1802-1839), was assigned to a mission of 
collecting the historical documents related to the Ottoman Slavs (Fig. 4.4). The 
results of his Balkan travels were published in 1829 volume “The Ancient and 
Present Day Bulgarians and Their Political, Ethnographic, Historical and Religious 
Relations with the Russians” where he called the population of Macedonia – 
Bulgarian.25  
     
Fig. 4.3 – Viktor Grigorovich (1815-1876)                 Fig. 4.4 – Yuri Venelin (1802-1839) 
 
These early authors were inspired by the growing Pan-Slav movement which 
was generously supported by the Russian state. Even though the movement originated 
in the Slavic lands of the Habsburg Empire (Prague, above all), Russia quickly 
assumed the leading role in the research of its Slavic origins. Russian interests in the 
Balkan Slavs were guided by the need to expand influence in the region, so 
publications that served the purpose of the national awakening, had also been used to 
legitimize Russian political activities. The publication of Venelin’s work caused a 
great sensation and triggered the interest of the Bulgarian Diaspora in Russia, mainly 
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the merchant class, to get involved in the matters of national awakening. In Bulgaria 
itself, Venelin encountered apathy and a lack of response by the local population.26 
The reason for that was the high illiteracy rate. The foundation of schools and 
programmes for basic education were the only solution, if the shaping of the 
emerging national consciousness was to be done efficiently. Between the end of the 
Crimean War and Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Bulgarian nationalism grew 
considerably, resulting in the upsurge of in Bulgarian education and national re-
assertion.27  
One of the earliest writers born in the territory of modern Macedonian republic 
was a monk Kiril Pejčinoviḱ (c.1770-1845), who published in 1816 in Budapest a 
book of orthodox sermons, Ogledalo (Miror), printed in the local dialect, in Old 
Church Slavonic orthography (Fig. 4.5). All three orthodox Slavs from the Balkans 
regard Pejčinoviḱ as the early national writer; the Bulgarians regard him as a 
Bulgarian, asserting that he was writing in the Bulgarian language of Lower Moesia 
(Fig. 4.6). The Macedonians regard him as a Macedonian, as he was writing in the 
“Tetovo dialect” of western Macedonia. The Serbs regard him as a Serb, as he wrote 
the biography of the Serbian mediaeval Prince Lazar28 and had a Serbian surname. 
            
Fig. 4.5 – Kiril Pejčinoviḱ (c.1770 – 1845)          Fig. 4.6 – The front page of the Ogledalo which states 
                                                                              that the writing is aimed “for the needs and benefits    
                                                                              of the people in the Bulgarian Lower Moesia.” 1816.    
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4.4 Historical and academic sources on Macedonian heritage 
The historical primary sources relating to Macedonian territories can be divided 
into two distinct groups: the sources on Ancient Macedonia, written predominantly in 
Greek (ancient and modern), and sources on mediaeval Macedonia written in either 
Byzantine Greek, Old Church Slavonic (9th-12th centuries) or post-12th century 
mediaeval recensions of Bulgarian or Serbian Church Slavonic. None of them refer to 
separate Macedonian ethnicity. Additional problem with both sets of sources is their 
scarcity and great gaps between different historical periods with no surviving written 
documents. This is particularly relevant for the Slavic texts, as the standardization of 
the “national” recensions took place relatively late in history, between the 12th and 
15th centuries. By the end of the 15th century, almost all Balkan lands were conquered 
by the Ottomans and native elites disappeared. This resulted in the hindrance of the 
natural linguistic evolution until the 19th century, when language standardization 
became central to the nation-building process. Regional dialectological characteristics 
among Macedonian Slavs were equally understandable to both the Serbs and 
Bulgarians and as the “scramble for Macedonia” gained momentum, any notion of a 
separate Macedonian Slav ethnic identity was silenced.  
The discovery and evaluation of historical manuscripts in the course of the 19th-
20th centuries was influenced by the ideas of Romantic sentiments until the 1870s, 
when the political usage of national narratives prevailed as the standard practice in 
nation-building process. As the 19th century authors addressing the Macedonian 
question were often born outside Macedonia, their remarks on the land and its people 
were frequently genuinely erroneous or politically charged. The interpretation of the 
ambiguity of the Ancient and Mediaeval historical manuscripts which do not refer to 
a separate Macedonian Slav nation by the 19th century scholars provided the basis for 
the 20th century Macedonian nation-building.  
However, from the beginning, writings about Macedonia were marred by 
divided opinions and confusion. After the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 
1870, all writings urged the Slavic population in Macedonia under Ottoman rule to 
fight for its liberation. In those early days, being Christian was the only determinant 
of the identity of the local Slavs.29 Religious identification was the only way of 
expressing separateness from the Ottoman authorities. Since Christian religious 
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affairs were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate in Constantinople, which used 
the Greek language, the position of the Patriarch was in many respects similar to the 
position of the papacy in the mediaeval Catholic Church: there existed a universal 
church, united in terms of religion alone. But just as Protestantism challenged the 
Pope’s supremacy over the matters of nascent nation-states in the West in the 16th 
century, growing Balkan nationalisms challenged the authority of the exclusively 
Greek Patriarchate.30 
The response from the Patriarch was logical: on 28 September 1872, the 
Bulgarian Church was proclaimed schismatic and all its adherents to be heretics. 
From that moment on, the Christian identity was divided along the language line: 
Greek speaking subjects of Macedonia were naturally supportive of the Patriarchate, 
whilst the Slavic speakers supported the Exarchate. Russian pressure on Serbian and 
Romanian churches to recognize the Bulgarian Exarchate in Constantinople 
accelerated the activities surrounding the implementation of religious practise and the 
opening of schools for the first time in over five centuries. As a result, those 
Macedonians who attended the churches that held their rites in Greek were labelled as 
Greek,31 and those who attended the churches that held their rites in Church Slavonic 
were labelled as Bulgarian. The Serbian Orthodox Church in this period was not able 
to interfere, as its seat was in Sremski Karlovci, on the territory of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, whilst the Serbian Principality was under the jurisdiction of the Belgrade 
Metropolitan who was bellow the rank of the Patriarch and the Exarch. The opening 
of the Macedonian Question was initially the duel between the Greek and Bulgarian 
national narratives to win the support of the local Christian population. 
4.4.1 Salade Macédoines 
Dissemination of books that aimed at creating national identity in Macedonia 
was problematic from the start. Bulgarian intellectuals of the period based their work 
on Venelin’s enthusiasm and continued the process of national (re)discovery through 
the medium of magazines and periodicals edited and published not only in the 
nascent Bulgarian Principality, but abroad as well. The problem, however, was the 
lack of a standard Bulgarian language and orthography. Between the 1830s and 
1870s, about 1600 books were published in Bulgarian vernacular, in non-standardised 
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orthographies.32 However, the existence of various regional dialects of the Ottoman 
Slavs, recognized very early on, prevented the swift assimilation of the Macedonian 
Slavs into the Bulgarian national core, because the pioneering writers and journalists 
all wrote in their native dialects.  
In 1856, Dragan Tsankov (1828-1911), a teacher, and a group of Bulgarian 
merchants established the Society for Bulgarian Literature, for the advancement of 
Bulgarian letters. Through a series of publications, Bulgarian authors gained an 
opportunity to do research on history, religion, education, literature, linguistics, 
folklore, etc. In 1859, Tsankov (Fig. 4.7) began publishing the magazine Bulgariya. 
By 1867, the society helped in the foundation of the St. Cyril and Methodius 
Bulgarian Men’s High School, which opened in 1871 in Thessaloniki. In the 
following year, the new society Prosveshtenie (Enlightenment) was established with 
the aim of spreading education and national consciousness in Macedonia.33  
        
Fig. 4.7 – Dragan Tsankov (1828-1911), a liberal     Fig. 4.8 – Petko Slavejkov (1827-1895), a teacher, 
politician and future Prime Minister, responsible      poet and folklorist in Bulgaria. His early career 
for foundation of the first Bulgarian language           developed in Constantinople, where he argued for 
magazine in Macedonia.                                             Bulgarian national revival. 
However, in 1866, another writer and journalist, Petko Slavejkov (1827-1895), 
began publishing the weekly newspapers Makedoniya, in the local Macedonian Slav 
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dialect, printed in Greek letters.34 A few years before Makedoniya was being 
published by Slavejkov (Fig. 4.8), two brothers, teachers from Struga,35 Konstantin 
(1810-1862) and Dimitar (1830-1862) Miladinov (Fig. 4.9) published in Zagreb in 
1861, with the assistance of Bishop Strossmayer a collection of folk songs Bulgarian 
Folk Poems, modelled on the work of Serbian linguist Vuk Stefanović Karadžić.36  
The “true” nature of the Miladinovs’ ethnic affiliations became the subject of 
many academic and political disputes during the formation of Macedonian nation. 
Konstantin contributed to the confusion himself as he used to sign his surname in 
1840 Miladinidis (Greek), in 1855 Miladinos (Grecoman) and, finally Miladinov in 
1857 (Bulgarian/Serbian/Macedonian Slav), which perfectly illustrates the 
transformation of his national identity.37 Bulgarian scholars regard the Miladinov 
brothers as Bulgarian national writers, who identified themselves as Bulgarian. 
Macedonian scholars regard them to be the founders of the modern Macedonian 
literary tradition.  
   
Fig. 4.9 – The Miladinovi Brothers, Konstantin and  Fig. 4.10 – The cover of the                                                                                            
Dimitar, died in Constantinople, where they were imprisoned        Bulgarian Folk Poems, published in 
on accusation of spying and other subversive activities.                   Zagreb in 1861, contained 600 Ma- 
                                                                                                           Cedonian and 67 Bulgarian poems. 
The dispute about their origins had reached the phase in which the Bulgarian 
scholars accused their Macedonian colleagues of forging the archival editions of the 
work of the Miladinovis by deliberately deleting the word “Bulgarian” from the front 
covers and their refusal to display them in museums (Fig. 4.10). On the other hand, 
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Macedonians insist that the word “Bulgarian” was inserted on the facsimiles of the 
first editions of the Miladinovs’ works by the Bulgarian nationalists and that the 
copies displayed in the Macedonian museums are original.38  
These frequent changes of ethnic identity within Ottoman Macedonia in the 
second half of 19th century were both a cause and a consequence of the political 
unrest of the region. During the Ottoman period, the population of Macedonia was a 
patchwork of various ethnic groups which, apart from the Greeks, Slavs and Turks, 
included a large number of Sephardic Jews, Vlachs, Albanians, Romanians and a 
smaller number of Muslim peoples from Asia Minor settled there after the Ottoman 
conquest. The clean-cut borders between the groups were impossible to establish, as 
they varied from one village to another and their loyalties were determined by the 
religious affiliations. As late as 1900, British diplomat Sir Charles Eliot, wrote that “a 
race in Macedonia is merely a political party.”39 The loyalty of peasants was most 
likely to be won by those factions that offered the most stability. Since the political 
events between 1870 and 1908 were changing frequently and radically, there was no 
possibility of achieving a slower and more “natural” evolution of national feelings. 
Similarly, the national self-assertion within the Bulgarian Principality was soured by 
disagreements among Bulgarian intellectuals themselves on the nature of the 
language and linguistics, as well as by the increasingly unpopular Russian tutelage of 
the Bulgarian Principality. The complete upper class within Bulgaria, the officers of 
the Bulgarian army (all ethnic Russians) and members of the educated elite (all 
educated at St.Peterburg and Moscow Universities), followed the Russian imperial 
orders without questions, making the emerging local bourgeois class resentful.40  
Such tense political atmosphere accompanied by the appointment and short 
reign of Alexander von Battenberg (1879-1886) as Prince of Bulgaria, affected the 
development of a codified language and orthography. The Slavic dialect in north-west 
Macedonia, which was still under Ottoman rule, was different from the dialects 
spoken in the east, within the Bulgarian state. Despite the arguments, the eastern 
variant prevailed. This decision was logical because it was natural that the language 
codification was conducted by the authorities of an independent state of Bulgaria and 
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that the dialect spoken in the territory under those authorities was to be chosen as an 
official language. The orthography developed and systematized by Marin Drinov 
(1838-1906) was finally accepted as official by the Bulgarian Ministry of Education 
in 1899. Before that, starting from 1835, nearly thirty proposals of the language 
reform were attempted, with the number of letters ranging from 25 to 44.41 The 
linguistic chaos surrounding the codification of the Bulgarian language within 
Bulgaria enabled the assertion of the Serbian claims over the Macedonian linguistic 
territory.  
Serbian influence in Macedonia was briefly revived after the unification of 
Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in 1885. King Milan Obrenović (Fig. 1.16), “a weak 
man under the best circumstances,” alarmed by Bulgarian state consolidation, 
attempted to prevent the growth of Bulgarian influence by declaring war on Bulgaria 
in 1885.42 The fourteen-day war was lost and the king was personally humiliated. As 
the possibility of influencing events in Macedonia militarily had to be abandoned, the 
only way to exercise Serbian policies towards Macedonian Slavs was through Serbian 
cultural assertion. 
Before 1878, the main bearers of national awakening in Macedonia were the 
Bulgarian and Greek Orthodox Churches and clergy and, to a lesser extent, those few 
existing secular schools. After the Congress of Berlin Serbia joined in the contest.  
The three nascent nation-states attempted to implement their national policies through 
education. The number of secular schools, sponsored by the governments of the three 
neighbouring countries around 1876-1878, grew considerably. By 1876, there were 
350 Bulgarian schools and their number grew to 800 in all Ottoman territories by 
1900. Towards the south of Macedonian region, Greek schools counted to 907 by 
1894.43 The number of Serbian schools fluctuated, as the San Stefano Bulgaria 
immediately closed them all down.44 The Ottoman government also prevented 
existence of Serbian schools in the aftermath of war that led to Serbian full 
independence from Ottoman state.  
The struggle for the educational dominance that took place from the 1880s 
resulted in southern Macedonia to become increasingly Greek and northern, Slavic 
part, to become the academic battleground between Bulgaria and Serbia. The national 
                                               
41
 Roudometof, 2002, 92 
42
 Jelavich, 1978, 163 
43
 Roudometof, 2001, 145 
44
 Roudometof, 2001, 122 
Chapter IV                                                                                           The Macedonians 
 326
historians of the time, regarded today as the pioneering historians of national 
academies in both Bulgaria and Serbia all adhered to their national views of 
Macedonia; Marin Drinov (Fig. 4.11), one of the early Bulgarian historians and a 
language reformer, in his seminal work of 1869 “The General Overview on Origins 
of Bulgarian People and the Principle of Bulgarian History”45 maintained that the 
Slav population of Macedonia was Bulgarian.46 At the same time, the Serbian 
historian Stojan Novaković (Fig. 1.13) in his 1864 work “Historical Consideration of 
Bulgaria”47 argued the Serbian origins of the Macedonian Slavs.48  
  
Fig. 4.11 – Marin Drinov (1838-1906), a historian, the founder of the modern Bulgarian historiography 
and a founding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, which was initially inaugurated under 
the name Bulgarian Literary Society in 1869 in Brǎila in the Kingdom of Romania. 
Both Drinov and Novaković were part of the early elite of their states; both 
were extremely well educated, spoke foreign languages, were the founding members 
of the Bulgarian and Serbian Academies respectively, and believed that they had 
worked in the best interest of their peoples. The legacy they left regarding the 
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national cultures of Bulgaria and Serbia is still highly valued in both countries. 
However, the criticism they received by some modern commentators of nationalism 
and ethnic origins derives from the current understanding of these concepts. Modern 
valuation of their works, as indeed those of their contemporaries and followers, 
frequently has little to do with the objectivity of historical perspective, but more with 
modern manipulation of historical sources.  
4.4.2 On Macedonian Matters 
The 19th century authors who argued for a separate Macedonian nation (and 
state) are very few in number. There were several reasons for this: firstly, the 
Ottomans refused to implement the policies of equality for all its citizens, imposed by 
the Congress of Berlin. Secondly, the banditry and general insecurity of life and 
property were a constant threat. Thirdly, most of the local scholars were educated 
either in Belgrade or in Sofia, where they acquired their use of language and writing, 
which led to future problematic disputes (or claims) with their neighbours. Finally, 
the economic difficulties hindered attempts to form lasting intellectual associations 
that would benefit the local population. Thus, the separateness of the Macedonian 
Slavs from their Bulgarian and Serbian neighbours came rather late, in the first part 
of the 20th century, after the partition of Macedonia in 1913. 
The earliest attempt to advocate a separate and independent Macedonian Slav 
nation, independent from the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, came 
from Petko Slavejkov. In 1871, in his newspaper Makedoniya, he wrote that those 
who live in this region and call themselves Makedonci were Macedonians and not 
Bulgarians49 The efforts to achieve some level of political freedom were further 
complicated by the foundation of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (IMRO) in October 1893 in Thessaloniki.50 The founding members 
aimed at an independent Macedonian state.51 However, by 1878, when Macedonia 
was returned to Ottoman rule, the Christian population was exposed to revenge of the 
Muslims, particularly Albanian overlords, and many Christians sought refuge in 
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Bulgaria proper, Serbia or Greece. Also, there was a considerable Macedonian colony 
in St. Petersburg, not large in numbers, but comprising Macedonians who had some 
education.  
The number of educated Macedonian Slav refugees was too small to promote 
efficiently the cause for an independent Macedonian state, which prompted Bulgarian 
interference. In 1895, the Supreme Macedonian Revolutionary Organzation (EMRO), 
the Vrhovists, was formed in Sofia, and immediately began agitating for stronger 
political ties with IMRO. Whilst the IMRO leadership consisted predominantly of 
teachers and lawyers who studied abroad, the EMRO leaders were dominated by men 
with a military background.52 It soon became obvious that the Vrhovists viewed the 
IMRO as an instrument for Bulgarian policies towards Macedonia. The San Stefano 
debacle had not been forgotten. Throughout this period, Serbian political influence in 
Macedonia was dormant, as the political crisis of the accession to the throne of the 
young King Aleksandar I Obrenović (Fig. 1.17) and subsequent abolition of the 
liberal 1888 Constitution drew attention away from the problems in Macedonia. 
Modern Bulgarian historians view the IMRO movement as representing the will 
of Macedonian Slavs to join Bulgaria and they underline Bulgarian financial support 
for the organization. The opinion of Macedonian historians is radically different: 
“The Bulgarian infiltration into IMRP was not easily recognized, because the 
Bulgarians spoke Macedonian language readily….Gotse Delchev (Fig. 4.12)53 called 
the EMRO the Trojan Horse of IMRO…”54 Despite the mutual distrust, the two 
groups cooperated with each other, until the famous Ilinden uprising on 2 August 
1903. For just over a week, the rebels captured the city of Kruševo and declared 
Macedonian independence. However, the Ottomans crushed the revolt swiftly and 
killed or captured most of their leaders. Alerted to the possibility of new war, 
Emperor Franz Joseph and Tsar Nicholas II imposed a programme of reforms for 
Macedonia, which the Porte viewed as a further humiliation and it never fully 
implemented it. The general dissatisfaction with the lack of reforms became one of 
the major reasons for the Young Turk revolution of 1908.55  
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The Ilinden Uprising of 1903 became mythologized by the modern Macedonian 
nation-state which considers it to be the beginning of the Macedonian revival. 
Coinciding with the uprising, Krste Misirkov (1874-1926), a teacher from 
Macedonia, published in Sofia a book titled On Macedonian Matters (За 
Македонцките работи), in which he claimed that the Macedonian Slavs had an 
identity separate from the Bulgarian (Fig. 4.13). 
    
Fig. 4.12 – Gotse Delchev (1872-1903)                                 Fig. 4.13 – Krste Misirkov (1874-1926)  
 
Misirkov, regarded as the most important literary figure and national fighter for 
the Macedonian national identity, as well as the founding father of the Macedonian 
language, was a highly controversial figure.56 In his early-20th century writings, he 
suggested the separateness of the Macedonian language and proposed the reformed 
orthography, but his ethnic loyalties changed over time.57 While studying at the 
Universities of Belgrade and St.Petersburg, he lived in Belgrade, Sofia and St. 
Petersburg, writing and reporting on the events in Macedonia until the outbreak of 
Balkan wars. In 1902 Misirkov became one of the leading members of the 
Macedonian Scientific and Literary Society founded in St. Peterburg. There he co-
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authored a Memorandum on the independence of Macedonia, which was sent to the 
representatives of the Great Powers to the London Peace Conference in March 
1913.58 The Memorandum, written in the same year in the manner similar to that of 
Dako and Grameno on Albanian matters, included a group of authors affiliated to the 
idea of a possible Macedonian state.59 They applied the same type of arguments as 
their Albanian counterparts: 
“1) Macedonia should remain single, indivisible and independent Balkan state 
within its geographical, ethnographical, historical, economic and political borders. 
2) A Macedonian national assembly should be established on the basis of 
general elections in Salonika in the soonest possible time which would work out in 
detail the internal structure of the state and determine its relations with the 
neighbouring countries.”60  
However, the geo-strategic position and complexity of Macedonia’s mixed 
population was not taken into full consideration when Macedonia was partitioned 
among Serbia (38%), Greece (51%) and Bulgaria (11%), following the outcomes of 
the two Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 (Map 4.4).61 The partition was sanctioned by the 
Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 and confirmed by the Treaty of Constantinople later in 
the same year. The First World War that followed, brought into existence a temporary 
Bulgarian state based on the San Stefano borders, but the borders drawn in Bucharest 
were restored at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919.  
Throughout this period, Misirkov changed his ethnic affiliation on at least two 
occasions. After failing his studies in Belgrade in the early 1890s, he went to 
Bulgaria, where he had to declare himself a Bulgarian in order to continue his 
education. Disappointed by life in Sofia, he returned to Serbia where he was expected 
to declare himself a Serb in order to finish his studies.62 Similarly, during his 
university education in Russia, Misirkov joined the Bulgarian Student Society and 
maintained his Bulgarian identity until the outbreak of the First World War. After 
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1919, he took Bulgarian citizenship and spent last years of his life in Sofia, where he 
was eventually buried.63 His Bulgarian identity was strongly denied first by the 
Yugoslav and then by modern Macedonian scholars. In 1953, an Institute for 
Macedonian Language “Krste Misirkov” was founded in Skopje with aim to 
standardize a separate Macedonian language. 
However, between 1919 and 1945 the Macedonian Slav population and the 
arguments of the language used in Macedonia officially ceased to exist in all three 
states covering the territory of Macedonia. In Greece, the Macedonian Slavs were 
considered Greeks, in Bulgaria – the Bulgars and in Yugoslavia – the Serbs. 
  
Map. 4.4 – Partition of Macedonia after Balkan Wars 
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4.5 The winning of a state 
The legitimacy for taking over Macedonia by all three Balkan states in 1912-
1913 demanded a convincing narrative that would have credibility in international 
political and academic circles. By 1923, the Eastern Question crisis was over. With 
the influx of Greek refugees from Turkey after the Greco-Turkish war of 1922, the 
ethnic picture of Greek part of Macedonia changed in favour of the Greeks. The 
Ancient Macedonian history narratives did not play a prominent role in this period, as 
an independent Macedonia did not exist. The struggle for influence in the rest of 
Macedonia continued on the line Belgrade-Sofia. This brought into prominence the 
question of ethnic affiliations during the mediaeval period.  
In the second part of the 19th century, Serbian academia asserted the theory of a 
separate Macedonian Slav ethnic identity of the mediaeval Balkan ruler, Tsar Samuil 
(997-1014). The argument was based on the fact that Samuil was born in the territory 
of Macedonia and had his capital transferred from Preslav (Mediaeval Bulgarian 
capital) to Ohrid (which was taken over from the Byzantines). The debate reached a 
stalemate, as the analysis of surviving mediaeval manuscripts was inconclusive. The 
14th century Chronicle of the Priest of Dioclea (written in Latin) and 11th century 
Synopsis of Histories by John Skylitzes (written in Byzantine Greek), the only 
documents referring to the period of Samuil’s rule, were scrutinized on many 
occasions. The fine nuances of mediaeval Latin and Greek terms were interpreted in 
accordance with the nationalistic views of Serbia and Bulgaria at the time. Quite 
often, the misuse of mediaeval terminology was in the interpretation, rather than the 
direct translation of the original text. These early arguments could not be either 
confirmed or denied by any other evidence, because proper archaeological 
excavations and interpretation of inscriptions took place only after the Second World 
War.  
Serbian part of Macedonia, renamed Old Serbia64 with added territories of 
southern Serbia was incorporated into the new Kingdom of SHS.  It remained the one 
of the least developed and poorest parts of the country throughout the Yugoslav 
period, despite significant governmental efforts to improve economy and 
infrastructure. Expectedly, the central government in Belgrade imposed education in 
Serbian language and the official schoolbooks followed the narratives of the 19th and 
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early 20th century scholars, which maintained the theory that Macedonian Slavs were 
actually Serbs, as based on their customs and folklore. The main premises of the 
Serbian origins of the Macedonian Slavs was less supported by the similarity of the 
language – after all, Bulgarian scholars had an equally convincing argument – but on 
the similarity of customs and tradition. For example, the celebration of a family’s 
Saint Protector (Slava) was considered to be a unique Serbian custom amongst all 
Orthodox peoples. Bulgarians do not have the custom, but Macedonian Slavs do, 
which, therefore, indicated their Serbian ethnicity.65 Similarly, the fact that Skopje 
was a mediaeval Serbian capital during reign of the Emperor Stefan IV Dušan in the 
14th century, was an additional Serbian argument.66  
However, throughout the interwar period, Bulgarian academics continued their 
claim to Macedonian Slavs by emphasizing that the Bulgars were in Macedonia 
before the Serbs, in the time of the First Bulgarian Empire (7th-11th centuries and), 
under Tsars Symeon (893-927) and Samuil (997-1014), whose reigns epitomised the 
Bulgarian national “Golden Age.” National grievances for the Bulgarian loss of 
Macedonia were expressed through the guerrilla activities of the IMRO, which was 
after the First World War reduced to the terrorist activities against the Greek and 
Yugoslav states.67 The official Bulgarian authorities, even though not responsible for 
the irregular military incursions into Greece and Yugoslavia, waited until the 
beginning of the Second World War to re-assert their claim to Macedonia.  
The beginning of the Second World War showed all the weaknesses of the 
united South Slav state. Yugoslavia was partitioned among its neighbours and 
occupied by Germany (Map 1.a.15). Almost whole of the Yugoslav Macedonia was 
once again occupied by Bulgaria. The western part with a large Albanian population 
was incorporated into a Greater Albania in 1941. 
 With Tito in power in 1945, the Yugoslav borders were restored with slight 
modifications. Former Serbian Macedonia returned to Yugoslav jurisdiction. The 
change of regime introduced new official Yugoslav version of history. The Serbian 
theories from the 19th and first part of the 20th centuries about the “Macedonianism” 
of Samuil’s state, which served to disentangle the Macedonian Slavs from the 
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Bulgars, were re-written and re-used as a grand narrative for the newly proclaimed 
Macedonian nation. The Communist doctrine of Brotherhood and Unity, designed to 
curb Greater Serbianism of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia decreed the foundation of 
new educational institutions away from the old universities of Belgrade and Zagreb, 
with aim to counteract the competing national narratives created in those two national 
centres in the previous six decades. The chief-executors of the Brotherhood and 
Unity were young communist scholars in socialist Yugoslavia, graduates from the 
Universities of Belgrade and Zagreb and former Partisans.  
The pattern for establishing national narratives among the newly proclaimed 
Yugoslav nations was mirroring those of the Serbs and Croats, during the decades of 
formation of their national awakening: young students were sent to obtain education 
abroad, or in this case, Belgrade or Zagreb, where they would acquire a specific 
mind-set gained at these two centres. On their return, these young communist 
graduates had a task to re-interpret the existing theories in favour of the new nations. 
The main seats for these theories were, naturally, in the newly founded universities of 
Skopje and Sarajevo. On the other hand, in Belgrade and Zagreb, due to the war 
losses, forced retirement and emigration of the pre-war intellectuals, there was a 
considerable decline in the quality of instruction.68 Because any form of critical 
inquiry was silenced, the revised past was imposed relatively easily upon the 
traditionally poorer parts of Yugoslavia which retained a significant Ottoman cultural 
inheritance.  
Writing the history of Macedonia as an ethnic and linguistic entity distinct from 
its neighbours began only after the Second World War and was based entirely on 
political and academic arguments promoted in the later 19th and early 20th centuries, 
during the “scramble for Macedonia.” The newly introduced Macedonian national 
narrative focused on the Slav Empire of Samuil which was not viewed anymore as 
pro-Serbian, but anti-Bulgarian, which fitted well within the context of the wider 
Yugoslav idea. This interpretation of the 9th-12th century Orthodox Slav history 
remained the main doctrine of the Yugoslav educational syllabus in the Socialist 
Macedonian Republic until the disintegration of the federal state. It remained a part of 
the leading doctrine of the newly independent Macedonian state, from 1991 onwards, 
when the internal weakness required the expanded theories of nation-creation.   
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The establishment of the new national institutions after 1945 was simultaneous 
with the establishment of similar institutions in other parts of Federal Yugoslavia 
which had been promoted into the new nations. The City of Skopje Museum was 
founded in the same year as the University (1949) and housed a series of artefacts 
from various disciplines, such as archaeology, anthropology, ethnology, history and 
art history, collected by Serbian archaeologist who began work on excavation and 
systematization in the interwar period.69 However, there was no adequate building to 
store and display the collected artefacts. Until 1974, various venues such were the 
Secondary Technical School or the old Turkish Post Office were used as the museum 
display halls. Most of the artefacts were stored in various warehouses around town 
and were not available to the public.70 Following the devastating earthquake of 1963, 
the Museum was finally moved to the refurbished building of the Old Railway 
Station, built in 1938-1940 by a Serbian architect Velimir Gavrilović (Fig. 4.14). The 
City of Skopje Museum was the highest ranking museum in socialist Macedonia until 
the establishment of the Museum of Macedonia in 1977.  
 
Fig. 4.14 – The Old Railway Station, erected in 1938-1940 by a Serbian architect Velimir Gavrilović – 
The earliest photograph, published in the Skopje daily newspapers “Pravda” (no longer issued), dated 
23 November 1940. The building itself was a modernist perception of the neo-Byzantine style. 
Following the 1963 earthquake and extensive adaptation, the building served as the City of Skopje 
Museum from 1974. 
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The collections amassed after 1945 were not systematically organized until the 
formal establishment of the Museum of Macedonia in 1977, when the first generation 
of academically trained Macedonian professionals was able to apply the techniques of 
storing, presenting and interpreting the material findings amassed in the post-Second 
World War period. Prior to that, the majority of artefacts discovered in Macedonia 
during the 19th and first part of the 20th century ended up in museums in Sofia and 
Belgrade, as Serbian and Bulgarian historians and archaeologists were those mostly 
involved in researching the Macedonian Slavic heritage. The Communist regime 
supported the development of Macedonian nationalism, but there was a limit to the 
interpretation of 19th and 20th century events, which had to conform the Party’s 
policies of “brotherhood and unity.” The official version of history for the Yugoslav 
part of Macedonia was that the Socialist Revolution allowed Macedonians to declare 
for the first time in history their national identity freely. At the same time, the parts of 
Macedonia belonging to Bulgaria and Greece were regarded as oppressed. The 1912 
partition of Macedonia was interpreted as an imperialist attempt by the neighbouring 
states Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria to conquer the territory and oppress the 
Macedonian nation.  
Naturally, the Greek response was that of suspicion and rejection. The 
Yugoslav interpretation of Macedonian history was considered to be “seditious 
propaganda, distortion of history, anthropological and historical studies of dubious 
or prejudiced nature that never seriously considered the existence of millions of 
indigenous Hellenic Macedonians…the maelstrom of political intrigue, marked by the 
Tito-Stalin scheming relationship and intrigue of the Bulgarian communist leader 
Georgi Dimitrov…”71   
4.6  Disputed independence 
The sustainability of Macedonia as an independent state after 1991 was 
seriously shaken from the beginning by the open call by its Albanian minority to join 
the struggle for the independence of their Kosovo and Metohija compatriots and the 
Bulgarian assertion of its traditional claim to Macedonia.72 The only way to keep the 
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republic whole and in peace, as the wars in the rest of Yugoslavia were unfolding, 
was to re-examine its geo-political and national strategies, resulting in the acquisition 
of a new historical narrative – the one that would create “continuity in 
discontinuity.”73 Thus, the history of the Republic of Macedonia needed:  
1) a much larger time span, linking various historical personalities and 
epochs,  if it was to achieve existential legitimacy, and 
2) the ethnic, blood-links between those periods to validate such claims. 
From 1991 and the emergence of a new state of Macedonia (FYROM),74 all 
efforts by the Skopje elites were dedicated to this cause, witnessing in the process the 
evolution of contemporary nationalism. Whilst the traditional nationalist tendencies 
in the West were being constantly undermined by the concept of a supra-national 
citizen state in the shape of the EU, the end of the 20th century in the Balkans saw a 
full re-deployment of the traditional nation-building tools, widely supported by all 
forms of public media. The language and the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts – MANU (Македонската Академија на Науките и Уметностите – 
MAНУ), which was created in 1967 by a decree of the Communist authorities, gave 
impetus to the use of traditional nation-building processes in Macedonia.75 A series of 
publishing programmes organized and promoted by the MANU from 1991 onwards, 
aimed at asserting the Macedonian national programme, insisting on visibly distinct 
national narratives from those of the neighbouring countries.  
The national self-assertion needed to define the theoretical background using 
technics and models found in modern studies of nationalism. One of the former 
presidents of the MANU, Georgi Stardelov (b.1930), re-interpreted the works of 
Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith in order to establish the credibility of theories 
promulgated in the Macedonian Republic. The basic argument is a combination of the 
Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach and Halbwachs’ interpretation of collective 
memory:  
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“….In the period around 1830, the Serbs and the Bulgars were considered to be 
one people that spoke the same language. The differentiation enabled them to become 
separate nations….When one people achieves the same postulates, such as the 
historical origins of people, a unified territory, language and religion, then the 
people receives an inner unity, becomes one in terms of both material and spiritual 
culture...This process enables a people to go through the emotional and intellectual 
self-identification, self-reflection and renewal of national myths, religious cults, 
personalities and heroes.  In other words, people reach its roots. This inner search 
enables a nation to acquire a historic patina, and with an emotional and intellectual 
credo in concordance with spirituality…the autochthonous being becomes embedded 
in history.”76  
As the main evidence of the different historical stages when these processes 
were taking place in the Balkans, Stardelov (Fig. 4.15) employed recent 
Sundhaussen’s definition of nations that are based on origins and nations that are 
based on choice.77 Based on this definition, he argued that the differentiation of the 
nations in the Balkans was taking place according to two models: nation-building 
where there existed a national state with its institutions and nation-building in 
Renan’s sense, without the existence of a state and state institutions.78 In Macedonia, 
according to Stardelov, the building of a national state had to take place through 
culture, which existed before the state. Paraphrasing Smith, Stardelov insisted that the 
causality of a nation was based on the nation’s needs for existence. However, the 
pluralistic tendencies of modern nation-states, Stardelov argued, should lead to 
integrative processes in the Balkans.79 
Unfortunately, the whole concept that Stardelov developed, albeit fulfilling 
scholarly techniques, had serious logical misgivings, immediately identified by those 
disputing any separate Macedonian Slav nation. Namely, if any nation needs to 
differentiate itself from the wider family of nations, then any notion of the 
“integrative pluralistic tendencies of the modern world becomes automatically 
contradictory, as integration excludes, or at the very least, downplays, the 
differentiation. Thus, the narrative supported by the theory conceptualised around 
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mutually exclusive premises received an unprecedented scrutiny by the neighbouring 
states and international scholars researching the region. 
 
Fig. 4.15 – Georgi Stardelov (b.1930), provided the theory of nation which argued that “acquiring 
historic patina could be reached through the renewal of national myths” without defining to whom 
these national myths belong. 
4.6.1 The Amalgamation Theory 
The historical narrative referring to the nature of the Samuil’s state and the 
changing ethnic affiliations of the 19th-20th Macedonian Slav national revivalists, 
were not enough to strengthen the territoriality of the independent Macedonian state. 
Even though Bulgaria was the first country to officially recognize the independence 
of Macedonia in January 1992, it negated the existence of a separate Macedonian 
nation. For Bulgaria, Macedonia is simply another Bulgarian state and Bulgarian 
identity is intimately bound to Macedonia as an area inhabited by Bulgarians. In other 
words, a separate state can exist in FYROM, but there can be no Macedonian 
nation.80 To overcome this existential problem, Macedonian scholars have developed 
in the past twenty years a theory which would enable the extension of the 
Macedonian Slav history deep into the period when the Balkans were not inhabited 
by the Slavs or Bulgarians. Parallel with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the 
Macedonian scholars and politicians have stirred the academic debates among the 
international scholars about the ethnic separateness of the Ancient Macedonians from 
the Ancient Greeks. Behind the initial argument that “the Slavs who domesticated 
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themselves on the Balkans inherited the name and decided to call themselves 
Macedonians,” they persistently insisted on the ethnic difference between two ancient 
states in order to overcome the Bulgarian argument that cannot stretch in the past 
further than the 7th century AD.81 
The theory based on the re-interpretation of the ancient writers and putting 
them in the context of modern understanding of terms nation and ethnic was 
somewhat cynically named as The Amalgamation Theory.82 Modern Macedonian 
scholars, supported by the MANU, emphasised the ambiguity of the surviving ancient 
texts which refer to the Ancient Macedonians as “barbarians.” Insisting on the 
difference of the state systems between the Macedonian Kingdom and Greek poleis, 
the creators of the new Macedonian national narrative hoped to win the approval of 
the international academic circles which could lead to winning the political support of 
the main powers presently influencing the Balkans. 
All Macedonian scholars charged with the creation of the new narrative insisted 
on the word “barbarian” as a major demarcation line between the Macedonians and 
the Greeks. They argued at large that “in the 6th century BC Macedonia did not have 
close contacts with the Greek state and culture, as it was a society of a ‘military 
democracy’ which started the process of unification under Alexander I (c.498-
454BC).”83 Aleksandar Donski (b.1960), from the Institute of History and 
Archaeology Goce Delčev University in Štip, has gone furthest in this argument. In 
2010, Donski (Fig. 4.16) authored an extensive memorandum, comprising quotes and 
maps supporting the Macedonian cause. Under the title The Ancient Macedonians 
Were NOT Greeks! (In Defence of Macedonia) addressed to the USA President, EU 
and NATO officials and selected world universities, Donski replied to the similar 
memorandum sent by Greek scholars to the same institutions in May 2009, which 
demanded the withdrawal of the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under that 
name. So far, Greece blocked all attempts by the former Yugoslav republic to join 
international institutions under the name of Macedonia since 1991, as it considers 
Macedonia part of its own heritage. In 70 pages of the document, Donski argued that 
territory of modern Macedonian Republic belonged to the ancient Paionia, later 
renamed into Macedonia – “a land that was never Greek.” He also argued that 
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Alexander the Great, the most important figure of Ancient Macedonia never 
considered himself a Greek:  
“The term ‘Macedonian Geeks,’ referring to the ancient Macedonians, is a 
time-honoured and meaningless canard. No biographer of Alexander the Great of 
Macedonia ever characterized the ancient Macedonians as ‘Macedonian Greeks,’ but 
only as Macedonians. It is difficult to understand how these expert signatories could 
invent a nonexistent term to support their core premise. One suspects that since no 
ancient biographer of Alexander ever used the term ‘Macedonian Greeks,’ these 
‘experts’ decided that this term needed to be invented to better align their argument 
with the official Greek policies and propaganda that their letter supports. Objective 
contemporary experts agree that the writing of the ancient authors who directly 
observed these societies is far more valuable and valid than the expedient inventions 
of the signatories’… position that Alexander the Great was Greek is effectively 
discredited with his own words: ‘O Macedonians and Grecian allies... I have 
collected you together into the same spot, so that I may either persuade you to 
march forward with me, or may be persuaded by you to return.’”84 
 
Fig. 4.16 – Aleksandar Donski (b.1960) authored in 2009 the theory which argued for separate ethnic 
identities of the Ancient Macedonians and Ancient Greeks. 
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Insisting on the difference between the Macedonians and the Greeks 
emphasised the difference of the state organization and certain customs, as well as the 
fact that non-Greeks were not allowed to participate in the Olympic Games. 
According to the new Macedonian narrative, Alexander I of Macedon (498-454BC) 
was allowed to participate only when he “forged” his Greek origin, because he was 
“not from Argos in Peloponnesus, but from Argos in Orestikon in Upper 
Macedonia.”85 Since no Ancient Macedonian language texts existed, the usage of 
Attic Greek for most of Ancient Macedonian history was usually explained by the 
notion that it was considered the international language of the time.86  
Needless to say, the Greek position on this matter is firmly based on the 
argument that no Slavs could claim Hellenic heritage. Innumerable studies written 
and published by both Greek and international scholars from the Second World War 
onwards maintained the view and insisted on the usage of Greek letters and some 
form of Greek language by the Ancient Macedonians represented sufficient evidence 
for the claim of the Greek origins of the Macedonians: 
“It is generally accepted that the ethnic name of Macedonians derives from the 
Greek term Μακεδών that denotes physical characteristics of the highland tribes, 
distinguishable by their height…”87 wrote Greek scholar Andriotes from the Institute 
for Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki, as early as the 1960s. The main Greek objection 
was based on the presumption that if the usage of the name of Macedonia by the 
Slavs was to be allowed, then “a masterful interplay of the geographical and national 
concepts of the term, these two concepts would be fused into one….and in the ensuing 
confusion, the newly-established Macedonian nation could rightfully stake a claim to 
everything Macedonian.”88 With Macedonian independence from Yugoslavia, Greek 
activities related to what they consider their historical heritage had become a matter 
of national interest.  
Politically, the situation was further complicated by the adoption of the state 
symbols for the Republic of Macedonia. The state’s adopted flag, modified Sun of 
Vergina, a symbol on the tomb of Philip II (359-336BC) near Pella (Fig. 4.17), the 
ancient Macedonian capital, now in Greece was regarded by Greece as a direct 
provocation (Fig. 4.18). After three years of campaigning, Greece won the argument 
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and the state flag of FYROM, which was the state-name internationally officially 
accepted, changed into the modified Sun of Freedom (Fig. 4.19). 
      
Fig. 4.17 – Silver plate depicting the Sun        Fig. 4.18 – The flag of Republic of Macedonia between 
of Vergina, excavated in Vergina, 100km       1992 and 1995. Following Greek objections, it was mo- 
north of Thessaloniki                                       dified into the Sun of Freedom in 1995.             
 
 
Fig. 4.19 – The Sun of Freedom serves as a state-symbol of Macedonian Republic. References to the 
Sun of Vergina are clearly visible. 
4.6.2 “Antiquisation” of the nation 
As material evidence of the Ancient Macedonian kingdom in the 
Macedonian Republic is scarce in comparison with the evidence unearthed in the 
Greek part of Macedonia, the honouring of the Amalgamation Theory was 
exacerbated by a number of new monuments erected in the Macedonian Republic in 
recent years. The erection of monuments dedicated to the great heroes of the past as 
expression of national pride was a traditional way of confirmation of national identity 
and underlining the official national narrative. It was widely used in Europe in the 
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period of building early nation-states during the 19th and early 20th centuries.89 
However, at the beginning of the 21st century, the usage of the 19th century nation-
building techniques appears anachronistic and reflects lack of national self-respect.90  
The extent of the programme of nation-building through the symbolic usage of 
monuments reached such a scale that even some of the more prominent scholars in 
favour of a separate Macedonian identity disparagingly termed it “Antiquisation.”91 
The designed project envisaged the erection of thirty monuments dedicated to the 
famous persons from Ancient Macedonian history. The Macedonian government 
approved its beginning in 2007 under the title Skopje 2014, with aim to rebuild the 
complex of governmental buildings in the capital and give them the appearance of the 
classical architectural design.92  
Among the erected monuments, the most notable was the gigantic statue of 
Alexander the Great (Fig. 4.20 and Fig. 4.21), unveiled on 8 September 2011 on the 
Macedonia Square in Skopje, marking the 20th anniversary of independence. The size 
of the monument represents an expression of the collective belief in the direct descent 
of modern Macedonians from the great hero of the Ancient past.  
Only a few streets away from the 28m tall bronze Warrior on the Horse, as the 
monument to Alexander was officially named, in the Autokomanda part of Skopje, 
the 8m tall monument to Philip II (Fig. 4.22) was erected simultaneously. From the 
time of independence, a number of monuments of different sizes, dedicated to 
Alexander and Philip were unveiled in all major cities and towns in Macedonia. A 
smaller version of Alexander, pointing a long spear into the sky was erected in Prilep 
(Fig. 4.23) and Štip, where Alexander is represented with a sword in his hand (Fig. 
4.24). Another monument to Philip, also 8m tall was also erected in Bitola in 2011 
(Fig. 4.25).  
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Fig. 4.20 – The Warrior on Horse on Macedonia Square in Skopje, unveiled in 2011. The size and 
proportion of the monument were criticized as not corresponding to the surrounding architecture. 
 
Fig. 4.22 – The Warrior on Horse resembles traditional representation of Alexander the Great 
 
Fig. 4.22 – The Monument to Philip II dominates the vista over Skopje. 
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Fig. 4.23 – Alexander, 2011, Prilep                         Fig. 4.24 – Alexander, 2011, Štip 
  
Fig. 4.25 – Philip II, work of a young Macedonian sculptor Angel Korunovski (b.1979), was unveiled 
in Bitola in 2011. 
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Along with these works, a new sports venue, the National Arena Philip II of Macedon 
was built in place of the old stadium, erected in 1978.93 Following major 
reconstruction in 2008, the international airport in Skopje was renamed the Skopje 
Alexander the Great Airport.94 In general, since 1991, the main city squares in most 
Macedonian towns that used to be named after communist partisan fighters of the 
Second World War were systematically re-named after most important historical 
figures and places of Macedonian ancient and mediaeval history. Thus, within the 
Skopje 2014 Programme, the statue of Justinian I was unveiled in 2007 in front of the 
old Stone Bridge,95 as some Macedonian archaeologists maintain the theory that 
Justiniana Prima, birthplace of the great Eastern Roman Emperor is actually Skopje 
(Fig. 4.26).  The nearby Skopje Square was embellished by the marble statue of Tsar 
Samuil in 2011, a move that was received with critical amusement by the Bulgarian 
public (Fig. 4.27).96 Similar amusement took place among the Serbian public when 
the statue of Emperor Stefan Dušan was symbolically unveiled in front of the 
Supreme Court in 2013 (Fig. 4.28). 
 
Fig. 4.26 – Monument to Justinian I (527-565), considered to be Macedonian, according to the new 
Macedonian national narrative. In the background, the Stone Bridge (current structure re-built by 
Mehmed II Conqueror in the 15th century on the foundation of the mediaeval bridge built by Stefan 
Dušan IV in the early 14th century on even earlier Roman foundations. In the background, across the 
River Vardar, the construction of the new Archaeological Museum of Macedonia. 
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Fig. 4.27 – Monument to Tsar Samuil on Skopje Square 
 
Fig. 4.28 – Monument to Emperor Stefan Dušan was erected in 2013 in front of the Supreme Court as 
a reference to his Code of 1349. Almost immediately it was damaged by the supporters of the ethnic 
Albanian political parties from Skopje. 
Chapter IV                                                                                           The Macedonians 
 349
The newly urbanized Pella Square in Skopje was chosen as a place to honour a 
controversial Krste Misirkov in 2007 (Fig. 4.29). However, in 2012, the Pella Square 
received a monument worthy of the Imperial Rome: the triumphal arch. (Fig. 4.30).  
 Fig. 4.29 – Monument to Krste Misirkov          
 
Fig. 4.30 – Porta Macedonia, unveiled in 2012. The decorative plastic on the triumphal arch refer to 
the important periods of Macedonian history. In the background, the Warrior on Horse. Both 
sculptures are by Valentina Stefanovska, a sculptress closely associated to the Prime Minister Nikola 
Gruevski.   
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During the unveiling of Porta Macedonia, the current Prime Minister Nikola 
Gruevski (b.1970) admitted that he personally was the initiator of the Project Skopje 
2014.97 Judging from the scope of planned works and the scale of costs, it appears 
that insisting on monumentality aimed to argue the Macedonian version of national 
history.98 For the design of the monuments, the government in Skopje chose twenty-
eight sculptors and architects from several Macedonian universities. The author of the 
Warrior on Horse and Porta Macedonia, a sculptress Valentina Stefanovska, as the 
most prominent of them, was commissioned by the state officials to execute the most 
ambitious monuments.99 Her commission is reminiscent of that of Ivan Meštrović 
during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia when he was one of the key-promoters of Integral 
Yugoslavism.100 The similarity between Meštrović, the Yugoslav court-artist, and 
Stefanovska, the state-artist of a newly created nation state, could be observed only in 
the fact that both worked as promoters of artificial national narratives imposed from 
the state authorities, rather than from the belief of the general population.101  
There is an observed tendency that the smaller and newer the state is, the larger 
the public monuments are being erected as a clear statement to the wider world that 
the new state is here to stay. This tendency can be viewed as an act of national self-
convincing in the truth of the proscribed national narrative.102 Therefore, the example 
of the Project Skopje 2014 represents a typical case-study of an all-inclusive banal 
nationalism on a collective socio-psychological level, as described by Billig.103 
4.7 “Acculturation” of the nation 
The general idea of the Amalgamation theory was to legitimize the existence of 
the modern nation-state of Macedonia, as a South Slavic state different from both 
Bulgaria and Serbia. Despite loud Greek objections that it is aimed primarily at Greek 
national interests, the real reasons behind the acquisition of the ancient heritage by 
the modern Macedonian state lay in the desire to distinguish itself from its two Slavic 
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neighbours. It also aims to counteract the Albanian national narrative which claims 
the ancient Illyrian heritage and the territory of, at least, the western part of the 
modern republic. 
With this in sight, the Amalgamation Theory aims to link the historical events 
between the 6th and 9th centuries with ancient period. The sources referring to the 
regional socio-political situation relate mainly to the southern Balkans and Adriatic 
coast. The most important one, Porphyrogenitus’ De Administrando Imperio from the 
first part of the 10th century, recorded the names of the various Slavic tribes for the 
first time in history. Of all the Balkan Slavic tribes mentioned by Porphirogenitus, 
only the Serbs and the Croats survived under their names.104 The tribes which did not 
preserve their names, such were Draguvites, Sagudats, Strymonians, for example, and 
which lived in the Thessaloniki hinterland were conveniently deployed by the new 
Macedonian narrative as the true ancestors of the Macedonian Slavs.105 According to 
modern Macedonian scholarship, they could not preserve their ethnic names because 
they mixed with the local, certainly not Greek, population that survived the demise of 
the Roman Empire:  
“The inhabitants of Macedonia outlived their physical existence in the material 
culture they left behind….Towards the close of the Antique Period all these 
nationalities and minorities were melded into a homogenous ethnic entity, known as 
Romaioi….The meeting of the Romaic and the Slavonic worlds is a key factor in an 
interpretation of international relations in Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages. The 
acculturation occurred through Christianity.”106  
The lack of information about the tribes inhabiting Macedonia immediately 
after the settlement of the Slavs is usually discussed as the analogous to the better 
known Serbian and Croatian early settlements:  
“During the 7th century, the Macedonian Slavs twice formed large tribal 
unions… (which) represented the basis for establishing a (not yet developed) political 
community; not less developed than the tribal union of the Serbs and the Croats in 
                                               
104
 D.A.I., Volume I: 29-37. Also, see Chapter I – Historical background, p. 26-27 
105Павловски, Ј. ᴎ Павловски, М. – Македонија, вчера и днес, Книгоиздателство, Скопје, 1996 – 
Pavlovski, J. and Pavlovski, M. – Macedonia, yesterday and today, Knigoizdatelstvo, Skopje, 1996, 
57. There were no records of the “Slav speaking Macedonians” ever in existence. 
106
 Čausidis, 1995, 73-93 – Prof. Čausidis, himself originally from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, was one of 
the great promoters of the new Macedonian identity in the first years of Macedonian independence. 
From the theoretical builder of the national identity, nearly two decades later, he became one of the 
fiercest critics of the manner in which the materialization of the narrative was taking place. 
Chapter IV                                                                                           The Macedonians 
 352
the 9th-10th centuries.”107 The acculturation, according to this theory, was a synthesis 
of the material, cultural and spiritual values of natives and conquerors and lasted for 
many centuries. Their co-habitation additionally ascertained that Slavic tribes did not 
settle in a deserted and empty territory.108 Direct contact resulted in the interweaving 
of the two heritages: the old Balkan cultural and mythical with the new Slavic culture 
and myth.”109  
The mixing of the population had inevitably happened, but to what extent it is 
impossible to determine. A relatively small number of Latin and Greek words that 
entered Slavic languages point to a lesser percentage of influence. A very few ancient 
myths and motifs survived in the oral Slavic poetry collected during the 19th and 20th 
centuries among the Southern Slavs. That suggests that either the Slavs outnumbered 
the local population to an extent that the assimilation was on the side of the Slavs, or 
that the area they inhabited was scarcely populated. In the first case, the assimilated 
local population would have lost the memories of their ancient roots, which would 
mean that the assimilation into the Slavic stratum severed the links with the pre-
Slavic Balkans. In the second case, if the Slavs had encountered the vast empty 
territory, as some researchers of the period suggest, the link with the pre-Slavic 
Balkans did not exist from the start.110  
However, the remains of the material culture, from the Neolithic period until 
the settlement of the Slavs, not fully scientifically explored and interpreted, but 
scattered all over the territory of present-day Macedonia, were being used for another 
assertion of the Amalgamation Theory: the earliest Christians in the Balkans were 
from the region of Macedonia.  
“The ruins of over 230 basilicas have been located, but only small percentage 
have been excavated and studied. A third, quite considerable group have not yet been 
located, although their existence is confirmed by high quality stone samples. This 
abundance of Early Christian shrines shows Macedonia to have been one of the most 
magnificent Early Christian centres of the Mediterranean region.”111 
Similarly, the later spread of Christianity among the settled Slavs conducted by 
the missionary work of brothers Cyril (827-869) and Methodius (815/820-885), 
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themselves natives of Macedonia, was explained as deriving exclusively from the 
Macedonian linguistic background. Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, “Apostles to 
the Slavs,” when creating the first Slavic alphabet, based it on their native tongue. 
According to the Amalgamation Theory, this means that the Old Church Slavonic was 
essentially the Old Macedonian. The brothers Cyril and Methodius “most probably 
came from the Bregalnica region, where Methodius was an administrator, although 
the archaeology has yet to confirm it.”112 The argument augments not only that the 
missionary brothers were Macedonian Slavs, but that they also spoke the Macedonian 
Slavic language or, at least, its early version. Equaly, the disciples of Cyril and 
Methodius, St. Clement (840-916) and St. Naum (830-916), founders of one of the 
earliest Slavic schools in Ohrid were also considered to be of ethnic Macedonian Slav 
descent.113 Thus, both pairs of early Slavic scholars, being natives of Macedonia, 
were worth of monuments within the Project Skopje 2014 nation-building programme 
(Fig. 1.a.6 and Fig. 1.a.7).  
4.7.1 Mediaeval Empire – Bulgarian 9th-11th centuries? 
As mentioned earlier, the ethnic identity of Tsar Samuil (997-1014) from the 
period of the First Bulgarian Empire (681-1018), caused a great academic debate 
between Serbian and Bulgarian scholars in the later 19th and early 20th centuries. 
During Tito’s regime in Yugoslavia, the theory of the Macedonian Slavic Empire of 
Samuil, initially put forward by the Serbian academics of the early 20th century, was 
further refined and sanctioned for the official use in school syllabuses of the Republic 
of Macedonia. Macedonian scholars presently argue that Tsar Samuil could not have 
been a Bulgarian because “in the minds of the Byzantines there was only one empire 
different from their own in the Balkans: that of the Bulgarians.”114 They further 
argued that Samuil’s rule, centred on Ohrid in the territory of modern Macedonian 
republic, was important geo-strategically regarding Byzantium, and indicated 
Samuil’s intent to “empower Macedonia”, his native country.115 
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 This theory was seriously weakened after the discovery of the Cyrillic 
inscription in Bitola116 which commemorates the construction of the Fort by Samuil’s 
nephew as “a haven for the salvation of the Bulgarians.”117 The inscription, dated 
between 1014/15, was discovered in 1956, during the demolition of the Ottoman 
mosque in Bitola (Fig. 4.31). It is currently housed in the Bitola Municipal Museum, 
although not open to the public.  
 
Fig. 4.31 – Bitola Inscription which corroborated Tsar Samuil’s connection with the Bulgars. 
In 2006, a huge controversy arose when the French Ministry of Culture 
undertook the sponsorship of the catalogue representing Macedonian heritage. The 
front page of the catalogue consisted of the reproduction of the Bitola Inscription. 
The local government objected to its publication as “Macedonian heritage was 
presented as Bulgarian”. The catalogue was never published.118 
The surviving monuments from the period, dispersed all over the region, 
necessary for the corroboration of the narrative are predominantly of an ecclesiastical 
character: churches and monasteries. Also, some elements of military structures, such 
as city walls and fortresses, built with large rectangular stone blocks, survived, but 
usually lacking sufficient/exact recorded data about their founders and/or architects. 
Further complication is that very few monuments from this period survived in their 
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original state, due to later additions and conversions, especially during the Ottoman 
period. The remains of secular architecture of this time are generally insignificant. 
There are no remnants which would serve as a basis for shaping a picture of palaces, 
houses or town planning. There are no preserved examples of individual domestic 
dwellings from the pre-Ottoman era. All architectural units that could be described as 
individual houses date to the 19th-20th century.119 Such a situation enables speculative 
interpretation on an unprecedented scale.  
For the 9th-11th century period in Macedonia, the most notable is the mediaeval 
complex of the Ohrid churches and monasteries (Fig. 4.32). When Samuil transferred 
his capital from Preslav to Ohrid, the disciples of Cyril and Methodius, St. Clement 
and St. Naum came to Ohrid to continue the work of their teachers. They founded 
two churches on the opposite sides of the Lake Ohrid, in which they were later 
burried.120  
The new Macedonian narrative argues that “during the Macedonian Empire of 
Samuil, new characteristics appeared in Macedonian architecture, long after the 
Byzantine architectural influence had run its course….This suggests the existence of a 
separate Macedonian school of architecture.”121 As an example, Pavlovski points to 
the Monastery of St. Panteleimon, also in Ohrid, consecrated by St. Clement in 893, 
which had “oval” forms, as opposed to the round 3-conchal buildings (Fig. 4.33). But, 
the church that survives today is not the original 9th century monument. The whole 
complex of mediaeval churches and the city walls of Old Ohrid, dated to the period of 
Samuil’s Empire, were carefully restored in recent years. Parallel with the restoration 
of mediaeval heritage, a team of archaeologists led by Paško Kuzman of the Institute 
and Museum of Ohrid, excavated the remains of the “ancient fortress, assumed to be 
built by Philip II of Macedon (Fig. 4.34).”122  
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Fig. 4.32 – The Monastery of St. Naum, Ohrid, late 9th century. Byzantine style of architecture re-
named into Macedonian school of architecture 
 
 
Fig. 4.33 – The Monastery of St. Panteleimon, Ohrid, 9th century. “Oval” forms of the single nave 
building are now described as a unique Macedonian school of architecture. 
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Fig. 4.34 – The Monastery of St. Panteleimon, 9th century, Ohrid. In the front, the ancient ruins 
unearthed during the conservation works, now presumed to have been built by Philip II of Macedon in 
the fourth century BC. 
 
During the Ottoman period, the Ohrid church of St. Panteleimon was converted 
into a mosque, only to be restored to its previous use after the Ottomans left in 1913. 
In 2000-2002, the complex underwent major reconstruction and was restored to what 
it might have looked like in the time of its consecration.123 It is now referred to as the 
most sacred mediaeval monument of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. A similar 
designation was given to other churches and monasteries on the whole territory of the 
Republic of Macedonia, despite the fact that the Macedonian Orthodox Church was 
never ecumenically recognized. 
4.7.2 Macedonian Orthodox heritage – Serbian 13th-14th centuries? 
The creation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church was a political act of the 
Communist regime in Yugoslavia. In 1958, the Serbian Orthodox Church was put 
under pressure to recognize the autonomy of the Ohrid Archbishopric, which was 
under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Patriarchate after the creation of Yugoslavia.124 
In 1967, on the bicentenary of the abolition of the Ohrid Archbishopry, the higher 
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clergy in the Republic of Macedonia, prompted by the Communist authorities, 
unilaterally announced its autocephalous status from the Serbian Patriarchate, which 
in return declared such a move as schismatic.  
Since then, all three neighbouring Orthodox churches, Bulgarian, Greek and 
Serbian blocked the attempts of the Ohrid Archbishopric to become a separate 
national church. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the powerful 
Russian Patriarchate sided with the Serbian Church. The struggle for ecclesiastical 
supremacy over Macedonia has remained in stalemate ever since. In 2002, the 
Serbian and Macedonian clergy began negotiations at Niš.125 The attempt to reach an 
agreement, backed by both governments, produced no results. The Macedonian 
negotiators argued is that the Macedonian Church should be allowed the autocephaly, 
as it would restore the long tradition of the Ohrid See, established in 535 by the 
Emperor Justinian.126 The Serbian church questioned the ecumenical legality of the 
Macedonian church.127 The dispute resulted in Serbian priests being banned from 
entering Macedonia. In return, the Serbian church has prevented the celebration of the 
Day of the State of Macedonia within the compounds of the Monastery Prohor 
Pčinjski, where the Republic of Macedonia was founded in 1944. The dispute 
between the churches intensified after the Serbian Orthodox Church demanded to 
take into its care the mediaeval monasteries of the Nemanjić period (12th-14th 
centuries), which happen to be the best preserved heritage on the territory of the 
republic. The struggle for jurisdiction over 1200 churches, most of which are dated 
from the period when the Serbian dynasty ruled Macedonia, effectively turned into a 
struggle for building the new national identity. Currently, Serbia does not interfere in 
the church dispute in Macedonia, but Serbian intellectuals regularly warn on the state 
sponsored eradication of the remnants of the Serbian ethnicity in the Macedonian 
Republic.128 
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Serbian state influence in mediaeval Macedonia became significant after 1185. 
The Nemanjić rulers and their vassals followed the Byzantine tradition of church 
building. As the main artistic and architectural influence for all orthodox Balkan 
countries emanated from Byzantium, most of the Orthodox heritage was subject to 
the great nationalist debates about the ethnic origins of the founders of these 
monuments. Throughout the mediaeval and Ottoman periods, the churches and 
monasteries had been destroyed, rebuilt, converted and returned to its previous use. 
Only in a few cases do inscriptions or charters clearly identify a founder (ktitor) or a 
master-architect.  
An extensive in-depth literature on the technical details and artistic influences 
about all major monuments in the region is available in all Balkan languages and is 
beyond the scope of this study. What is of concern is the current interpretation of the 
significance and the change in the nomenclature of architectural styles.129 Inventing 
new names for the existing architectural styles and assigning different characteristics 
to them is often based on peculiarities of local detailing, rather than significant 
aesthetic differences. Current academic writings that endorse such practise have 
function of the nation-building process. By obscuring the origins of the monuments 
through the invention and re-employment of new names for the specific 
archaeological heritage and architectural styles – particularly for the ecclesiastical 
buildings of the exceptional historical value – political and academic elites engaged 
in the nation-building programme aim to achieve their objectives by frequent 
repetition of their arguments.   
During 9th-11th centuries, according to the new Macedonian interpretation, 
Constantinople abandoned basilicas as an architectural type. The multitude of 
monuments in the Balkans from that period has been described as a union of two 
types: the basilica and the cruciform-domed cupola.130 This interpretation of the 
historic architecture became a “programmatic imperative” for the restoration of the 
church organization of the Ohrid Archbishopric. As the nobles who commissioned 
the churches and monasteries were almost exclusively Byzantine, they naturally 
aimed at copying the Constantinopolitan tastes. In doing so, they were employing 
foreign master-builders. The case study of the re-interpretation of heritage for modern 
political purposes could be shown on yet another church dedicated to St. Panteleimon 
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near Skopje (Fig. 4.35). Built in 1164 by Alexius Porphyrogenitus, grandson of the 
Byzantine Emperor Alexius I Comnenus (1081-1118), the Church of Panteleimon 
was interpreted to have “its walls broken by entrances to the arms of the cross, a sign 
not of a predestined power of the Empire, but of a family pledge to piety.”131 This 
argument can be only partly accepted. The smaller scale of the Balkan monuments is 
not necessarily linked to the “family pledge” of the ruling nobles, but the need to 
commission of as many religious objects as possible, as that was the way to keep the 
population in subjection. The small size of the churches was often caused by the 
limitation of the older foundations. This explanation points to the conclusion that the 
later (and better preserved) mediaeval monuments of the Nemanjić period were not a 
novel approach to building, but the product of local inventiveness. 
 
Fig. 4.35 – The church of St. Panteleimon in Gornji Nerezi near Skopje. Built by the member of the 
Comneni dynasty in the 12th century, it is now renamed into Macedonian historic architecture. 
 
According to the Amalgamation Theory, “one of the most important 14th 
century monuments, Staro Nagoričino near Kumanovo, built by King Milutin 
Nemanjić (1282-1321), was in the dominant style of the century: a cross within a 
square, with a cupola resting on four columns. However, the builders of the Staro 
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Nagoričino used an elongated five-domed cross, precisely because of the shape of the 
old building, which is now lost.”132 Insisting on the limitation of the older 
foundations should lead to the conclusion that the 13th-14th century Serbian kingdom 
in Macedonia had a similar “usurping role” like the Byzantium or Bulgaria between 
the 6th-12th centuries. In reality, the 14th century monuments in Macedonia did indeed 
develop certain differences from the Constantinopolitan monuments of the same 
period. Namely, there was a visible increase in Romanesque features, particularly in 
architectural details. This did not come from the declining Constantinople, but from 
the North-West, through Serbia. Neither Bulgarian nor Byzantine architectural styles 
of the period contain Western influences. Serbian styles, on the other hand, do. The 
reason for this was the proximity of Catholic countries on the northern and western 
Serbia borders and a strong economic connection with Italian Adriatic city-states. 
Several styles developed in the 12th-15th century’s Serbian architecture, each named 
according to the region of its origin.133 It was normal to expect the ruling families in 
Macedonia to adopt the royal fashion. 
4.7.3 Palaeologian Renaissance – Macedonian version 
The last centuries of the Byzantine Empire under the Palaeologian dynasty 
(1261-1453) were marked by constant warfare and economic impoverishment.134 This 
period is sometimes referred to as the Palaeologian Renaissance, meaning the revival 
of Orthodox Byzantium under the last Byzantine dynasty after the short period of 
Latin rule (1204-1261). The term itself, coined in the 1990s, is deliberately 
misleading and a twofold problematic; the word “Renaissance” was always most 
commonly associated with the revival of the classical art and architecture in 15th-16th 
century Italian states and, secondly, the Palaeologi did not have the economic power 
to implement significant building programmes that would lead to the union of the 
Western and Eastern architectural styles, despite several attempts to create the union 
of the churches, split in 1054. 
The Amalgamation Theory introduced the term Palaeologian Renaissance in 
the aftermath of Yugoslav dissolution in order to describe the surviving 14th century 
Nemanjić monuments of the Vardarska School of Architecture in Macedonia, as 
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“those close to the imperial workshop of the Emperor Andronicus II (1282-1328).”135 
It entirely neglected the fact that the reign of Andronicus II had little or no influence 
over much of the Empire’s former Balkan territories.136 The problem of the 
terminology was additionally exacerbated by the Albanian acquisition of the term for 
stylistically very different Raška School of Architecture was deployed during their 
nation-building programmes in the Kosovo and Metohija in the mid-2000s.137 Both 
Albanian and Macedonian arguments, however, neglect the fact that the Byzantine 
artistic influence was in decline for nearly a hundred years prior to the erection of 
these monuments in Kosovo and Metohija and Macedonia. The weakened Byzantine 
Empire under the Palaeologues was not able to significantly influence the art and 
architecture beyond its crumbling borders. The Palaeologian period (1261-1453) was 
constantly plagued by economic deficiency and the Paleologian emperors were often 
referred to as “paupers in their own house.”138 Building and restoration works of the 
Paleologian Renaissance were modest: “…many of the churches were little more 
than empty shells and…even the Imperial Palace of Blachernae was crumbling.”139 
As such, they were in sharp contrast to the extensive works of the Nemanjić kings 
who ruled over the northern Macedonia since the second part of the 13th century and 
openly aspired to take over Byzantium.  
Re-naming the Serbian Vardarska School after the contemporary but absent 
Byzantine dynasty provided the connection between the “Macedonian Slav Empire of 
Samuil” and the “Macedonian Kingdom of Prilep” discovered in the 1990s.140 The 
invention of a Palaeologian Renaissance Style served to legitimize the territoriality of 
the modern nation-state. 
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4.7.4 Twilight of Christianity – The Macedonian Kingdom of Prilep 
After the death of the Emperor Stefan Dušan in 1355, the Serbian state went 
into a rapid disintegration. Most of the grand lords from his court ruled as 
independent princes and fought each other for territorial supremacy. In this sense, the 
Serbian mediaeval state was no different from Byzantium. The rule over the territory 
of modern Macedonia was in the hands of the powerful Mrnjavčević brothers, 
Vukašin (c.1320-1371) and Uglješa (c.1346-1371).141 Vukašin crowned himself king 
in 1365, usurping the power from a young son of Stefan Dušan. In 1371, however, 
the brothers lost the Battle of Maritza, after which the Vukašin’s kingdom became a 
vassal state to the expanding Ottoman Empire.142 Vukašin’s son Marko ruled in 
Prilep (southern Macedonia) as a vassal to the Ottomans. He died in 1395 fighting 
alongside the Ottomans in Wallachia.  
King Marko (c.1335-1395) became the most important individual hero of 
Serbian epic poetry. Admittedly, he appears in both the Macedonian and Bulgarian 
oral tradition,143 but the Serbian folklore references about Marko far outnumber both 
of them. The earliest, 16th century records referring to Marko come from a Dubrovnik 
historian Mavro Orbini (d.1614). In his Il Regno degli Slavi, published in Pesaro in 
1601, Orbini placed the origins of Marko’s family somewhere in Herzegovina, but 
there is no confirmation of this claim. As there are no surviving contemporary written 
documents about the Mrnjavčević genealogy, it is very difficult to disentangle the 
historic Marko from the hero of the myth.  
The historical Marko left several monuments in the territory which he ruled in 
the 14th century. The remains of the city walls and a donjon of Marko’s castle in 
Prilep in Macedonia are still visible (Fig. 4.36). The Marko’s Tower and a few epic 
poems collected from the area in the early 20th century were considered sufficient 
enough to establish a new term in Macedonian mediaevalist studies: the short-lived 
Kingdom of Prilep (1365-1395), the last Macedonian national revival before the final 
Ottoman conquest. From the archaeological evidence, Marko’s Tower was built over 
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the much earlier settlement, as, indeed, most of the Balkan mediaeval towns were, but 
the present condition of the remains cannot give any conclusive answer to the 
question of the ethnic background of the builders.  
 
Fig. 4.36 – The western wall of Marko’s castle in Prilep 
Much better preserved, however, is Marko’s Monastery, 18km south of Skopje, 
near the Markova River (Fig. 4.37). The monastery itself was built during the reigns 
of Vukašin and Marko (1342-1371) and is itself the work of two different building 
schools: one, influenced by the Byzantine church architecture similar to that in Ohrid, 
and another, influenced by the Serbian Morava School.144 Based on this analogy of 
the fusion of the styles, Macedonian scholars boldly asserted that “no soil for the 
growth of the new northern plan (which, actually, originated in Mt. Athos (sic!)) was 
to be found on King Marko’s territory…The most evident example is that of the 
Church of St. Andrew on the River Treska, near Skopje, built in 1388 by Marko’s 
brother Andreas. It differs from the Morava churches both inside – as the cupola 
rests on the walls – and on the outside, which is cruciform.”145 However, the 
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monastery was built in 1388/1389,146 years in which the Ottoman presence cut off the 
Moravian influence from the southern lands of the former Serbian Empire (Fig. 4.38). 
This inevitably influenced the works on the erection of the monastery. Thus, the 
differences to which modern Macedonian art historians refer in their attempt to 
describe a separate Macedonian mediaeval architectural style remain unique to this 
church only. No other mediaeval monument in Macedonia or elsewhere has similar 
characteristics. Whether this one church is enough to serve as an example of a 
separate and unique national architectural style in the Macedonian Republic remains 
within the discourse of the nation-creation programmes on the territory of former 
Yugoslavia. Except for St. Andrews, built on the eve of the Ottoman conquest, the 
rest of the 13-14th century churches in this part of Macedonia were built under the 
Nemanjić kings and their vassals and belong to the Vardarska School of Architecture.  
 
Fig. 4.37 – Marko’s Monastery near Skopje, built 1342-1371, frescoes 1366-1371 
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Fig. 4.38 – St. Andrew’s Monastery in Treska Canyon 
4.7.5 A five centuries long sleep – Ottoman influence 
The Ottoman period marked the penetration of Islamic and Oriental 
influences in every sphere of life in Macedonia. Similar to the other conquered 
Balkan states, all higher echelons of the society were either of Turkish/Asian origins 
or converted native Christians. After the conquest, urban landscape was re-modelled 
entirely on Oriental principles with the town population predominantly Muslim, with 
the exception of the Jewish quarters in larger towns.147 High taxation of the Christian 
population meant that the money for the repair works of the surviving churches and 
monasteries from the pre-Ottoman period was frequently inadequate. Equally, there 
was a great loss of professional labour. The skilled architects were either converts 
working for the Ottoman commissioners, or they had emigrated to the Christian 
states.148  
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Throughout the Ottoman period, most of the surviving churches and 
monasteries were repaired at some point in history. Depending on the scale of repair 
and the materials used, the differences in craftsmanship and artistic value are easy to 
identify. The later works are usually of much poorer quality. The church architecture 
of the Ottoman period in Macedonia was researched less than the pre-Ottoman 
heritage, though this was not due to its insignificance. A multitude of small single-
isled, barrel-vaulted village churches were built mostly by anonymous builders. 
However, these churches, usually situated in remote villages and away from the main 
trade routes, left them out from the researchers’ focus. The churches from the 
Ottoman period often display significant Islamic influence, usually present in the 
façade details which frequently consist of semi-arches or sometimes pointed oriental 
arches.149  
After the conquest, larger towns and cities had undergone a major 
transformation. The mosques erected from the 15th century onwards were usually in 
the most prominent parts of the urban settlements and bear all the features of the 
Ottoman school. The largest surviving monuments from the Ottoman era include the 
Mustapha Pasha Mosque in Skopje (Fig. 4.39), built in 1492, the Painted Mosque in 
Tetovo (Fig. 4.40), built in 1495 and the 1558 Yeni Mosque (Fig. 4.41) in Monastir 
(Bitola). Because most of the mosques were built more than a century after the 
conquest, “none of the Turkish edifices in this region possesses the tradition of the 
church building.”150 
 After the Gülhame Hattişerif of 1839, Macedonian towns witnessed the great 
influx of the peasant (Christian) population.151 The new urbanites were still tied to 
their land and the emancipation was slow. Thus, the urban architecture of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries was still greatly influenced by Ottoman aesthetics and petrified 
patriarchal Christian code. The best representation of this socio-cultural urban model 
is the Old Town of Ohrid, now a World Heritage Site (Fig. 4. 42).  
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Fig. 4.39 – Mustapha-Pasha Mosque, Skopje, built in 1492. 
 
  
Fig. 4.40 – Painted Mosque, Tetovo, built in 1495. 
 
The building of churches and monasteries resumed in the mid-19th century, but 
most of these were modelled on the old mediaeval buildings, with a few novelties, 
imported from other Orthodox countries. Analysed individually, none of the 
architectural features of these monuments possess a particularly national character. 
The reason for this was that the master-builders were moving freely throughout the 
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Balkans and worked where they could earn their wages. Had they been university 
educated like their European counterparts of the time, there might have been some 
notion of the individual architectural achievements. As this was not the case, most of 
the 19th and early 20th century architecture has a provincial character, albeit with 
plenty of charm deriving from the specific climate and natural beauty of the region. 
      
Fig. 4.41 – Yeni Mosque, Bitola, built in 1558          Fig. 4.42 – Ohrid, Old Town, 19th century 
After the Ottomans lost control of Macedonia in 1913 and in the period during 
and after the First World War, many of the Islamic buildings, particularly in smaller 
towns, were demolished. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia attempted modernization, but 
this was slow and insufficient and often marred by violence and destruction from the 
remnants of the pro-Bulgarian and pro-Albanian para-military units that dwelt in the 
mountains and attacked the Yugoslav authorities. Larger public buildings in Skopje 
and other towns were being erected not earlier than the late 1930s. By then, any 
process that would result in national self-identification of the population of the 
Vardarska Macedonia with the Serbs was seriously compromised. 
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4.8 Albanian Macedonia 
From the establishment of the Macedonian separate nation until the republic’s 
independence from Yugoslavia, an enormous task for nation-building had been set. 
The illiteracy that was endemic at the beginning of the 20th century was annihilated 
within a century and, according to the 2002 census, 96.1% of population was 
functionally literate.152 However, the winning of independence posed a new threat to 
the new Macedonian nation-state, significantly different from the traditional 
arguments with Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia.  
The Republic of Macedonia now faces the rise of the Albanian nationalism in 
the west of the country. With one quarter of its population being ethnic Albanians, 
Macedonia is internally under constant pressure to allow the federalization of the 
state. As early as November 1993, Macedonian police arrested a group of Albanians 
(including a deputy minister of defence in the government of Macedonia) and 
accused them of attempting to establish an “autonomous province of Ilirida” in the 
west of the country where Albanians form the overall majority of the population.153  
In 1994, the Albanians from the west of the Macedonian Republic established 
the University of Tetovo without applying for the permission from the authorities. 
With syllabuses identical to the corresponding institutions in Albania and Albanian 
held Kosovo and Metohija, the lectures were being held exclusively in Albanian. The 
tensions between the Albanians and Macedonian Slavs grew as the wars in the rest of 
Yugoslavia were unfolding and culminated after the Kosovo war of 1999 which the 
Kosovo’s Albanians won with the strong military support of NATO. The Albanian 
population of Macedonia immediately tried to assert their territorial claims to the 
western part of the country, which, according to the Albanian national narrative, 
represents a part of the ancient Dardania, which they consider the Albanian historic 
land, usurped by the Slavs.  
In January 2001, the insurgency erupted between the Albanian guerrilla fighters 
and the Macedonian police. The hostilities lasted until November 2001, when both 
sides, pressed by NATO, stopped fighting. Macedonia was obliged to give a wider 
range of rights to the Albanian minority, which included proclaiming the Albanian 
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language as the second official language in the country154 and enable Albanian 
political parties to participate in all forms of government as well as to allow the 
decentralization of the country. Albanians, in return, had to denounce their separatist 
claims. As a result, the University of Tetovo was recognized by the Macedonian 
authorities in 2004.155 
During the hostilities, the main attack happened in the village of Lešok, where a 
monastery church of St. Atanasius, originally built in the 14th century, was destroyed 
by the ethnic Albanians (Fig. 4.43).156 Next to the church was a grave of Kiril 
Pejčinoviḱ (Fig. 4.5), regarded by the Macedonian new narrative as the “the father of 
Macedonian literature.”157 The demolition of the church was regarded by the 
Orthodox Macedonians as an attack on their national and religious culture by the 
Muslim Albanians. The cessation of hostilities enforced by NATO did not end the 
tense inter-ethnic relations between the Christian Macedonians and Muslim 
Albanians.158 The result of the conflict was a growing distrust between the 
Macedonian and Albanian political parties.  
On 28 November 2008, the Day of the Albanian Flag – an official state holiday 
in Albania – a leader of the Albanian political party and former leader of the 
insurgents, Ali Ahmeti (b.1959), opened the Museum of Freedom in the Albanian part 
of Skopje. The Museum is dedicated to all Albanian national fighters from the time of 
the Prizren League until the 2001 insurgency. During the inauguration of the 
Museum, Ahmeti referred to Skopje as “the ancient city in the heart of Dardania.”159 
The Museum is housed in the restored house of the Ottoman official Jašar Bey, built 
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around 1885 and listed as a building of historic importance in 2007 (Fig. 4.44).160 The 
Albanian historian from Macedonia, Skender Asani said at the opening ceremony that 
the Museum of Freedom “was the greatest day for Albanians since 2001,” which 
indicates that military clashes between ethnic Albanians and Macedonian police are 
considered as rightful fight for Albanian national territory.161 
  
Fig. 4.43 – St. Atanasius Church, Lešok, destroyed in 2001 and reconstructed in 2005. In the front, the 
grave of Kiril Pejčinoviḱ. 
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Fig. 4.44 – The Albanian Museum of Freedom, opened in Skopje in 2008, causing a lot of controversy. 
4.8.1 Encyclopaedia 
In 2009, the MANU published a new Encyclopaedia, edited by the historian 
Blaže Ristovski (b.1931).162 Unsurprisingly, it included most of the Macedonian 
arguments about state, peoples and history as discussed in this study. Macedonian 
schools based their educational syllabuses on the narratives given in the 
Encyclopaedia and endorsed by the Macedonian Academia. However, the 
Encyclopaedia was immediately condemned by the Albanians, who opposed being 
interpreted as “Arnauts and Shqiptars – the highland people who moved into the 
territory of the present-day Macedonia in the 16th century, following the Ottoman 
programme of awarding the land to the converts to Islam.”163 The Albanian 
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population regarded this part of the Encyclopaedia as historically incorrect, insulting 
and required the withdrawal of the publication.164 This, however, did not happen, 
resulting in the school syllabuses in Albanian schools in Macedonia and the 
University of Tetovo being based on the official publications of the Albanian 
Academy in Albania. Consequently, two ethnic groups, living in the same territory, 
educate their young generations on two mutually exclusive interpretations of national 
history. 
In July 2011, the Albanian political parties won the right for the Albanian 
ministers in the Macedonian Government to make public announcements and answer 
the questions within the Parliament Building in the Albanian language.165 The 
Macedonian public regarded this move as another concession by the Macedonian 
politicians, whilst the Albanians saw it as a failure to win the full recognition of 
Albanian human, cultural and historical rights.166  
4.9 So, Who are the Macedonians? 
Macedonia became a UN member in 1993 under the “technical” name of 
FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, following the Greek objections 
about the name. At that time, the Macedonian Foreign Minister argued:  
“We have used that name (Macedonia) for centuries to try to draw a distinction 
between us as a people and the surrounding people, the Bulgarians, the Serbs, the 
Greeks and the Albanians…It is very important to our identity. So, if we eliminated 
the word ‘Macedonia’ from our name we would in fact create a crisis of identity, we 
would sterilize the region where we live and we would reopen a century-long debate 
about who the people who live here are…”167  
This explanation revealed a somewhat contradictory remark that the Slav 
Macedonian identity and state were better protected within the Second Yugoslavia 
then after gaining the independence. The loud insistence on the uniqueness of 
Macedonian nation and newly created national narrative, reflect a certain lack in 
confidence that such a small state would be able to survive as an independent entity. 
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The more stubborn the Macedonian insistence on its right to claim the Ancient 
Macedonian heritage, the more likely the Greek opposition to its northern neighbour 
will remain. Despite the economic hardship that engulfed Greece in recent years, its 
academic influence worldwide is far stronger than that of the Macedonian republic. 
The international academics who favour the Greek view outnumber by far those 
scholars who support the Macedonian objections to the Greek ownership of the 
Ancient Heritage.168 Greece certainly shows no interest in acquiring the territory of 
the republic, but is greatly concerned about the potential outcome of the full 
recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and the adoption of its ancient heritage, as 
it may lead to territorial aspirations towards Greece by Macedonia itself. 
On the other hand, the Macedonians themselves do not help much to allay 
Greek fears. In 2008, Seraphinoff and Stefou, following the line of some intellectuals 
and politicians in Skopje, argued that:  
“…if some new international conference on the Balkans should be on the table, 
the old Macedonian Question must be also revisited in all its variants. This should 
include the possibility of a Greater Macedonia that would incorporate portions of 
Albania, Bulgaria and Greece into a present-day Republic of Macedonia.”169  
As far as its eastern neighbour is concerned, the problem is not the lack of the 
recognition of the state, but of the nation itself. Even though Bulgaria was the first 
state to recognize Macedonian independence on 15 January 1992, it did not recognize 
the existence of a separate Macedonian nation. The Bulgarian state and National 
Academia refer to the Macedonian language and state merely as a part of the 
Bulgarian cultural domain. There has been an increase in cultural activities sponsored 
by Bulgaria aiming at establishing closer links between Bulgaria and Macedonia. The 
Bulgarian Cultural Club was founded in Skopje in 2008 and soon developed a 
network of local branches in all major Macedonian towns. This move is, in a sense, 
comparable to the establishment of the Bulgarian schools after the creation of the 
Exarchate in 1870. The Macedonian acquisition of Samuil’s Empire is a source of 
amusement in Bulgaria, but the practical politics is fully focused on re-building 
Bulgarian national consciousness among the Macedonian Slavs.  
                                               
168
 This is not surprising, as the Macedonian narrative is less than three decades old, as opposed to the 
Greek narrative that had been established nearly two centuries ago and relatively successfully 
maintained ever since. 
169
 Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008, 254 – It is not clear, however, what is the “old Macedonian 
Question” to which Seraphinoff and Stefou refer. 
Chapter IV                                                                                           The Macedonians 
 376
Thus far, Bulgaria was greatly helped by most of the Macedonian post-
independence governments, which were regarded as strongly pro-Bulgarian. This is 
not surprising, as Skopje needed to completely disassociate itself from the Belgrade 
regime during the 1990s wars. This culminated with the application of the former 
Vice-President of Macedonia, Ljupčo Georgijevski (b.1966), for a Bulgarian 
passport.170 On its part, immediately after joining the EU, Bulgaria introduced the 
scheme of awarding Bulgarian citizenship to all “Bulgarian nationals” from the 
neighbouring countries.171 This had an enormous impact on Macedonia, as 
Macedonians applying for Bulgarian citizenship had to declare themselves as 
Bulgarian. Because Bulgaria was admitted to the EU before Macedonia, the 
opportunity to travel, live and work abroad that was forbidden for Macedonian 
citizens since 1991 was fully exploited by Bulgarian politics aiming at the 
incorporation of Macedonia into Bulgarian state. 
The current Serbian position regarding Macedonia is defensive. As a state that 
lost the Wars of Yugoslav Succession and under constant international pressure 
which aims at further reduction of its territory, Serbia is in no position to exercise its 
influence over Macedonia. Being put in the situation to fight for the preservation of 
its own national core, it is less likely that Serbia in the near future will be able to 
claim any territorial rights regarding Macedonia. However, the pending dispute 
concerning the Ohrid Archbishopric shows no signs of being solved. Similarly, the 
acquisition of King Marko’s mediaeval state as the Macedonian Kingdom of Prilep is 
received with the same amount of amusement in Serbia, as that in Bulgaria regarding 
Tsar Samuil. On the other hand, several decades of the Brotherhood and Unity within 
Yugoslavia, left family and emotional ties at the grassroots levels of the Macedonian 
society and those could be severed only from the top establishment which 
discourages the usage of Serbian language in schools and forbids the entrance to the 
country to the members of the Serbian Orthodox Church.  
The growing problem with the Albanian national assertion within the country 
and the establishment of the Bulgarian Cultural Club slowly undermine the existence 
of the Republic itself. Because of the Greek blocking of the opening of the 
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negotiations to join the EU, it seems that Macedonia does not have much chance for 
survival as an independent state. In that sense, a few new steps to form closer 
relationships with Serbia were made during 2011. The reason for this may be that of 
all neighbouring states, Serbia was the only one to recognize both the Macedonian 
nation (including its name and language) and the Macedonian state (including its 
unitary organization). There has been observed a minimal increase of Serbian cultural 
influence in the last few years in terms of books, media and arts. It is almost certain 
that after its national consolidation, Serbia will re-assert its influence over 
Macedonia. 
In all this social turmoil, however, the voice of the people was ominously left 
out from the media reports and academic surveys. Thus, the question Who are the 
Macedonians? will remain unresolved for a very long time. 
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The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The central republic of federal Yugoslavia declared its independence on 2 March 1992, 
following the results of the referendum which was boycotted by the majority of the 
Serbian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Barely a month later, on 6 April 1992, 
the European Economic Community led by Germany recognized its independence, 
following the recommendations of the Badinter Committee, the principal body set up 
by the EEC for conducting the peace talks in Former Yugoslavia. It argued that the 
Serbs outside the border of Serbian republic cannot be considered a constituent people 
in other Yugoslav republics, but rather as ethnic minorities.1 Considering that the Serbs 
counted for nearly 32% of the overall population of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time 
of the outbreak of war (Map 5.1), this recommendation became a serious concern of the 
Serbs, following the events in the Republic of Croatia which, prior to its proclamation 
of independence in 1991, introduced constitutional changes which downgraded the 
Serbs to minority status and suppressed the use of Serbian national symbols, language 
and religion. The Serbs of Bosnia, therefore, refused to vote in the referendum, whilst 
the combined Muslim and Croat population, amounting to 64% voted in favour of 
independence.2 The recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina accelerated the outbreak of 
war which lasted for nearly four years, until the Dayton Agreement of 21 November 
1995 finally marked the end of hostilities.  
After that, Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two parts: Republika Srpska 
(containing majority of the Serbs of the republic) and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (containing the majority of the Muslims and Croats). Still nominally 
united, Bosnia and Herzegovina was placed under the international supervision, which 
was meant to act as a guarantor of the republic’s unity. However, it is highly unlikely 
that the Serbs of Republika Srpska will ever willingly accept the imposed unification 
under the government in Sarajevo, that the Croats will remain satisfied until their 
demand for the creation of the third, Croat, polity within the state or that the Muslims 
will accept the existence of the Serbs or Croats within their borders. The full 
reconciliation will be unlikely mostly because of the inability of the international 
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community to accept all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina as equal parties with equally 
valid arguments.  
In order to justify their current policies towards the Balkans, Western 
governments instigated parts of Western academia to promote a separate Bosnian 
Muslim ethnicity, stemming from the Tito’s decision to create a nation out of the 
religious community. This political concept, developed and further refined during the 
conflicts of the 1990s, enabled the creation and then the recognition of a new nation – 
that of the Bosniaks.3 
 
Map 5.1 – Ethnic and territorial map of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 and 1998  
 
5.1 Territoriality of “Bosniak” nationalism 
The population of the contemporary republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
according to the estimations for the census scheduled for April 2013, counts just under 
3.9 million. The same estimates predict the ethnic composition as: Muslim (40%), 
Serbian (31%), Croat (15%) and others (14%).4 The last census conducted in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was that of 1991, when the overall population amounted to 4.38 
million with ethnic composition that included Muslims (44%), Serbs (32%), Croats 
                                               
3
 As a matter of fact, most of the contemporary writings on Bosnia is mutual referencing between the 
Sarajevo and Western academics, with little use of the primary sources. 
4
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(17%), Yugoslavs (5.5%) and others (2.5%).5 There were some attempts by the 
UNHCR and the International Community to conduct the census immediately after the 
end of hostilities in 1996, but the scheme collapsed as the Sarajevo Government of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina refused to recognize the results which came up 
with the results that just over 3.9 million people in Bosnia include Muslim (46%), 
Serbian (38%), Croat (14.5%) and others (1.5%). The reason stated for refusal is that 
accepting the UNHCR statistics would “legitimize the ethnic cleansing committed in 
the 1992-1995 war.”6 In the following years, consensus between the Federation and 
Republika Srpska could not be achieved, because the Bosnian-Muslim entity insisted 
that the census results should not include religious, ethnic and language designations 
arguing that it could provoke new ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, Republika 
Srpska insisted on these as it wanted the power-share within the republic to be based 
on the participation of the Bosnian ethnicities, as originally agreed by the accords of 
the Dayton Agreement in 1995.7 The political stalemate that has lasted for the past 
twenty years shows no signs of moving ahead and both entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina accuse each other of hindering the process of reconciliation.  
5.1.1 Opening of the “Bosniak Question” 
For most of its early history, Herzegovina was a separate political unit, known 
under the name of Hum since the arrival of the Slavs (Map 5.2). It was briefly 
incorporated into the Kingdom of Bosnia in the late 14th century and then again added 
to the Vilayet of Bosnia during the Ottoman period. Slightly modified, current borders 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina date from the period of Austro-Hungarian occupation in 
1878-1908, which was part of the outcome of the Eastern Question crisis. Measured by 
modern standards, these borders never corresponded to the ethnic borders and the 
population of Bosnia was a mix of Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim confessionals that 
all spoke the same language and lived until the late 19th and early 20th century, in 
segregated villages.  
                                               
5
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Map 5.2 – Bosnia, marked darker colour and Herzegovina, marked lighter colour 
Because the Austro-Hungarian occupation coincided with the general 
development of nationalism in Europe, the first awareness of national identity among 
the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina date from this period. The disturbances of the 
First and Second World Wars which witnessed the terrible casualties that the local 
population inflicted upon each other and subsequent inclusion of the very same 
population under the umbrella of a nationally ambiguous Yugoslavia prevented the 
natural development of a healthy nationalism based on mutual tolerance and respect for 
diversity. As during the Yugoslav period there was no political and academic discourse 
that would address the former grievances of the Bosnian peoples,8 the notion of the 
Bosnian identities resurfaced during the 1990s and resulted in an unprecedented 
division of opinions about the nature of the term “Bosnian.” The most commonly asked 
questions are: 
1. Is the term “Bosnian” only a geographical expression? or, if not, 
2. Who are the Bosnians? 
3. What are their ethnic origins?  
                                               
8
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4. What is the difference between the terms Bosnian and Bosniak? 
Even though there were serious attempts by the Austro-Hungarian authorities to 
establish a new nation in the territory of the occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina after 
1879 that never materialized. From about this period date the first competing theories 
coming from the academic circles in Zagreb and Belgrade about the nature of the 
identity of the Bosnian Muslims. As they were ethnic Slavs and spoke the same dialect 
as their Catholic and Orthodox compatriots, the educated elites in Zagreb and Belgrade 
saw them as the converts from their respective ethnic communities. The Bosnian 
Muslims, on the other hand, identified themselves as “Turks” until the early 20th 
century.9  
During the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims were mostly 
gathered around the Yugoslav Muslim Organization led by Dr Mehmed Spaho (1883-
1939) and declared themselves as Serbs or Croats of the Islamic faith, as there was no 
constitutional recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nation. This trend 
continued after the Second World War and in the first constitution of Federal 
Yugoslavia in 1946 the Montenegrins and Macedonians were recognized as separate 
nations, whilst the Bosnian Muslims were still considered to be converted Serbs or 
Croats. The situation, however, changed in the period of the re-opening of the national 
question in the 1960s, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina announced the need for the Muslims in Yugoslavia to have a separate 
nation.10 Three years later, in 1971, the Muslim Slavs of Yugoslavia were recognized 
as a separate nation – the Muslims. This national designation was to include not only 
Bosnian Muslims, but also Muslims of Raška/Sanjak in Republic of Serbia and Slav 
Muslims from Kosovo and Metohija in the southern Serbian province. The term 
Bosniak with exactly the same meaning did not appear until 1993, when the Bosnian 
Muslims re-named themselves Bosniaks. Even though sounding similar, the terms 
“Bosnian” and “Bosniak” have different meanings. “Bosnian” denominates a native to 
Bosnia, from all three confessional backgrounds, whilst “Bosniak” is exclusively linked 
to those Slavs of the Islamic faith, that is, the Muslims. It is in this context that the two 
terms will be used throughout this work. 
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5.1.2 The Ambiguity of Bosnian identity  
Political division into Croat-Muslim and Serbian parts of the state opened path 
for the division and opposing interpretations of educational systems and national 
narratives. With the University of Sarajevo split in 1992 into its Serbian and Muslim 
branches, a fertile soil for the invention and dissemination of new “grand narratives” 
was created. Whilst the Serbs throughout the war and at present retained the traditional 
historical narratives that were used in the Republic of Serbia,11 the Muslim side needed 
an expediently formulated new national narrative that would emphasize its difference 
from the Serbs and, to a lesser extent, the Croats. 
In 1993, a group of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals gathered in Zürich, Switzerland, 
and founded Matica Bošnjaka, the supreme cultural institution of the Bosnian Muslims. 
Its foundation was initiated by the Bosnian Muslim émigré Adil Zulfikarpašić (1921-
2008) who previously founded the Bosnian Institute in Zürich in June 1988, aiming to 
promote the Bosnian Muslims in the West.12 The conclusions of the foundation meeting 
of the Matica Bošnjaka were published in a manifesto entitled Bosnia, Bosnianism and 
Bosnian Language (Bosna, Bošnjaštvo i bosanski jezik), which was printed in Zagreb 
later in 1993. This manifesto marked the beginning of the creation of the new Bosniak 
nation, separate from Serbian and Croatian. Supplemented by publications of the 
Bosnian Institute, of which a journal published in the German language Islam und der 
Westen was the most important, the notion of a separate Bosniak identity was fully 
formulated and presented to the outside world. 
During the period of Communist Yugoslavia, the authorities, guided by the 
principle of “brotherhood and unity” which aimed at reducing the Serbo-Croat 
dichotomy, formulated the notion of the separateness of the Bosnian Muslims. This was 
done by adopting modified Austro-Hungarian theories, introduced and developed after 
the 1878 occupation for the purpose of securing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s loyalty to 
Vienna. However, this was not done until 1971, because the communist authorities 
insisted on secularization of the entire Yugoslav territory. In the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War they retained the political and legal solutions of the Yugoslav 
kingdom, which treated the Muslim Slavs as Serb/Croat converts to Islam. Thus Federal 
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Constitution of 1946 did not recognize the the Bosnian Muslims as separate nations, 
such was the case with the Macedonians and Monetnegrins. Already in 1943, a senior 
Party member Edvard Kardelj (an ethnic Slovene) remarked that “we cannot speak of 
the Muslims as a nation, but…as a separate ethnic group.”13 No further discussions on 
Bosnian Muslim nationhood took place at the time. 
As Party’s policies included opening of the higher educational institutions in areas 
where they were non-existing, the University of Sarajevo was established in 1949, the 
same year the University of Skopje was founded. Admittedly, there were attempts to 
improve the need for higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the last days of 
the Yugoslav kingdom, with the establishment of the Faculty of Agriculture and 
Forestry in 1940, but nothing related to the study of history, linguistics and local culture 
was done prior to the establishment of the Faculty of Philosophy in 1950.14 In the same 
year, the communist authorities throughout Yugoslavia closed a number of Islamic faith 
schools, mektebas, and introduced the ban on burka veils.15  
However, the first post-Second World War Yugoslav census, conducted in 1948, 
allowed the people to declare themselves ethnically undetermined. Nearly 30% of the 
overall population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (roughly 778,000 people at the time) had 
chosen this option, which was in the course of the 1990s interpreted as the decision of 
the Bosnian Muslim population not to identify with the Serbs or Croats. However, the 
same census included 72,000 Muslims who declared themselves ethnic Serbs and 
25,000 Muslims who declared themselves Croats.16 As the undeclared population did 
not stipulate their religious affiliation, it is difficult to accept that among 778,000 people 
there were no other ethnicities, except the Muslims. For example, as during the 1990s, 
a great number of people left Bosnia and Herzegovina as refugees and emigrants, a 
significant number being from a mixed Christian (of both denominations)/Muslim 
background who respected their ancestral heritage equally; as the Second Yugoslavia 
had almost two million interethnic marriages, many of these refused to adhere to any 
ethnic group.17 This poses a question whether in 1948 a significant number of people 
from the mixed background had also refused to declare their ethnic affiliation because 
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of the similar reasons. Since the census data of 1948 did not include information about 
the mixed population, any claim that the 778,000 were exclusively Muslims should be 
taken with great caution. The decision not to declare ethnicity in 1948 should be viewed 
as a result of several causes: the traumatic war-experience which considered the 
Bosnian Muslims during the NDH-era to be “the best of the Croats,” the Yugoslav royal 
period which had a Christian Orthodox King ruling over Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
even further back, when the Austro-Hungarian foreign Emperor began to change the 
traditional Bisnian society with its reforms.  Nevertheless, this census was taken as a 
starting point for building a separate Bosnian Muslim nation. 
5.2 Imagined aspects of the Bosniak national narrative – The origins of the 
Bosniak Question 
During the Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav royal periods, the Muslims of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina played an important role in balancing the competing nationalisms of 
the Serbs and Croats. The question of their ethnic identity was first imposed by the 
Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities to facilitate control of the province. During 
his twenty years as the governor of Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Benjamin von Kállay (1839-1903, in Bosnia from 1882-1903), a high Viennese official 
of Hungarian origins (Fig. 5.1), became a standard-bearer of an invented “Bosnian 
consciousness”, promoted on the pretext of preventing the rift between the Serbs, 
Croats and Turks, as the Bosnian Muslims used to call themselves.  
5.2.1 A nation by decree 
Immediately after the occupation, in 1879, the Austro-Hungarian authorities 
conducted a census which showed that of just over 1,158 million of people that included 
43% Orthodox, 38% Muslim and 19% Catholic, only 3% were literate.18 Already on 6 
June 1879, the Provincial Government, Landesregierung, aiming to strengthen its rule 
introduced educational reforms. It issued an Ordinance No.8876 ordering the hiring of 
elementary school teachers to teach the contrived Landessprache (Zemaljski jezik, Land 
Langauge), hoping that upholding a Bosnian identity (Bosniankentum) by creating a 
sense of belonging to a Bosnian territory would develop a strong idea of statehood 
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(Staatsidee) and loyalty to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.19 Landessprache was in 
1885 renamed into Bosnische Sprache (Bosanski jezik, Bosniak), the name which was 
not accepted by the leading South Slav intellectuals at the time and which returned into 
use only in 1993. Kállay explained the invention of a language as a consequence of 
Bosnia’s specific historical features. This decision aimed to prevent the development 
of closer connections between the Bosnian Serbs with their co-nationals in the Serbian 
Kingdom. Kállay, who had spent the early days of his diplomatic career in Belgrade 
(1868-1875), spoke Serbian/Croatian well and had a good understanding of the 
situation in the Balkans. As a reliable civil servant of the Monarchy, he understood that 
changes had to be introduced gradually, taking into account the existing circumstances: 
“…I knew I had to act decisively if I want to accomplish something worthwhile. 
That meant to awaken the spirit of the West, the strong feeling of statehood without 
harming the peculiarities of the single-minded yet not to let the petty and divisive 
peculiarities to continue to take root…So long that I am at the helm of this land, I shall 
strive to instil in the Bosnian people the spirit of statehood, and moreover of a great 
and powerful statehood. So long that I adhere to the gist of our obligations that we have 
taken in respect of these lands, I will continue with my efforts to create something good 
not only for the Bosnians, but also for the Monarchy (sic).”20 
The concept, however, did not survive beyond the bureaucratic attempts, as the 
majority of literate Serb and Croat teachers, citizens of Austro-Hungary, refused to 
participate in the programme.21  With this background, the Austro-Hungarian 
authorities had a problem from the onset. As the Landessprache was also based on the 
Herzegovinian dialect, the Provincial Government issued in 1884 guidelines for a new 
grammar and suggested that “special attention should be paid to the creation of a  
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election of special expressions that were not originally Bosnian, but became familiar 
and could not be replaced.”22  
      
Fig. 5.1 – Benjamin von Kállay (1839-1903)           Fig. 5.2 – Lajos Thallószy (1857-1916), a historian 
was an Austro-Hungarian official responsible for    responsible for implementation of the “Bosnian 
the introduction of the “Bosnian consciousness.”    Consciousness.” 
In February 1894, Kállay initiated the foundation and publication of a journal 
Nada (Hope) to be printed in the “Bosnian Language” in order to “provide interesting 
material from different fields of knowledge and education presented to the native 
reading public in a simple and persuasive manner befitting their educational horizon 
and level of understanding. On the other hand, the journal should depict in word and 
picture the cultural development in Bosnia and Herzegovina in an objective and 
trustworthy manner in order to further such information abroad.”23 The appointed 
editor-in-chief was Crown Counsel Constantine Hӧrmann (1850-1921), an Austrian. 
As with the majority of civil servants of the Provincial Government, Hӧrmann’s 
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language abilities were very limited while the response from Serbian and Croat 
intellectuals to participate in the creation of a new language was a unanimous refusal.24  
Nevertheless, the Provincial Government progressed with establishing the 
primary schools by recruiting low-ranking officers (Unteroffiziere) for the position of 
a “teaching candidate” (Lehramtskandidat) and a number of “intelligent lay persons.” 
Vienna, however, refused to fund the establishment of schools and all the costs were to 
be paid by the local communities.25 This was further complicated by the fact that the 
entire Provincial Government was in the hands of bureaucrats who came predominantly 
from Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Bohemia and who did not speak Serbo-
Croat or had only some vague knowledge of it. This resulted in the official documents 
being written in an incorrect syntax, thus making them unclear and  
prone to misuse.26 The ensuing public debate between the Provincial Government and 
Serbian and Croatian intellectuals of Austro-Hungary remained in the domain of elite 
polemics, as illiteracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was endemic.27  
5.2.2 Political reasons behind the attempt to create a “Bosnian nation” 
The Austro-Hungarian attempts to reform Bosnia and Herzegovina proved 
unsuccessful. After the occupation, the promised agrarian reforms were postponed and 
the old Ottoman system with Muslim overlords and Christian peasants remained fully 
operational for the whole period of Austro-Hungarian rule.28 This particularly affected 
the rural areas, as the feudal bondage persisted until the end of the First World War. 
That meant that the Austrian non-South Slav civil servants who worked for the 
Provincial Government in Sarajevo had to rely on 200-300 of the wealthiest beys who 
controlled over one million people. These Muslim nobles were in a position to 
recognize the Austro-Hungarian suzerainty, but certainly had no interest to work on 
improving the living and educational conditions of their Christian (and some Muslim) 
serfs. On the other hand, as long as Austro-Hungarian authorities had free usage of 
natural resources and the unpaid work of the mandatory labour, there was no interest in 
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changing the social structure of the region. As the acquisition of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was received with a certain political discontent within the Empire, its 
political standing was not to be assigned either to Vienna or to Budapest. The Hungarian 
part of the Empire feared an incorporation of another million of Slavs and saw it as 
potential strengthening of the nationalist arguments. On the other hand, Vienna 
regarded it as a matter of strategic importance in moving foreword with their Drang 
nach Osten policies. The problem was solved by assigning the province directly to the 
Crown and placing it under the Joint Ministry of Finance, with a Provincial Governor, 
who happened to be a Hungarian.29 This solution was welcomed by the leading Austrian 
economists at the time that regarded the whole of the Balkan Peninsula of major 
economic and strategic interest and regularly referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
“our European India.”30 However, both Vienna and Budapest refused to invest in the 
economy of the province and decided that the whole burden was to be paid out of the 
local revenues. Admittedly, to transport Bosnian resources, the authorities immediately 
started works on improving the road system and even laid down several railway lines. 
But, even though the Government took the sole credit for these endeavours, the 
complete work was undertaken by mandatory labour (kuluk) which was increased by 
10% for all eligible peasants, aged 16-60, who had to work on construction when called, 
without any pay.31 This only contributed to the animosity of the Orthodox population, 
which began emigrating to the Serbian Principality.  
Simultaneously, heavy economic duties imposed on the Serbian Principality 
(Kingdom from 1882) by the accords of Berlin Congress placed the now officially 
independent state in the vassal position and prevented any serious involvement in 
protecting its co-nationals across the Drina.32 The Obrenović government did not have 
much manoeuvring space and could only help by supporting the Orthodox Church 
communities on an individual basis. Even this was not looked upon favourably by 
Vienna, which in order to reduce contacts between the Serbs from both sides of the 
Drina, began building a cordon militaire, a dense network of military watchtowers 
along the Serbian and Montenegrin borders (Fig. 5.3). The task was to be completed by 
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1882. In the same year, the traditional Military Frontier, established in 1526 along the 
Danube was abolished.33  
 
Fig. 5.3 – The ruins of the watchtower of Cordon Militaire in Petrinja near Trebinje in Herzegovina, 
built during the Austro-Hungarian occupation. This site became politically charged, as famous film 
director Emir Kusturica (b.1954) used some of the stones for building his town-monument Andrićgrad 
in Republika Srpska in 2011-2012, much to the dismay of the Muslim-Croat intellectuals of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who regard the Austro-Hungarian period as the period of 
freedom. 
 
In 1885, Kállay reported that 35 watchtowers were working well and in 
accordance with the plan. In addition to the excessive cost incurred by the construction 
of these compounds, the cordon militaire almost brought to a halt any contacts between 
the populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. Even though 
the traditional Military Frontier was officially abolished, in reality, it was moved along 
the Drina and towards the Montenegrin mountains. Additionally, Serbia and 
Montenegro were denied a common border, which enabled Austro-Hungary to control 
the Raška/Sanjak passes by positioning an army contingent in Raška. Despite the 
official explanation that the establishment of the cordon militaire was to maintain order, 
the real intention was to sever contacts between the populations of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on one side and the Serbian Kingdom and Montenegrin Principality on 
the other. Kállay was particularly harsh in his judgement towards Montenegro, as in his 
report to the Ministry of War, dated 1889 he stated that the cordon militaire should 
“prevent a continuous contact between the populations and induce the weakening of 
the mutual feelings of closeness among related tribes by blood and religion. The 
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existing ties with the neighbouring population of Montenegro should be severed and 
directed to develop a complete and conscious devotion to our state.”34  
By severing the free movement of people and goods between the naturally linked 
and related populations, Kállay provoked feelings of resentment, especially of the 
orthodox Serbs who, hoping for the improvement of living conditions after the 
departure of the Ottoman state realised that the new Christian empire would treat them 
just as badly. Parallel with the building of roads, the Provincial Government undertook 
the task of “introducing Western values” into the backward Bosnian society. At first, 
for the use of the bureaucracy and then for “urban planning” the Provincial Government 
commissioned several public buildings to be built in the architectural style of historism 
that dominated the Empire then, but it did not stop there (Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5).  
  
Fig. 5.4 – Social Home (Clubhaus), built in 1897 by a Czech architect Karel Pařĭk (1857-1942), now 
National Theatre.  
As huge numbers of military personnel and civil servants descended on Sarajevo 
from around the Monarchy, they contributed significantly to the city’s overall growth 
as well as to its demographic and religious shifts. When the Austro-Hungarians arrived, 
Sarajevo’s population was approximately 70% Muslim, 17% Orthodox, 10% Jewish, 
and 3% Catholic. By 1910 it had changed to 36% Muslim, 35% Catholic, 16% 
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Orthodox, 12% Jewish and 1% Evangelical.35 This religious shift caused the need to 
change the Oriental features of the provincial capital and other strategic towns. 
However, the presence of significant numbers of Muslims required careful 
management.     
 
Fig. 5.5 – Officer’s Club, built in 1880 by Karel Pařĭk, now Federation Army Centre 
 
Maintaining the idea of Bosnian uniqueness due to its sizeable Muslim 
population, a number of imposing public edifices were erected in a pseudo-Moorish 
style, mostly designed by a Czech architect Karel Pařĭk (1857-1942), a follower of the 
Viennese historism in architecture. Introducing Islamic elements into Western-style 
architecture provided a picturesque and colonial atmosphere of the latest Habsburg 
acquisition. Partly, this was influenced by the Central European perception of Bosnia 
as an exotic country in a state of arrested development and partly by the need to flatter 
the Bosnian Muslim landowners who had difficulties accepting the fact that they were 
now nominally under a Christian state. However, the majority of Viennese architects 
working on the development of the “Bosnian style” drew inspiration from the 
Mameluk-inspired architecture of Cairo and architecture of Moorish Spain and North 
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Africa. As they were all Catholics from around the empire, no local Muslim nobles 
participated in these developments. All newly built institutions were either for 
governmental use or the maintenance of the European lifestyle of the employed civil 
servants who were non-Muslim (Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7). Unsurprisingly, Muslims did 
not attend theatre or officers’ balls partly because the plays were in the German 
language and partly because it clashed with their Islamic lifestyle. For the most part, 
the co-habitation between the Muslim nobility and the Provincial Government rested 
on Kállay’s diplomatic skills and strong military presence. However, government’s 
failure to introduce economic and agrarian changes alienated primarily the Serbian 
orthodox population, the result of which was growing distrust to the authorities’ 
policies. 
     
Fig. 5.6 – The City Hall (Vijećnica), erected in 1894, after the design of an Austrian architect Alexander 
Wittek  (1852-1894), now National and  University Library.             
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Fig. 5.7 – The Railway Station at Bosanski Brod, erected in 1896, after the design of an Austrian architect 
Hans Niemeczk. Destroyed in 1945, now in ruins. 
5.3 Cultural aspects and material heritage in the context of multinational Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
As noted above, the earliest notion of some form of an independent polity under 
the name “Bosnia” can be dated in the late 12th century, when the local ruler Ban Kulin, 
was mentioned in a Cyrillic inscription found in Visoko, to the northwest of Sarajevo.36 
The two main documents dealing with the period prior to the 12th century, De 
Administrando Imperio and the Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea, give no mention of 
any separate Bosnian tribe or political entity. Porphyrogenitus clearly stated and 
repeated in chapters 33, 34 and 36 that the Serbs inhabited Pagania (the Neretva 
valley), Zachlumi (Zahumlje, Hum), Terbouniotes (Trebinje) and Kanalites (Konavli), 
which are now Herzegovina and a large part of Dalmatia and coastland.37 The Croats, 
on the other hand, inhabited the territory to the northwest of the Cetina River (Tzentina, 
Τζέυτιυα) around the town of Livno (Chlebena, Χλέβευα).38 If Porphyrogenitus was 
right, then the Serbs settled all over central and eastern Bosnia, too.39  
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Following this delineation, the claim that the Bosnian Muslims were converts 
from either Serbs or Croats was first asserted after the revolutionary 1848 when both 
Serbian and Croat historians in the early phases of development of national ideas 
expressed interest in the history of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By then, 
the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina referred to themselves as Turks and 
showed no interest in the achievements of European philosophy and science. However, 
both Vuk Karadžić and his followers and the Croat Illyrianists regarded the Bosnian 
Muslims different to the extent of their religious affiliation. The establishment of 
Matica srpska (1826) and Matica ilirska (1842) coincided with the national revival and 
prompted the research of foreign archives and first publications of the surviving 
mediaeval manuscripts. This early period did not witness nationalist competition 
between the Serbian and Croatian authors, as they were immersed in the enthusiastic 
creation of national grand narratives and the formulation of myths of a “Golden Age.” 
For the Serbs, the Golden Age was obviously the Nemanjić period, whilst for the Croats 
the period of rule of the only native Croat dynasty of the Trpimirović period (845-1102). 
The converted Muslim population showed no signs of identification with the pre-
Ottoman Christian state and this trend continued well into the late 19th and early 20th 
century. An Austro-Hungarian civil servant of Croat origins, a teacher Antun Hangi, 
wrote in 1900:  
“The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were the Slavs. After the fall of the 
former Bosnian kingdom in 1463 under the Ottoman suzerainty, many renounced their 
faith and accepted the Faith of Muhammad and that today they are the most fervent 
defenders of Islam. Their faith is closely linked to those who brought it here and even 
now they call themselves Turks and swear oaths by the Turkish faith….Our Muslims do 
not have feelings strongly devoted to their homeland. Because of it the religious side is 
predominant, until now they did not even know what their nationality was. Some beys, 
respectable agas and more learned people call themselves Bosniaks and that they speak 
Croatian, but the majority of people neither know who they are nor what their 
nationality is.”40  
Since the literacy rates in all former Ottoman territories were notoriously low, the 
concept of “competition” for the Bosnian population was devised by the Austro-
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Hungarian authorities later in the 19th century and was presented as the attempt by 
Serbia to attract the Serbian population from the Habsburg territories. Hangi’s writings 
about the Muslim population were a result of his observations of the wealthier urban 
class and were restricted to several larger towns he visited during his service in Bosnia. 
This situation was clearly favoured by Vienna, as it was easier to maintain the sense of 
separateness solely on a religious basis. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population 
was predominantly Serbian Orthodox at the time, Viennese authorities shifted their 
favouritism towards the Catholics of Bosnia, as combined Muslim and Croat population 
could outnumber the Serbs.  
Of all three religious communities, the Catholics were to gain the most. Along 
with the traditional Franciscans, the Jesuits were introduced for the first time. Two new 
seminaries were established and the civil servants, merchants and other professionals 
from Catholic parts of the Empire were moving into Bosnia which was perceived as a 
land of opportunities for the quick advancement of their careers.41 This class, relatively 
better educated than the local peasants or Muslim nobility brought with them European 
lifestyle which was considered more advanced in comparison with the Ottoman.42  
The Provincial Government sought to present its takeover from the Ottomans as 
a success story by establishing European-style cultural institutions. Under Kállay’s 
personal supervision, the Museum Association (Musealenverein) was formed in 1884. 
A Croatian archaeologist Dr Ćiro Truhelka (1865-1942) was charged to guide a newly 
established association and generate public interest for the preservation of 
archaeological sites in situ and valuable artefacts from the past. The association gained 
importance in 1887, when it was promoted into a research institution aiming to promote 
the idea of a future Landesmuseum.43  Already in February 1888, von Kállay approved 
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the foundation of the Land Museum (Landesmuseum, Zemaljski muzej), the first 
museum institution on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first director of the 
Land Museum was no other than the very same Constantine Hörmann, an editor-in-
chief of the future journal Nada and the first editor of the Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja 
Bosne i Herzegovine (Herald of the Land Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The 
Land Museum was conceptualised as a centre for research in history, archaeology, 
ethnology, art history and natural sciences.44 As such, it became a place of interest for 
various Austro-Hungarian scholars, and particularly for those who arrived to work on 
behalf of the Provincial Government. All journals in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were 
being published after 1878, including the Museum publications, were subsidised by the 
Provincial Government, which was particularly keen on developing the sense of 
separateness between the Bosnian communities, in order to curtail the growing South 
Slavic feelings at the time.  
In the light of the South Slav movement, a number of educated Habsburg Serbs 
had already expressed interest in Bosnian history. Thus, in 1867, a Dalmatian Serb 
Božidar Petranović (1809-1874) published in Zadar45 his history of the Bosnian 
Church, titled Bogomils-The Bosnian church (Bogomili-Crkva bosanska) in which he 
described the elusive Bosnian Church as a part of Eastern Orthodoxy that fell into 
schism. Petranović’s work immediately attracted the attention of European and Russian 
scholars and was soon followed by a publication of the work Bogomili i Patareni 
(Bogomils and Patarins) in 1870 by a Croat scholar and cleric Franjo Rački (Fig. 2.10) 
who hypothesised that the Bosnian Church was heretical, of dualist nature, influenced 
by the Bulgarian heretical movement of the 9th century.46 This hypothesis remained in 
use until the mid-20th century, when the communist authorities aiming to reduce 
Serbian influence in Yugoslavia after the Second World War, initiated a new narrative 
which linked the Bosnian Church to Catholicism.  
5.4 Historical and academic sources  on heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Vague and contradictory references about the religious situation in mediaeval 
Bosnia and total absence of archaeological evidence about the Bosnian Church proved 
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to be a fertile soil for exploitation by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, which put a 
significant effort in suppressing the Serbian Orthodox population. Parallel with the 
introduction of the Land Language and foundation of the Land Museum, the Provincial 
Government forbade a number of journals and newspapers that were printed in the 
Serbian Kingdom and Serbian and Croatian regions within Austro-Hungary.47 
Simultaneously, the Provincial Government refused funding for a public library on the 
grounds of a shortage of money.48  
In 1892, the Joint Ministry in Vienna, on Kállay’s recommendation, drafted 
legislation related to the preservation and upkeep of the monuments of the past. Two 
years later, in 1894, the Provincial Government hosted an international archaeological 
congress aiming to present to the world its cultural achievements in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.49 The culmination of these activities was the commissioning Karel Pařĭk 
to design a new Museum building that finally opened in 1913 (Fig. 5.8). From 1893, a 
German Language journal Wissenschaftliche Mittheilungen aus Bosnien und der 
Herzegovina was subsidised for the presentation of the Museum’s activities to 
European scholarly circles.50  
However, by the end of the century, these efforts became economically unviable, 
as there was no readership, due to the high illiteracy rates. The dissemination of the 
“Bosnian consciousness” failed, despite Kállay’s decision to grant a privileged position 
to the Muslim population. Following that policy, Kállay charged Hörmann with the task 
of collecting Muslim folk poetry, emulating Karadžić’s work on recording the Serbian 
oral traditions nearly seventy years earlier. In January 1888, the publication of this 
collection was officially approved and subsidised by the Provincial Government, 
arguing that the poetry of Christians was already published and well known.51 The 
expensive and lavishly illustrated publications of the Museum, the congress and costly 
visits of the foreign scholars, as well as the erection of the imposing Land Museum 
building served as an advertisement for the Provincial Government, which sought to 
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underline the Austro-Hungarian stewardship to enlightened European circles.52 Kállay 
personally made sure that in the Museum display the emphasis was on the pre-historic 
and Roman artefacts, which in 1903 numbered around 3000. The mediaeval Slavic past 
was barely visible and any connections with the Serbs and Croats beyond the provincial 
borders were deliberately omitted.53  
 
Fig. 5.8 – Land Museum, built in 1908-1913, after the design of Karel Pařĭk 
The Bosnian Serbs were particularly concerned with the actions of the Provincial 
Government, as they feared that they would be forced to convert to Catholicism. This 
view was strengthened with the arrival of Jesuits in Bosnia in 1881. The Jesuits were 
considered more aggressive than the local Franciscans who, over the previous decades, 
had closely cooperated with the local Serbs and the governments in Belgrade. The 
newly appointed Roman Catholic Archbishop of Sarajevo, a Croat Josip Štadler (1843-
1918), was especially ardent in sowing the seed of discord between the Serbs and the 
Croats, and between the Serbs and the Muslims, by an open call to annex Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to Croatia.54 Numerous books and brochures containing insulting names 
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for Orthodox Serbs were frequently printed and persecution on a national and religious 
basis often verged on open racism. The increased pressure on the Serbian Orthodox 
Christianity only contributed to the growing resentment of the Serbs. Vienna obtained 
consent from the Patriarchate of Constantinople, to which the Serbian Orthodox Church 
in Bosnia was formally subjected, to appoint a Metropolitan independently. In 1881, 
the Orthodox Metropolitan of Sarajevo, Sava Kosanović, informed the Serbian 
government, the Russian Synod and the Viennese ministry that a local government 
official had attempted to bribe him to convert to the Uniate rite and to recognize the 
Pope as the supreme religious leader. Because of his firm resistance to Roman Catholic 
pressure, Metropolitan Kosanović was forced to leave his post and eventually to 
emigrate from Bosnia.55 The Jesuit activities in Bosnia were followed by the erection 
of a number of Catholic churches and monasteries throughout the Province. On the 
initiative and with the support of Archbishop Štadler (Fig. 5.9), a new cathedral in 
Sarajevo was built on the site of the former Janissary military camp in Neo-Gothic style. 
The commissioned architect was a Hungarian born architect Josip Vancaš (1859-1932), 
who was invited by the Provincial Government in 1883 to work on re-building Sarajevo 
(Fig. 5.10). 
                  
Fig. 5.9 – Archbishop Josip Štadler (1843-1918)   Fig. 5.10 – Catholic Cathedral of Sacred Heart, built 
                                                                                1884-1887, after the design of Josip Vancaš.                               
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5.4.1 The problem of the validity of sources – the initial misreading 
Kállay was a perfectly chosen chief executor of the Austro-Hungarian policies 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As an astute historian, Kállay understood well the national 
sentiments of the Southern Slavs that were forming against the background of the 
Eastern Question. Prior to and during his engagement in both the Serbian Principality 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he travelled widely through the region and conducted an 
extensive research of the Serbian National Library and Archive which was then 
immersed in the project of collecting old manuscripts.56 On his first travels through the 
Serbian Principality in late 1868, he was accompanied by Felix Kanitz (1829-1904), 
who had already published his extensive works on Serbia in Leipzig.  
Kállay recorded the scarcity of road network and churches in Serbia in the late 
1860s: approximately one in ten villages had a church without a belfry and bell-ringing 
was disallowed even in towns.57 His views on Serbs and Serbia were expressed in his 
History of Serbs (Geschichte der Serben), which he published in Budapest in 1877. In 
the foreword to his book, Kállay noted that he “copied about 600 documents from the 
University Library58 in Belgrade that were, to a large extent, not yet published.”59 
Serbian scholars of the period welcomed the book. Stojan Novaković (Fig. 1.13) noted 
at the time that Kállay produced “a book that was written by a scholar with an open 
mind.”60 
However, immediately after taking the post in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kállay 
previously heavily criticized in both Vienna and Budapest for his “pro-Serbian” views 
assumed a completely different attitude towards the Serbs and Serbian state. Kállay 
went so far as to forbid the printing and distribution of his own Geschichte der Serben 
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on the territory of the Condominium.61 Implementation of the Austro-Hungarian 
policies towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was accompanied by a strong anti-Orthodox 
rhetoric, because it was deemed that the Eastern and Western Christianity were not 
equal in character. Vienna maintained that an exaggerated ethnic individualism of the 
Eastern Christianity hindered the creation of a powerful state.62 Thus, in his dealings 
with the Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kállay was obliged to refer to the 
Serbian Church as Orientalische Orthodox Kirche, Orientalische Orthodoxe Gemeinde 
or Orientalische Orthodoxe Confession, in order to replace any mention of the Serbs in 
the Province.63 His adopted political views were finally presented in his Geschichte des 
Serbischen Aufstandes, 1807-1810 published posthumously in Vienna 1910.64 Stojan 
Novaković commented on this academic u-turn as “an approach of a politician and a 
diplomat carefully formulating his evaluations.”65 
A deliberate avoidance of implementing agrarian reform, an open state support 
for Roman Catholics and enforced fabrication of the new Land Language achieved the 
first objective of dividing Bosnian religious communities, but resulted in a total failure 
of the concept of a Bosnian nation as envisaged by Vienna. Indeed, it was much easier 
to rule over divided communities, but ultimately it was precisely that division which 
prevented the creation of a unified national identity through the loyalty to the territory. 
Both the Serbian and the Croat communities relied more and more on financial support 
from their co-religionists from Serbia and Croatia for opening and funding schools and 
paying for the education of their children. As far as the Bosnian Muslims were 
concerned, the most they could achieve at that period was to create a Muslim 
Movement, an association of Muslim landowners in 1899. There were some Bosnian 
Muslim intellectuals loyal to the Habsburg government owing to the fact that the 
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government offered them scholarship and employed them in the Bosnian bureaucracy. 
But, there was no a strong Bosnian Muslim bourgeoisie, intellectual elite or bureaucrats 
to stimulate, organize and lead Bosnian Muslim nationalism and national movement. 
Consequently, the Muslim community was led by ulemas (clerics) and begs 
(landowners).66 
5.4.2 Invent a narrative, and then divide and rule 
The first generation of intellectuals born in the territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and educated in the universities of the Dual Monarchy appeared towards 
the very end of the 19th century. Similar to their counterparts from the Serbian 
Kingdom, the students from these communities acquired the ideas of nationalism and 
national identity in the centres of their studies. As most of them returned to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina after graduation, they sought to spread basic education among the people 
through the works of Choral Societies, which were carefully observed by the 
authorities, particularly during religious festivities or celebrations of historical events.67 
Whilst in the Serbian Kingdom the returnees had some relative freedom to express their 
adopted knowledge, in Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, they 
were expected to conform to official state policies, which discouraged the exchange of 
ideas between the intellectuals of Bosnia and Herzegovina with their counterparts in 
Belgrade and Zagreb.  
This suppression of Serbian and Croatian national consciousness coincided with 
an emigration of several thousand Muslim families from Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Unwilling to submit to the new Christian state or frightened by it, many Muslim 
families decided to immigrate to Turkey. Vienna did little to prevent this, as by 1882 it 
already had in place the plan for the colonization of the Germans and Hungarians in the 
areas bordering the Serbian Kingdom. Kállay observed that the Hungarians should be 
settled along the Danube in order to separate “our Serbs from those on the other side.”68 
The emigration of the Muslims was, therefore, considered convenient by Vienna. 
Similarly, Serbs willing to go to Serbia were encouraged to do so. During the 1880s a 
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slow implementation of the plan started, but was abandoned prior to the end of the 
century due to relocation costs. The number of Muslims who left the country in the 
period 1878-1914 became seriously contested in the 1990s when the Muslim nation of 
Bosnia finally received its international recognition. Modern Serbian historian, Dušan 
Bataković quotes a number of nearly 140,000 of both Muslims and Serbs leaving 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by 1914.69 Current Bosnian Muslim historians claim the 
number of purely Muslim émigrés was 300,000, whilst the number given by Noel 
Malcolm stands at 100,000.70 Whatever the number, the forced resettling of the 
Muslims unintentionally helped the consolidation of Serbian and Croatian national 
feelings which eventually gained full confirmation in the foundation of their respective 
national societies aiming at spreading education and national consciousness among 
their co-nationals.  
In January 1901, a group of Sarajevo’s Serbs requested the foundation of a society 
Prosvjeta (Enlightement), to support Serbian pupils and students from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina educated elsewhere in the Monarchy. About a month later, a similar 
request was sent to the authorities from a group of Mostar’s Croats to found a similar 
society named Napredak (Advancement). Nearly two years later, in February 1903, the 
newly established Muslim Society for Support of Students Gajret (Society) made a 
similar request arguing that two other societies, Orthodox and Catholic were already 
established. The Provincial Government granted permission to all three, reasoning that 
if Gajret was permitted to exist, it will prevent young Muslims from participating in 
Croatian and Serbian societies.71  
By 1908, the year of the Annexation crisis, the Provincial Government managed 
to open 251 elementary schools using local revenues for their construction and 
maintenance. During the same period and in the same manner, 266 military 
watchtowers similar to that in Petrinja were built to the detriment of financial education. 
According to the official report prepared by a special Austrian committee headed by 
J.M. Bärenreiter, in 1905/1906 school year, only 14% of eligible school children 
attended elementary schools.72 Despite the government’s efforts, the Muslim 
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population remained dormant regarding the development of its national narrative. This 
was partly due to the sense of alienation from the Austrian authorities and partly due to 
their disconnection from the core of the Ottoman state that was undergoing societal 
disintegration prior to the Young Turk Revolution. Additionally, as the majority of 
Bosnian Muslims did not speak Turkish and were aware of their Slavic (Serbian or 
Croatian) origins, they could not engage in any process of building a national identity 
that would enable them to declare themselves anything else but the Serbs or Croats of 
the Muslim faith. As late as 1930s, the Bosnian Muslims were still observing the 
Christian holidays and in some cases participating in village celebrations along with 
Christian villagers. They maintained a number of pre-Ottoman customs, connected to 
the days of St.George and John the Baptist. Most interestingly, they observed the days 
of St.Procopius, St.Peter and St.Ilija, Good Friday, Easter and Christmas according to 
the Julian calendar and in some cases, they celebrated the custom of slava, a uniquely 
Serbian Orthodox tradition.73 In this ambiguous situation, it was natural for the 
emerging Muslim intellectuals to apply diplomatic positioning between the Serbs and 
the Croats and assert themselves as the true leaders of the Muslim population.74  
Since researchers who were the citizens of the Serbian Kingdom were not allowed 
into Bosna and Herzegovina, a number of Croat scholars, citizens of Austro-Hungary, 
undertook the opportunity to explore the past of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Authors like 
Antun Hangi, wrote about the Bosnian Muslims as converted Croats. This was not 
unnoticed by the Serbian authors from both states. Luka Grdjić-Bjelokosić, an 
ethnographer from Mostar, criticized Hangi’s approach in his book Life and Customs 
of the Mohammedans of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in Serbia in 1903, in 
response to the Austro-Hungarian effort to separate the Bosnian Muslims from the 
Serbs.75 Since Serbian authors in Bosnia and Herzegovina were heavily suppressed by 
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the authorities from publishing their works related to the province, they naturally turned 
towards Serbia.76  
The decade of the 1890s was marked by the appearance of the nationalist claims 
by both the Serbs and the Croats over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Already mentioned 
Franjo Rački, the author of the Bogomil Theory of the Bosnian Church, believed that 
“the Croat people had a legal and permanent right of ownership to the whole space 
from the Bojana River (southern border of Montenegro) to the Drina and Danube.”77 
The competition was facilitated by the counter-claim that the Serbs had an equal right, 
as the majority of the Bosnian population was of Serbian Orthodox origin due to 
historical development in the Middle Ages. Naturally, the Austro-Hungarian authorities 
could not support any idea that would encourage any idea of independence of the 
Austrian Serbs, the Serbian argument was dismissed as the attempt of the Serbian 
Kingdom to destabilize the Monarchy and expand its borders towards the West. The 
Serbian response was labelled as “Greater Serbian expansionism” towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.78  
However, the threat from Hungarian nationalism in Croatia Proper and Slavonia 
prompted Rački and Bishop Strossmayer (Fig. 2.9) to adhere to the idea of the co-
operation and unity of all South Slavs. This resulted in an absurd situation in which the 
Serbian and Croatian intellectuals from those provinces of the Dual Monarchy co-
operated in their attempt to confront the attempt of the Austro-Hungarian authorities to 
suppress Slavic nationalism. Simultaneously, they were developing disagreements over 
the sizeable Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, now living within the 
imperial borders. Similarly, the authorities in Vienna and Budapest were playing their 
own power-games, with the Austrians supporting the Croats against the Hungarians and 
the Hungarians supporting the Serbs against the Austrians.79 The result was a growing 
rift between the Serbs and the Croats themselves, unnoticed at the time by the leading 
intellectuals of Yugoslav orientation. 
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5.4.3 The Sarajevo assassination 
Sarajevo assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 was 
used as a pretext to begin the First World War. The real causes and events surrounding 
the beginning of the Great War were traditionally explained as the mutual resentment 
of the Great Powers during the imperialist race.80 For this study, the important notion 
was the impact that the First World War had on the population of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The immediate action of the Provincial Government was to organize anti-
Serbian demonstrations and mobilize Catholic and Muslim population against the 
Serbs, as retaliation for the killed Duke. The authorities encouraged the terror against 
the Serbs, arguing that the “Greater Serbianism” was the threat for all population of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.81  
Generally, the rhetoric used by the authorities in the decade prior to the First 
World War was reflecting the fervent anti-Serbianism of the Croatian Party of Right. 
At the same time, the authorities adopted a patronising attitude towards the Muslims 
explaining that “the Serbian enemy will destroy all the Muslims if they take over the 
Muslim territories.”82 This attitude was echoed in the Report of the International 
Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conducts of the Balkan Wars, which was 
issued in Washington DC by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 
behalf of the government in Vienna. Its main objective was to promote the policy of 
appeasement on the eve of the First World War.83 The Austro-Hungarian authorities 
welcomed this report, as it was published just in time when the preparations for the war 
were taking place.  
The anti-Serbian feelings were exacerbated by the politically motivated trials 
against the prominent Serbs in Austro-Hungary, which culminated in their deportation 
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to detention camps in Arad, Nežider, Doboj and Šopronje.84 One of the survivors of the 
camp was a native of Mostar, historian Vladimir Ćorović (Fig. 1.42), who recorded the 
events of the First World War in Bosnia and Herzegovina in his work The Black Book 
– The Sufferings of the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the World War 1914-
1918. Without prejudice, Ćorović described in detail how the anti-Serbian feelings were 
incited among some parts of the Croat and Muslim population and underlined that the 
antagonisms would not happen if they were not manipulated from the outside.85  
5.5 The First Yugoslavia and its Muslims 
After the establishment of Gajret, the pro-Serbian feelings prevailed among the 
Bosnian Muslims whose leading western educated politicians during the Austro-
Hungarian era began advocating the unified South Slav state.86 When the First World 
War ended, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (YMO) was formed as a political 
organization based on the transformed Muslim Movement.87 As the Kingdom of SHS 
recognized only the nations of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Slav Muslims were 
permitted to declare themselves as either Serbs or Croats.  
Politically, that meant that they became the lever that regulated the political 
discourse between the Serbs and the Croats, when the economic disparity and differing 
views on state-organization became obvious in the first post-war years. The immediate 
action of the Belgrade Government was to introduce much needed agrarian reforms and 
to abolish the serfdom, retained by the Austro-Hungarian authorities in four decades 
after the Ottoman departure.88 Naturally, this affected the Muslim landowners as their 
privileges, maintained by both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian states, guaranteed 
their control over the majority of the population. The adopted economic measures 
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somewhat eased the growing food shortages, but alienated politically part of the leading 
Muslim politicians. Nevertheless, throughout the period of royal Yugoslavia, YMO 
leadership actively participated in the royal government. Mehmed Spaho (1883-1939), 
the undisputed YMO leader throughout the interwar years, held important Ministries of 
Economy (1919) and Trade and Industry in several parliaments until the death of King 
Alexander in 1934 (Fig. 5.11). None of the leading Muslim politicians at the time 
opposed the measures of the central government.89 Similarly, the YMO supported the 
Cvetković-Maček Sporazum when it was signed in 1939.90  
  
Fig. 5.11 – Mehmed Spaho (1883-1939), the leader of Yugoslav Muslim Organization and the most 
influential Muslim politician in the interwar period.  
In this period, however, the Muslim political front became more fragmented, as 
younger intellectuals sought to re-assert Islamic cultural values, but was divided 
whether it should be sought within Yugoslavia, as an autonomous region, or within a 
union with all Balkan Muslims, which would be a separate state.91 This particularly 
affected the younger and educated Muslim intellectuals who were divided between 
various pan-Islamic groups and the League of Communists. Their affiliation will 
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directly determine which side to join during the Second World War. The YMO, 
however, remained the main political power of the Bosnian Muslims. 
5.5.1 Integral Yugoslavism 
The period of royal Yugoslavia was marked by attempts to impose the policies 
of “integral Yugoslavism.”92 As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina was concerned, the 
Government’s immediate action was to expand primary education as the illiteracy rates, 
together with Kosovo and Metohija, were still among the highest in the state. The only 
noteworthy academic activities that were taking place in Yugoslavia were in Zagreb 
and Belgrade and from this period date the first serious academic debates on the ethnic 
nature of the Yugoslav Muslims. As there were no Muslim academics who would 
introduce a narrative of a separate Muslim nation and the Austro-Hungarian 
sponsorship of the “Bosnian consciousness” had failed, the Croat and Serbian scholars, 
reflecting the political stalemate in the parliament, transferred political disagreements 
into the scholarly debate on the ethnic nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
In 1925, Vladimir Ćorović argued that the historical, cultural and educational 
backwardness of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a direct consequence of the divisive 
policies of the Ottoman-Habsburg periods and insisted that the nature of Bosnia that 
became contested between the Serbs and Croats was implemented from the outside.93 
Ćorović emphasised that the cultural mix in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the 19th century 
had reached such a point that it had become impossible to disentangle them. This was, 
according to Ćorović, most visible in a few surviving examples of the mediaeval 
ecclesiastical architecture which was frequently orthodox in base, but richly decorated 
by the Romanesque and Gothic details of the coastal towns of Dalmatia (Fig. 5.12).94 
Ćorović also reported that the largest number of the surviving Ottoman heritage was 
concentrated in central Bosnia, bore visible Levantine features and was little or not 
researched at all. He advocated a professional assessment of the remaining heritage, 
which would help scholars to come to a better understanding of Bosnia’s cultural 
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position in the new South Slav state.95 His views, however, were influenced by the 
general acceptance of “integral Yugoslavism,” as he stated in the introduction of his 
work that “during the 19th century, there existed a serious threat that Bosnia might 
become an apple of discord between the Serbs and the Croats…luckily, with the 
unification that threat was removed, as desires of both were fulfilled.”96  
 
Fig. 5.12 – Monastery of Krupa, on the River Vrbas in central Bosnia, 13th-14th century. Destroyed and 
rebuilt several times. Romanesque windows and elongated bell-tower point to the Catholic influences 
from the Adriatic coast. 
Another important representative of the “integral Yugoslavism” was Ivo Andrić 
(1892-1975), a Bosnian Croat who later declared himself a Serb (Fig. 2.53). A 
distinguished writer and diplomat of the first part of the 20th century, he immortalized 
the intricate nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the most famous of his novels The 
Bridge on Drina, published in 1945. The novel was centred on the famous bridge (Fig. 
5.13) built by Mehmed-Pasha Sokolović (1509-1579) in Višegrad (Fig. 5.14), on the 
border between the Belgrade and Bosnian Pashaliks, as an allegory of bridges between 
the peoples, cultures and religions. For his work, Andrić was awarded a Nobel Prize in 
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1961. Andrić was one of the first intellectuals who pointed out that the concept of 
“integral Yugoslavism” was far broader than the Serb-Croat dichotomies.97  
         
Fig. 5.13 – The Bridge on Drina, built in 1571-1577 by Mimar Sinan (1489-1588), a chief Court architect 
in Constantinople, often called “the Ottoman Michelangelo.”  Listed by UNESCO as a World Heritage 
Site in 2007.                                                             
                                                                                                                  
  
Fig. 5.14 – Mehmed-Pasha Sokolović, born Rade Sokolović, the Ottoman Grand Vizier (1565-1579), 
erected many bridges and mosques throughout his native Bosnia and re-established the Serbian 
Patriarchal Seat in Peć (Kosovo and Metohija) in 1557. 
                                               
97
 Wachtel, A.B. – Ivan Meštrović, Ivo Andrić and the Synthetic Yugoslav Culture of the Interwar 
Period in Djokic, D. – Yugoslavism – Histories of a Failed Idea – 1918-1992, London, 2003, 246 
Chapter V                                                        The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
413 
 
5.5.2 Becoming Croat 
By 1939 the divisions between Serbian and Croatian scholars on the question 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina took divergent paths. The appearance of racist theories in 
Europe at the end of the 19th century was most visible in the Habsburg influenced parts 
of the Balkans, especially in Croatia, where Ante Starčević (Fig. 2.16) formulated a 
Croat national ideology that denied the existence of any South Slav nation other than 
Croat. In 1881 Starčević founded the Party of Rights that advocated secession from the 
Habsburg Empire.98 Because this was not politically possible, by the end of the century, 
the party ideology turned against the Serbs, arguing that “the Serbs were actually 
orthodox Croats and the Slovenes were Highland Croats.”99 In the interwar period, 
Starčević’s postulates were adopted and expanded by the Ustaše ideology which 
included in the Croat national spectrum his perception of the Bosnian Muslim elite as 
“Croat by nationality and the oldest and purest nobility in Europe.”100 
Ever since 1878, the politically prominent Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
generally applied political pragmatism, cooperating with current regimes. Thus, the 
political clashes between the Serbian and Croatian parliamentarians in the interwar 
period paid little attention to the Muslims, but determined their orientation during the 
Second World War, when the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina was included into the 
NDH. During the NDH a significant number of the Bosnian Muslims joined the Ustaše 
regime, declared themselves Croats and participated in the genocide of the Serbs, Jews 
and Roma.101 Embracing the NDH state policies which based their theory of ethno-
genesis on the highly polemical Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea, some Muslim leaders 
like Uzeiraga Hadžihasanović and Nedžad-beg Sulejmanpašić in the 1940s assumed 
the Gothic, that is German, heritage of the Bosnian Muslims.102 However, as the Second 
World War in Yugoslavia was also a civil war, a number of Bosnian Muslims also 
joined the communist Partisans.  
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5.6 The Second Yugoslavia and its Muslims 
The reconstructed federal Yugoslavia under Tito immediately imposed the 
“brotherhood and unity” policies that were designed to diminish the Croat-Serbian 
antagonisms. Since the Serbs still presented the most numerous national group in the 
state, the introduction of the new nations was directed towards reducing Serbian 
influence in Yugoslavia. Equally, Croat participation on the side of the Axis was used 
to re-assess the Muslim participation in the war as resulting from coercion by the 
Pavelić regime to “secure the practice of Islam unmolested.”103 For this purpose, the 
Serbian royalist units Četniks (Četnici) led by General Draža Mihajlović (1893-1946) 
which fought for a while on the side of the Allies became equivalent to the Croatian 
Ustaše units which fought on the side of the Axis. This designation led to the creation 
of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the borders that roughly corresponded 
to those of the Austro-Hungarian occupation.  
When the Second Yugoslavia was established, the Communist leadership also 
considered transferring the capital to Sarajevo, where no single religious community 
had a majority. The republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was, therefore, a good 
representation of the new Yugoslavia. The new authorities immediately undertook 
reconstruction projects which aimed to rebuild the entire Yugoslav territory on the 
Soviet model. The underdeveloped parts of the state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and Metohija, Montenegro and Macedonija benefited the most, as large sums of the 
budget money were directed towards the urbanization and industrialization of these 
regions. The Five Year plans, devised on the Soviet model, prompted large numbers of 
the rural population to move towards the rapidly expanding towns.  
Apart from Sarajevo, traditional local centres such as Banja Luka, Mostar, 
Travnik and Tuzla also experienced an economic growth and territorial expansion. In 
contrast to the urban areas, rural parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced decline, 
because the economic emphasis was on towns and industrialization. A number of 
villages that were completely destroyed during the war were slowly recovering, as there 
was no infrastructure to connect them to the more prosperous towns.104 Similarly, due 
to the loss of population, some villages were never re-populated and the only 
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demographic expansion took place in towns. The re-built towns bore no national 
character, but rather the grey features of Socialist Realism, like elsewhere in the 
Communist Yugoslavia.105  
5.6.1 Discovering the heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Similar to other parts of Yugoslavia and in accordance with the “brotherhood and 
unity” policies which required that every federal republic should have corresponding 
university and cultural institutions, these were developing by the decree. After the 
initial re-building of the country, the efforts of the Yugoslav authorities did indeed bring 
some progress in institutional research and preservation of heritage in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The People’s Library was founded in October 1945 and was situated in 
the former Town Council palace (Vijećnica), built in 1895 in the neo-Moorish style 
(Fig. 5.6).106 The new Act on Protection of Monuments of 1945 regulated the 
foundation of the Land’s Institute for Protection and Scientific Research of Cultural 
Monuments and Natural Landscapes of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Institute itself 
was placed in one wing of the Land Museum,107 but did not commence work until 1947, 
when it consisted of only one member of staff. By the end of 1948, the Institute re-
employed one retired museologist, one historian and, two years later, its first 
archaeologist, albeit a student. The first architect-conservationist was employed in 
1952. The Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded in 1947, but that institution 
too lacked sufficiently trained staff. The central museum institution in the republic, 
Zemaljski muzej, suffered lasting shortages of academically trained professionals and 
consolidated only in the beginning of the 1960s.108 A special Oriental Institute was 
established in Sarajevo in 1950, to research and publish historical documents relating 
to Bosnia or written in Turkish, Arabic and Persian by the natives of Bosnia during the 
Ottoman period.109 However, the first Scientific Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Naučno društvo Bosne i Hercegovine) was founded only in 1951 in order to support 
and promote the spread of education.  
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Despite initial enthusiasm for the educational and cultural development, the 
programme for researching of political, cultural and socio-economic relations in the 
19th and 20th century began only in 1956.110 Understandably, this situation, because of 
the inexperienced staff and money shortages prevented any re-thinking of the Bosnian 
past to take place, except in relation to communist interpretation of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia and the Second World War. Nevertheless, the first survey-volume on 
mediaeval settlements in Bosnia and Herzegovina was published in Sarajevo in 1957.111 
In the following decades, the works on mapping the archaeological and architectural 
heritage increased, with the support of the Universities of Belgrade and Zagreb. 
Scholars involved in research were frequently natives of Bosnia who completed their 
studies in Belgrade or Zagreb, but focused their research on Bosnia. However, not 
before 1978 the first comprehensive work on Bosnian mediaeval towns appeared. In 
that year, a Bosnian Serb urban historian, native of Sarajevo, Desanka Kovačević-Kojić 
(b.1925) published her extensive study on mediaeval towns in Bosnia in the 14th and 
15th centuries. This study was orientated strictly to the urban features of the pre-
Ottoman towns and was based on the available information from various archives and 
archaeological data collection. In accordance with the official Yugoslav historiography, 
it bore no national assignations.112  
Similarly, the conservation works were undertaken on the most important 
monuments belonging to the heritage of all three religious communities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The old towns of Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Jajce, stećci in Radimlja, 
Srebrenica, but also bridges in Mostar (Fig. 5.15) and Višegrad underwent major 
restorations, albeit with substantial help from the experts from Belgrade and Zagreb.  
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Fig. 5.15 – The Mostar Bridge, built by an apprentice of Mimar Sinan in 1566 on place of an older 
Mediaeval bridge, destroyed in 1993 by Croat forces in Herzegovina. Rebuilt in 2004 by various 
international agencies, without participation of local conservation experts. Inscribed in the UNESCO’s 
World Heritage List in 2005.                                                             
5.6.2 The Muslim Nation 
In 1966, the Scientific Society was upgraded into an Academy of Sciences and 
Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ANUBiH) which resulted from the change in political 
thinking against the background of the European events of 1968 and re-opening of the 
national question in Yugoslavia.113 The Yugoslav top communist establishment, whilst 
seemingly opening towards the West, sought to maintain their privileges at any cost. 
This resulted in modification of the old Austro-Hungarian methods of invention of the 
national grand narratives which would instil the sense of loyalty to the Communist 
Yugoslavia.  
Parallel with the official party-line of historiography that adopted much of 
Rački’s initial assessment that Bosnian Muslims were descendants of the converted 
members of the dualist Bosnian Church, a new line of argument was developed under 
the influence of some Croat émigré historians and their Western colleagues who 
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claimed that the elusive Bosnian Church of the Middle Ages was nether Bogomil-
dualist nor in any contact with the Serbian Orthodox Church. The revolutionary thesis 
that the little understood mediaeval Bosnian Church was actually a renegade Roman 
Catholic Order was promulgated by the American scholar John V.A. Fine (b.1939) in 
his book The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation, published in New York in 1975. 
Fine (Fig. 5.16) based his research exclusively on the late 19th and early 20th century’s 
interpretation of the surviving mediaeval manuscripts of the Dubrovnik, Vatican, 
Venice, Budapest and other archives of the Roman Catholic world, dismissing in the 
process Orthodox sources and stressing that his work was the result of receiving a 
Yugoslav government grant in the 1960s.114 The book was dismissed as not being a 
genuine work of scholarship with an arguably well-intended motivation.115 
Nevertheless, Fine proceeded to create some relatively well accepted books on the 
mediaeval Balkans in the early 1980s, which became standard reference points in the 
English language after Yugoslav dissolution in 1991. 
However, the process of building a Muslim nation based on material evidence 
was seriously undermined by three important facts: firstly, there were no surviving 
contemporary sources written by the natives of Bosnia who referred to themselves as 
of Bosnian identity; secondly, the surviving pre-Ottoman heritage belonged clearly to 
either Catholic or Orthodox traditions and those two religions were already “nationally 
acquired” by the Croats and the Serbs; finally, a complete absence of church ruins that 
could be related to the Bosnian Church with certainty made any conclusive argument 
impossible. Because Islam appeared in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina only in 
the mid-15th century and the Slavic-speaking converts identified themselves as Turks 
until the late 19th century, the question whether they belonged to the Serbs or the Croats 
was really a debate between the Serbs and Croats.116 The heresy in mediaeval Bosnia 
that was mentioned on several occasions between the 12th and the 15th century in various 
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primary sources of both Catholic and Orthodox origins could be interpreted in either 
way, as the evidence of its existence was contradictory and inconsistent. Therefore, the 
attempts to link the Bosnian Church to the pre-Ottoman archaeological and cultural 
heritage resulted in assigning the characteristics of the Bosnian Church to the mediaeval 
tombstones known as stećci (Fig. 5.17). The problem appeared instantly, as many of 
those tombstones were unequivocally either Serbian Orthodox or Croat Catholic and 
could be found outside Bosnia proper, in the territories of Serbia and Croatia. 
  
Fig. 5.16 – John V.A.Fine (b.1939) interpreted the Bosnian Church as emanating from the misinterpreted 
Catholicism in mediaeval Bosnia. In his research, he used almost exclusively the late 19th and early 20th 
century Croat interpretations of the Bosnian identity. 
 
Fig. 5.17 – Stećci in Radimlja – Mediaeval graveyard specific to the Balkans. As the greatest number of 
tombs is situated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, serious attempts were to associate them with the elusive 
Bosnian Church. 
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5.6.3 The Bogomil Theory 
As noted above, the Bogomil Theory of the nature of the Bosnian Church was 
first advocated in the 19th century by the Catholic priest and historian Franjo Rački. The 
Bogomil Theory served the purpose of “bridging the gap” between the medieval times 
and the massive conversions that occurred after 1463.117 The main emphasis was on the 
dualism of the church doctrine which linked the Bogomil heresy that appeared in 9th 
century Bulgaria with the sparse information about the “Bosnian heretics” of the 12th-
15th centuries. This dualism arguably identified by the unusual hierarchy of the clergy, 
described as having a bishop Djed (Grandfather), Strojnik (prior, iguman?) and his 
inferior Starac (Old Man) and superior Gost (Guest).118 These titles appear in the 
several surviving mediaeval manuscripts and represent the only indication of the 
existence of some religious peculiarity in that period. They were all written in the 
Cyrillic of the Old Church Slavonic of Serbian redaction (Manuel’s Gospel, Batalo’s 
Gospel, Hval’s Gospel), with visible Catholic-style illuminations. However, these 
gospels were arranged to follow the Orthodox creed and even Fine, the author of the 
“catholic interpretation” of the Bosnian Church, admitted that some of these gospels 
were used by the Serbian Orthodox Church in the centuries after the Ottoman 
conquest.119 
The problem, however, was a complete absence of any archaeological evidence 
that could confirm the existence of the Bosnian Church except for the remains of a few 
Orthodox and Catholic monasteries in pre-Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key 
explanation of the lack of the material evidence was the dualist doctrine itself: the 
dualists did not require church structures and built no monasteries. However, the stećci 
monuments that were erected in the same period (12th-15th century) were declared to be 
a product of separate and unique Bosnian Church activities, as the majority of them 
were situated in the territory of and coincided with the existence of the mediaeval 
Bosnian state. Some estimates suggest the existence of nearly 70,000 stećci tombstones 
in the central Balkans, the majority of which (nearly 58,000) are in the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.120 However, until the mid-20th century, the local peasants 
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used to call the stećci “the Greek graves” (Orthodox graves).121 Symbolically, the 
tombstones display a myriad of motifs that have both Orthodox and Catholic features 
whose origins and artistic development are still not fully explained.122  
The Bogomil theory was accepted for most of the 20th century as an accurate 
explanation for religious practices in pre-Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the 
Second Yugoslavia, the most prominent Bosnian Muslim scholars accepted the 
argument that the dualism of the Bosnian Church, persecuted by both the much stronger 
Orthodox and Catholic Churches that were competing in Bosnia, was the main reason 
for the swift conversion to Islam of its members. The Yugoslav Muslim scholars 
maintained that the dualist nature and weak church organization prevented the firm 
establishment of Christianity among the Bosnian population, which later contributed to 
the much quicker penetration of Islam in Bosnia.  
Among Muslim scholars who accepted this thesis was Atif Purivatra (1928-2001), 
who devised the theory of the evolution of the Muslim national identity in Bosnia in 
the years prior to their recognition as a nation in Yugoslavia in 1971. Purivatra argued 
that the most prominent members of the Bosnian Church were the ruling aristocrats 
who accepted Islam immediately after the conquest in order to retain their privileges. 
He concluded that the contemporary Bosnian Muslims were the descendants of the 
mediaeval nobility.123 This theory, however, could not extrapolate the scale of 
conversion of the Albanians, which are not known to have been subject to heresy in the 
pre-Ottoman times and also lived in the mountainous areas, similar to those in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
The theoretical debate on the nature of pre-Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
exacerbated by increased archaeological research. A number of epigraphic monuments 
related to the stećci were discovered and presented to the public, but the debates on the 
nature of the Bosnian Church differed on the interpretation of details rather than its 
essence. This was partly because the theory itself was very much in accordance with 
the South Slav idea, retained by the Yugoslav Communists. When the Bogomil Theory 
was first devised in the Romantic and post-Romantic periods, it fitted well with the idea 
of the unity of all South Slavs. After the 1918 unification, it was easily incorporated 
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into the policy of “integral Yugoslavism” on the basis that it was devised by a Croat 
historian, who incorporated the Serbian influences through its links to the Orthodox 
material evidence. After 1945, again, it was easily incorporated into the Yugoslav 
“brotherhood and unity” policy, as the “dualism” of the Bosnian Church, illustrated by 
the intertwined stećci motifs, was explained by Bosnia and Herzegovina belonging to 
all three peoples equally. As such, it was accepted by the wider academic circles both 
in Yugoslavia and internationally for the most part of the 20th century. 
However, the opening of the national question in Yugoslavia in the 1960s implied 
that the Bogomil Theory was considered to be too close to Serbian Orthodoxy. A new 
theory was developed that denied the link between the Bogomils and the Bosnian 
Church.124 The new theory did not comprise new ideas, but revised arguments that 
appeared for the first time on the eve of the Second World War and during the existence 
of the NDH.  
5.6.4 The Cyrillic Catholic Theory 
In the midst of the Second World War, some Croat historians asserted that the 
nature of the Bosnian Church could not have been dualist, but Catholic that fell into the 
schism. Ćiro Truhelka (Fig. 5.18), the very same man who was behind von Kállay’s 
enterprise of awakening the “Bosnian state-consciousness” in his final book Studije o 
podrijetlu. Etnološka razmatranja iz Bosne i Herzegovine, published by Matica 
Hrvatska in 1942, asserted that the Bosnian Church was established as a consequence 
of transferring the Archbishopric of Bosnia to Đakovo in the mid-13th century.125 
Because the religious practices were still not fully established, the changing 
jurisdictions between the Archibishoprics of Bar (Doclea), Split or Dubrovnik, 
Catholics fell into the schism.126 Truhelka pointed to the surviving Latin sources which 
indicated that the creed of the Bosnian Church did not show signs of heresy, but rather 
a “uniquely Bosnian version” of Catholicism. Similarly, this theory associated the name 
of krstjani127 which frequently appeared on the stećci tombstones and in some 
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documents as evidence of belonging to the hierarchically well-organized church with 
autochthonous religious practices. Since the evidence of these practices were 
contradictory and the remaining archaeological sites difficult to decipher, he concluded 
that the Bosnian Church was essentially Catholic, built in the “Oriental style” and used 
the Slavic Language and Cyrillic traditions of Cyril and Methodius.128  
To corroborate the Catholic Cyrillic theory, Truhelka pointed to the existence 
of a so-called bosančica, a Cyrillic script allegedly used by the Franciscan monks in 
the 17th century in Bosnia.129 The name of bosančica was first invented in 1889 by 
Truhelka himself during his tenure of the Landesmuseum in Sarajevo. In accordance 
with von Kállay’s policies, Truhelka asserted that bosančica was native to Bosnia and 
had no connection with the Cyrillic of the Serbian mediaeval courts.130 
  
Fig. 5.18 – Dr Ćiro Truhelka (1865-1942) worked on the development of Bosnian identity under von 
Kállay’s tenure in Bosnia and Herzegovina and coined the term of bosančica (meaning: script of Bosnia) 
for the mediaeval Serbian manuscripts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The main drawback to this theory was that there were no remains that would 
corroborate the existence of the Bosnian Church buildings. Whilst the Bogomil Theory 
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argued that the nature of the heresy was to reject any church structure, the Cyrillic 
Catholic Theory insisted that “the monasteries of the Bosnian Church were built in the 
Oriental style.”131 Even though it included some valid arguments on the discrepancies 
and huge time-gaps in the Bogomil theory, its main disadvantage was the interpretations 
based on probability, rather than hard evidence. 
This Cyrillic Catholic theory, because of the time and place of its appearance, was 
abandoned immediately after the Second World War and the Bogomil Theory 
prevailed.132 However, it was preserved by the Croat émigré historians close to the 
Nazi-regime of the NDH who left Yugoslavia after 1945 and continued their work 
abroad. The special position of Yugoslavia in relation to the rest of the communist 
countries favoured the development of Yugoslav studies in a number of foreign 
universities. The primary interest was, of course, in modern history and culture, whilst 
the mediaeval period was studied in passing and was usually based on the contemporary 
historiography sanctioned by the Yugoslav government. Apart from the works of John 
V.A. Fine, an in-depth analysis of the early history of Yugoslav peoples in the majority 
of Western countries was non-existent. This proved fatal after 1990. 
5.7 Becoming a nation 
In the two decades after the introduction of the “brotherhood and unity,” many 
Serbs were systematically removed from the key-party positions at both republican and 
Federal level. By 1965, there were no high-level Serbs in the Bosnian Communist Party 
branch.133 Similarly, the Christian population of the republic went into a rapid decline 
and by the 1960s, the Muslims became individually the most numerous ethnic group.134 
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The assertion by the Muslims to be a nation separate from the Serbs and the Croats 
also raised the question of the contemporary religious situation in Yugoslavia. Even 
though religions were not officially banned, their open practice was discouraged. The 
role of the Muslims in communist Yugoslavia was much the same as during the Austro-
Hungarian occupation and royal Yugoslavia: that of the buffer-zone between the Serbs 
and Croats.135 The extensive programmes for the eradication of illiteracy that took place 
in the first years after the Second World War and strict secularization for the first time 
brought into existence the secular Muslim intellectuals who worked under the aegis of 
the Communist ideology. However, from the 1960s, the Bosnian Muslim communist 
leaders were increasingly involved in the “clientelistic” conflicts among the different 
communities and nations in Yugoslavia.136 
The League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a resolution in the 
revolutionary 1968, which stated that:  
“The practice has shown the harmfulness, in the past period, of the different forms 
of pressure and injunction aiming to make Muslims declare themselves nationally as 
Serbs or Croats, since it has appeared in the past and it is confirmed by the present 
socialist practice, that Muslims form a distinct nation.”137 
The national confirmation was finally sanctioned in the 1974 Constitution.  
5.7.1 The Islamic Declaration 
From 1974, the leading Muslim Marxist intellectuals, such as Atif Purivatra, 
Muhamed Filipović, and many others, supported by the CPY leadership, worked 
fervently for the promotion of Bosnian Muslim history and literature, albeit within the 
Yugoslav framework. The exception was, however, the pan-Islamic movement, whose 
informal leader, Alija Izetbegović (1925-2003) advocated the re-establishment of the 
Islamic values in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1970, Izetbegović (Fig. 5.19) published 
a manifesto entitled the Islamic Declaration, which proposed that the Yugoslav 
Muslims should adopt as their political role-model the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, a 
country created after the secession of the Muslim part of a large multiethnic state, 
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basing its national identity on Islam.138 Izetbegović’s views on the pan-Islamic 
movement were expressed as a call for the “establishment of the great Islamic 
federation from Moroco to Indonesia, from subtropical Africa to Central Asia.”139 Since 
this publication roughly coincided with the period of the Croatian Spring, the Yugoslav 
authorities forbade it as they saw it as a threat to state security.140 Izetbegović, himself 
a member of the SS Handžar Division141 during the Second World War, was not tried 
until 1983, following the 1980 publication of yet another manifesto, titled Islam 
between East and West. His lengthy prison sentence ended in 1988 with the beginning 
of the political upheaval in Yugoslavia, when Izetbegović was released from prison. 
Almost immediately he assumed the leadership of the first post-communist Muslim 
party, the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA), founded on 
27th March 1990 from some members of the pan-Islamic movement and former Muslim 
Communists.142 Izetbegović’s fundamentalism was a key Serbian argument in the 
1992-1995 war, but was mostly ignored by the West. 
 
Fig. 5.19 – Alija Izetbegović (1925-2003), the leader of the Bosnian Muslims during the wars of 
Yugoslav succession in the 1990s. 
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5.7.2 Ethnic divisions 
The first multi-party elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina of November 1990, 
as expected, showed deep divisions among the nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Croats and Serbs stood behind their national parties the Croatian Democratic Union 
(Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) and the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska 
Demokratska Stranka, SDS), whilst the Muslims rallied behind the SDA. Until spring 
1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was locked in internal disagreements. The Croats, 
naturally, wanted to join their co-nationals in the recently proclaimed independent 
Croatia, whilst the Serbs insisted on remaining with other Serbs and Montenegrins 
within Yugoslavia. If either were allowed self-determination, the territory of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina would inevitably ended up changed. This would further leave the 
Muslims between two choices: either to join the new states of Serbia and Croatia in the 
new borders or to form a minute Muslim republic in the area of central Bosnia, around 
Sarajevo, where they had a majority. The first option was not allowed by the 
international community. The second option was not acceptable to the Muslims, as that 
would mean significant reduction of their influence. All attempts by the international 
mediators to find an acceptable solution failed as the Muslims of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina rejected the partition of the state either pressed by the pro-Croat faction 
within the SDA or on the advice of the Americans.143 Whichever was the case, the 
recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state within the borders 
determined by Tito occurred on the unhappy date of 6th April 1992.144 It now marked 
the beginning of a three year war, which the major western media seized upon to justify 
the interventionist policies of their governments. 
The brutality of the war exposed all the weaknesses of the previous Yugoslav 
system. Since an open debate on the ethnic and national conflicts between the Yugoslav 
peoples after the world wars were silenced in order to maintain the “brotherhood and 
unity”, the suppressed unsolved enmities exploded. In the initial stages of the war, the 
JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina disintegrated along national lines, much as had 
happened in other parts of Yugoslavia. The JNA officers defected to the newly formed 
national armies and acted on the pretext of protecting their co-nationals from ethnic 
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cleansing. Initial accounts of war reported nearly 250,000 lives lost, but some recent 
research suggests that the real number is closer to 100,000.145 The destruction of towns, 
urban structures and rural areas is still subject to analysis, as early reports on destruction 
were focused only on the most prominent towns and most significant historic structures 
and in some cases were grossly exaggerated for the purpose of war propaganda.146  
5.7.3 The war of the monuments 
One of the most memorable pictures of the destruction of heritage was 
certainly the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar. The film shots of its savage 
destruction on 9th November 1993 shocked the world (Fig. 5.20). The bridge as it was 
had existed for over four centuries, although there is a document dating back into the 
XV century which refers to the mediaeval wooden hanged bridge, built before the 
Ottoman conquest. According to the Ottoman sources, by the mid-XVI century the 
wooden structure of the previous bridge decayed and the new stone structure was 
erected in 1566 under the supervision of the main architect, Hayrudin, the apprentice 
of the Ottoman Court-architect, Mimar Sinan.147 The bridge was built in order to span 
the banks of the river Neretva, and had no significance or outstanding architectural 
features. Its value derived from the centuries of use and, more importantly, because the 
city built around it was named and identified by the bridge: Mostar. Most in the 
language of Southern Slavs means Bridge, hence the name of the city, Mostar.148 
Because the Old Bridge represented the Islamic heritage in Europe, the Croatian 
military units in Herzegovina destroyed it. 
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Fig. 5.20 – The moment of destruction of the Old Bridge, as captured by the camera in 1993. 
Mimar Sinan was also commissioned to design a second major bridge in Bosnia 
on the initiative of the Grand Vizier Mehmed-Pasha Sokolović (1505/6-1579), a native 
of the area around Višegrad (Fig. 5.14). Built between 1571 and 1577, the Bridge on 
the Drina survived several centuries and was not directly endangered during the 1992-
1995 war. However, this bridge played a prominent role in defining the Serbian identity 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as its benefactor, Mehmed-Pasha initiated the renewal of 
the Serbian Partiarchate of Peć in 1557, abolished after the fall of the Despotate in 
1459.149 The bridge on the Drina was presented as an allegorical symbol of Bosnia 
belonging to all three religions and nations in the Nobel Prize awarded novel The Bridge 
on the Drina written by Ivo Andrić (Fig. 2.53) during the Second World War. Andrić’s 
vivid descriptions of hatred and intolerance in Bosnia, which reflected the time of his 
own youth during the Austro-Hungarian occupation, was carefully balanced by the 
images of interwoven cultures and symbolic bridges, as a common heritage of Bosnia's 
population.150 After Andrić died in 1975, a monument to him was erected in Višegrad. 
In 1992 the busts that were dedicated to him in several Bosnian towns in the 1970s and 
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1980s were destroyed by the Muslims. The first one to be destroyed was the one in 
Višegrad (Fig. 5.21).151 
          
Fig. 5.21 – The re-erected statue to Ivo Andrić (1892-1975) in Višegrad’s monument complex 
Andrićgrad, built by Emir Kusturica in 2011-2014 – The monument is a replica of the statue that was 
erected in central Belgrade in 1992, on the centenary of Andrić’s birth. In Bosnia, the centenary marked 
the beginning of war and the busts and monuments to Andrić were either collectively removed or 
destroyed in the territories held by the Muslim forces. 
No systematic data on the destroyed heritage was collected during and 
immediately after the war ended in 1995. In 1997/1998 the Council of Europe 
undertook the initial assessment of the destroyed heritage, but the programme was 
carried out only partially, because some (mainly Serbian) parts of Bosnia were omitted 
from the programme. The first acceptable, albeit partial, assessment about the 
destruction of the architectural and archaeological heritage in the territory of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was published only in March 2010, fifteen years after the end of the 
conflict. In a lengthy document, the presented data reported 2771 damaged architectural 
structures, both secular and ecclesiastical, whilst 713 heritage units were completely 
destroyed and 554 burnt beyond repair.152 Particular destruction was inflicted upon 
                                               
151
 Upon opening the national question in Yugoslavia and the assertion of Muslims as a separate nation, 
Andrić was accused of harbouring anti-Muslim bias. Isakovic, 2000, 109 
152
 The report was produced under the supervision of the European Commission and Council of Europe 
http://www.kons.gov.ba/main.php?mod=vijesti&extra=aktuelnost&action=view&id_vijesti=667&lang
=1 – The official web-site of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (under the jurisdiction of the Muslim-Croat Federation) – Accessed on 20/09/2012 – One 
of the main deficiencies of this document is that it does not state whether the given data is related only 
Chapter V                                                        The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
431 
 
listed monuments of religious significance especially those dating from the 15th-19th 
centuries and included listed buildings of both the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian 
periods.  
Numerous mosques, dating from the 16th-19th centuries, were destroyed or 
suffered heavy damages. The most prominent was certainly the Ferhat-Pasha Mosque, 
built in 1579 in Banja Luka and destroyed by the Serbian forces in 1993. Together with 
the Old Bridge in Mostar, it became iconic evidence of the suffering of the Bosnian 
Muslims. As war destruction in Yugoslavia was fervently followed by the international 
media, the nature of war was explained in terms of Serbian aggression, rather than a 
civil war. Thus, the destruction of the Croat Catholic and Serbian Orthodox religious 
edifices was less pronounced by the Western media, which argued that the number of 
destroyed Islamic objects far exceeded those of both Christian denominations.153 This 
argument was used for singling out the Serbs as the main war initiators. The Republic 
of Serbia was directly accused to be the main aggressor, despite the fact that the 
majority of Serbian army deployed in the war operations was formed and consisted of 
the natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The involvement of NATO was followed by 
general condemnation of the Serbs, irrespective of whether they were natives of the 
Republics of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia or Montenegro. Parallel with the 
media coverage, Serbian arguments and their institutions were silenced by the harsh 
sanctions imposed on the Republic of Serbia including all aspects of academic debate. 
This scholarly vacuum enabled the formulation and popularization of a new grand 
narrative for the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina originating predominantly in the 
English and German linguistic traditions. 
5.8 The Bosniaks – The South Slavs autochthonous to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
On 23rd January 1993 a group of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals gathered in Zürich 
to established Matica Bošnjaka as the highest cultural institution of the Bosnian 
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Muslims.154 The manifesto, Bosnia, Bosniadom and the Bosnian Language, published 
in Zagreb later in the same year, introduced a notion of the separate character of the 
Bosnian Language and Bosnian national identity. Even though based on the 19th century 
Serbian and Croat language manifestos, its tone differed from those in the aggressive 
expression of the need for the individuality of the Bosnian Muslim identity which would 
be based on the religion. Thus, in the introductory article Kultura na nišanu (Culture 
Targeted), Dr Smail Balić (1920-2002), an Austrian of Bosnian Muslim origins, 
reported that “by January 1993 the Serbian aggressor has destroyed or damaged over 
1000 mosques, or two-fifths of all mosques in the country, as well as the building of the 
Oriental Institute and the National Library in Sarajevo.”155 He proceeded in a highly 
emotional tone to describe the aesthetic values of the Islamic heritage exposed to 
“Četnik destruction.”156 
In the same manifesto, in the article Bosnian Language-Myth or Reality? Dr Ante 
Granić, a Croat from Herzegovina, formulated the theory of a separate Bosnian 
Language, based on the hypothetical interpretation of some mediaeval manuscripts 
which referred to the pre-Ottoman Bosnian state. Those were mainly the charters issued 
by Bosnian mediaeval rulers, which alternated between the Cyrillic and Latin scripts 
and indicated, according to Granić, the “unawareness of the existence of Serbian and 
Croatian languages in the territory of Bosnia.” Granić admitted that the difference 
between the Serbian and Croatian languages was less than the difference between the 
American and British English, but asserted that “in those parts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina where the Croats live, it is likely that the language policy will correspond 
to that in Croatia and where the Serbs live, the language policy will correspond to that 
in Serbia…Thus, it was essential that the language used exclusively by the Muslims 
should be called Bosnian.”157 He insisted that the Bosnian Language was unique in its 
richness of Turkish words, use of the sounds H and F and was essentially pluralistic, as 
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it was written in both scripts.158 Finally, Ganić admitted that the policies of Benjamin 
von Kállay were for the benefit of the Bosnian people and called for the re-examination 
of his time as the Governor of Bosnia.159  
The foundation of Matica Bošnjaka in Zürich was helped by the Bosniac Institute 
that had been founded in Zürich in 1988 on the initiative of Adil-beg Zulfikarpašić 
(1921-2008), a Muslim intellectual-dissident, who emigrated from Yugoslavia in the 
1960s (Fig. 5.22).160 The Bosniac Institute in Switzerland played a prominent role in 
organizing pro-Muslim media campaigns in the West. The central argument of the 
Bosniac Institute during the civil war, was the need to maintain Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as a unified state at any cost, despite the wishes of Serbs and Croats. Since the West did 
not support the idea of an Islamic state within Europe, maintaining Bosnian unity 
became a political tool for the interventionism. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
depicted as the aggression of Republic of Serbia on a sovereign, internationally 
recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key-problem was how to justify the 
intervention, as the Serbs of Bosnia had at least an equally valid argument for having 
the right to choose the state in which to live. Thus, the Western governments, already 
embarrassed in Iraq and Afghanistan, seized the opportunity to exonerate themselves 
from the accusations of European Christian intolerance against Islam. By showing 
support for the Muslims, albeit of white race and in Europe, the West presented itself 
as tolerant of Islam in the light of ”the political, religious and cultural frustrations and 
contradictions inherent to the regions and societies outside the Balkans.”161  
5.8.1 The Bosnian Institute 
During the war in 1993, British historian and journalist Noel Malcolm undertook 
the task of writing a short history of Bosnia which would depart from the standard 
history textbooks that existed until then. The book Bosnia, A Short History was 
published in 1994 and was widely publicized as “a brilliant work of history which set 
the terrible war in the Balkans in its full historical context.”162 Acknowledging that he    
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Fig. 5.22 – Adil-beg Zulfikarpašić (1921-2007) promoted the picture of Bosnian Muslims as essentially 
secular and European-orientated. As such, he was in conflict with Alija Izetbegović. 
 
never visited Sarajevo libraries,163 Malcolm wrote an eloquent and well referenced 
account, based predominantly on a distorted use of secondary sources, written mostly 
by the late 19th century Austro-Hungarian and 20th century Croat émigré historians 
close to the NDH regime of the Second World War, openly hostile towards the Serbs.164 
For a non-specialist, the book reads like a genuine work of scholarship. One problem 
was a total absence of references to any primary source and some mistranslations of the 
Serbian/Croatian words.165 Malcolm (Fig. 5.23) re-asserted the Austro-Hungarian 
theory of the autochthonous Bosniak nation, different from the Serbs and the Croats 
and invented the notion that the Serbs appeared in Bosnia for the first time after 1532, 
when “an Orthodox Metropolitan” of Sarajevo was mentioned in the sources.166 
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Fig. 5.23 – Noel Malcom (b.1956) invented a new national narrative for the Bosnian Muslims in 1994. 
He did the same for the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija.  
According to Malcolm, Serbian Orthodoxy was brought to Bosnia only after the 
Ottoman conquest in the 15th century. Being a religion “favoured by the Porte,” it 
initiated the large migrations of the Serbs in the 16th century because Bosnia offered 
better prospects. As evidence that the Orthodox Serbs never existed in Bosnia before 
the Ottomans re-settled them there, Malcolm employed Fine’s speculative account on 
the Bosnian Church.167 Malcolm adopted the view of a Croat émigré author Dominik 
Mandić (Fig. 2.55) who asserted that the predominance of the Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina until the mid-20th century was a consequence not only of migrations 
after 1463, but also “forceful conversions of the Catholics to Orthodoxy during the 
Ottoman period.”168 Finally, for Mandić and subsequently Malcolm, a significant 
majority of the Orthodox population of the pre-ottoman Bosnia were not ethnic Serbs 
at all, but the Vlachs, who were incorporated into the Serbian nation only in the 19th 
century, when “Greater Serbian propaganda” convinced them that they were Serbs. For 
Malcolm, thus, the Bosnian Muslims were converted Croats.169 
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It is often said that it is not dangerous reading many books, but reading just one.170 
Malcolm’s book became of crucial significance in the process of historical revisionism 
in the West Balkans and creation of a new Bosnian nation. All subsequent books written 
on Bosnia either in English or in the “Land Language” of the new independent state 
were based on his premises that the Serbs have neither historical nor moral claim to live 
in Bosnia, unless they accept their new Bosniak identity. For this purpose, Malcolm 
and a group of Muslim and Croat émigrés and their Western supporters, founded the 
Bosnian Institute in London in 1997, a charity that became “a key organization 
internationally in providing education and information on the history and culture of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a special concern for the past and present development of its 
social, economic, governmental, legal and cultural conditions, organizations and 
institutions (sic).”171 The Bosnian Institute now stores a collection of works on Bosnia 
in English and other major languages, written and published since 1990 and from the 
time of its foundation represents the main institution for the application of normative 
historiography in the Balkans. The most notable achievement of its activities was the 
complete rehabilitation of the pro-Ustaše movement and the ideology of the Croat 
Party of Right which inspired it. The Communist historiography of the Yugoslav period 
was used selectively and described as essentially “Greater Serbian” and anti-
democratic. The dominance of the English language in historiographical writing after 
1989 enabled Malcolm’s version of Balkan events to become a standard reference 
point.172 Personally, Malcolm profited by being awarded a number of prestigious 
academic posts both in the United Kingdom and abroad.173 These significant titles 
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enabled him to influence the present generation of British, Bosnian Muslim and 
Albanian scholars, especially as very few modern Western students of the region speak 
Serbian/Croatian and take the revised work of the 1990s as academically indisputable.  
5.8.2 The Bosniak Narrative 
After the creation of the Matica Bošnjaka and Malcolm’s invention of the new 
Bosnian historical narrative, the Muslim scholars in Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted 
this war-time revisionism and developed it further in order to fully establish the Bosnian 
nation, separate from the Serbs and the Croats. With the end of the war and the 
establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an alleged multinational state of the 
Bosnian Muslims, renamed Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, an impressive academic effort 
had been put foreword to inject the new narrative and strengthen the Bosnian 
consciousness among the population through educational and cultural programmes. 
This new narrative became operational in the Muslim-Croat Federation, whilst 
Republika Srpska retained educational system equivalent to that of the Republic of 
Serbia. In the Muslim-Croat Federation, the Croats displayed dissatisfaction with the 
narrative that negates their ethnicity. Thus, for the Bosnian Serbs, Ćorović’s 
interpretation that the Bosnian Muslims were converted Serbs is still part of their grand 
narrative. Among the Croats, Mandić’s argument that the Bosnian Muslims were 
converted Croats reflects the guiding theme of their own national narrative.174   
According to some modern Muslim scholars who advocate the Bosniak narrative, 
the Bosnian Muslims are descendants of an ancient Slavic tribe “Bosna.”175 Enver 
Imamović (b.1940) adopted the view which traces the origins of the Bosnian Muslims 
to the Illyrian tribe “Posen.”176 The “Gothic” origins of the tribe “Bossi,” as argued by 
the influential merchant Uzeiraga Haždihasanović in the early 20th century were largely 
dismissed because of their original misuse during the NDH, although they still 
occasionally appear in the popular literature.177 Since the evidence for any of these 
claims provided by written sources, archaeology and linguistic studies were either 
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insufficient or contradictory, the argument turned towards the numbers of the 
conquering Slavs in the early 7th century.178 According to this theory, the Serbs and the 
Croats came in small numbers to the Balkans and subjected the indigenous Romanized 
Illyrian population, which later adopted their language. Thus, Denis Bašić adopted 
Malcolm’s argument that the terms “Serbs” or “Croats” were nothing but the tribal 
labels which differed significantly in the 7th-12th centuries. Based on this premise, he 
developed the theory that neither the Serbs nor the Croats were Slavs in a genetic sense, 
and therefore, could not be linked to modern day Serbs or Croats.179 Therefore, Bašić 
concluded that the Bosnian Muslims cannot be related to the Serbs or Croats for the 
same reason.180 
Since the myths of origins were very difficult to conceptualize, the adherents of 
the Bosniak narrative turned towards the mediaeval Christian aristocracy, focusing on 
the only ruling family of Kotromanić (1250-1463) with its greatest ruler, King Tvrtko 
I (Fig. 1.a.10). They asserted that the Kotromanićs felt and described themselves as 
Bosniaks. This assumption, of course, is difficult to corroborate, as most of the 
surviving evidence related to the mediaeval Bosnian aristocracy link them to either 
Serbs or Croats. The Kotromanić rulers frequently intermarried with the Nemanjić and 
other Serbian high nobles, most notably the Kosača family which ruled Herzegovina 
and held the title Duke of St.Sava181 in the mid-15th century. Equally, on several 
occasions they intermarried with the Croat noble houses of Nelipčić and Hrvatinić. 
Because Bosnia and Herzegovina was from the beginning an area where the 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy mixed, it was not unusual for the nobles to have family 
members belonging to both creeds. This practise, interpreted by Malcolm as loyalty to 
the territory of Bosnia, derived directly from von Kállay’s argument of a separate 
Bosnian consciousness, and as such was no older than the 1880s.182 This premise, now 
a core argument of the Bosniak narrative, was used to underline a separate identity of 
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the mediaeval Bosnian rulers, thus making the Serbs and Croats not only separate 
ethnically, but foreign in their native land. Of course, it is not possible to speak of any 
national identity in the modern sense for the people of the 14th or 15th centuries, but this 
convenient modern re-invention of von Kállay’s thesis provided a further assertion that 
the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina essentially possesses a Central European 
character. The notion that the majority of the mediaeval rulers and nobles in the 
surviving charters frequently took Serbian and Croat titles, was interpreted as they 
being more concerned with their own grandeur, rather than with the question of national 
identity.   
Apart from the Serbs of Bosnia who reject the Bosniak theory in its entirety, the 
Croats of Bosnia seem to be more satisfied with the argument that there was no 
Orthodoxy in Bosnia prior to the 16th century. Bosnian Croat scholar, Monika Fath-
Lihić quoted a modern Croat historian Lovrenović who without any references argued 
that the majority of the Bosnian population in the 15th century was Catholic.183 As there 
were no traces of Catholic monasteries in Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the mid-14th 
century, and only sixteen by the time of the conquest, this argument resulted from the 
current revisionism.184 An additional problem was that the majority of the surviving 
mediaeval manuscripts “do not show any striking deviations from Orthodox belief. They 
were all written in Cyrillic and include Canonical Christian scriptures.”185 The pre-
Ottoman ecclesiastical structures bear Orthodox characteristics. The Bosniak narrative 
explained these by Malcolm’s argument about “the Ottoman favouritism of the 
Orthodoxy at the expense of Catholicism and deliberate destruction of the Catholic 
churches by the Orthodox and Muslim population during the Ottoman period.”186  
Finally, the transformation of the Muslims into Bosniaks according to the Bosniak 
theory was neither en masse nor forced upon the Christians. Basing their argument 
exclusively on the Croat émigré authors of the 20th century, Western scholars who 
advocated the anti-Serbian campaign in the 1990s, developed a theory that Bosnia was 
tolerant and multicultural where no religious enmities existed prior to the 20th century 
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“Serbian aggression” towards Muslim population.187 The necessity for separation of 
Serbs, Croats and Muslims through the invention of a new myth of origins was also 
explained by some Western scholars as dividing “bad, Orthodox, backward, rural 
Serbs” from “secular, Central European, urbanite Bosniaks.” By invoking the 1914 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Austro-Hungarian arguments from 
the period as evidence that the Serbs were prone to barbarism and that the Austro-
Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina was that of “enlightenment,” they 
successfully rehabilitated the Drang nach Osten for the modern times. The contrasting 
depiction of the Austro-Hungarian rule as peaceful and prosperous and of the 
Habsburgs as benign dynasts was mirrored by the representation of the Karadjordjević 
kings and the Serbian army simply as “aggressors.”188  
5.8.3 Gavrilo Princip (1894-1918), a hero or a terrorist? 
The advancement of this argument led to the re-interpretation of the events 
surrounding the outbreak of the First World War: the assassin of Arch-Duke Franz 
Ferdinand, Gavrilo Princip (1894-1918) was during the existence of both Yugoslav 
states described as a “member of Young Bosnia who gave his life for freedom.” Modern 
revisionists re-labelled him into a plain “terrorist.”189 The changing interpretation of 
Princip (Fig. 5.24) was well illustrated by the fate of the house in Sarajevo where 
Princip lived before the assassination. During the First World War it was demolished 
by the Austro-Hungarian authorities; after the war, it was re-erected and turned into a 
memorial-home, only to be demolished for the second time by the Ustaše regime during 
the Second World War. After 1945, it was rebuilt and turned into a museum dedicated 
to the communist narrative of Yugoslav “brotherly struggle against foreign oppressors 
and home-grown traitors.”190 During the 1990s, the Muslim authorities demolished it 
as they saw it as a symbol of “Greater Serbianism” and it was never rebuilt. Similar fate 
was of some other museums and street-names dedicated to Princip, most of which were 
renamed. His birth-house in a village near Bosansko Grahovo was razed to the ground 
in 1995 by the Croat forces, and all memorabilia which included the authentic plans for 
the assassination were destroyed (Fig. 5.25).  
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The Latin Bridge in Sarajevo (Fig. 5.26), an actual place where the assassination 
happened in 1914, had the memorial plaque removed and the Commission to Preserve 
National Monuments are currently campaigning for the re-erection of the monument to 
Franz Ferdinand which was erected by the Austro-Hungarian authorities in 1916, but 
removed in 1918 (Fig. 5.27).191  
   
Fig. 5.24 – Gavrilo Princip (1894-1918), the assassin of Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand was a member of 
the revolutionary organization Young Bosnia, modelled on the Italian irredentism of the 19th and 20th 
century. Together with other Serbian, Croat and Muslim members, of which the most prominent was the 
future Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andrić, they advocated the South Slav unification. 
 
Fig. 5.25 – Princip’s birth house in the village near Bosansko Grahovo. Destroyed during the 1990s. In 
the process of reconstruction. 
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Fig. 5.26 – Erected in the late 18th century by the Ottomans, after the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 
1878, the bridge was repaired and named the Latin Bridge. It gained fame as a place of the assassination 
of Arch-duke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914. The date of the Austro-Hungarian military manoeuvres 
was deliberately chosen to coincide with the Serbian national day, Vidovdan, the date of the eponymous 
Kosovo Battle.  During both Yugoslav eras, the bridge was renamed into the Princip’s Bridge, in honour 
of Gavrilo Princip, only to have the name Latin Bridge restored after the Yugoslav wars of succession. 
  
Fig. 5.27 – The monument to the ill-fated Arch-duke Franz Ferdinand was erected near the place of 
assassination in 1917, only to be demolished a year later. The Sarajevo authorities initiated the re-erection 
of the monument to coincide with the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War, but the financial 
difficulties postponed it for the future. 
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On the other hand, for the Serbs in Republika Srpska (and other Serbian lands), 
Princip is still venerated as a young idealist who would sacrifice his life for freedom. 
The centenary of the outbreak of the First World War in June 2014 stirred the ethnic 
feelings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation authorities and media, supported 
by the majority of the Western scholars involved in the revisionist accounts of the First 
World War, want to mark the anniversary as “facing the fact that a Serbian terrorist 
kick-started a war in which millions died.”192 Contrary to that, the Serbian side argued 
that neither the Serbian government at the time nor the act of Princip himself were the 
main cause of the war and that the word “terrorist” reflects modern reasons behind 
current military campaigns.193 Following the trends set up by Malcolm and the leading 
Western media, the majority of the Western scholars seemingly adopted this version of 
the outbreak of the First World War.194 
5.9 Bosnia and Herzegovina – Muslim and Christian 
The Dayton Peace treaty of 1995 de facto divided the country into its Serbian 
(49%) and Muslim-Croat (51%) parts, even though any legal separation was denied. 
The capital of the Federation is Sarajevo, whilst the capital of Republika Srpska is 
Eastern Sarajevo, the pre-war suburbs of the city of Sarajevo. The population of the 
country, displaced during the war, concentrated in their ethnic entities. A very few 
Serbs returned to the Federation, and a very few Muslims and Croats to Republika 
Srpska. All pre-war institutions were divided into their Muslim/Croat and Serbian 
equivalents. Politically, the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was placed under 
the supervision of the High Representative, usually a European bureaucrat, with rights 
to approve or reject the decisions of the two governments. The two entities are forced 
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 An excellent example of the revisionist approach to the subject can be found, for example, in 
Christopher Clark – The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, published in London on 2012. 
However, the reasons for the revisionist accounts should be sought far beyond the Balkans. The fragile 
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however, is beyond the scope of this work and will not be discussed further. 
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to co-operate, but rarely a common agreement could be achieved in twenty years after 
the war. 
Academic and cultural institutions were also divided along ethnic lines. The 
University of Sarajevo in the Federation, placed in the buildings built during Austro-
Hungarian occupation, claims that its beginning could be dated back to 1531, when 
Gazi-Husrevbeg founded the Sufi School for studying the Islam (Fig. 5.28).195 The 
University of Eastern Sarajevo, on the territory of Republika Srpska (Fig. 5.29), 
consisting of the staff and students of Serbian background who left Sarajevo in 1992, 
was established in the same year and asserts that the foundation of the university was 
the opening of the Faculty of Theology of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1882 in 
Sarajevo. Both universities consider themselves the legal successor to the first 
University of Sarajevo founded in 1949.196  
    
Fig. 5.28 – The Rectory of the University of Sarajevo, Muslim-Croat Federation. Erected during the 
Austro-Hungarian occupation in Neo-Classist style. 
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Fig. 5.29 – The Faculty of Electronics of the University of East Sarajevo, located in the Serbian part of 
Sarajevo, Pale, erected in the 1960s in Soc-Realist style. The building itself has been subject to the 
ownership dispute between the University of Sarajevo and University of East Sarajevo for the past 
decade. 
The Zemaljski muzej, initiated by von Kállay in 1888 and built in 1913 remained 
the central museum of the Federation and the centre of the Institute for the Protection 
of Monuments of the Bosnian/Croat entity. In Republika Srpska, a former Museum of 
Bosanska Krajina in Banja Luka, founded by King Alexander I Karadjordjević in 1930, 
was renamed the Museum of Republika Srpska and as such became responsible for the 
heritage on the territory of the Serbian entity (Fig. 5.30). The National and University 
Library of the Federation in Sarajevo returned to the refurbished Vijećnica (Fig. 5.6),197 
whilst the National and University Library of Republika Srpska was established in 
Banja Luka in 1999 in the former Library of Vrbaska Banovina, established in 1935 
under the Karadjordjevićs.198 Similar divisions of the institutions remain present on all 
levels of life and society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In practice, the co-operation 
between these institutions is non-existent. 
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Fig. 5.30 – Museum of Republika Srpska in Banja Luka, currently in the former building of the Home of 
Worker’s Solidarity, erected in the early 1970s, following the catastrophic earthquake that destroyed 
much of the old town. 
The international community through the Office of the High Representative for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) oversees the implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, but also has the mandate for insisting on the implementation of the 
regulations that would enable the return of the refugees and rebuilding of the damaged 
infrastructure. Among these, there has been a special interest for the reconstruction of 
the damaged and destroyed monuments. The UN, EU and UNESCO donated and 
controlled the majority of the reconstruction works executed in the Federation. For 
example, the reconstruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar was supervised by UNESCO 
and paid for by the World Bank.199 The reconstruction of Vijećnica was financed by 
Austrian donations and various EU funds, whilst the Zemaljski Muzej had donations 
from various European countries of which the Swiss contributions were significant.200 
The OHR has exercised its powers to put pressure on both entities to enable the 
reconstruction of the destroyed heritage of the opposing religious communities on its 
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territories, but it appears that the result was only partially successful. The Saborna 
Church of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Sarajevo, built 1863-1874, was 
reconstructed by donations from the Greek government (Fig. 5.31), whilst the 
reconstruction of the Ferhad-Pašina Mosque, erected in 1579 in Banja Luka and 
destroyed in 1993 by Serbian forces, was paid by the donations of the Islamic 
Community in Banja Luka and the Government of Republika Srpska (Fig. 5.32). The 
reconstruction of other monuments in Republika Srpska were mainly paid by donations 
from Russia, Serbia and Greece. 
This pattern was repeated throughout the country on local levels, but an obvious 
reluctance of both entities to allow the return of refugees and the rebuilding of the 
symbols of other religions above the minimal level became omnipresent. The insistence 
of the OHR to impose the laws and regulations that would enable the gradual unification 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a state whose citizens will have loyalty to the territory 
was particularly strongly opposed by the Serbs. They understood these measures as 
repeating the attempt of the Austro-Hungarian Provincial Government to do the same 
a century ago. 
  
Fig. 5.31 – The Saborna Church, Sarajevo, erected in 1863-1874, photographed in 2011. 
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Fig. 5.32 – The Ferhad-Pašina Mosque, Banja Luka, erected in 1579, photographed in the 1970s, before 
the destruction in 1993. The re-constructed Ferhad-Pašina Mosque is scheduled to open in July 2016. 
 
The vacuum created by the Serbs’ refusal to adhere to the demands of the West 
enabled the Islamic countries to assert their support for the Muslims of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Apart from Turkey which provided financial support for the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction of the Ottoman heritage, Saudi Arabia was also involved in 
strengthening its influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The help offered by the Islamic 
world was strategically motivated, as the Federation territory is undergoing a process 
of transformation which includes building new mosques and calls for the introduction 
of Sharia-Law.201 Despite the official call for the multiculturalism, there was a clear 
return of Islamic values, as the opening of the religious schools flourished. In Sarajevo, 
which currently consists from nearly 80% of the Muslim population, it became usual to 
see women wearing hijab or burka, an unusual feature for Sarajevo until twenty years 
ago. This situation conflicts directly with political decisions of the West to present 
Bosnia and a democratic state with European values. Because financial donations from 
the West directly influenced the formulation of the Bosniak narrative, the Muslim 
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authorities in Sarajevo approved some recognition of the pre-Ottoman history of 
Bosnia. Thus, the mediaeval history of the Bosnian Kingdom, interpreted in Kállay’s 
terms of loyalty to the territory, brought to the recognition of the Bosnian Christian 
Kingdom and Kotromanić rulers. Several monuments dedicated to King Tvrtko I and 
some other members of the dynasty were erected in recent years in the Muslim-Croat 
Federation. Expectedly, all their connections to Serbian mediaeval state were carefully 
omitted (Fig. 1.a.10).202    
On the other hand, Republika Srpska places an emphasis on its Serbian Orthodoxy 
and insists precisely on the connections which the Muslim and Croat side wants to 
forget. Apart from the rebuilding of smaller churches in its territory, certainly the most 
ambitious project is the erection of Andrićgrad (Andrić’s Town) in the proximity of the 
Višegrad’s Stone Bridge (Fig. 5.13). As it name suggests, it is a monument-town 
envisaged to be a memorial not only to Višegrad’s most famous citizen, Ivo Andrić, but 
also to the South Slav Balkans. The project was initiated by Emir Kusturica (b.1954), 
the internationally renowned film-director (Fig. 5.33).203  
 
Fig. 5.33 – Emir Kusturica (b.1954), two-times winner of the Palme d’Or at Cannes, was born in Sarajevo 
in the Muslim family. When the war in Yugoslavia began, he declared himself a Serb and moved to 
Belgrade. He initiated a number of cultural manifestations celebrating Slavic heritage. 
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Kusturica’s ambitious idea was to create a complex of buildings “as a reaction to 
the demolition of the monument to Ivo Andrić in 1992.”204 The Andrićgrad complex, 
thus, consists of the central town’s piazza, named after the famous Serbian scientist 
Nikola Tesla (1856-1943) and surrounding streets that include 46 buildings built in all 
architectural styles that existed in the territory of former Yugoslavia. The Town Hall 
bears Renaissance features, but the Orthodox Church is a replica of the Kosovo’s 
Dečani Monastery (Fig. 3.26). Also, a Caravan-Serai and a Catholic church were 
planned to be in prominent positions. According to Kusturica, “Andrićgrad is an 
attempt to reconcile Byzantine, Serbian Mediaeval, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian 
heritage.”205 Andrićgrad (Fig. 5.34) will be surrounded by the outer walls, which 
represent the protection of culture. The works on Andrićgrad symbolically began on 28 
June 2011 (Vidovdan), and the scheduled end of construction was Vidovdan 2014.206 
 
Fig. 5.34 – Panoramic view of Andrićgrad. The construction began in 2011 on the initiative of the film-
director Emir Kusturica. Main square opened in June 2014, whilst the surrounding walls are still to be 
built. In the background is the Višegrad Bridge, built by Mehmed-Paša Sokolović, inscribed on the World 
Heritage List in 2007. 
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Unsurprisingly, the Federation officials do not approve of this enterprise and argue that Andrićgrad is 
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The architects and conservationists from the Sarajevo’s Institute for the Protection 
of Monuments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the corresponding 
Institute in Banja Luka both agreed that there was no improvement in inter-religious 
relations between the entities. Afraid for their own careers, professionals from each 
institution during interviews with me emphasized that they were stating their personal 
opinion. The answers, however, were astonishingly similar: “Politics keeps the 
Institutions separated. Republika Srpska’s main goal is to sever any connection with 
the Federation, whilst the Federation claims to support cooperation. In reality, that is 
questionable. The professionals outside the institutions do cooperate, but their hands 
are tied. The education is directly influenced by the religion and also divided. In a 
myriad of newly established universities, the student organizations are also divided and 
the students are prone to manipulation. Since their organizations are weak, students, 
as the bearers of avant-garde, are disabled to make any changes. Generally, the 
foreigners who de facto rule seem to maintain this situation, as it gives them the reason 
to exist and there are no indications that they will attempt to impose any order that 
would be necessary for the normal functioning of the state.”207  
5.10 The Cul-de-Sac of Nation-Building  
European bureaucrats that ran Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 proved unable 
to work on reconciliation. Their deliberate partiality, personal ineptitude and greed 
contributed more to the maintenance of the tense atmosphere than to its easing, despite 
their rhetoric. The arrogant attitude towards all Bosnian ethnic and religious 
communities contributed to the entrenchment of the national ideas and narratives 
among the Serbs, Croats and Muslims and made their own nation-building efforts only 
more prolific and mutually exclusive. Recently, the Council of Europe initiated and 
imposed the idea of forming an Act on Protection and Care of Cultural and Historical 
Heritage for the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The draft document was 
submitted to the Parliament in Sarajevo, but it was never discussed between the two 
entities. In 2008, a new draft was submitted to the Parliament, but Republika Srpska 
rejected it, seeing this Act as a violation of the Dayton Agreement and the restriction 
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of its powers.208 Thus, the protection and care of heritage in accordance with leading 
national narratives is territorial and depends on the governments of the two Bosnian 
entities. As there are no joint Ministries of Culture and Education for the whole territory 
of the state, there is no legislation that would be equally applicable for all three religious 
communities. Such a situation stems not only from the latest war, but from the religious 
resentments that date back further in the past and which caused three major inter-ethnic 
conflicts in the 20th century alone.  
The by-products of those clashes were the invention of the nation of Bosniaks, 
the formulation of their national narrative, as well as further fortification of Serbian and 
Croat national narratives regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina. The inconsistencies in the 
Bosniak narrative, which aims to present Bosnian Muslims as an autochthonous ethnic 
community, different from both the Serbs and Croats, will continue to be challenged by 
both. Additionally, re-introduced Islamic values already expressed disagreements with 
the attempt to present Bosnia as a state with European heritage. With growing anti-
Islamic feelings throughout Europe, the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina seems 
uncertain. 
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The Montenegrins 
 
The smallest of the former Yugoslav republics, Montenegro, declared its 
independence from the state union with Serbia on 3 June 2006. This followed a 
decade of controversial campaigns by the Montenegrin government for a separate 
state, generously helped by external political factors (Map 6.1). During the wars of 
Yugoslav succession, the primary focus of the international participants was on 
Serbian nationalism, perceiving the Montenegrins were indistinguishable from the 
Serbian national corpus and too small for any significant political impact. Indeed, 
until 1945 there was no separate Montenegrin nation; the language, history, religion 
and culture were considered Serbian. Not even the creation of a separate Montenegrin 
nation after the Second World War altered the traditional ethnic and religious 
identification, despite the fervent communist attempts to create a separate 
Montenegrin Orthodox Church, in the same manner as it had occurred in Macedonia. 
This was prevented by the Montenegrins themselves, as the majority of the Serbian 
political elite in Belgrade after 1945 were of Montenegrin origin who regarded 
themselves as “quintessentially Serbian.”1 With the exception of Aleksandar 
Ranković (Fig. 1.a.22), all top positions in the Serbian branch of the CPY were held 
by party members born in Montenego. The removal of Serbs from Serbia from the top 
federal posts in the first two decades after the war was in accordance with Tito’s 
policies of curbing “Greater Serbian tendencies” in Yugoslavia. Their replacement by 
the more conformist natives of Montenegro enabled a number of prominent 
personalities to enjoy successful political careers. Politically, they varied from some 
of the most prominent dissidents such was Milovan Djilas (Fig. 1.a.21) to the Serbian 
president Slobodan Milošević (Fig. 1.a.25). On the other side of national spectrum, 
the Patriarch Gavrilo (Fig. 1.58) and numerous scholars and artists residing in Serbia 
and writing about Serbia were also natives of Montenegro.  
However, the general condemnation of Serbia in the 1990s and the crippling 
economic situation divided the politicians in the Montenegrin capital, Podgorica, in 
relation to the future of the state. Being regarded as a junior partner in the Serbian 
political spectrum and economically equally affected by the wars, the political elite in 
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Podgorica decided to distinguish Montenegro from Serbia. This resulted in the swift 
construction of the new Montenegrin ethnic identity, which was not only considered 
separate from Serbian, but its total denial. The split among the political elite in 
Montenegro was quickly transferred to all parts of society, particularly affecting the 
Orthodox Christian population of the republic, which in the late 1990s split between 
those who still wanted closer ties with Serbia and those who were passionately against 
it. A Montenegrin sociologist Srdjan Darmanović, explained this division of the 
Montenegrin identity as that of a national homo duplex, “a victim of double or divided 
consciousness,” caused by the shared Serbian-Montenegrin identity, until recently 
conferred by language and religion.2   
        
Map 6.1 – Montenegro today                    Map 6.2 – Zeta Valley with Cetinje and Podgorica, two Mon- 
                                                                   tenegrin capitals, surrounded by the Komovi Mountains, one  
                                                                   of the three tallest mountains in the region. 
6.1 Territoriality of Montenegrin nationalism 
The historic name of Montenegro is an Italianised version of the Serbian native 
name Crna Gora, meaning: Black Mountain. The term Montenegro came into use at 
the end of the 15th century, when this part of the former Serbian Empire came under 
the rule of the House of Crnojević (1326-1516), which replaced the former House of 
Balšić (?-1421). Before the name Montenegro became common, the territory that was 
held by the Nemanjić dynasty and their liege family of Balšić during the 14th century 
was usually referred to as Zeta, named after the area of confluence of two major 
rivers, Zeta and Morača, that met in the immediate vicinity of the ancient town of 
Doclea (modern Podgorica). The term Zeta, however, replaced an even earlier name 
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Duklja, a Slavic version of the Roman Doclea, in use after the settlement of the Slavs 
in the 7th century and during the rule of the Vojislavljević dynasty (11th-12th century).3 
The seat of the last native rulers of Zeta prior to the Ottoman conquest, the 
Crnojević family, was situated in Cetinje in the late 15th century, in the mountains 
overlooking the Bay of Kotor. In this period, the contacts with the Venetians were 
frequent, so the Italians named the territory of Montenegro after the Crnojević family 
name.4 However, what became Montenegro in its present borders was the result of the 
first Yugoslav Constitution of 1946 which abolished the monarchy and 
institutionalized the Communist regime.  
The republic today occupies less than 14,000km2 of predominantly karst terrain 
of the southern Dinaric range, which abruptly plunges into the Adriatic near the Bay 
of Kotor. Inhospitable and barren mountains surround the valley of the Zeta River, 
which runs from the north and forms a confluence with the River Morača near the 
capital Podgorica. These two rivers form the Zeta Plain that stretches from Lake 
Skadar to the vicinity of Podgorica forming the only hospitable region with a 
moderate climate (Map 6.2). Because of the difficulty of access towards the rest of the 
Balkan Peninsula, small agricultural potential and poor mineral wealth, Montenegro is 
not strategically important to the modern Great Powers to the same extent as Croatia 
or Serbia. However, its overland link with Serbia provided an invaluable sea-access 
for Serbia through the important port of Bar.5 Thus, preventing Serbia to acquire sea-
exit increased Montenegro’s importance in regional geo-politics. Because the 
Montenegrins were always regarded as “the highlander Serbs,” the problem of 
Montenegrin national territoriality became closely related to severing these links with 
Serbia. This could be achieved only by creating an entirely new Montenegrin identity 
through the employment of the traditional methods of re-interpretation of historical 
narrative and its replacement with a politically acceptable construct. The questions, 
therefore, are: 
1. Who are the people inhabiting the territory of modern Montenegro, and 
2. Who were their ancestors? 
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The first post-war Constitution, drafted principally by Tito’s chief Communist 
theorist and a Politburo member, the Slovene Edvard Kardelj (1910-1979), was based 
on the premise that “Greater Serbianism” of the Karadjordjević’s Yugoslavia had to 
be suppressed at any cost. Concurrently with the debate over the borders of the new 
federal republic, the issue of a separate Montenegrin identity arose, causing a rift 
within the CPY.6 Despite the fact that the greatest number of the Partisan army 
consisted of Bosnian and Montenegrin Serbs and 36% of all Partisan generals were of 
Montenegrin origin, the CPY political leadership consisted mainly of Croat and 
Slovene communists.7 With a minority of the Serbian communists at the top echelons 
of the CPY, the proclamation of a new Montenegrin nation in 1945 passed relatively 
smoothly, much to the dismay of the Serbian members of the Politburo. 
In the first post-war census conducted in 1948, the new Montenegrin nation 
numbered just over 340,000 people.8 Interestingly, all subsequent censuses, including 
the final Yugoslav census in 1991, witnessed serious fluctuation in the ethnic 
composition of the tiny republic: the percentage of those who declared themselves 
Montenegrins within the republic dropped from 90% in 1948 down to 62% in 1991 
and 43% in 2003 in favour of those who regarded themselves Serbs.9 In all these 
censuses the official language in use was Serbo-Croat during the existence of federal 
Yugoslavia and Serbian from 1993 until 2002. 
The present ethnic composition of Montenegro is just over 620,000 people. 
According to the 2003 census was: 43% Montenegrin, 32% Serbian, 8% Bosniak, 5% 
Albanian and 12% others.10 However, in 2002 the authorities in Montenegro 
introduced a new official language, Montenegrin, which was, in the first census of 
2003 spoken by 22% of the population of the republic. In the same census, 63% of the 
population spoke Serbian. Less than a decade later, the census data of 2011 showed a 
dramatic fall of the Serbs in the overall population of Montenegro, which did not 
show any significant demographic change, still numbering around 620,000 people: 
Montenegrins (45%), Serbs (28%), Bosniak/Muslim Slavs (12%), Albanian (5%). At 
the same time, the languages spoken by the Montenegrin citizens were: Montenegrin 
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(37%), Serbian (43%), Bosniak (5%). According to the same census, nearly 5% of the 
overall population refused to declare their nationality.11  
This sharp change in the ethnic structure of Montenegro was the result of a 
systematic effort by the Montenegrin government in the past 15 years to forge a new 
Slavic nation in the Balkans. Aided by some Western politicians and scholars, the 
Montenegrin government, led by the eternal President and Prime Minister Milo 
Djukanović (b. 1962, in power since 1991), adopted the programme of the recently 
established Doclean Academy of Sciences and Arts which sought to promote an 
alternative version of national history. According to the Doclean Academy, the 
Montenegrins speak a Slavic language akin to Serbian, Croatian or Bosniak, but as a 
nation they descended directly from the mixed Illyrian, Roman and Slav population 
that inhabited the territory of present Montenegro in Ancient and Mediaeval times. As 
such, they are separate from other South Slavs and have characteristics that 
distinguish them from their other South Slav neighbours.12  
Even though the separate Montenegrin nation was introduced after the Second 
World War, there were no major alterations of historical narratives established in the 
19th and 20th century until the late 1990s. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s and the general condemnation of Serbia by the Western part of the international 
community, Montenegrin politicians, supported by the key international players in 
these developments, began the task of disassociating Montenegro from Serbia, hoping 
to achieve the political and economic benefits. However, in the 1992 referendum, 
Montenegro opted to stay in union with Serbia in what became known as “rump 
Yugoslavia” – Federal Republic Yugoslavia. This state lasted until 2003, when it was 
transformed into a loose federation called Serbia and Montenegro, only to be 
dissolved in 2006. 
In 1993 the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, a minor political party in favour of 
independence, together with some representatives of an NGO sector sponsored from 
abroad gathered in the old capital Cetinje and proclaimed the Montenegrin Orthodox 
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Ignatieff applied the term to the nations of the former Yugoslav nations rewording it as “nationalism of 
minor differences” in 1993. These actions of the Montenegrin government should be understood in 
Ignatieff’s definition. 
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Church. The same political party, supported by the Catholic and Muslim members of 
the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts (Crnogorska Anakemija Nauka i 
Umjetnosti – CANU), formed in 1998 a separate Academy of Sciences and Arts, 
called the Doclean Academy of Sciences and Arts (Dukljanska Akademija Nauka i 
Umjetnosti – DANU), with sole aim to promote an alternative view of Montenegrin 
history, separate from the Serbian. Since popular support for an independent church, 
language and state was lacking at the time, the activities surrounding the Montenegrin 
church remained dormant until the early 2000s, when an open call for the re-
establishment of an independent Montenegro prompted a heated debate on all issues 
regarding national identity, revealing in the process new divisions within Montenegrin 
society. As a significant number of the Montenegrins still regarded themselves ethnic 
Serbs, the Orthodox population split between those who still preferred the union with 
Serbia and those who were passionately against it.  
By 1998, a new historical narrative was being formulated. The new narrative 
finally emerged as The History of Montenegro, by Živko Andrijašević and Šerbo 
Rastorder, both members of the Doclean Academy.  It was published and widely 
distributed in 2006, the year that Montenegro seceded from Serbia. In the same 
period, following the successful promotion of the new Bosnian Muslim and Kosovo’s 
Albanian narratives, the West sought to support the formation of the new 
Montenegrin narrative by fomenting some English speaking authors to support and 
promote this new version of the history of Montenegro, its people and identity. So far, 
the most significant example of this effort represented the book by a former diplomat 
Elizabeth Roberts, Realm of the Black Mountain – A History of Montenegro, 
published in London in 2007. This general historical overview offered to the English-
speaking readers was quickly followed by the work of Kenneth Morrison entitled 
Montenegro – A Modern History, which concentrated on contemporary Montenegrin 
events. Both works reaffirmed attempts to introduce a new country and its history into 
the family of newly established European nations in the light of the current political 
context and were offered as a digested read to foreign scholars interested in 
researching the subject, but non-fluent in Serbian/Croatian:  
“Very little has been written exclusively on Montenegro by non-Montenegrins. 
This book attempts to fill a gap by offering a consecutive general history….covering 
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such a long period inevitably required reliance on secondary sources where these 
exist and recognition of the lack of detailed knowledge at other times.”13 
This statement inadvertently confirmed that behind the political intent of 
contemporary Great Powers involved in regional Balkan politics advocating the 
creation of new nations in the Yugoslav successor states, aim was to re-interpret the 
past and place it in the context of the 1990s wars of Yugoslav succession. The validity 
of this claim can be tested by comparing the sources used by foreign historians. These 
rarely include primary sources and the 19th century secondary sources written in 
Serbo-Croat, with the exception of those written in the latter part of the 20th century.14 
6.2 Imagined aspects of the Montenegrin national narrative – Montenegrin 
Serbdom 
Between the departure of the last Crnojević lord in 1496 and the appearance of 
the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty in 1697, there were no contemporary written sources 
about the situation in Montenegro in existence, except in the coastal towns ruled by 
Venice. The inhospitable terrain prevented the full penetration of the Ottomans into 
the Brda (Hills), where the remaining Serbian Orthodox population withdrew, 
reverting over centuries to a tribal society. The Ottomans conquered more accessible 
areas in the valleys of Zeta and Morača, whilst the Venetians acquired the coast. The 
coastal towns, firmly under the Venetians between the 15th century and 1797, 
underwent a major change, as all the Orthodox population was duly expelled into the 
mountains.15 The remaining Catholic population lived under the Italian cultural 
influence, similar to that in Dalmatia. 
During these three centuries, the inaccessible hinterland was ruled by the 
Prince-Bishops (Vladikas) elected by the tribes. The Orthodoxy in Montenegrin 
mountains survived as a church institution virtually independent from the Patriarchate 
in Constantinople. After the abolition of the Serbian Patriarchate in 1459, the 
Montenegrin Vladikas never accepted the supremacy of the Greek Patriarch and 
preserved the Serbian Orthodox Calendar and hierarchy. 
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 Roberts, 2007, xiv. My bold. 
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 In my communication with Dr Morrison, there was an obvious lack of language skills; yet, he listed a 
significant number of books in Serbian/Croatian as his sources. Dr Morrison acknowledged a number 
of interviewees who are all English speaking, but it is highly questionable whether they were also 
translating for Dr Morrison’s study.  
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The establishment of the hereditary theocracy of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty in 
1697, coincided with the growing power of Russia.16 Regarded as defender of the 
Orthodoxy, Russia’s influence in Montenegro quickly assumed the most important 
political influence. In order to introduce Montenegro to the Russian Court, Vladika 
Vasilije Petrović-Njegoš (1709-1766, ruled from 1744), published in Moscow in 1754 
the History of Montenegro (Fig. 6.1). This was the first written account about the 
history of Montenegro since the time of the Priest of Doclea in the 12th century.17  
Subsequent Montenegrin rulers communicated with the Russian and Habsburg 
courts, usually asking for help against the Ottomans. However, no educational 
activities through the publication of general histories took place. When romantic 
nationalism appeared during the reign of Peter II Petrović-Njegoš (1831-1851, ruled 
from 1830), there was some increase of interest in Montenegro (Fig. 6.2). However, 
this was limited to occasional visits by European travellers, who left vignettes about 
the life, customs and the fight against the Ottomans in the Montenegrin highlands.  
     
Fig. 6.1 – Vasilije Petrović-Njegoš      Fig. 6.2 – Petar II Petrović-Njegoš (1813-1851, ruled from 1830) 
(1709-1766, ruled from 1744) 
On the personal invitation of Peter II, Vuk Karadžić (Fig. 1.5) spent 1834-1835 
in Montenegro collecting poems and other ethnographical material.18 In 1837 he 
published this collection entitled Montenegro and the Montenegrins in Stuttgart in the 
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 Russia was not directly responsible for the rise of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty, but it soon became 
influential in those parts of Montenegro in which neither the Italians nor the Venetians had access. 
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 A significant part of this history was dedicated to the Kosovo Battle which was for Vasilije a source 
of great pride. http://www.rastko.rs/rastko-cg/povijest/vladika_vasilije-istorija_o_crnoj_gori.html - An 
integral version translated into contemporary Serbian by Prof. Radoje Marojević – Accessed on 
05/05/2012 
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German language.19 Karadžić, himself a descendant of the Montenegrin-
Herzegovinian tribe of Drobnjak, considered the Montenegrins to be nothing else but 
ethnic Serbs. This view was maintained throughout the 19th and the first part of the 
20th century, as Serbia and Montenegro, although both officially recognized as 
independent states after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, were regarded as two Serbian 
states. The diplomatic correspondence after 1876-1878 recorded the political 
peculiarities within the Montenegrin Principality, but the question of identity was 
never on the agenda. 
The development of the national idea and the nation-state in the Serbian 
Principality in the 19th century and the Serbian Learned Society’s programme of 
collecting historical documents and recording the material heritage understandably 
did not differ from Karadžić’s, Šafarĭk’s and Jireček’s observations about the 
Montenegrin identity.20 Neither did foreign visitors ever question the Serbian identity 
of Orthodox Montenegrins.21  
This view of the Serbian identity of Montenegrins was upheld until the mid-20th 
century. All Serbian historians from the period of Enlightment until the Second World 
War based their conclusions on the prevailing understanding of the surviving 
mediaeval sources. For them, the Serbian identity of the Montenegrins was 
unquestionable. But they were not writing exclusively from the perspective of the 19th 
century nation-building. They were greatly helped by the Petrović-Njegoš dynasts 
themselves who, in all their writings, always insisted on their Serbian identity and 
used the terms Montenegro and Montenegrins in geographical context.22  
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 http://www.rastko.rs/knjizevnost/vuk/vkaradzic-crnagora.html - Accessed on 05/05/2012 
20
 See Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 33. Vuk Karaǆić proudly displayed his ancestors from the Drobnjak 
tribe which inhabited both Montenegro and Herzegovina. 
21
 For example, Sir Arthur Evans, during his travels through Montenegro, used the term “Old Serbian 
church” for describing the sad state of the heritage around the town of Pljevlja. Evans, 1886, 133 
22
 For the collection of writings of Peter I, Peter II, Danilo and Nikola, see the online network of the 
electronic libraries, professional and academic institution and local communities – www.rastko.rs – 
„Projekat Rastko“, neprofitna mreža elektronskih biblioteka, stručnih ustanova i lokalnih zajednica 
posvećenih umetnostima, tradicijama i društvenim naukama. – Sadly, a very few articles are available 
in English, which may prove problematic for wider readership. However, as it is expected that any 
serious scholar researching the former Yugoslav countries speaks the language, the library is an 
invaluable source for the 19th-20th centuries most important collections in digital version.  
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6.3 Cultural aspects and material heritage in the context of Montenegrin 
nationalism 
The earliest mention of a separate Montenegrin identity occurred in the 
aftermath of the First World War, when the exiled King Nikola (1842-1921, ruled 
1860-1916, king from 1910), angry at the loss of support from the Entente powers 
ferociously attacked the new Kingdom SHS headed by his own grandson, Aleksandar  
Karadjordjević, as the enemy of the Montenegrins. Until 1916, Nikola considered 
himself “the first among the Serbs,” but when the Austro-Hungarian army occupied 
Montenegro in 1916, he abandoned his country, seeking refuge in Italy and France. At 
the same time, his Serbian son-in-law, King Peter I Karadjordjević (Fig. 1.37) 
remained with his army during the eponymous withdrawal through Albania.23 This 
cost Nikola not only his reputation, but his throne. His disappointment with the 
creation of the new kingdom which had a place for only one king was understandable. 
His open denouncement of his Serbian identity had more to do with his injured 
personal pride rather than the political choice to discover a new ethnic identity of his 
state (Fig. 6.3).24 Subsequently, Nikola’s supporters in Montenegro, the so-called 
Greens, seized upon this message and organized an unsuccessful rebellion against the 
Karadjordjević regime.25 However, the words of a deposed king and the events of the 
early 1920s provided convenient justification for the formulation of a separate 
Montenegrin identity and nation in the course of the 20th century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.3 – King Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš (1842-1921, ruled 
1860-1916, king from 1910) 
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 See Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 80-81 
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 http://www.rastko.rs/rastko-cg/povijest/kralj_nikola/npetrovic_3.html - Letter of King Nikola dated, 
6 January 1919, Ney, France 
25
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Nikola’s and his supporter’s anger was quickly seized upon by the Croat 
nationalists during the Kingdom of SHS and Second World War. Despite maintaining 
the idea that Montenegro was part of historic Croatian lands, Pavelić’s regime could 
not annex any part of Montenegro, as it was occupied by Italy. Nevertheless, the NDH 
leadership supported the former Montenegrin Greens, who attempted to re-establish 
the Kingdom of Montenegro under Italian protectorate. The attempt had failed as 
King Nikola’s son, Prince Mihajlo Petrović-Njegoš, refused to take the throne arguing 
that such an act would mean “the treason to Serbian people.”26 However, after 1945, 
these Croat efforts were extinguished in Yugoslavia. They survived among the Croat 
diaspora closely related to the NDH.27 
6.4 Historical and academic sources on Montenegrin heritage 
All existing sources from the 18th to the 20th century referred to Montenegrins as 
the Serbs. Since there were no autochthonous sources between the 15th and 18th 
centuries, only two primary sources from the mediaeval pre-Nemanjić period have 
value for studying the history of Montenegro: De Administrando Imperio of 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, written in the 10th century, and The Chronicle of the 
Priest of Doclea, written by an anonymous monk in the 13th century.  Both sources 
survived in much later copies and were open to contested interpretations, because no 
other contemporary documents which would confirm or contradict their contents 
exist. Of these two documents De Administrando Imperio was considered more 
reliable, due to the completeness of the manuscript. The Chronicle of the Priest of 
Doclea was regarded as an early work written by an ethnic Slav. So far, Archaeology 
has been unable to corroborate these manuscripts, as the field-research related to the 
8th-12th centuries is “notoriously underdeveloped.”28  
It is precisely the ambiguity of the two sources and insufficient archaeological 
research that enabled the promoters of the new Montenegrin national identity to 
develop a theory which argues that the Montenegrins are a Separate Slav group 
entering the Balkans in the 6th-7th centuries. According to this premise, the ancestors 
of modern Montenegrins were a product of mixing with Romanized Illyrians and 
Albanians, which created a unique identity, separate from all other South Slavs.  
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 Пипер, Марко М. – Краљ Никола Први, Крагујевац, 2001, 160-161 
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 After 1945, Dominik Mandić (Fig. 2.55) maintained the idea of the Croat origins of Montenegrins 
through Starčević’s notion of Red Croatia (Map 2.4). See Chapter II – The Croats, p. 170-171. 
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6.4.1 The problem of the validity of the sources – The Doclean narrative  
To create a connection between the modern Montenegrins and Ancient 
Roman/Illyrian inhabitants of Montenegro, members of the DANU asserted that two 
principal primary sources related to the territory of Montenegro should be re-
interpreted in a manner that would dismiss previous reading of the historians from the 
past several centuries. De Administrando Imperio did not record any separate 
Montenegrin tribe, but it stated that the tribes surrounding Doclea were all Serbian: 
Zachlumi, Terbounites and Kanalites (living in the territory of modern Herzegovina 
and western Bosnia) as well as Pagani/Arentani who lived in Dalmatia. For Doclea, 
the former territory of the Romanised Illyrians and Roman veterans settled by 
Diocletian, Porphyrogenitus gave no tribal identity: 
“(Diocleia)…was repopulated in the time of Heraclius the emperor, just as were 
Croatia and Serbia and the country of the Zachlumi and Terbounia and the country of 
Kanali…”29  
 
Fig. 6.4 – The remains of Doclea, 4km away from the city centre of Podgorica 
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Traditionally, the mediaevalists studying this part of the world understood the 
Greek geographical and etymological derivatives from Porphyrogenitus’ description 
that the Slavic tribes around the ancient Dioclea, being surrounded by the Serbian 
tribes of Zachlumi, Terbounites and Kanalites, were actually Serbs. This was not 
limited only on the native historians, but also the foreign scholars.30  They argued that 
even if the ethnic affiliations of the early Slavs around the ancient Doclea (Fig. 6.4) 
were left open to discussion, the later centuries of self-identification with the Serbs 
and, particularly from the late 18th century, the insistence in all written documents on 
belonging to the Serbian national corpus by the Montenegrins themselves, pointed to 
this conclusion. However, from 1999, the approved reading of the De Administrando 
Imperio by the Montenegrin government, DANU and their Western supporters relied 
exclusively on interpretation, rather than on material evidence. As a result, in 2006, 
Živko Andrijašević (Montenegrin, b.1967) and Šerbo Rastoder (a Montenegrin 
Muslim, b.1956) provided an explanation that would secure this missing link between 
the modern Montenegro and that of the 7th century: 
“As Constantine Porphyrogenitus did not supply any data about the ethnic 
origin of Docleans, it may be assumed that he viewed them as a separate ethnic 
group, just like the Serbs or Croats. Unlike the Docleans, Porphyrogenitus ascribes 
Serb origins to all other Slavic tribes named after a notion or toponym…Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus may not have known the real ethnic origins of the Docleans, but he 
obviously did not regard them as Serbs or Croats, for otherwise he would have put 
them into one of the two groups….Irrespective of all these controversies over their 
ethnic origin, by setting up a state, founding a dynasty and developing an awareness 
of their political distinctness, in historical terms, the Docleans unequivocally 
managed to distinguish themselves from all other tribes and ethnic groups 
surrounding them.”31  
Despite the probabilistic terminology used by the current Montenegrin 
historians in order to connect their newly propagated to an early Doclean identity, 
there were no indications that there was any firm state structure in Doclea prior to the 
end of the 10th century, when the Doclean princes joined the Byzantine-Bulgarian 
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wars in the time of Samuil (976-1014).32 Indeed, Porphyrogenitus himself stated that 
in his time “Doclea was under the emperor of the Romans.”33  
The existence of Doclean princes and later kings in the 11th century was 
corroborated by The Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea, a highly unreliable source, 
“long dismissed as a collection of fact and fiction, especially in relation to the 
coverage of earlier periods.”34 Numerous studies of the manuscript that appeared 
from the early 19th century pointed to the incompleteness of the text and overall 
confusion of the events and personalities described. The Slavic original did not 
survive, but later Latin translation consists of three main parts: The Croat Chronicle 
(Libellus Gothorum), which connected the Croats to the Goths,35 The Hagiography of 
St. John Vladimir and the third, written as a history of Serbian rulers in Zeta.36 The 
problem of the manuscript, especially its first volume, was the artificial connection 
between the events, personalities and often invented characters. Clearly, the Priest of 
Doclea did not differentiate the Serbs from the Croats and provided no dates, which 
made some of the rulers to have abnormally long reigns or the rulers from different 
epochs coincide with each other.37 For these reasons, a number of scholars regarded 
the manuscript more a literary than historical document.  
Despite all its deficiencies, the second part of The Chronicle of the Priest of 
Doclea, the Hagiography of St. John Vladimir, were taken as the basis of the new 
national narrative in Montenegro, which could conveniently be named the Doclean 
Narrative.38 The narrative focused on the character of John Vladimir (c.990-1016), a 
Doclean prince from the time of the Byzantine-Bulgarian wars which ended the First 
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 See Chapter II – The Croats, p. 165. Initially, Starčević asserted the non-Slavic origin of the Croats, 
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 Мијушковић, С. – Летопис попа Дукљанина – пријевод и објашњење – Београд, 1988 – Slavko 
Mijušković – Chronicle of Priest of Doclea – translation and explanation – Belgrade, 1988 (the text of 
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Mijušković's work) 
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 For example, in the first part of the Chronicle, the King of the Ostrogoths Totila (d. 552AD) 
coincides with the Emperor Anastasius (491-518) 
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 The two editions of the Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea used here are by Dr Slavko Mijušković 
(1912-1989), a former Director of Archives in Kotor, from 1988 – Летопис попа Дукљанина – 
превод и објашњење, СКЗ, Београд, 1988 and Dr Nikola Banašević (1895-1992), a professor of 
Classics at the Belgrade University, from 1971 – Летопис попа Дукљанина и народна предања, 
СКЗ, Београд, 1971. The reason for this is that the two academics conducted heated debates over the 
fine nuances of translation of the Latin manuscript. However, both of them considered the story of John 
Vladimir to belong to Serbian historiography.  
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Bulgarian Empire of Samuil.39 The only existing reference to his ethnic origin given 
in the manuscript is his Serbian (Raškan) descent through his father Petrislav (his 
existence was not confirmed by the contemporary Byzantine sources) who ruled Zeta 
before the Bulgarian expansion under Samuil.40  
The Doclean Narrative described John Vladimir as the Prince of Doclea whose 
realm had incorporated the territory between the Bojana River and Boka Kotorska,41 
the Adriatic Coast and the upper valley of the Morača River which, conveniently, 
corresponds to the modern territory of Montenegro.42 The reference about the Serbian 
origin of John Vladimir was completely ignored, which provided the basis to further 
expand the argument about a separate Montenegrin identity dating back from the 11th 
century. Additionally, after his execution in 1016 in Prespa by the Bulgarian Tsar 
John Vladislav (1015-1018), John Vladimir became the first Slavic saint to be 
venerated throughout Orthodox Christianity. His cult was celebrated by all Orthodox 
Churches that gained autocephaly after 1204. However, the Doclean Narrative 
insisted that the much stronger cults of the Nemanjić saint kings later maintained by 
the Serbian Orthodox Church were because “Vladimir’s sainthood did not suit the 
future Nemanjić rulers.”43 In reality, after the Kosovo Battle the cult of Prince Lazar, 
with the exception of the cult of St. Sava,44 superseded all other cults within the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, but the cult of John Vladimir was never lost.45 This 
argument, coined a few years ago, subtly enabled the construction of a new theory, 
which by insisting on the non-Serbian identity of John Vladimir, proceeded to the 
claim that the subsequent rulers of Doclea, the Vojisavljević dynasty (1034-1186), 
were not ethnic Serbs. 
The Vojislavljević dynasty ruled for a century and a half over the Serbs before 
the Nemanjić kings came to power. According to the Chronicle, the first 
Vojisavljević, Stefan Vojislav (1040-1043),46 was John Vladimir’s nephew, whilst his 
mother was a princess of Raška.47 Even if the Priest of Doclea invented this, the claim 
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of his Serbian ethnicity was confirmed by the contemporary Byzantine authors, such 
as Keukamenos, Zonaras, Cedrenus and John Skylitzes.48 However, the Doclean 
Narrative ignored these sources and without any explanation simply termed the 
Vojislavljević dynasty as Doclean (Montenegrin.)49 Insisting on the fact that Doclean 
rulers, by receiving the royal insignia from the Pope around 1077 had exercised their 
power over all other Serbian lands which were Orthodox, confirmed their Catholic, 
that is, ethnic Doclean identity.50  
6.4.2 The Serbian occupation of Doclea, now renamed Zeta and “the 
beginning” of the Montenegrin identity 
This oversimplified version of the turbulent events of the 11th century was 
not put into the context of the regional politics at the time. The Byzantine-Bulgarian 
wars at the beginning of the century, the Great Schism of 1054, the loss at Manzikert 
and Bari in 1071 and Norman advances under Robert Guiscard all had their impact on 
the political developments in the Slavic parts of the Balkans. Of these, particularly 
important was the changing religious affiliation of the Slavic aristocracy. Both Roman 
Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy were exercising their influence on the local lords 
and, depending on which was ascendant at the time, they would swear allegiance to 
one or the other. The Papal recognition of the Doclean kings implies their Catholic 
allegiance at that time. However, the renewed Byzantine influence under the Comneni 
dynasty re-installed Orthodoxy in the Balkans, bringing into political prominence 
another Serbian land – The Grand Principality of Raška.51 According to the new 
Doclean Narraive, the Raškan influence that soon expanded over the Doclean 
kingdom was solely a result of conquest by the alien Nemanjić Serbs:  
“Stefan Nemanja entered Doclea not as a hereditary ruler but as a conqueror. 
His biographers’ claims that he was related to the Docelan dynasty and that he 
occupied Doclea as their legitimate descendant and heir, were merely an attempt to 
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give legitimacy to his invasion. The Doclean dynasty he allegedly belonged to was 
banished, and the towns he came to take over as his inheritance, were the first to be 
demolished.”52  
This claim ignores the family ties between the Houses of Nemanjić and 
Vojislavljević, recorded in the Chronicle and several later biographies of Stefan 
Nemanja, written by his sons,53 Stefan the Firstcrownded and St.Sava in the early 13th 
century, as well as that of Domentian of Hilandar.54 In the version written by 
Nemanja’s son Stefan, the first of the Nemanjić dynasts, Stefan Nemanja, was born in 
Ribnica55 and baptised according to the Catholic rite.56 All three biographies asserted 
that “Zeta was the fatherland and the first kingdom” of Stefan Nemanja, which was 
later confirmed by its special status: all Nemanjić heirs to the throne bore the title 
“Prince of Zeta” similar to the title “Prince of Wales,” borne by English male heirs to 
the throne.  
Renaming Doclea into Zeta occurred gradually. Zeta was originally one župa (a 
baronial estate) within the Doclean kingdom. Being the most important territory that 
belonged to the crown, when the Nemanjićs took over the suzerainty, the whole 
territory of Doclea was being referred to as Zeta. The term itself, however, was first 
used by the Byzantine historian Keukamenos in 1080.57 Andrijašević, in accordance 
with the Doclean Narrative, argued that “the Nemanjić invaders stripped the formal 
status of kingdom from Doclea” in order to acquire the crown for themselves and 
renamed Doclea as Zeta.58  
In order to strengthen the belief in the 2006 version of the history of 
Montenegro, all mediaeval writers that were studied within the Literature and History 
curricula in schools throughout Montenegro were officially removed from the 
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 Andrijašević and Rastoder, 2006, 16 
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 The biographies of Stefan Nemanja by Stefen the Firstcrowned used here are:  
- a 1970 edition by Dragoljub Pavlović in the series “Serbian Literature in One Hundred books”, Book 
1 – Св. Сава – Живот Стефана Немање, Едиција “Стара српска књижевност у сто књига”, књига 
прва, Нови Сад, 1970 
- a 1988 edition by Liljana Juhas-Georgievska in the series “Old Serbian literature in 24 books”, Book 
3 – Стефан Првовенчани, Сабрани списи, Просвета и Српска књижевна задруга, Београд, 1988, 
Едиција "Стара српска књижевност у 24 књиге", књига трећа 
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 Domentian finished his chronicle in 1264 in the Serbian redaction of the Old Church Slavonic. 
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 Today a suburb of Podgorica 
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 Првовенчани, Живог светог Симеона, II 
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 Fine, 1997, 212 – The Byzantine historian did not refer to the province by its Latin name, but as it 
was called by the Slavs at the time. On the other hand, the Pope’s recognition of the kingdom implies 
to the traditional usage of old Roman imperial names by the Catholic Church. 
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 Andrijašević and Rastoder, 2006, 16. Again, the authors offered neither explanations nor references 
for this claim in the new History of Montenegro. 
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textbooks in September 2011.59 They were replaced by the local 20th-21st century 
authors or the Catholic Renaissance poets from the coastal towns who wrote in Italian 
and Latin.  
6.5 Material evidence “confirming” a separate Montenegrin identity 
Because the existing written sources prove insufficient and highly contested, the 
Doclean narrative sought reliance on the material heritage: the ancient and early 
mediaeval sites in Montenegro. A problem arose immediately, as the urban 
characteristics of the post-Roman territory inhabited by the Slavs from 6th-7th 
centuries were insufficiently researched. Some general synthesis of archaeological 
research relating to early mediaeval towns and fortresses was published in 1953 and 
1956 in two volumes of the Archaeological sites in Serbia (Arheološka nalazišta u 
Srbiji) and in the Archaeological Lexicon of Bosnia and Herzegovina I-III (Arheološki 
leksikon Bosne i Hercegovine I-III) from 1988.60 As the University of Montenegro 
still has no Archaeology Department and that all Montenegrin archaeologists to date 
were graduates from (mainly) Belgrade or Zagreb Universities, it is expected that 
future research in Montenegro will take place gradually and will need Western 
financial support to assert its newly adopted national narrative. For this purpose, the 
Montenegrin government has created a Montenegrin Centre for Conservation and 
Archaeology in July 2011, with offices in Cetinje and Kotor.61 
However, work done during the existence of Yugoslavia created a solid base for 
future research. The research done to date underlined major differences in the heritage 
studies in Montenegro. Firstly, there is a general division between the archaeology 
and architecture of the coastal towns and the interior. Secondly, the coastal towns 
once under the Venetians: Kotor, Bar, Budva and Herceg Novi, to mention the most 
important ones, have been better preserved and possess solid archives. Most of these 
towns had reasonable urban development under Byzantine, Serbian and Venetian 
influences until the catastrophic earthquakes of 1563 and 1667 annihilated the early 
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 Arheološka nalazišta u Srbiji I-II were written between 1951 and 1954 by Milutin and Draga 
Garašanin, the key-figures in the post-Second World War Archaeology at the University of Belgrade. 
As they worked under the heavy restrictions of the post-war Communist regime, their works could 
hardly be described as nationalist. Arheološki leksikon Bosne i Hercegovine I-III was a capital project 
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there is a genuine need for more research. 
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mediaeval architecture of the coastal areas. The re-building that took place following 
this devastation was executed under Venetian influence, giving these coastal towns 
the unmistaken Renaissance and Baroque Italian-Adriatic features. Thus, early 
mediaeval monuments survived only in fragments, making the attribution of any 
ethnic characteristics difficult.62 From the 9th century, the Romanesque architecture 
influenced church-builders in the coastal towns. A few monuments of the period that 
survived owed much to the dominance the Catholic Church during the Venetian 
period. In the hinterland, the Romanesque architecture merged with the Byzantine 
influences transforming in the 12th century into Serbian Raška School of 
Architecture.63 
This Serbian influence, according to the new narrative, came from the interior, 
after the Docleans were subjugated by the Nemanjić kings. As there is no readily 
available data on the mediaeval urban structures in the interior due to the lack of 
evidence and insufficient research, the initial archaeological classification, done 
primarily by Belgrade researchers in the mid-20th century, managed to date the 
earliest urban settlements to the time of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus.64 However, 
in the two centuries between Porphyrogenitus and the Nemanjić kings, most towns in 
the interior were subject to major alterations and changes and survived only in 
traces.65 Better preserved heritage in the Montenegrin interior dates from the late 12th 
century, was ecclesiastical in character and generally belonged to the Raška School.66 
The best preserved examples, such as the Morača Monastery unequivocally coincide 
with the Nemanjić period (Fig. 6.5).  
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 It is not possible to ascribe any ethnic characteristics to the surviving architecture and archaeology 
not only because of their fragmentary state, but because it is impossible to think that they were erected 
as the examples of national culture, since it is not exist as such at the time. 
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 Andrijašević and Rastoder, 2006, 30 – It is not clear to which monuments the authors refer to. 
Serbian Raška School definitely represents the fusion between the Byzantine and Romanesque forms, 
but the best preserved examples are in Serbia Proper, not in Montenegro. 
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 10th century 
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 Мишић, С. – Лексикон градова и тргова средњовековних српских земаљаа – према писаним 
изворима – Београд, 2010,12 
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 The secular and urban structures were either demolished or heavily altered by the Ottomans during 
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Fig. 6.5 – The Morača Monastery, built in 1252 in Raška School by Stefan Nemanjić, son of Vukan, 
Prince of Duklja and the eldest son of of Stefan Nemanja. 
 
Because the Raška School itself was a fusion of the Catholic and Orthodox 
influences67 that flourished under the early Nemanjić kings, who also showed 
tendencies towards changing their religious affiliations, it can be argued that the 
combination of Catholic and Orthodox elements in ecclesiastical architecture reflected 
the political ambiguity of the rulers, rather than prescribed methods of building. But 
even this argument can be viewed as an interpellation from the modern perspective, 
because the general premise on which this work is based is that the sense of national 
identity and nationalism did not exist prior to the 19th century. The Doclean narrative, 
however, uses interpellation for its hypothesis that the symbiotic Romanesque-Gothic 
style was autochthonous to Montenegro. Furthermore, the methods of normative 
historiography were fully employed in analysing the ruins of the mediaeval 
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monasteries in southern Montenegro and northern Albania, such was St.Sergio and 
Vakh Church south of Skadar in order to impose the new narrative (Fig. 6.6).68 The 
church, now in ruins, changed its use several times over the centuries, but the new 
explanation insists that “the previously Benedictine Monastery suffered certain 
alterations in the 13th century.”69 In reality, the site was known as a holy ground since 
the late antiquity and was demolished and rebuilt several times over the centuries. In 
1290, Queen Helen of Anjou, the French wife of King Uroš I Nemanjić, built the 
church on the site of the mediaeval port whose remains had sunk into the river over 
the centuries. Finally demolished by the Ottomans in the 16th century, the church 
remained in ruins ever since.70  
 
Fig. 6.6 – The only surviving wall of the Church St. Sergio and Vakh, built by Queen Helen in 1290, 
south of Skadar in Albania. Queen Helen converted to Orthodoxy, but was supportive of the Catholics 
from the coast. The Doclean Narrative proclaimed the indistinct ruins of St. Sergio and Vakh as its own 
autochthonous architectural, that is, national style.  
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 Now in Albania 
69
 Andrijašević and Rastoder, 2006, 30 
70
 The ruins still contained identifiable inscriptions when they were first recorded and described by the 
Russian consul Jastrebov (1839-1894) in the late 19th century. The Doclean narrative barely mentioned 
Jastrebov, while the inscriptions related to the Queen Helen he reproduced were ignored. 
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6.5.1 “Catholic nature” of Doclea 
 
Insisting exclusively on archaeologically uncorroborated “Serbian demolition 
of the 13th century,” the Doclean Narrative provided foundations for its claim of 
“deliberate destruction of Doclean identity.” Using the method akin to the methods of 
the new Bosniak, Macedonian and Kosovo and Metohija’s Albanian new narratives 
created during the 1990s wars in former Yugoslavia, the Doclean Narrative 
interpreted the mediaeval societies in the context of the politically and militarily 
charged 1990s.71 The change of identity in Doclea, as indeed in other Former 
Yugoslav republics, was executed through the destruction of religious objects and 
their re-interpretations in primordialistic terms.  
According to the new narrative, the undoubted Catholic nature of Doclea was 
irreversibly changed when the Nemanjić kings enforced conversion to Orthodoxy 
which limited the Benedictine educational activities previously supported by the 
Doclean rulers. Since the surviving documents do not confirm the enforced 
conversion,72 Montenegrin Catholic publicist Ivan Jovović in his study Iz prošlosti 
Dukljansko-barske nadbiskupije published by the Catholic Archibishopry of Bar in 
2004, explained this lack of evidence as “a joint venture of the Benedictine and 
Orthodox monks who sought to maintain political order.”73 The Nemanjić kings, 
continued Jovović, “frequently married Catholic princesses and needed the Pope’s 
support in obtaining the Doclean crown because the land had significant numbers of 
Catholics.”74 Since the archaeology so far could not locate and confirm the existence 
of “large numbers” of Catholic churches and monasteries beyond the coast, the 
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 Unsurprisingly, the development of all these narratives were supported with financial help from the 
West. The main task was to reduce or completely expel Serbian presence and influence in the new 
independent states. However, the seeds of future discord were sawn in the process, when these new 
national narratives begin to clash over the same territories. For example, the above mentioned St. 
Sergio and Vakh Church was also being claimed by the ethnic Albanians, willing to prove their Crypto-
Christian identity. 
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 As indeed, there are no material remains of Catholic churches outside a few coastal towns dating 
from the 11th century. 
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 http://www.montenegrina.net/pages/pages1/religija/povijest_dukljansko_barske_nadbiskupije.htm – 
Jovović, I. – Iz prošlosti Dukljansko-barske nadbiskupije, Bar, 2004 – Jovović, I. – From the past of 
Doclean-Bar Archibishopry, Bar, 2004 – Accessed on 23/05/2012. Insisting on the exclusively 
Catholic character of the Doclean kings, without putting it into the context of Catholic-Orthodox 
relations in the 11th century endorses the modern differentiation of the Montenegrins from Serbs. 
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Doclean narrative explained this by the destruction that occurred after the Ottoman 
conquest.75 
6.5.2 Ottoman threat to the Montenegrin identity 
As in other Balkan areas, after the Ottoman conquest, towns were 
transformed according to Levantine models, irrespective of size and importance. 
Because of the constant warring between the Ottomans and Montenegrin clans, only 
those towns that were in more accessible areas were garrisoned by Ottoman armies 
and were re-organized for Ottoman needs. The Islamic Community of Montenegro 
asserted that 162 mosques were erected during the Ottoman period in the whole 
territory of Montenegro.76  
The conquered towns, previously the seats of the pre-Ottoman native rulers 
featured Christian architecture. After the conquest, the Ottomans carried out the 
reconstruction which suited their needs. This was usually done by re-using materials 
from the pre-Ottoman Christian structures. Some pioneering work on locating and 
describing these pre-Ottoman towns was done by foreign travellers and members of 
the Serbian Royal Academy in the second half of the 19th century,77 but the events of 
the Balkan and the First and Second World Wars prevented more in-depth analysis. In 
the decades between 1945 and 1991 there were a few genuine attempts to address this 
problem,78 but the studies were limited to the most prominent sites and monasteries 
because of the lack of funding. Thus, the archaeological sites and monasteries in the 
territory of Montenegro beyond the narrow coastal strip were little researched. 
However, as all the surviving urban and monastic heritage of the pre-Ottoman period 
in Montenegrin hinterland examined to date bears Nemanjić characteristics, the 
Doclean Narrative argued that by “depriving the Montenegrins of their heritage,” 
Belgrade committed a deliberate “act of looting, wild destruction and avoidance of 
research in the years following the Second World War.”79 
However, this lack of research was not unique to Montenegro. Very few pre-
Ottoman towns in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia received due 
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scientific attention and scholars recognized their genuine lack of knowledge of 
mediaeval life prior to the conquest.80 Whilst in Serbia, theoretical and field research 
of mediaeval urban lives was revived in the 1990s, albeit restricted by the difficulties 
caused by economic sanctions and with the majority of this work still unpublished, no 
such research has been undertaken by Montenegrin scholars as yet. Therefore, the 
argument of the Doclean Narrative of the Nemanjić occupation and destruction of 
Catholic Doclea was based solely on the writing of historians belonging to the DANU 
from 1998 onwards.  
Simultaneously, the Western supporters of the Doclean Narrative argued for the 
existence of the separate identity as early as the 13th-14th century, neglecting the 
discourse about the appearance of nationalism as late as the 19th century. Using as a 
pretext poorly documented local revolts that occurred in this period, Elizabeth 
Roberts, one of the few authors to write about Montenegro in English language, 
suggested that the sense of identity “must have existed among the Zetans who did not 
want to live under the Raškan yoke.”81  
6.6 Montenegrin culture 
After the demise of the Serbian Empire in the second part of the 14th century 
there was a brief attempt by the Balšić and Crnojević families to win power and 
restore order. Both families aspired to rule the whole territory of Zeta, but the borders 
of their dominions were fluid. Throughout the 14th century, the feuding noble families 
in Zeta rarely held entire territories of what they considered their dominions because 
of the extremely inaccessible mountain passes. It is precisely the geography of 
Montenegro that made it a unique case in the formation of statehood. Similar to 
northern Albania, most of Zeta was unsuited for agriculture and had limited 
opportunities for trade, so the predominant activity of the population was stock-
raising. The rough terrain and constant need for new pastures caused frequent moves 
by families and their flocks over considerable distances, transforming the societal 
features into tribal. As some tribes became more or less powerful and widely differed 
in numbers, it became extremely difficult for the great noble families to assert their 
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 Roberts, 2007, 70-71. However, even Roberts had to acknowledge that the sense of national identity 
in the Middle Ages was an entirely different concept from today, which in turn made it impossible to 
argue the existence of the “Zetan identity” in primordialistic terms. 
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control over the whole population.82 Additionally, certain tribal lords possessed 
houses in towns that were outside their pastoral zones and since the documents 
covering the period of the Middle Ages are scarce, drawing accurate conclusions 
became impossible.  
The evidence of final flourishing of the cultural development in the last years 
before the Ottomas finally ousted the native rulers, however, survived. Ivan Crnojević 
(1465-1490) moved his court and the Metropolitan seat to Cetinje, where he built a 
monastery in 1484/85 (Fig. 6.7). Ivan’s son Djuradj established there in 1493 a 
printing press. This was the first Cyrillic printing press in the Balkans and, until it 
ceased operating in 1496, published five books of liturgical character, mainly Psalters 
and Hymns, commonly named the Oktoih (Fig. 6.8).83 
              
Fig. 6.7 – The Cetinje Monastery, founded by Ivan Crnojević in 1484/85.  Destroyed by the Ottomans, 
the monastery was rebuilt in 1697 by the first Vladika of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty, Danilo I (1670-
1735, ruled 1697-1735).  
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Fig. 6.8 – The facsimile of the Oktoih, 1494, the first printed Cyrillic book in the Balkans 
Surviving copies of the Oktoih, found in various monasteries in Montenegro, 
Kosovo and Metohija and Sarajevo are now in kept in the State Museums of 
Montenegro, National Museum of Serbia and Museum of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in Sarajevo and several monastery treasuries. Djuradj also ensured the 
printing of the text of Dušan’s Code,84 which seems to have been recognized as the 
legal framework under the Crnojević rulers.85 Nevertheless, in 1496, Djuradj was 
forced into exile in Venice. His departure enabled the Ottomans to advance into the 
more accessible areas.86 Only the mountain peaks remained out of the Ottoman 
control.  
The decline of the central government of the native ruling families in the 14th-
15th centuries created an increasing need for self-reliance. The forms of tribal law and 
hierarchy were established as a substitute for official law. However, the highland 
tribes, although relatively safe from Ottoman raids, were also cut off from all outside 
influences, cultural and political development, which took place in Europe from the 
16th to the 19th centuries. Montenegrin Orthodox Christians were under the 
jurisdiction of elected Metropolitans until 1697 when the Petrović-Njegoš tribe 
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secured the right to become hereditary Metropolitans, Prince-Bishops. When the 
Serbian Patriarchate was abolished in 1459 after the fall of the Despotate, the 
Orthodox Church in Montenegro remained unaffected by the Patriarch of 
Constantinople’s decisions, as there was no control over the highland territory. 
However, from the establishment of the hereditary metropolitans, Russia began a 
long-term policy of supporting and financing Cetinje. Russian support lasted until the 
beginning of the 20th century.  
All Petrović-Njegoš Metropolitans regarded themselves as Serbian, which was 
first recorded in 1754 in the above mentioned History of Montenegro by Vladika 
Vasilije. The dedication of the book swore allegiance to Peter the Great and his 
successors and confirmed their determination to fight the Turks, so they would not 
“fall into slavery like the rest of Serbia.”87 What is interesting in this history, 
however, is the recounting of the Myth of Kosovo and the adoration of Miloš Obilić 
in the same form recorded by Vuk Karadžić six decades later. Another set of written 
documents dated between 1800 and 1830 by Vladika Peter I Petrović-Njegoš (1748-
1830), in which he also identified the Montenegrins as Serbs. The names of 
Montenegrin and Serbian were used interchangeably, where the Montenegrin marked 
their geographical belonging, rather than their ethnic identity. The Doclean narrative, 
however, deliberately ignored any mention of the name of Serbia and insisted that 
Vasilije “propagated the idea of an independent Montenegro under the protection of a 
Christian power.”88 
6.6.1 The Mountain Wreath  
The most prominent Prince-Bishop, Petar II Petrović-Njegoš (Fig. 6.2), was a 
complex personality, studied by many scholars since the second half of the 19th 
century. He began the modernization of the government by forming a Senate and the 
rudimentary law-court at Cetinje, but his rule was in many ways restricted by the 
influence of the Great Powers and an insignificant number of educated professionals 
able to undertake the task of building the state institutions. Njegoš received his early 
education in the Cetinje monastery. By the time of Njegoš’s education, the old capital 
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of the Crnojevićs founded in 1484, was destroyed by the Ottomans in the mid-16th 
century. The first Prince-Bishop of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty, Danilo I (1697-1735) 
re-established Cetinje as capital of the Brda (Highlands) when he rebuilt the 
Monastery in 1697.  
Njegoš’s tutor, a Serbian romantic poet Sima Milutinović Sarajlija (1791-1847) 
from Sarajevo, had a profound influence on the young Prince-Bishop, supporting his 
love for poetry. Like many young nobles, Njegoš travelled throughout Europe and, 
inspired by the ideas of romantic nationalism, wrote epic poems. The most important 
was a religious-philosophical epic play written in decasyllabic verse of oral tradition, 
The Mountain Wreath. The central theme was an event of 1702 or 1711, when Danilo 
I, on the Serbian Orthodox Christmas Eve, ordered the Serbian Christian tribes to 
slaughter the Serbian Muslim converts. No contemporary accounts exist, but the 
theme of massacre of the Muslims was first mentioned in 1833 by Prince-Bishop 
Peter I, repeated by Sarajlija and received its legendary character in The Mountain 
Wreath in 1847. Often referred to as “the Montenegrin Vespers,” it was dedicated to 
the leader of the First Serbian Uprising, Karadjordje (Fig. 1.a.11).89 The struggle of 
the “Cross against the Crescent” was invoked as “the sacred justice of Miloš,”90 whilst 
the Montenegrins were described as the “best of the Serbs”, who, surviving the 
Kosovo Battle, withdrew into the Montenegrin mountains (Brda) to continue their 
fight “for the honourable Cross and golden freedom.”91 The epic verse undoubtedly 
confirmed that Njegoš regarded Montenegrins as Serbs.92  
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 Roberts, 2007, 133 
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 Miloš Obilić, the central figure of the Kosovo Myth. 
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 A recurring verse from the Kosovo epic which Njegoš used as one of the leading lines in his 
Mointain Wreath. 
92
 “God is angry with the Serbian people. 
A dragon with seven heads has appeared 
and devoured the entire Serbian nation, 
the slanderers as well as the slander. 
On the ruins of the heroic empire 
Miloš shone forth with his holy justice. 
Made immortal and crowned was the glory 
of both the true sworn brothers of Miloš 
and the lovely wreath of Jugovićs. 
The Serbian name has perished everywhere. 
Mighty lions have become meek peasants. 
Rash and greedy converted to Islam - 
- may their Serb milk make them all sick with plague! 
Those who escaped before the Turkish sword, 
those who did not blaspheme at the True Faith, 
those who refused to be thrown into chains, 
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The Mountain Wreath was published in Vienna in 1847, the same year in which 
Vuk Karadžić published his own translation of the New Testament into vernacular 
Serbian (Fig. 6.9).93 Njegoš shared Karadžić’s views about the Serbian language, 
history and identity and was aware of the need for general education. In 1836 he 
established the first two primary schools for boys who were taught reading from The 
Serb Elementary Reading Book (Fig. 6.10).94 After his visit to Russia, Njegoš brought 
and installed a printing press in Cetinje in the same year.95 Throughout his rule and 
those of his successors, the Kosovo Myth was carefully maintained, regarding the 
Montenegrin fight against the Ottomans as a noble cause.  
             
Fig. 6.9 – The front page of the first edition         Fig. 6.10– The Serb Elementary Reading Book 
of The Mountain Wreath, published in Vienna     re-published by Njegoš in 1836 for the needs of the 
in 1847 in Slaveno-Serbian alphabet.                    few schools in Montenegro, in Slaveno-Serbian.    
                                                                                                                                       
took refuge here in these lofty mountains 
to shed their blood together and to die, 
heroically to keep the sacred oath, 
their lovely name, and their holy freedom.” 
The first edition of The Mountain Wreath in English was published in 1930, in the translation by the 
first English lector in the Department of English at the University of Belgrade, James W. Wiles, who 
had learnt Serbian quite well on his arrival to Serbia in 1913. The translation used here is by Dr Vasa 
D. Mihailovic, a naturalized American and a Slavic scholar at the University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill, USA, which appeared in the USA in 1997, celebrating the 150th anniversary of its first publication 
in Vienna in 1847. Even this English edition was criticized as Serbian expansionism. See page below 
and the accompanying quotation. Also see Chapter I – The Serbs, p. 35-36. 
93
 This first edition of The Mountain Wreath was printed in the old alphabet. Modern creators of the 
new Montenegrin narrative emphasize that Njegoš did not want to print it in the reformed alphabet of 
Vuk Karadžić, otherwise he would have done so. In reality, Njegoš and Vuk only met in 1847 and 
developed close friendship after Njegoš personally witnessed Vuk’s efforts.  
94
 http://www.njegos.org/heritage/educat.htm - A digital collection of Montenegrin documents which 
refer to the Montenegrins as Serbs. – Accessed on 27/05/2012 – The Serb Elementary Reading Book 
was originally published by Peter I in 1812 in Venice and re-published by Peter II in Cetinje in 1836. 
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           According to the newly established Doclean reading of the epic, “regardless of 
their political agendas, ideological preferences or religious persuasions, every new 
generation of South Slav historians and politicians appropriates Njegoš’s work 
hoping to find enough quotations to validate their own views. In every translation of 
The Mountain Wreath in English, one can detect attempts to remodel the original. The 
latest English version by Professor Vasa D. Mihailović is simply another attempt to 
colonize Njegoš’s work for the sake of aiding modern political and ideological 
struggle in the Balkans.”96  
In reality, throughout the 19th and 20th century, The Mountain Wreath was read 
as an excellent example of the romantic poetry, written in the period of the 
revolutionary 1848. However, in the 1990s the epic was interpreted as a Serbian myth 
calling for the genocide of the Muslims. Much quoted book by a Croat author 
Branimir Anžulović, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide, published in New 
York in 1999 was often taken by the Western politicians as the final and correct 
reading of the entire Serbian epic tradition and assessment of Njegoš.97 Aware of 
these interpretations, the Doclean narrative proposed re-reading the epic as the “New 
Beginning” and the death of the tribal society: 
“The Beginning is Tragedy. It is the destruction of everything that is and the 
collapse of the fundamental taboos that regulate the life of an individual and a 
society. It is the final departure from a past way of life and its radical alteration.”98 
This obscured explanation offered in ethno-symbolic terms by the creators of the new 
Montenegrin narrative represented an attempt to retain Njegoš as the central figure of 
Montenegrin culture as well as to distance from the influential anti-Serbian rhetoric 
employed by the Western interventionists during the 1990s Yugoslav wars. However, 
it became increasingly difficult to re-interpret Njegoš’s political and national self-
identification in non-Serbian terms. That Njegoš’s poetry was the reflection of his 
political views was additionally corroborated by the preserved correspondence that he 
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maintained with the leading politicians in the Serbian Principality. He had good 
relations with Garašanin (Fig. 1.9) and in a letter dated 5 July 1850 he underlined his 
sense of belonging to the Serbian nation: 
“….My dear and esteemed Mr Garašanin, as backward as our Serbian state of 
affairs is in our century…I would be sorry for nothing now save for not seeing some 
progress among our whole people and for not being able in some way to establish the 
internal government on Montenegro on a firm foundation, and thus I fear that after 
me all those woes that existed before will return to Montenegro and that this small 
folk of ours, uneducated but militant and strong in spirit, will remain in perpetual 
misery. There is not a Serb whom Serbdom loves more sincerely and respects more 
than you, and there is not a Serb who loves and respects you more than I.”99 
The Doclean narrative, however, interpreted Njegoš’s identification with the 
Serbs as a consequence of the “indoctrination” received from his tutor Sarajlija and 
Karadžić’s propaganda. The greatest proponent of Njegoš’s confusion over his own 
identity, Dr Novak Kilibarda (b.1934), a professor of literature, published in 2009 a 
study titled The Oral Literature in Montenegro (Usmjena književnost Crne Gore), in 
which he negated any presence of Serbian culture in Montenegro, whilst 
acknowledging only the presence of the Montenegrin and Bosniak (Muslim) cultural 
tradition.100 Interpreting Karadžić’s collected poems Kilibarda (Fig. 6.11) carefully 
replaced any mention of the term “Serbian” with the term “Montenegrin”. For him, all 
Karadžić’s bards, born in Montenegro, regarded themselves Montenegrin. Similarly, 
Njegoš’s epic was re-interpreted as “historically inaccurate.”101 Kilibarda’s thesis 
could have had some academic value, had it not been that before becoming one of the 
main supporters of the Doclean narrative, Kilibarda himself advocated that 
Montenegrins and Serbs were ultimately one nation.102  
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Fig. 6.11 – Dr Novak Kilibarda (b.1934), from a fierce Serb to an even fiercer anti-Serb. He introduced 
the retrospective reading of the Romantic writers in Montenegro arguing that they were all “confused” 
about their identity and seduced by the “nationalist propaganda” of Vuk Karadžić. 
 
6.6.2 Dinaric type – Montenegrins as proud and freedom loving highlanders 
The impact of The Mountain Wreath and wars for independence 1876-1878, 
which Serbia and Montenegro jointly waged with Russian support, only strengthened 
the identification of the Montenegrins with Serbs, despite the fact that the two 
Principalities did not achieve to have a common border. Officially independent after 
the Congress of Berlin, Montenegro still relied on Russian financial support. In the 
early 20th century, Serbian academic Jovan Cvijić (Fig. 1.35) systematised the 19th 
century partial research of European geographers who travelled through the Balkans 
and complemented them with his own studies.103 Cvijić, like other South Slav 
intellectuals of his time, was greatly influenced by the developing Yugoslav idea and 
shared the belief that all Sothern Slavs were ethnically of the same origin. According 
to him, the prolonged exposure to different cultural influences developed certain 
psychological characteristics and mentalities, which adapted to the geographical and 
climatic peculiarities of various Balkan regions. A series of lectures he gave at the 
Sorbonne were published in two volumes in Belgrade in 1922 and posthumously in 
1931 under the title Balkan Peninsula and the South Slav countries I and II 
(Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje I i II). The central thesis of these works 
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was the existence of four psychological types amongst the Southern Slavs: Dinaric 
(living in the Dinaric range of the peninsula), Central (living in the narrow strip south 
of the Danube, Southern Morava and Vardar valleys), Eastern (living in the eastern 
part of the Peninsula to the Black Sea) and Pannonian (living predominantly in the 
Pannonian Plain and central Europe). Cvijić emphasized that demarcation lines 
between the types were fluid and the population was exposed to innumerable mixing 
and migrations.104 Cvijić’s analysis paid particular attention to the Dinaric type which, 
according to him, consisted of three quarters of the Serbs. The Dinaric type was a 
freedom loving skilful soldier and “burning with desire to avenge Kosovo.”105 The 
Dinaric type carefully maintained the cult of forefathers by knowing all direct 
ancestors, sometimes up to twenty generations. This respect for ancestors was most 
prominent in Montenegro, where, except remembering the blood ancestors, existed a 
form of a collective memory, expressed through the personal acquisition of national, 
mythical heroes of the epic. “In Montenegro,” Cvijić witnessed, “Miloš Obilić was 
considered a spiritual ancestor.”106  
Cvijić wrote his volumes during 1916-1918, at the height of the First World 
War. His romantic vision of the Dinaric type, of which the Montenegrins were the 
primary example, was undoubtedly influenced by the late 19th century nationalism 
and nation building in both Serbia and Montenegro, as well as by the war then in 
progress. He evoked the epic tradition maintained by Njegoš whose description of the 
Dinaric Slavs was quoted directly from The Mountain Wreath. Cvijić, like his older 
contemporary Stojan Novaković (Fig. 1.13) of the Serbian Royal Academy, 
considered the Montenegrins – Serbs. He had a good reason to believe this, as the 
Montenegrins themselves maintained the same argument throughout the 19th and early 
20th century. Furthermore, during the somewhat cold relations between the 
traditionally pro-Russian Petrović-Njegoš dynasts and the pro-Austrian Obrenovićs in 
the Serbian Principality (and later kingdom), the Prince (and later King) Nikola 
considered the Montenegrins to be “the best of the Serbs.”107  
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Not only that Nikola shared the dream of the resurrection of the Serbian Empire, 
he also declared his kinship in depicting himself as a brave warrior Prince, the 
successor of the Nemanjić kings and Lazarević and Branković despots. Admiring the 
poetry of his great-uncle Peter II, Nikola also wrote patriotic poems, inspired by the 
epic tradition. His poems dedicated to St.Sava, Olivera,108 and the Serbian Fairy, 
contained recurring references to the mediaeval Serbian glory. He also wrote a hymn 
Onamo ‘namo (There, over there) in 1867 which became a pan-Serbian anthem.109  
During Nikola’s rule, partial systematization of the school syllabus took place. 
The general subjects for primary and secondary schools included Serbian Grammar, 
Montenegrin and Serb History, as well as Serbian Literature and Geography, which 
aimed at “studying the Serb lands independent, subjugated and occupied as well as 
main cities, places and villages in entire Serbdom.”110  
Nikola’s undoubted national self-identification with the Serbs was best 
represented during his official visit to St.Peterburg in 1869, when Tsar Alexander II 
presented the young Prince Nikola with the “sabre of King Milutin Nemanjić.”111 The 
Doclean narrative recently disputed the authenticity of the sabre, arguing for a late 
17th century Russian forgery.112 Whether it was a forgery or not, the symbolism of 
presenting the sabre that allegedly belonged to the mediaeval Serbian king and its 
sincere acceptance by the Prince was both a sign of Russian support for the national 
revival of the Orthodox Slav state and Nikola’s desire to play a major role in it. This 
had little to do with Russian worry over the renewal of Serbian mediaeval glory, as 
much as with securing Russian influence in the Balkans. As far as Prince Nikola was 
concerned, he viewed himself as the leader of the never conquered highlanders and 
even dreamt of Montenegro becoming the leading force among the Serb states in the 
Balkans.113   
That the Great Powers shared this view of Montenegrin identity being Serbian 
was expressed, for example, by the articles and speeches of Gladstone during the 
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Eastern Question crisis. Gladstone thought the Montenegrin people were “the most 
wonderful race alive.”114 But the European politicians of Gladstone’s rank were aware 
that, on its own, Montenegro was too small to influence regional politics: 
“Montenegro…will not die…It is another question whether their brethren of the 
Serbian lands will amalgamate with them politically on an extended scale, and revive, 
either by a federal or an incorporating union, the substance, if not the form, of the old 
Serbian state.”115 
It was precisely Gladstone’s immense influence that helped Montenegro to 
obtain the sea exit by acquiring Bar and Ulcinj in 1878. Since the 15th century, these 
towns were exchanged between the Venetians, Ottomans, the Habsburgs and (briefly) 
Napoleon. Their inclusion in Montenegro enabled the slow return of the Orthodox 
population, which was ousted after the Venetians took control in 1443. As in other 
coastal towns on the eastern side of the Adriatic, the dominant urban structure was 
Catholic and reflected Italian taste. The arrival of the Orthodox population from the 
highlands in the 19th century did not bring any significant change in town life, as the 
newcomers soon adapted. Orthodox churches in Kotor, Bar, and other towns in 
Montenegro were re-built and “it appears that there was peaceful co-existence 
between the two Christian denominations, confirmed by the Concordat signed in 
1886.”116 The co-existence between the Orthodox and Catholic population in the Bar 
area was best expressed by the common use of the Church of St.Tekla (Fig. 6.12). 
Originally built as an Orthodox Church in the 14th century, it was converted under the 
Venetians, only to be given a second altar in the 19th century.117 It is still used by both 
Catholics and Orthodox. 
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Fig. 6.12 – Church of St.Tekla, near Bar, 14th century. Unique in the world as one of the few churches 
where both Orthodox and Catholic services are being held. 
After obtaining the full independence in 1878, the Muslim population of 
Montenegro was duly expelled. The towns and areas that were previously 
predominantly Muslim, but also with the greatest agricultural potential, were re-
populated by the Serbs from the rough highlands and Herzegovina who escaped the 
Habsburg occupation. As was the case in other Balkan countries that emerged 
independent from Ottoman rule in the 19th century, most traces of Islamic culture 
were eliminated.118  
6.7 Becoming European 
Only after 1878 it became not only possible but necessary to begin the 
modernization of the state. It was essential to establish an effective educational 
system. Even though Peter II had began an educational programme in 1836, for most 
part of the next four decades Montenegro, being under constant threat from the 
Ottomans and participating in several local wars against them, there was little 
improvement in education and literacy rates remained relatively low. Before 1878, 
there were only 53 primary schools and two high schools, the Orthodox Seminary 
(1868) and the Girl’s Institute (1869), both founded in Cetinje.119 For further 
education, young men were sent to Russia and Serbia, whilst the Catholic youth from 
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the coast usually opted for Zagreb and other universities in the Habsburg Empire. A 
Gymnasium modelled on European equivalents opened in Cetinje in 1880.  
Already recognized as the capital, Cetinje was subject to urban development 
according to European models. Peter II had built a residence for his personal and state 
needs within the compound of the Monastery of Cetinje in 1838 (Fig. 6.13). Its design 
corresponded to Peter’s role as a theocratic ruler, so its Russian architect Jakov 
Ozerckovski, retained the mediaeval features of austere religious architecture. Named 
Biljarda, because the first billiard table in Montenegro was brought there by Njegoš, 
it served as a dynastic seat until 1867, when a new residence was built for the Serbian 
widow of Prince Danilo (1851-1860). She passed it on to Prince Nikola and his family 
(Fig. 6.14).120 Even though the name of the architect is now lost, the new residence 
marked the beginning of the urbanization of Cetinje beyond the Monastery estate, by 
featuring simple geometrical forms of the Mediterranean town-house. Nikola also 
commissioned two additional palaces: a splendid neo-Renaissance palace, built for his 
daughter Zorka and son-in-law Peter Karadjordjević in Bar in 1885 (Fig. 6.15) and 
another neo-Renaissance palace for his personal use in Nikšić in 1900 (Fig. 6.16). 
  
Fig. 6.13 – Biljarda, the residence of Peter II Petrović-Njegoš corresponded to his role of a theocratic 
ruler and displayed mediaeval monastic features.   
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Fig. 6.14 – The residence of Prince, later King Nikola, built in 1867 in simple Mediterranean style 
marked the beginning of proper urbanization and modernization of Cetinje 
 
  
Fig. 6.15 – The residence of King Nikola in Bar, built in 1885 in Neo-Renaissance style. 
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Fig. 6.16 – The residence of King Nikola in Nikšić, built in 1900. 
After 1880, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Montenegro and 
the Great Powers brought first diplomats to Cetinje. To accommodate diplomats and 
present Montenegro as a serious European state, a series of European fin de siècle 
houses were built. The first one to be built in 1899, the Embassy of Austro-Hungary, 
was designed by a Dalmatian architect Josip Slade, the Head of the Civil Engineering 
Administration within the Montenegrin Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1880-1890.121 
Adjoining the main building was a Catholic chapel for the use of Embassy officials. 
That Slade’s design owed much to the influence of Austrian and Italian architecture 
could be observed on the features of the first Montenegrin theatre building. The Zetski 
Dom (The Zeta House), built between 1884 and 1896, was a neo-classical 
representation of similar buildings in the Adriatic region (Fig. 6.17). The same neo-
Classical style was used for the new residence of the the Montenegrin heir prince 
Danilo, built in 1894-1895. Named Plavi dvorac (The Blue Palace) after its blue 
façade, it represented the desire of the Montenegrin princes to finally become 
recognized among the European ruling elites (Fig. 6.18).  
The development of Cetinje as a European-style town was triggered mainly by 
the housing needs for embassies of the Great Powers. Without exception, they were 
all works of foreign architects. The Russian Embassy, built in 1903, was designed by 
an Italian architect A.C. Corradini, who lived and worked in Cetinje until the outbreak 
of the First Balkan War in 1912. Corradini also designed an Italian Embassy and the 
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Government House, all of them, unsurprisingly, in Italian neo-Classical style. The 
French Embassy, designed and executed by the Paris architect Auguste Perret, one of 
the creators Art Nuovo and Secessionism in France, created in Cetinje a building that 
corresponded to his design in Rue Franklin 25 in Paris, an epitome of the late-19th 
century French architecture. In contrast, the British Embassy was designed in 1912 by 
an English architect Harty and represented a typical English “cottage.”122   
  
Fig. 6.17 – Theatre Zetski Dom, 1884-1896 
 
Fig. 6.18 – Plavi dvorac, 1894-1895 
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The Serbian Embassy was placed in 1907 in a modest house privately owned by 
the Serbian King Peter Karadjordjević, son-in-law to Prince Nikola and. The house 
was built in 1883, as a dowry for Nikola’s daughter Zorka, who married the Serbian 
Prince in the same year (Fig. 6.19). All their children, including the heir to the Serbian 
throne, Alexander, were born in Cetinje and lived there until 1894.  
  
Fig. 6.19 – Serbian Embassy in Cetinje, erected in 1883, a very simple and inexpensive building in 
comparison with embassies of European countries erected at the same time. 
As demonstrated, none of these urban developments were inspired by national 
narrative, as was the case in other European and Balkan states at the time. The 
crippling poverty of the small Principality, as well as the absence of Montenegrin 
educated classes ready to create the national identity through public monuments 
prevented the change of traditional mountainous features of the small Principality. At 
this period, nation-building in the Serbian Kingdom was at its peak.123 Whilst Serbian 
intellectuals gathered around the Royal Academy and the Grand School and party 
leaders argued over the constitutional rights of the king, demanding full parliamentary 
democracy, Montenegro was ruled in the same way as in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Nikola, in power since 1860, considered Montenegro his private property and every 
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decision was made by him.124 The Senate, introduced by Peter II was replaced by the 
Council of Ministers in 1879, but there was no constitution. Admittedly, two tribal 
laws dating from the time of Peter I in the late 18th and early 19th century, modified in 
1855 by Prince Danilo (1851-1860) were still in use, but they were insufficient for 
any serious development of parliamentarism, which in turn, could not promote any 
state programme of nation-building that was taking place in other European countries.  
Lack of public monuments was complemented by two mausoleums that were 
erected in Cetinje. The first was a small burial chapel that Njegoš built for himself in 
1845 on the top of Mount Lovćen, overlooking the Bay of Kotor (Fig. 6.20). In his 
will, Njegoš wanted to be “buried on the highest peak of Montenegro, from which he 
can oversee the Serbian lands and the wide sea.”125 Afraid that the Ottomans would 
destroy the chapel, his successors initially buried him within the Cetinje Monastery 
and transferred his body to the chapel in 1851.126 The chapel was eventually destroyed 
by the Austrians in 1916 and re-built by King Alexander Karadjordjević in 1925. 
 
Fig. 6.20 – Njegoš’s burial chapel, built in 1845 was destroyed in 1916. Re-built in 1925, it was 
demolished again in 1974, the year of ill-fated Yugoslav Constitution which sought to reduce further 
Serbian nationalism. Photograph from 1972. 
                                               
124
 Roberts, 2007, 271 
125
 Much quoted sentence from the testament of Njegoš has become a compulsory subject in the 
political debate in the new Montenegrin narrative. 
126
 http://www.rastko.rs/rastko-cg/povijest/njegos-kapela.html - Accessed on 30/05/2012 
Chapter VI                                                                                           The Montenegrins 
 495
The second mausoleum to be built was that of Prince Danilo, erected in 1893-
1896 on another Lovćen hilltop overlooking Cetinje (Fig. 6.21). This was the first and 
only public monument erected in Montenegro until 1939, when a monument called 
Lovćenska vila (Lovćen Fairy) was erected in front of the building of the former 
French Embassy, commemorating 350 emigrants who drowned after their ship was 
torpedoed in 1916 (Fig. 6.22). 
   
Fig. 6.21 – Mausoleum of Prince Danilo on the Lovćen Top Orlov krš, erected in 1893-1896                              
 
Fig. 6.22 – Monument to Lovćenska vila, the only public monument erected in Montenegro until 1939. 
Designed by Risto Stijović. 
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6.8 The King’s Anger  
In 1905, Nikola was forced to adopt a Constitution and create an Assembly, 
which was called “the Serb Skupština in Montenegro.”127 On the golden jubilee of his 
reign in 1910, he decided to transform Montenegro into a Kingdom. The Doclean 
narrative recently argued that the reason for this was to “consolidate the reputation of 
Montenegro and obtain equality with Serbia, its chief political rival.”128 Since there is 
no evidence that Serbia was “the chief political rival of Montenegro at the time,” the 
reasons behind this act appear to have been more mundane and based on the personal 
enmities between Nikola, Milan Obrenović and Peter Karadjordjević.   
Nikola was a flamboyant personality who was brought up in the romantic period 
of nationalism. An early education in France seems not to have attracted him to a 
European lifestyle, as it did Milan (Fig. 1.16) and Peter (Fig. 1.37), two main 
contenders for the Serbian throne. Nikola was dismissive of both, maintained the cult 
of Kosovo Battle and respected the message of The Mountain Wreath, styling himself 
as a warrior-Prince. He did not have a competitor in Milan, because King Milan was 
greatly unpopular for his pro-Austrian politics and scandalous lifestyle. On the other 
hand, exiled Peter, French educated, was a reflective personality, with a great respect 
for European culture and clear understanding of the royal duties as those of service to 
the nation, rather than as an autocratic exercise of power.129 Nikola allowed his eldest 
daughter Zorka to marry Peter in response to the antagonistic relationship with King 
Milan in Belgrade.  
Strategically, Serbia, even though not much more developed than Montenegro 
was on the main overland route to Asia Minor and as such more attractive to the Great 
Powers in their regional policies, especially in the aftermath of the 1903 dynastic 
change in Belgrade and the looming Tax War and the Annexation crisis.130 Nikola felt 
left out from the decision making in regional politics, particularly as Russia, France, 
Germany, Austro-Hungary and Great Britain regarded Serbia as a key player in the 
Balkans. Assuming the royal title in time which coincided with exclusion of Serbia 
from the European political framework, Nikola wanted to show himself as a better 
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choice as Serbian leader. His coronation was explained in terms of “the restoration of 
the Old Serbian line of kings who once ruled Zeta, making him by implication the 
embodiment of a more ancient dynasty than the king presently reigning in 
Belgrade.”131 Despite the official reasons for obtaining a crown which the Belgrade 
press laughed at, it appears that assuming the royal title indeed was a matter “of 
vanity, or jealousy of the status of his son-in-law King Peter” as the British chargé 
d’affairs at Cetinje at the time noticed.132 Whether Nikola was jealous of Peter or he 
genuinely aimed at increasing Montenegro’s reputation bore no consequences because 
during the Balkan wars in 1912-1913 and in 1914 he firmly stood next to Serbia. 
On 28 July, when Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia, Nikola sent a 
dépêche to Prince Alexander Karadjordjević in Belgrade informing him of 
Montenegro’s readiness to fight alongside Serbia: 
“The pride of the Serbian tribe did not allow further yielding. Sweet are the 
sacrifices made in the name of justice and national independence. In the name of God 
and with the help of our centuries old protectress Russia and the sympathies of all 
civilized peoples, our Serbian people will come out of this temptation forced upon us 
victorious and will secure a glorious future. My Montenegrins are already on the 
borders, prepared to die for the defence of our independence. Long live, my beloved 
grandson, for the joy of your dear father and mine! Long live the brave Serbian army! 
Long live our beloved Serbdom!”133 
Similarly, on 6 August, Nikola issued a proclamation calling on the 
Montenegrins to take arms:  
“….He, who considers himself a hero, let him come and follow in the footsteps 
of the two old Serbian kings: to die and spill our blood for unity and golden freedom! 
God and Justice are on our side. We wanted peace, but we were forced into war. 
Accept it as always, Serbian and heroically, and the blessing of your old king will 
follow you in all your deeds…”134 
Whilst both Serbian and foreign historians until the late 1990s never questioned 
the expressed sense of solidarity as that of two separate nations, the Doclean 
narrative described all the events surrounding the Balkan and the First World Wars as 
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the product of the “Greater Serbian Propaganda.” Carefully omitting the words 
“Serbian people” and “Serbian” from the original source references and replacing 
them with the words “Montenegrin people,” and “Montenegrin,” the creators of the 
new interpretations of 19th and 20th century events in Montenegro insist on the non-
existing sense of separateness between Serbs in Serbia and Serbs in Montenegro.135 
The re-interpretation also included the re-evaluation of the war activities as those of 
“Serbian invasion and occupation of Montenegro” in 1918, employing the official 
narrative adopted after 1945 by the communist historiography which generally 
condemned the “Greater Serbianism.” 
Admittedly, the first mention of the Montenegrins being distinct from Serbs 
appeared in 1918, when the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty was removed from power 
immediately after the unification of Serbia, Montenegro and the State of Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs. Angered, King Nikola denounced the unification and the Belgrade 
government. In the long proclamation issued on 6 January 1919 in Ney near Paris, 
exiled Nikola accused Serbia of occupying and betraying Montenegro.136 This was an 
understandable reaction of the old King who had to sacrifice his right to the throne in 
favour of his own grandson, Prince Regent Alexander Karadjordjević. Despite his 
attempts to resume his kingship in Montenegro, Nikola failed.  
The Doclean narrative argued that this was because of the coercion of the 
members of the Montenegrin Great People’s Assembly in 1918 to support 
unification.137 Similarly, the legal actions surrounding the unification, which took the 
form of a plebiscite, have been interpreted as the “Greater Serbian violation of the 
1905 Montenegrin Constitution.”138  
The subsequent formation of the Kingdom of SHS changed the political picture 
of the western Balkans and introduced the policy of Integral Yugoslavism. Except for 
the periodical attempts between 1919 and 1924 of the supporters of King Nikola, the 
so-called Greens, to organise the guerrilla uprisings against the Karadjordjević 
dynasty, there were no debates on separate Montenegrin identity. As the parts of the 
new state that were hit hardest by the war were slow to recover, Montenegro and its 
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inhabitants were receiving the financial support as much as they could from Serbia, 
herself being in dire economic situation.139  
The Montenegrins were considered Serbs, which was re-iterated by the renewal 
of the Patriarchate of Peć. The unification of the Metropolitanates of Karlovci, 
Belgrade and Cetinje in 1920, marked the re-establishment of the Patriarchate 
abolished in 1766. In the following decades, two Serbian Patriarchs, Varnava (1930-
1937) and Gavrilo (Fig. 1.58) were natives to Montenegro, as well as a number of 
Archbishops and Bishops.  
6.9 Becoming Montenegrin 
Montenegro was not spared loss of life and material destruction during the 
Second World War. Initially occupied by Italy, Montenegro was soon divided by Nazi 
forces and their Ustaša and Muslim allies who fought against Communist Partisans. 
This was complicated further by the guerrilla war of royalist Serbian and Montenegrin 
Četniks. It was finally liberated by the Partisan army in 1945.140 It lost about 10% of 
its population.141  
The destruction of the few towns in Montenegro was such that, for example, 
Podgorica “was so devastated by the Allied bombings…that it resembled an 
archaeological excavation through which only one path had been cleared.142” By late 
1944, Montenegrin generals commanded eight out of eighteen Yugoslav partisan 
corps.  According to Rastoder, this was extraordinary, “bearing in mind that the share 
of the Montenegrin population in the total Yugoslav census was just over 2%.”143 
There were various attempts to explain this “ethnic anomaly within the Partisan 
army,” but most of them reflected the traditional perception of Montenegrins as 
fearsome highland warriors, epitomised by Njegoš’s poetry and Cvijić’s description 
of the Dinaric Balkan “type.”  
The 1946 Constitution officiated Montenegrins one of the five constituent 
nations in federal Yugoslavia. However, the proclamation of a separate identity was 
met with a degree of dissension. The Serbian members of the Communist Party 
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argued strongly against it, but were quickly silenced by Tito’s argument that “Greater 
Serbianism was a defining characteristic of Karadjordjević Yugoslavia.”144 To honour 
Tito, Podgorica was renamed Titograd and proclaimed the capital, whilst Cetinje 
remained a city of historic importance.  
Milovan Djilas (Fig. 1.a.21), before his spectacular disagreement with Tito, 
supported the political need to award Montenegro the status of a republic. He argued 
that the “Montenegrins were essentially Serbs, but different from other Serbs.”145 
Citing Njegoš, Djilas insisted that the Montenegro was “a cradle of Serbdom” and that 
the Montenegrins were not “only the cradle of Serbdom” but “the purest and the best 
of Serbs.” They “had different paths to statehood,” although he feared that giving 
them the new status “would lead to the recognition of a separate nation.”146  
Following the policy of “brotherhood and unity” which advocated that every 
federal republic should have its own educational and cultural institutions resulted in 
the gradual opening of schools and museums. First to be established was the College 
of Education in Cetinje (1947), followed by the Montenegrin Historical Institute 
(1948) and a number of similar schools in all major towns in Montenegro.147 
However, the University was not established until 1974. As in all other Yugoslav 
republics, Montenegro had its Institute for the Protection of Monuments established in 
1948. It was housed in the former Austro-Hungarian Embassy (Fig. 6.23). The first 
post-war museum in Montenegro, the Ethnographic Museum, opened in 1951 in 
Cetinje on the centenary of Njegoš’s death and was situated in his Biljarda Palace. 
Later it was transferred to the former Serbian Embassy (Fig. 6.19) enabling Biljarda 
(Fig. 6.13) to become solely the Njegoš Memorial Museum. 
Admittedly, the Karadjordjević dynasty had supported the establishment of 
cultural institutions. King Alexander opened the State Museum in Cetinje in 1926, in 
the old residence of King Nikola (Fig. 6.14). All other museums that opened before 
the Second World War were in coastal towns and had a local character, void of nation 
building process. Museums in Perast (1937) and Kotor (1938) displayed local and 
maritime artefacts.148 The National Museum of Montenegro, as a complex site was 
created only in 1989 after several municipal museums merged within the historic core 
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of Cetinje. Each palace once owned by the Petrović-Njegoš family and buildings of 
the former Embassies of Great Powers housed specific displays: the Historical 
Museum was in Corradini’s Government House (Fig. 6.24), whilst the State Museum 
was renamed the King Nikola Museum, containing the artefacts that belonged to the 
Petrović-Njegoš family.149  
  
Fig. 6.23 – Building of the former Austro-Hingarian Embassy, built in 1897-1899 after the designs of 
Josip Slade, now the Institute for Protection of Monuments of Montenegro. 
 
Fig. 6.24 – Vladin Dom (The Government House), built in 1910 by the Italian architect Cesare 
Corradini, now the Historical Museum. Corradini also designed the buildings of Italian and Russian 
Embassies in Cetinje. 
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As was the case with all palaces and stately buildings elsewhere in Yugoslavia 
after 1945, most of them were converted to public use. Thus, the building of the 
British Embassy was converted into a newly established Music Academy in 1980, 
whilst the Italian and French Embassies jointly became the National Library of 
Montenegro. The Blue Palace changed its function several times over the post-war 
period and is currently used by officials of the Republic. The former Russian Embassy 
was transformed into the Faculty of Art.  
All these conversions of the few existing representative buildings imply that 
there was no conscious nation-building programme in the material sense in 
Montenegro neither during its existence as an independent state between 1878 and 
1918, nor during the Yugoslav period 1918-2003. Old Nikola declared himself 
Serbian until he lost his throne in 1918, the Metropolitans of Cetinje used Serbian 
Orthodox Church books until the present and it appears that the general national 
feeling among the Montenegrin population, was unquestionably Serbian. 
The process of national separation of the Montengrins from the rest of the Serbs 
began in 1945. As Montenegro had so few public monuments it was necessary to de-
Serbianize those few historical personalities who could perform the function of the 
“fathers of the nation” and give them adequate interpretation through the symbolic use 
of newly erected monuments and other public buildings. Thus, in 1951, on the 
centenary of Njegoš’s death, the authorities decided to demolish his burial chapel in 
Lovćen, re-built by King Alexander. It was decided to erect a monumental 
mausoleum, designed by Ivan Meštrović, instead (Fig. 6.25). Despite the objections of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, which argued that the Prince-Bishop’s last will was to 
have a modest chapel, the Cetinje City Council replied that the Church had no right to 
interfere.150 However, financial difficulties postponed the works until 1971. The 
Mausoleum finally opened in 1974 and was credited to be the highest in the world. 
Because of the difficulty of access, a special tunnel with 461 steps was dug through 
the mountain to lead to the Mausoleum plateau. The Mausoleum was reminiscent of 
Meštrović’s previous works, in the form of an ancient temple, supported by caryatides 
(Fig. 6.26). Only, this time there was no programmatic Integral Yugoslavism 
involved, as was the case with the Monument to the Unknown Hero on Avala. 
Meštrović’s signature, the caryatides, dressed in Montenegrin national costumes, 
                                               
150
 http://www.rastko.rs/rastko-cg/povijest/njegos-kapela.html - Accessed 30/05/2012 
Chapter VI                                                                                           The Montenegrins 
 503
symbolized the Montenegrin identity.  A colossal sculpture of Njegoš, representing 
him engaged in deep thinking, with an eagle behind his back was placed inside the 
Mausoleum. The eagle, traditional symbol on the coats-of-arms of the Serbian and 
Montenegrin rulers was Westernized by being presented with his wings down, raising 
objections to the representation of theocratic Njegoš in a non-Orthodox pose.151  
The Mausoleum’s official inauguration coincided with the adoption of the 1974 
Federal Constitution which transferred much of the federal powers to the republics. 
This was followed by the opening of the University, which aimed to strengthen the 
institutions of each individual republic and province, seriously undermining the 
Federation in the process. Following these policies, the Montenegrin Academy of 
Sciences and Arts (CANU) was founded in 1976. Until it was split in 1998, it 
remained the highest cultural and educational institution in the republic. Nevertheless, 
despite all the efforts, Montenegro, together with Kosovo and Metohija, remained the 
areas with the least educated population of former Yugoslavia. Only in 2003, did the 
number of the overall population with primary school education reach 97%.152  
 
Fig. 6.25 – The new Mausoleum of Njegoš, after Ivan Meštrović, erected in 1974, in place of the 
modest chapel that Njegoš designed for himself in 1845. 
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Fig. 6.26 – The atrium of the Mausoleum. All references to Njegoš’s theocratic role of the Bishop of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church are deliberately removed and he is celebrated only as a poet and a ruler. 
 
6.10 Turning Doclean 
When the wars of Yugoslav succession began, Montenegro followed its 
tradition to stay closely associated with Serbia. It chose to remain part of the “rump 
Yugoslavia” and only in 1997, when Western pressure on the country increased, did 
the Montenegrin politicians decide that it was time to leave the joint state. The 1992 
referendum, which resulted in Montenegro’s decision to remain in the federation with 
Serbia, was soon presented by the Western analysts as staged by the Serbian president 
Slobodan Milošević, a native of Montenegro himself. Its legality was questioned by 
both the West and those Montenegrin politicians who began arguing for 
independence.153 Montenegrin intellectuals in favour of separation incited a fearsome 
debate over the future of the country and accused the CANU for being pro-Serbian. In 
1993, the establishment of Matica Crnogorska (Montenegrin Matica) traced the path 
for the invention of the separate ethnic origins of the Montenegrins: 
“Matica was needed in Montenegro because we considered ourselves to have 
our own country yet we had no such organization. The official government in 
Montenegro threw their lot in with Serbia completely. Also there had been a 
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suggestion that the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts would be merged into 
the Serbian Academy. So we formed Montenegrin Matica as a resistance to that.”154  
As Matica Crnogorska was modelled on Matica Srpska and Matica Hrvatska, 
which as supreme cultural institutions in both Serbia and Croatia began their existence 
concerned with language, an argument for a separate and “unique” Montenegrin 
language was devised as “the right of every nation to have and call its language what 
it wants.”155 
Parallel with the language argument there was a call for a separate Montenegrin 
Orthodox Church. The argument was that the Montenegrin Metropolitanate had been 
separate from the Serbian Patriarchate since 1766, until it was “illegally incorporated 
into the Serbian Orthodox Church” in 1920. The fact that the two Serbian Patriarchs 
who conducted the unification in 1920 were natives to Montenegro was termed as “a 
betrayal of the national interests” and that the Serbian Orthodox Church worked on 
the project of creating the Greater Serbia.156 The Montenegrin Orthodox Church, in 
order to distinguish itself from the Serbian, argued that a catholic king St. John 
Vladimir was a founder of Doclean Kingdom which converted to Orthodoxy only 
after the “occupation of Serbian despot Nemanja in 1186.”157 Even though 
ecumenically unrecognized, the Montenegrin Church appealed to the Montenegrin 
Government to start the process of “returning the churches and monasteries on the 
territory of Montenegro to the rightful church, unlawfully held by the Serbian 
Orthodox Church.”158 The current situation regarding the ownership of ecclesiastical 
buildings is in a stalemate, but it is reasonable to expect that in the near future the 
priests belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church will be duly expelled and replaced 
by priests loyal to the Montnegrin Orthodox Church, as was the case in Macedonia. 
In 2006 Montenegro declared independence from Serbia and from this time, the 
Doclean narrative, devised in the 1998-2006 period, received great publicity, both in 
Montenegro itself and in Western academic circles. Since the new narrative was still 
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in its early days, the separate Montenegrin nation had yet to be confirmed by the 
invention of a separate language. For this purpose, on the requirement of the 
Montenegrin Ministry of Education in 2008, members of the DANU and Matica 
Crnogorska developed a new Montenegrin language and orthography. Karadžić’s 
standard language and orthography used both in Serbia and Montenegro since 1868 
was replaced by a new alphabet. Instead of 30 letters, it added two new graphemes as 
separate signs for minor dialectological differences.159 As in Serbian, the new 
alphabet retained the duality and it can be written in both Cyrillic and Latin scripts. 
But this is only declarative. According to Kenneth Morrison, “ethnic Montenegrins 
and Montenegrin minorities prefer the use of Latinic script.”160 It is very easy to 
understand the attempt to Latinize traditional Montenegrin language and literature 
when the ethnic backgrounds of the compilers of the new orthography are taken into 
account: Dr Milenko Perović, a declared Montenegrin with a permanent position as 
Professor at the University of Novi Sad (Vojvodina, Serbia), Dr Josip Silić of the 
University of Zagreb (Croatia), Dr Ludmila Vasiljeva of the University of Lvov 
(Ukraine).161 The rest of the team are professors from the Faculty of Philosophy in 
Nikšić (established in 1988, as a branch of the University of Podgorica162), 
predominantly from the Muslim background with the evident absence of the 
professors from Podgorica itself.163 
The new Montenegrin language and orthography were approved by the 
government in 2010, when the Institute for Montenegrin Language and Literature 
was founded in Podgorica, under the directorship of Dr Adnan Čirgić, a Montenegrin 
Muslim. The new language was introduced in Montenegrin schools in September 
2011. Parallel with this, the Serbian language was downgraded as the language of the 
minority, but, following the census results of 2011 when 43% of the population 
declared Serbian as their mother tongue, the Serbian was returned into use, albeit 
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reluctantly.164 From September 2011, all official documents issued by the Republic’s 
authorities are written in the new orthography. Unsurprisingly, the linguists from 
Belgrade and Novi Sad, many of whom natives to Montenegro, were not amused. In 
the ensuing media war, the most commonly used argument by the Serbian side was 
that this was a deliberate step in the further disintegration of the Serbian national core, 
supported by the anti-Serbian regime in Podgorica.  
On the other hand, what Belgrade saw as further humiliation and disgrace, 
Zagreb greeted with a great sense of pride. In August 2011, the Zagreb daily Jutarnji 
List, under the title Croats introduced new letters to the Montenegrins, carried the 
story of the participation of the Zagreb educated linguists in creating the new 
Montenegrin language.165   
6.11 Montenegrin nation-building 
The invention of the new historical narrative, the creation of a separate language 
and foundation of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church were the first steps in creating a 
new Montenegrin nation. As in Macedonia, the next step will be to support these 
actions by creating the material heritage emphasizing the past as seen by the newly 
proscribed national narrative. Currently, the whole territory of Montenegro is covered 
by 22 museums.166 Of these, the most important is the complex in Cetinje, which 
celebrates the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty and Montenegrin sovereignty. Even though 
the Institute for the Protection of Monuments has existed since 1948, the only 
Montenegrin University in Podgorica still does not have an Archaeology Department, 
which will be needed in order to “unearth” the hidden heritage of the Montenegrin 
nation. So far, all the research undertaken during the Yugoslav era was conducted 
mainly by joint teams from other Yugoslav educational centres and abroad. As the 
Doclean narrative further develops, it is reasonable to expect the foundation of an 
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Archaeology Department within the University in the near future, with the main 
objective of uncovering the Montenegrin Doclean past.  
In the view of materialization of the new national narrative, the erection of 
public monuments and urbanization of towns that will carry out the message of the 
new national feelings is also to be expected. Since traditional Montenegro was not 
urbanized until the mid-20th century, those few representative buildings connected to 
the history of Montenegro that were all built in the four decades of rule of King 
Nikola, indicate more Nikola’s concern with his own comfort rather than his wish to 
make a statement in creating national public monuments and national style in 
architecture. There are, however, some indications that this is to begin changing soon. 
The reconstruction of Yugoslavia after the Second World War paid particular 
attention to the underdeveloped areas. Parallel with the enforced industrialization, the 
Montenegrin towns were being re-built in the proscribed social realism style without 
national characteristics. Montenegro, together with Macedonia, was the focus of these 
programmes.167 In order to emphasise its newly acquired independence and identity, 
the Montenegrin Ministry for Development and Economy with the financial support 
of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, published in 
2007 a guideline for the construction of new housing, with “an intention to 
demonstrate the beauty and value of Montenegro’s traditional architecture and to 
show how traditions can be converted into modern life-style and language without 
losing their regional characteristics and identity…..The purpose is to encourage the 
municipalities, the architects and the homebuilders, to view the samples and ideas 
that have been specified in the handbook and to support common efforts to develop 
Montenegro in respect of her past.”168 
As for public monuments, it appears that there is not an upsurge in erecting 
monuments in Montenegro yet. After the “Lovćen Vila”, erected in 1939, the only 
monuments erected in Montenegrin towns were modest memorials, most frequently in 
the shape of busts, dedicated to either some local Montenegrin artists or to the Second 
World War partisan heroes. The exception was a Monument to Ivan Crnojević, 
erected in 1983, celebrating the five hundredth anniversary of the foundation of 
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Cetinje (Fig. 6.27). Following the transfer of the remains of King Nikola to the Court 
Church in Cetinje in 1989, there were no monuments to the old king until 2005, when 
a 4m tall equestrian bronze statue facing the Parliament was erected in Podgorica 
(Fig. 6.28), on the same spot that housed the Podgorica Assembly in 1918 that voted 
for the unification.169 Placing the monument on the site that is now interpreted as “the 
beginning of the Serbian occupation of Montenegro” symbolically anticipated and 
celebrated the new independence. Explained as an attempt to commemorate the first 
Montenegrin Constitution, it ironically underplays the well-known fact about King 
Nikola’s scant enthusiasm for constitutionalism.170 A similar bronze statue of King 
Nikola, 9m tall, was erected in the central town of Nikšić in May 2006, celebrating 
the V.E. Day in Europe (Fig. 6.29).  
  
Fig. 6.27 – Monument to Ivan Crnojević, the founder of Cetinje, erected in 1983 on 500th anniversary 
of the town’s foundation. Work of the Kotor sculptor Ante Gržetić (1922-1995). 
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Fig. 6.28 – The monument to King Nikola, after design of Zadar sculptor Risto Radmilović (b. 1950), 
erected in 2005 in front of the Montenegrin Parliament 
 
 
Fig. 6.29 – The monument to King Nikola in Nikšić, erected in 2006. The equestrian statue alone is 5m 
tall, whilst the total height is 9m. 
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When in January 2012 the Serbian National Council of Montenegro requested 
permission from the City Council of Cetinje to re-erect the monument to King 
Alexander (Fig. 6.30),171 which was demolished by the Italian fascists in 1941, the 
municipality refused permission stating that “as there are no monuments to many 
glorious members of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty, it would be impossible to erect a 
monument to a Karadjordjević.”172  
 
Fig. 6.30 – The monument to King Aleksandar in Cetinje, erected in 1937, was work of Ivan 
Meštrović. Destroyed in 1941 by the Italian Fascists. 
 
This decision was very much in accordance with the Doclean narrative: all 
references to Serbia were to be minimised and, eventually, replaced by the official 
version of history of Montenegro based on the partial re-interpretation of one single 
source: The Chronicle of the Priest of Doclea. Since the Doclean narrative 
emphasizes the Catholic nature of St. John Vladimir, it is expected that the museums 
in coastal towns, together with their urban characteristics, will be further accentuated, 
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because of their Catholic heritage. Although the Serbian Orthodox Church celebrates 
not only the Nemanjić kings, but also St. Peter of Cetinje and St. John Vladimir, it 
would be no surprise the Montenegrin Orthodox Church to replace of Nemanjić saint-
kings with the Catholic saints of coastal towns in an attempt to give Montenegro a 
distinct Western characteristics behind the Orthodox façade. Similar steps are already 
taking place in Croatia, where a group of anonymous individuals petitioned for the re-
establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church, once in existence during the 
Independent State of Croatia, when was supported by the regime of Ante Pavelić.173 
There are some indications that the Montenegrin Orthodox Church supports this 
action, as announced in the Croatian media in 2010.174 These early actions indicate 
that the notion of Red Croatia as a euphemism for Montenegro, originally invented by 
Ante Starčević with aim to annihilate or reduce the Serbian Orthodoxy west of the 
River Drina and north of Skadar, would continue the traditional rivalry between the 
two branches of Christianity.  
For the proclamation of independence, the Montenegrin government received 
support from Muslim and Albanian political parties, but alienated the Montenegrin 
Serbs. The Muslim Slav community of Montenegro numbers around 12% of the 
overall population. Following the outcome of the wars of Yugoslav succession, there 
is an increased interest in Islamic culture and heritage. Seven out of 124 Montenegrin 
mosques were listed as heritage sites since the days of the Second Yugoslavia and are 
currently undergoing reconstruction. The plans for the construction of a new Mešihat 
(the top religious and administrative agency of the Muslim Community) and Bosniak 
Cultural Centre were revealed in January 2012.175 According to the Islamic 
Community of Montenegro at the end of the 20th and beginning of 21st century, 42 
new mosques were erected in Montenegro, celebrating the new “multicultural image” 
of Montenegro. In 2008 the first Madrassa opened in Podgorica.176 The Islamic 
Community of Montenegro also advocates closer links with Turkey and Bosnian 
Muslims.177 
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In March 2012, the government imposed a new Parliamentary Act which would 
sanction the unification of the two mutually exclusive Academies. Since the 
Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts disapproves the aims and methods of the 
Doclean Academy, it appears that the Act is aimed at ordering the former to accept the 
latter without the right to object.178 By securing a unified Academy, Serbian 
objections would be finally silenced. Amidst all these political activities that mirror 
those in Macedonia – enforced change of national consciousness, attempts to oust the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and the renewed growth of the influence of Islam – 
Montenegro, just like Macedonia, faces the possibility to become a dysfunctional or 
divided state and may well be reduced once again to its inaccessible core and reverted 
to the tribal society. 
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1. Some final remarks 
This study attempted to give a general overview about the changing nature of 
national narratives and national identities in the six Balkan countries. From the first 
national movement of the Serbs dating back to the first half of the 19th century to that 
of the Macedonians and Montenegrins which began in the second half of the 20th 
century, the focus was on the evolution and public display of the national narratives 
and national identities of Balkan nations. The representation of chronological 
developments of those narratives and identities through the key-heritage concepts was 
necessary as only through the comparison of nation-building processes was it possible 
to denote their mutual causality. Inevitably, this resulted in somewhat extended 
narrative on the historical background, but revealed in the process that conception and 
implementation of the nation-building processes in all observed states had been 
initiated from the political and ideological centres outside of their modern national 
cores. Furthermore, not only that the identification of the national myths and 
formulation of national narratives was influenced by the political and geo-strategic 
circumstances in the time of their conception (Serbs, Croats, Albanians, the Muslims 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina) but they were in some occasions produced directly by 
foreign intellectuals (Albanians, Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegrins).  
This study also attempted to denote that development of national identities from 
the appearance of nationalism in the Balkans in the 19th century until the end of the 
20th century was a political enterprise frequently undertaken by the external factors. 
As the geo-strategic interests in the Balkan changed, so did the national narratives. The 
results of these changes form the pathway for the future evolution of nationalism in 
the observed territory. In the early 21st century, there appears to prevail a growing 
mutual resentment rather than an honest attempt to reconcile the peoples and states – 
a direct consequence of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession in the last decade of the 20th 
century, so generously fuelled by external influence. As David Gibbs noted, “external 
intervention was one of the principal causes of the conflict” and “helped to trigger 
both the break-up of Yugoslavia and further intensify the war.”1 This assertion 
resonated well with the overwhelming support that some new states and nations “born” 
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out of Yugoslav ruin received from the West. Furthermore, Western scholars that 
actively participated in formulating new national narratives knowingly helped the 
revision of traditional historiography, not in the name of truth or justice, but for the 
aims and objectives of their own governing political elites. 
It is no coincidence that the upsurge of nationalism, followed by a decade of 
wars and political disturbances in Yugoslavia and Albania in the early 1990s, took 
place in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The fall of the Berlin Wall brought 
to a close the political balance established after the Second World War. As the societal 
model of the disintegrating Soviet Union withdrew to the East of Europe, its previous 
satellite states began the period of political transformations and adjustments to the 
advancing societal model arriving from the West of Europe in the same period. The 
re-unification of Germany directly influenced the reawakening of national feelings in 
all former communist states and the re-assertion of the question of self-determination. 
In most cases, the democracy re-introduced in the former communist states was based 
on the Western principle of a civil society.2 However, while the majority of the former 
Warsaw Pact states began their transformation from the inherited state structure 
modelled on Soviet political and economic principles, the two states of the Western 
Balkans, Yugoslavia and Albania, posed immediate obstacles for the projected 
transition from communist to capitalist states. 
Even though the formation of the nations in Central and Eastern Europe during 
the 19th century, based on the ethnic and linguistic principles of the Romantic and post-
Romantic periods, significantly differed from the creation of West European nations, 
the introduction of the modern Western-style nation-state based on a civic society was 
relatively easy because those states consisted of predominantly homogeneous ethnic 
territories. These modern Western values served as a basis for the re-interpreted 
national narratives which sought to re-assert the “old democratic values” that existed 
in those states and societies prior to their subjugation to the Soviet Union. In their 
search for the new freedom, which would be achieved by inclusion into the European 
Union, national histories were re-modelled for new use. This was most obvious in the 
valuation of less desirable events of recent history, particularly that of the 20th century. 
The inconvenient notions of Fascism, Nazism and Communism, three main ideologies 
that plagued some of the societies of those “newly freed” European states were 
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presented as understandable historical circumstances, although detrimental to the 
statehood. However, this was not an easy task in Yugoslavia or Albania for several 
societal anomalies existed within these two states.  
Yugoslavia as a communist state presented a special case during the Cold War 
era. After the 1948 split with Stalin, the CPY led by Josip Broz Tito (Fig. 1.a.20) 
introduced a special economic model that enabled participation of the social market 
economy in the Western framework of international trade.3 Having a heterogeneous 
population with three dominant religions of Orthodox and Catholic Christianity and 
Suni Islam, with a different historical past as subjects of the former Habsburg and 
Ottoman empires, Yugoslav unity could be only maintained through rapid economic 
growth and the state imposed doctrine of “brotherhood and unity.” By the 1980s, 
Yugoslavia enjoyed the privilege of free flow of goods and people across its territory, 
as well as a relative growth of the standard of living and an increase in population. But 
economic progress was uneven in different parts of the country because of the various 
stages of economic development inherited from the past and varying degrees of 
infrastructural damage that occurred during the Second World War.  
The federal state structure, over the decades up to 1990, devolved much of the 
political and economic power to federal units, leaving the only unifying factors the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) and a common 
currency. This contributed to the growing divide between the richer northern and 
poorer southern parts of Yugoslavia. There were only six common ministries in 
Belgrade, none of which dealt with the economy. From its beginning, Communist 
Yugoslavia was orientated to reducing the Serbian influence in the federal government. 
This devolved political power had an impact on the economy, politics, education, 
religion and national reconciliation. The educational system was under the authorities 
of the republics and provincial governments, thus preventing the development of 
common school textbooks. Despite the official doctrine of Brotherhood and Unity 
between the Yugoslav ethnic groups, the interpretation of national histories was purged 
of all existing inter-ethnic tensions.4 This systemic weakness of the federal state, which 
did not undergo the process of national reconciliation after 1945, hid the grievances 
surviving the two world wars between the Yugoslav nations and ethnic groups, easily 
exploited when the disintegration of the state began. Even though religion was not 
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officially banned, the mutual distrust of the three religious communities persevered 
throughout the existence of Yugoslavia. 
Albania, on the other hand, after initial adherence to the Soviet Union and China, 
went into self-imposed isolation under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha (Fig. 1.a.23), 
the regime’s control over the state being even harsher than in the Soviet Union. The 
legal profession was simply abolished, the industrial production heavily centralised, 
financial transactions under the strict control of government, while private agriculture 
and possession of livestock were banned causing long lasting food shortages until the 
late 1980s.5 Even though ethnically homogeneous, Albania was predominantly 
Muslim, with only pockets of Orthodox and Catholic population in the far north and 
far south of the state. All religions were officially banned in 1967, thus imposing a 
rigorous atheism which enabled the state-controlled educational programmes to 
enforce loyalty to the state in order to achieve national unity against the foreign 
“Other.”6 Its national narrative introduced after 1945 served the exclusive purpose of 
raising awareness of belonging to a uniquely Albanian nation and state, which could 
rely only on its own instinct for survival.  
Therefore, neither of the two states was sufficiently prepared for the new upsurge 
of nationalism that occurred in Europe in the 1980s. The open Yugoslavia with its 
population disunited along religious, historical, economic and administrative lines 
could not withstand neither internal nor even stronger external forces that sought its 
disintegration. The closed Albania with its population living under the induced 
paranoid distrust of anything foreign was not prepared to easily embrace the new ideas 
of globalization, imposed by the Western advance to the former communist East.  
In its haste to take control over the territories formerly controlled by now defunct 
Soviet Union, the West did not take into consideration the specificities of the two 
countries, condemning the region to two decades of catastrophic war, ethnic tensions 
and economic decline. Indeed, the dominant picture of the Balkans as the “alien Other” 
that was created in the late 19th and lasted throughout the entire 20th century, was 
particularly emphasized from the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia. The 
extremely complicated ethnic structure of the Western Balkans that were covered by 
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the territories of Yugoslavia and Albania was not thought through when new states 
were hastily recognized by the West. The Wilsonian principle of self-determination, 
as first defined after the First World War, was undermined by the interpretation that 
state borders, even those that did not exist as internationally recognized previously, 
were to take precedence over the wish of ethnic communities within those borders.7 In 
their enthusiasm for the free “New Europe” in the early 1990s, the “old” powers of 
Europe, France and the United Kingdom, allowed the newly unified Germany to re-
assert political and economic dominance over the countries of the former Eastern Bloc 
and, subsequently, to support those West Balkan nations that traditionally sided with 
German political goals. As the collapse of the Soviet Union and wars outside Europe 
led by the US and NATO took precedence over the situation on the continent, the 
Balkan crisis was handled without understanding of the situation on the ground and 
with even less respect for historical inheritance.  
Because the Serbs were the single largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia, with 
dominant positions in the JNA with its constitutional role to defend the federal state, 
Germany first, and later other West European countries and the United States, 
immediately established the image of “Red Serbia,” which was continually reinforced 
and emphasised by the media.8 The tendency to scapegoat Serbia and the Serbs in order 
to facilitate intervention continued unhindered throughout the 1990s and 2000s. This 
resulted in the external re-evaluation of the history of the entire region, which served 
the purpose of easing the tensions that existed between the former Second World War 
Allies and Germany. In condemning the Balkans and Serbia in particular for the failure 
of a quick transition, Western Europe, now in the form of the European Union, sought 
to whitewash its own political mistakes by transferring the guilt primarily to the Serbs 
and largely neglecting the roles of others. As a result, the beginning of the 21st century 
in the West Balkans, despite appearing to have brought peace and re-consolidation, in 
reality features a large Potemkin village, built to impress the political establishment in 
major European capitals and in the US.  
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1.1 The future of Serbia – Punishment and de-Nazification 
The change of regime in 2000 and the subsequent transitional period which 
witnessed the departure of Montenegro and Kosovo and Metohija, with further 
possibilities of the secession of Vojvodina and Raška county, prevented Serbia from 
making any attempt at nation-building in the near future. The post-Milošević pro-
European governments so far had little influence on the decision-making process both 
in Serbia and in the region. Because of the Western requirement to disassociate from 
the Milošević period, any programme of nation-building has been discontinued. 
Admittedly, the symbols of the communist period were removed from public display 
in the early 1990s, but no replacements were installed. The 200th anniversary of the 
First Serbian Rebellion was celebrated on a small scale in 2004 and there was no 
appropriate media coverage. No significant new monuments were built since the 
1980s, with the exception of several small ones commemorating the victims of the 
1991-1999 wars. Similarly, the infrastructure and buildings destroyed in 1999 are still 
not rebuilt and economic hardship continues. The majority of museums, including the 
National Museum, have either closed to the public or work with limited resources since 
the 1990s. There are some attempts to begin urban reconstruction on the dilapidated 
19th century architecture in Belgrade and a few other towns, but these did not pass 
beyond the planning process. The only building taking place at the moment is sporadic 
and ad hoc and some new Le Corbusier visiting Belgrade today would probably have 
a similar comment to that of his 1911 predecessor.  
However, the most notable activity regarding Serbian nation-(re)building 
process is the continuation of the traditional conflict between the Serbian and Croat 
scholars that began in the 1920s. Overwhelmingly helped from abroad, it culminated 
in the last twenty-five years. Similar conflicts exist between the Serbian and Muslim 
historians and there is total absence of discourse with the Albanian colleagues. The 
emerging Montenegrin new history and the resurrection of the Bulgarian grievances 
in relation to Macedonia and southeast Serbia is likely to increase in the following 
decade.9 The Western revision of Serbian history of the 19th and 20th century was being 
firmly contested as the political enterprise in the light of the 1990s. Because the SANU 
was and still is largely marginalized from directing the course of national development, 
this work was taken over and paid for mostly by the governmental sector from 
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Germany and the United States. However, the recently resumed works on the St.Sava 
Cathedral, and the beginning of the conservation of several mediaeval monasteries, 
destroyed during Kosovo and Metohija’s secession, both financed by Russia, suggest 
potential new developments. 
1.2 Clean Croatia  
Because Croatia was never internationally condemned for its role in the wars of 
Yugoslav dissolution, the presentation of the revised Croat national historic narrative 
cleared from chauvinism and genocide committed during the Second World War led 
to a considerable academic effort both in Croatia and, more significantly, abroad. 
Warning that building a nation-state on the mythologized past and revisionism may be 
detrimental to democracy appear not to have concerned the political elites in European 
capitals when they approved Croatian membership to the European Union in July 
2013. Eric Hobsbawm was particularly critical of this European and Croat practice of 
clearing the less desirable events from national history by means of identity history: 
“…The identity history that has developed in the past 30-40 years is much nastier and 
largely amounts to identity mythology in which nationalism or ethnic is the most 
dangerous politically. In fact, we have had some of the worst political results being 
won by people who’ve taken over new countries as professional historians as in 
Georgia and Croatia where they have tried to impose a mythological view…”10 
Despite warnings, the West supported the Croat proclamation of independence and 
remained silent on the public outcry of Zagreb political elites which continued 
presenting the Croat part of responsibility for wars in Former Yugoslavia as a just 
cause which brought to the final liberation of the state from its enemies.  
This public outcry of Croat elites enabled the rebranding of controversial 
individuals from Croat history as patriotic. Ante Starčević became again “the Father 
of the Nation” and in 1992 a state-medal bearing his name was established to honour 
those individuals who contribute to the development and sustainability of the Croat 
state-idea by maintaining Croat statehood and building a sovereign Croat state. In the 
same year, a new Institute for Social Sciences named after Ivo Pilar was established 
within the University of Zagreb. One of the many projects of the institute is to promote 
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Croat history and national narrative as officially sanctioned by the state. Ever since, 
the Institute “Ivo Pilar” has developed a network of branches in all major Croat towns, 
followed by regular publications of the periodical “Pilar.”11 
The 1990 Croat constitution declared Latin as the only official script in Croatia 
and began withdrawing books in Cyrillic from public libraries. According to Antun 
Lešaja, the authorities have ordered the withdrawal, burning and shredding of nearly 
2,8 million Cyrillic books during the 1990s.12 At the same time, the words in the 
Croatian language that sounded too “Serbian” were replaced by neologisms, which 
was received with a certain level of amusement in both Serbia and abroad.13 However, 
the picture of democratic Croatia required some Constitutional readjustments to the 
European laws, which would give certain cultural rights to the remaining Serbs. In 
January of 2013, the Croatian government under pressure from the EU agreed to re-
introduce the Cyrillic alphabet in Vukovar and some other towns in Croatia which still 
have a considerable Serbian population. However, this move was not received well 
among local Croats, who immediately began a campaign of violence against the use 
of Cyrillic in Croatia.14  
The controversial Cardinal Alojz Stepinac was beatified by the Pope in 1998. 
This move, seen as an insult by the survivors of Jasenovac and other concentration 
camps in the NDH, was not well received by the Serbian Orthodox Church. The 
sanctification announced in 2014 was postponed and the meetings with the 
representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church initiated. Presently, there are no 
indications whether the process will be continued. 
Other formal EU requirements regarding the position and the property of the 
Serbs remain mostly ignored and it appears that Croatia, after becoming an EU 
member, can finally enjoy the status of a purely Croat nation-state, free of Serbs. 
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1.3 Towards “Natural Albania” 
Following the Western intervention in Kosovo and Metohija which resulted in 
the self-proclaimed independence in 2008 and Albanian admittance to NATO in 2009, 
the Albanian nationalism appears to be ascending towards its main goal: the unification 
of all Albanians in one common state. With the support of those states that have 
interests in creating an enlarged Albania, the future will almost certainly see an 
increase of publications related to the historical development of Albanian national 
narrative and heritage studies, all along the lines of the main premises initiated in the 
late 1990s.15 The term “Natural Albania” referring to all territories inhabited by the 
ethnic Albanians was introduced by the Albanian historian Koço Danaj in November 
2014. As such, it was seen as a euphemism for the term “Greater Albania” by all 
neighbouring countries, but not the West.16 
With the support of the EU and the US, Kosovo and Metohija, as another 
Albanian state, unilaterally proclaimed independence on 17 February 2008. So far, 
nearly half of the world’s countries recognized this act. The independence gave an 
additional impetus to Albanian national and territorial claims. This trend was justified 
by the national narrative devised by the predominantly British, American and German 
scholars and accepted by the Albanian academics in the 1990s. The narrative was 
followed by a number of the newly erected monuments in Albania, Kosovo and 
Metohija and western Macedonia dedicated to the prominent personalities who 
influenced contemporary Albanian history.  
In May 2012, marking the beginning of celebration of the centenary of the 
creation of an independent Albania, a common primary school textbook for Albania 
and Kosovo and Metohija was symbolically introduced in Prizren, the town in Kosovo 
and Metohija where the Prizren League was formed in 1878.17 The Prime Ministers of 
both Albanian states were present and stressed the “undying ideal of all Albanians to 
unite…wherever they live.”18  
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The neighbouring countries, unsurprisingly, do not welcome these activities, 
particularly in Serbia and Macedonia, and to a lesser extent from Greece.19 Thus, all 
the activities related to the transformation of Albanian national myth should be 
observed as the activities leading to the creation of enlarged Albania, which is expected 
to happen in the foreseeable future.  
1.4 Macedonian House of Cards 
All efforts of the government in Skopje to assert the Macedonian nationhood, 
mostly expressed through the grandiose building programmes of re-modelling Skopje 
into a Neo-Classical city in the heart of the Balkans, were met with laughter among 
the intellectuals both abroad (not only among the neighbours) and within the 
republic.20 Macedonian nation-building process is, therefore, based exclusively on 
narratives invented in the 20th century without the confirmation in real material 
evidence. Unlike the Albanian national re-assertion of the 1990s, which was 
strengthened by the language distinctiveness and the open Western support, the 
Macedonians face more threat than support from both their neighbours and the 
international community. Bulgaria is the main identity threat to the extent that identity 
is anchored in the language; Serbia is the main identity threat to the extent that identity 
is anchored in religion; Greece is the main identity threat to the extent of usage of the 
name of the nation, language and state and Albania is the main identity threat to its 
statehood.21 If the situation remains as it is now, the future might see two options for 
Macedonia: the country will either be divided between Albania and Bulgaria, along 
the 1941 line; or it will join the Serbian-Greek alliance, which might not want an 
independent state between them.22 
1.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina – An Impossible State? 
The existence of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with 
predominantly Muslim and Croat population and Republika Srpska with the Serbian 
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majority, reveals deep divisions in modern Bosnia and Herzegovina. The inability or 
unwillingness of the EU and US to help solving the inter-ethnic, inter-religious and 
economic problems stems directly from the ambiguous nature of their involvement in 
the region. The Serbian refusal to accept the imposed qualification that they were the 
only guilty party during the 1990s wars, prevents any serious attempt to participate in 
the life of the Federation. On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims, supported by many 
Islamic countries, accuse the West of maintaining an essentially anti-Islamic attitude 
towards them.23 The divided state institutions in the two entities show no signs of 
creating an atmosphere which would enable an open academic discourse that would 
eventually lead to reconciliation. This is most obvious in the way these institutions 
officially address the questions of common history and heritage which suffered 
significantly during the hostilities. After the war, both entities produced compilations 
of listed heritage, as well as the lists of endangered heritage in their territories. The 
language used in the official presentations of the highest academic and cultural 
institutions is very much in accordance with the adopted national narratives; the 
highest cultural institutions of the Federation interpret the Muslims and Croats as 
“victims of Serbian aggression and genocide,” whilst the corresponding institutions of 
Republika Srpska refer to the position of the Serbs as the Muslim-Croat attempt “to 
oust the Serbs from their ancestral homes.”24 Interestingly enough, the Academy of 
Sciences and Arts in Sarajevo and its Banja Luka counterpart do not mention the events 
of the 1990s and do not contain any information of their historical institutional 
development except for the year when they were first established.25 
The internal divisions and neo-colonial foreign rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
prevent any sincere return of peaceful co-existence. However, as all former Yugoslav 
countries were forced by the EU to mutually cooperate, despite the deep divisions 
within Bosnia and Herzegovina itself and disagreements between Serbia and Croatia, 
a small improvement appeared in 2009. Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina announced a project titled A Bridge towards a Common Future, calling 
for their joint application to enlist the stećci tombstones on the UNESCO Heritage 
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List. The international community may seize this opportunity to explain this project as 
evidence of its “painstaking efforts to reconstruct multiculturalism.” However, the 
current existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, perceived as some sort of “small 
Yugoslavia,” only without the ideologies of the “Integral Yugoslavism” or 
“brotherhood and unity” will prove unsustainable in the long run, because neither side 
wants to compromise. Two decades after the war, “the peace and state system look 
more enforced than desired by the local sides and will probably last as long as 
sufficient foreign enforcement lasts. There is a great uncertainty what will happen 
afterwards.”26 One thing is evident: von Kállay’s efforts to rule Bosnia and 
Herzegovina through the invention of new nations finally succeeded, albeit with more 
than a century of delay. 
1.6 Montenegro Grande 
The greatest problem for Montenegro is its ambiguous position in relation to 
Serbia. As around 264,000 native Montenegrins living in Serbia were not allowed to 
vote in the 2006 referendum, the independence was decided with approximately 
50,000 votes in favour of separation. This left those who still regard themselves 
unequivocally Serbian, that is, nearly a third of the population of Montenegro 
according to the last census, deeply dissatisfied.27 The government in Podgorica 
currently relies on financial support from the West and political approval from the 
Muslim and Albanian national parties. All these will disappear the moment the anti-
Serbian narrative changes.  
The pressure from the West resulted in Montenegro’s recognition of the 
unilaterally proclaimed independence of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and 
Metohija in 2008. This political move loosened even more the traditional ties with 
Serbia. As the renewed calls for Albanian autonomy in Macedonia and Montenegro 
grow,28 there is a certain discontent among the Orthodox population in Montenegro. 
In May 2012, the Prime Ministers of both Albanian states called for the unification of 
all Albanians, which was giving impetus to the growing discontent of nearly 30,500 
Albanians demanding their rights.29 The silence of the Montenegrin political elites 
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regarding the open call for Albanian separation and its loud anti-Serbianism indicate 
that there will be some dynamic and interesting times ahead. 
2. Possible outcomes 
Because the external factors which influenced the region resulted in significant 
damage to inter-ethnic and inter-religious relationships, the recent academic tendency 
to conclude any scholarly work related to the West Balkan nationalism and nation-
building processes in optimistic tones, have no place in this study. The reason for that 
is that the satatus quo created in the early 2000s will eventually prove unsustainable 
over la longue durée. This argument draws directly from the above indicated current 
practice of nation-building that could be observed in the analysed Balkan states. 
Because the national narratives adopted by the new states and nations in the 1990s rely 
on the partial interpretation of the surviving historical evidence frequently imposed 
from outside the region, the applied methods of primordialistic-perennialist approach 
to the building of the new national identities could prove dangerous. Smith pointed out 
that the practice of imposing “retrospective nationalism onto communities and 
cultures, whose identities and loyalties are local, regional and religious, but barely 
national” may lead to some future intra-ethnic conflicts.30 In other words, as the 
interests and hegemony of the modern Great Powers of Europe and the world change, 
so the direction of ethnic, national and religious affiliations of the fragmented West 
Balkan population will. Because geo-strategic interests of the dominant world powers 
are subject to little change, maintaining certain degrees of tense relationships in the 
region could prove advantageous. At present, none of the major world powers, despite 
their rhetoric, shows a willingness to support re-conciliation and re-consolidation in 
the region. This makes the possibility of inter-ethnic and inter-state violence highly 
likely to resume in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
  
 
                                                            
30
 Smith, 1999, 5 
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1. Short history of West Balkans 
The traditional assertion that the Balkans represent the cradle of European civilization 
is not just a myth coined during the birth of nationalism in the 19th century. The earliest 
European settled culture with clearly defined religious forms and use of prehistoric 
architecture for habitat developed between 6,400 and 5,400 BC during the late 
Mesolithic period. Known as the culture of Lepenski Vir, it was situated along the 
riverbanks of the Danube, in the vicinity of the Djerdap Gorge. (Map 1.a.1).1 
Numerous anthropomorphic monumental stone sculptures combining human and fish 
features, discovered either within or at the entrance of houses, represent one of the 
earliest form of prehistoric art in Europe (Fig. 1.a.1). 
        
Map 1.a.1 – Lepenski Vir culture, the transition between      Fig. 1.a.1 – The earliest monumental  
the Mesolithic and Neolithic periods, traditionally dated       sculpture of Lepenski Vir, dated cca. 
6,400-5,500 BC                                                                       6,400 BC            
 
Around 5,400, when the Lepenski Vir culture was reaching its final phase, an 
early Neolithic culture of Starčevo developed between 5,700 and 4,500 BC.2 Starčevo 
culture covered a much larger region that included parts of modern-day Serbia, 
Romania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria (Map 1.a.2). This culture was 
gradually replaced by a fully developed Neolithic culture of Vinča,3 which lasted 
                                                            
1
 Борић, Д. И Димитријевић, В. – Апсолутна хронологија и стратиграфија Лепенског Вира, 
Београд, Старинар, LVII, 2007, 9 – Borić, D. and Dimitrijević, V. – Absolute Chronology and 
Stratigraphy of Lepenski Vir, Belgrade, Старинар, LVII, 2007, 9 
2
 Срејовић, Д. – Културе млађег каменог доба на тлу Србије, Историја српског народа I, Српска 
књижевна задруга, Београд, 1994, available at http://www.rastko.rs/arheologija/srejovic/dsrejovic-
neolit_c.html - accessed on 03/11/2014 
3
 In Hungary it is known as Turdaș culture or Turdaș-Vinča culture. Vinča is a village in the vicinity of 
Belgrade and, according to late Prof. D. Srejović, is the largest and best examined Neolithic settlement 
in Europe. See his posthumously published work Искуства прошлости (Experiences of the Past), 
Belgrade, 2000 – a collection of essays on his lifelong work on pre-historic and Roman sites in Former 
Yugoslavia. 
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between 4,500 and 3,200 BC (Map 1.a.3). Vinča culture was characterized by a 
sophisticated architecture and ornamental artwork. At its zenith, around 3,800 BC, 
Vinča people built large wooden and clay houses with several rooms and inbuilt 
hearths. A number of discovered anthropomorphic votive clay figurines represent a 
diverse range of both male and female deities (Fig. 1.a.2).4                                
           
Map 1.a.2 – The area of Starčevo culture which de-      Map 1.a.3 – Approximate area of Vinča culture 
veloped between 5,700 and 4,500 BC.                           that developed between 4,500 and 3,200 BC.               
 
  
Fig. 1.a.2 – The Lady of Vinča, excavated in 1929 by M. Vasić, the discoverer of Vinča in 1908. 
 
Archaeology so far adhered to the theory that the Neolithic cultures in the 
Balkans, especially from the 5th millennium BC which coincided with the appearance 
of Vinča culture, migrated from Anatolia and other Asia Minor areas.5 However, the 
evidence suggests that variations of Neolithic cultures with Vinča as its key-
                                                            
4
 Срејовић, Д. – Културе млађег каменог доба на тлу Србије, Историја српског народа I, 
Српска књижевна задруга, Београд, 1994, available at 
http://www.rastko.rs/arheologija/srejovic/dsrejovic-neolit_c.html - accessed on 03/11/2014 
5
 Ibid 
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representative, which existed dispersed all over the Balkans, were actually a product 
of the mixing of populations from both Europe and Asia Minor. Nevertheless, the 
collapse of the Vinča culture and its variations coincided with the beginning of the 
Bronze Age, when various Indo-European people migrated to the Balkans and 
produced the early Aegean and Mediterranean civilizations. It is impossible to 
establish the scale of migrations that took place between 3,200 and 1,600 BC, but the 
evidence suggests that the Balkan hinterland was where cultures of the Aegean 
civilizations influenced migrants from the central Ukrainian plain.6  
The Bronze Age in the Balkans witnessed the appearance of some of the first 
Indo-European tribes with historically recorded names: the Illyrians, Thracians, 
Dardanians and Greeks. It is mostly accepted that the expansion of Indo-Europeans 
between 1,600 and 1,200 BC was created by migratory waves which resulted in the 
destruction of the Mycenaean civilization in the Aegean around 1,200 BC and the 
beginning of the Greek civilization. Dorians, Achaeans and Ionians settled in the south 
of the peninsula and Asia Minor and began the development of Greek culture along 
the Aegean coast.  
1.1 The Illyrians 
The Illyrians and the Thracians7 which, following the Greek migration, settled 
in the north of the Balkans mixed with the remnants of the autochthonous population 
and among themselves. Neither of them succeeded in forming any lasting political 
entity until the 5th-4th centuries BC. As no Illyrian or Thracian languages have ever 
been recorded, everything that is known of these peoples comes from Ancient Greek 
sources and modern archaeological research. The earliest mention of the Illyrians was 
by a geographer Periplus of Pseudo-Scylax in the 4th century BC.8 However, he did 
not record either their origins or their customs. After him, several other ancient authors 
referred to the Illyrians as the “barbarian other,” but none of them could provide a 
                                                            
6
 Срејовић, Д. – Кад смо били средипте света, Искуства прошлости, Београд, 2000 – available at 
http://www.rastko.rs/arheologija/srejovic/dsrejovic-srediste_c.html - Accessed on 04/11/2014 - 
Srejović supports this theory through the analysis of graves discovered in the village of Vatin (near the 
present day Serbian-Romanian border), the post-Vinča Bronze Age culture that lasted until the invasion 
of the Dorians and appearance of the Illyrians in the Balkans. The remains contained the Mycenaean 
artefacts and some Mycenaean rituals.  
7
 The Thracians lived mainly in the Eastern Balkans, covering the territory of modern-day Bulgaria and 
Serbia, east of the Great Morava. Similar to the Illyirians, they formed several short-lasting kingdoms, 
but were eventually subdued by the Romans. They were gifted artisans and craftsmen. As the Eastern 
Balkans are excluded from this study, so is the Thracian timeline. 
8
 Wilkes, J. – The Illyrians, Oxford, 1995, 6. 
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satisfactory general explanation for the origins of the Illyrians. The archaeological and 
linguistic evidence uncovered during the 20th century showing significant regional 
differences in the production of various implements over the course of two millennia, 
imply that the population of the Western Balkans, known to Greek and Roman writers 
as the Illyrians, was anything but a homogenous ethnic group.9  
The demarcation of Illyrian territory starts on the coast of central Albania, 
follows the line of the Shkumbini River10 and passes into what is now western 
Macedonia from the Ohrid and Prespa lakes going northwards parallel with the Vardar 
River to Skopje. From there it continues north and follows the Morava valley almost 
in a straight line to the vicinity of Belgrade on the Danube. All the land west of this 
line to the Adriatic coast are generally accepted to be inhabited by various Illyrian 
tribes, whilst its northern borders reach the valleys of the Sava and Drava, extending 
to Lake Balaton in Hungary, from where it curves south of the Julian Alps to meet the 
Adriatic in Istria. Finally, the Calabrian and Apulian districts are also included in the 
Illyrian ethnic map (Map 1.a.4).11  
 
Map 1.a.4 – Illyrian territory in the Balkans within boundaries marked red. Wilkes after Russu, 1969, 
reproduced from Wilkes, 1996, xx – Red demarcation lines done by the author.  
                                                            
9
 Ibid, 38 
10
 This line, interestingly, corresponds to a linguistic boundary between the Northern (Ghegs) and the 
Southern (Tosks) dialects of the Albanian language 
11
 Wilkes, 1995, 68 
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The archaeological evidence from such a vast territory, ranges from the period 
of the Early Bronze Age (1900/1800BC – 1600/1500BC) up to Roman times (2nd 
century BC – 7th century AD). As mentioned above, by the late 5th century BC, the 
first Illyrian kingdoms were formed on the edges of the Greek world, centred in and 
around early, proto-urban settlements enclosed by stone fortifications.12 These began 
to develop at the southernmost territories of the Illyrian world bordering the Greeks, 
probably as a consequence of external threat, rather than a genuine evolution of the 
society towards more complex communal living.13 There were no such developments 
in the north.14 However, by far the largest quantity of material evidence for these early, 
“historical,” Illyrians was discovered in the north-west of the Illyrian world – in the 
northern Adriatic, Istrian peninsula, Slovenia and modern western Croatia.15 
From the mid-3rd century BC there are Greek reports of a political order among 
the Illyrians. These were mainly centred on the southern Illyrian lands, organized in 
smaller kingdoms, as well as on the Kingdom of Epirus (330-231 BC), where a 
variation of Greek language was spoken and Greek deities celebrated. All epigraphic 
evidence that is even vaguely related to the Illyrians comes from this area and was 
written exclusively in the Greek alphabet. Greek writings and symbols on coins minted 
in the Illyrian lands and the Kingdom of Epirus, also suggest strong Greek influence 
on the bordering Illyrian lands from the 4th century BC.16 From the archaeological 
evidence it is difficult to establish the nature of the ethnic relationships between the 
southern Illyrians, especially the Epirotes, and the Greeks. Thucydedes and Strabo 
considered the Epirotes to be barbarians. On the other hand, Dyonisius of 
Halicarnassus and Pausanias maintained them to be Greek. This difference of opinion 
survived to the present: modern Albanian scholars define the Epirotes as Illyrians; for 
their Greek counterparts, the Epirotes are unquestionably Greek.  
Greek influence in the southern Illyrian lands was certainly significant. For 
around a century, between the 5th and 4th century BC, Illyrian kingdoms represented 
no threat to the rise of the Greek and Macedonian power. No Greek writer is known to 
have ever made any serious study of the Illyrians, and it is difficult to make any 
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comparison with the much better recorded kingdom of Macedonia that rose to power 
from the 5th century.17  
By the end of the reign of Alexander the Great (336-323 BC), the Illyrians 
bordering Macedonia and the coastal area of the Adriatic received some Hellenistic 
influence. They were both warring and allying themselves with the Macedonians until 
the clash with the rising Roman state began in the 3rd century BC. Eventually, the 
Romans conquered both the Macedonian Kingdom and the Illyrian Dalmatians ruled 
by King Gentius (181-168 BC) in 168 BC. The Illyrian lands were turned into Roman 
provinces, thus beginning a long process of Romanization. During the reign of the first 
Roman Emperor Augustus (27 BC-14 AD), the last Illyrian warfare took place in the 
Balkans in 8-9 AD. After that, the Illyrian name survived only as the name of the 
Roman province, albeit with changeable borders.  
1.2 The Macedonians 
The period between the settlement of the Greek tribes and the appearance of the 
first Greek states (1,200 BC – 800 BC) is usually referred to as the Greek Dark Ages. 
Dictated by geography, the Greeks lived in the small city-states, polies, self-governed 
and often ruled by a small aristocratic class. Following the war between the Illyrian 
and Trhracian tribes in the 7th century BC, the vicinity of Aegae, near the coast of the 
Thermaic Gulf, was conquered by the Greeks who, according to the legend, fled from 
Argos in the Peloponnese and established in Aegae the first capital of the Kingdom of 
Macedon around 650 BC. Herodotus recorded this founding myth of the Macedonians 
as Greeks through the anecdote in which King Alexander I (498-454 BC), in order to 
compete in the Olympic Games, declared himself a Greek.18 Until the 4th century BC, 
the small kingdom occupied western parts of the modern-day Greek province of 
Macedonia and had little in common with the splendour of the Classical Greek world. 
When Philip II (359-336 BC) ascended to the throne (Fig. 1.a.3), Macedonia began a 
rapid expansion. Through a series of defeats of the Illyrians in the north and treaties 
with the neighbouring Epiros, Philip secured his northern borders. This enabled him 
to become involved in the politics of the central and southern Greek city-states and 
become a hegemon in the Greek world.  
                                                            
17
 Ibid, 167 
18
 This anecdote recorded by Herodotus will become a main flash-point between the Greek scholars and 
the creators of modern Macedonian nation. See Chapter IV – The Macedonians, p. 342-344. 
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Fig. 1.a.3 – Philip II (359-336 BC)                     Fig. 1.a.4 – Alexander the Great (336-323 BC)  
Philip’s son Alexander the Great (336-323 BC) continued his father’s 
expansionist policy and quickly conquered not only the rest of Greece, but also Persia 
and Egypt, creating and promoting in the process Hellenism, a fusion of Greek and 
Eastern cultures (Fig. 1.a.4). After Alexander’s death in 323 BC, his vast empire 
quickly disintegrated, partitioned among his generals. Macedonia was first under the 
Antipatrid followed by the Antigonid dynasties which entered into a period of civil 
wars and instability. Despite being still a dominant power in the Balkans, Macedonia 
eventually declined. By the 2nd century BC Macedonian kings presented no significant 
opposition to the rising power of the Roman Republic. In 168 BC, the Battle of Pydna 
marked the end of the Macedonian kingdom and firmly established Rome as the 
masters of the southern Balkans. 
1.3 Under the Roman rule 
The Romans were naturally more interested in the rich Greek lands with its 
sailing and merchant network rather than the “barbaric” Illyrians and Thracians. 
However, securing the trade routes required subjugating the population of the Balkan 
hinterland. After the fall of Macedonia and Epirus in the 2nd century BC, the Romans 
began slow penetration in the Illyrian lands north of the Neretva River. Their first 
conquests were in Dalmatia, where they increased their influence by settling veterans 
along the coast and giving various privileges to the fortified coastal cities.19 By the 
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time of Augustus, the Roman province of Illyricum, incorporating most of modern-
day Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, bordering the Sava River in the north and 
Drina in the west, was established. The coastal city of Salona20 served as the provincial 
capital. It survived, with significant modifications in size and borders, until the end of 
the Roman Empire.  
The Central Balkans, important for exploiting its rich mines and timber 
transported along the network of newly built roads, were incorporated into Moesia 
Superior, a province named after the dominant Thraco-Illyrian tribe that lived there 
prior to the conquest.21 It consisted of much of modern-day Serbia, northern 
Macedonia and eastern Bulgaria, bordering the Sava and Danube in the north and 
Drina in the east. Its principal cities were Singidunum22 and Viminacium.23 The 
Roman limes was for a long time stable on the right banks of the Sava and Danube 
rivers. From the late 1st century AD the Romans led incursions into the Dacian 
territories across the Danube, conquering much of the Pannonian plain which was, at 
the height of the Roman Empire, part of the Empire as the provinces of Pannonia 
Superior (which incorporated parts of Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia 
Proper, Slavonia and Bosnia) and Pannonia Inferior (which incorporated parts of 
Hungary, Slavonia and Serbia). Its principal towns were Siscia24 and Sirmium,25 
respectively. As the Empire changed, so did the provincial borders and territories.  
Between the 1st and 3rd centuries, Roman rule brought a period of stability and 
prosperity, which accelerated the process of Romanization. Army veterans were 
awarded land both on the coast and inland. Alongside the two principal roads Via 
Militaris and Via Egnatia and key strategic locations, Roman towns were built, 
sometimes on the foundations of older settlements, with typical Roman urban features 
– a perpendicular street grid, forum(s) surrounded by temples and other public 
buildings. Roman towns in the Western Balkans resembled those elsewhere in the 
                                                            
20
 Modern Solin in the Republic of Croatia. 
21
 The most important inland route in the northern and central Balkans was Via Militaris which ran 
alongside wide river valleys of Morava and Vardar. 
22
 Modern Belgrade. 
23
 Modern Kostolac in the Republic of Serbia. 
24
 Modern Sisak in the Republic of Croatia. 
25
 Modern Sremska Mitrovica in Vojvodina, northern part of the Republic of Serbia. 
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Empire. The exceptions were, of course, larger towns which often had an amphitheatre 
and a circus, such was the case in Pola (Fig. 1.a.5),26 Viminacium or Stobi.27 
 
Fig. 1.a.5 – Amphitheatre in Pula, built in 27 BC-68 AD. 
The Roman rule relied on the cities and their control of the neighbourhood, but 
the degrees of Romanization varied, especially in areas where Greek language and 
culture remained dominant. Archaeological evidence suggests that there was a visible 
demarcation line dividing Greek and Roman influence. This line started near Kotor28, 
ran towards Niš29 and along the ridge of the Mount Balkan to the Black Sea. South of 
this line Greek remained in permanent use throughout Roman era and north belonged 
to the Latin influence. This line can be identified from the surviving inscriptions on 
stone tablets, milestones, public buildings and headstones.30 
When political upheaval began in the 3rd century, the whole Roman Empire was 
on the verge of collapse. The northern limes, because of its geography, was easy to 
invade. The Goths were particularly active in this period and much of the fighting of 
                                                            
26
 Modern Pula in Istria. The amphitheatre in Pula is one of the best preserved and largest in the world 
and the only in the Western Balkans that is still standing. 
27
 Central Macedonia 
28
 Montenegrin coastal town 
29
 Naisus, the birthplace of Constantine the Great, south-east Serbia. 
30
 Ćirković, S. – The Serbs, Oxford, 2004, 4 
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Roman armies against invaders and among themselves took place in the Western and 
Central Balkans, which devastated the state structure.31 The establishment of the 
Tetrarchy in 293 by Emperor Diocletian (244-311, ruled 284-306) stabilized the 
Empire and introduced a series of Warrior-Emperors originating from the Balkans.32 
When the son of one of the tetrarchs, Constantine the Great (272-337, ruled 306-337), 
became sole Emperor of the whole Roman Empire, Christianity was finally recognized 
as the state religion. In 324 AD, Constantine decided to move the capital from Rome 
to the small, but strategically important old Greek town of Byzantium on the Bosporus. 
Renamed Constantinople, the new capital quickly became one of the early Christian 
centres and as such a bitter rival of the old capital of Rome. The Council of Nicaea of 
325 established a consensus on the nature of Christ and determined the key Christian 
doctrines, which lasted for the next several centuries. Constantine’s successors were 
unable to preserve his achievements and after 363, the Empire became threatened 
again by internal power-struggles and incursions of new barbarian tribes across the 
Rhine and Danube borders. Several generals ruled as emperors until 395, when 
Emperor Theodosius I (347-395, ruled, 379-395) divided the Empire between his two 
sons, one ruling the east and other the west.  
The Roman Empire was never reunited again, but the division line that was 
drawn through the Balkans, beginning at Sirmium in the north and following the Drina 
river south to Skadar, remained an important argument in all later quarrels between the 
Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches, following the Great Schism split in 
1054.33 The northern border contracted to the banks of the Danube, causing later trope 
about dividing the civilization of Europe from that of the Orient.34 The Western Empire 
fell in 476, whilst the Eastern, the Byzantine Empire, managed to survive for another 
millennium, although shrinking in size and population.   
                                                            
31
 Fine, 1983, 13 
32
 The first four tetrarchs were born: Diocletian in Salona (Solin), Maximian in Sirmium (Sremska 
Mitrovica), Galerius in Serdica (Sofija) or Felix Romuliana (Gamzigrad) and Constantius Chlorus 
somewhere in Dardania (most likely Niš).  
33
 Fine, 1983, 15 
34
 Samuel Huntingdon described these divisions as “civilisational fault lines” which persisted 
throughout history and became particularly dangerous in “those cleft countries held together during the 
Cold War.” See, Huntingdon, S. – The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, 
London, 1997, p. 138. 
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1.4 The coming of the Slavs 
The long established interpretation of the appearance of the Slavs in the Balkans 
in the 6th century is that they, pushed by the Avars, represented the second wave of the 
Völkerwanderung, whose raids had transformed the Roman world to the point of 
unrecognition and forever changed the ethnic structure of the northern Balkans.35 
Raiding barbarians, among which were the Slavs, were traditionally blamed for the 
decline of the Roman city and urban life during the disturbances of the 3rd to 5th 
centuries.36 However, during that period, various non-Slavic invaders destroyed not 
only the state structure, but also the representative features of developed urban life and 
caused a significant decrease of population. This created a vacuum in the economic 
and administrative distribution of government. By the time of the first Slavic raids in 
the 6th century, the old Roman life had disappeared and could not contribute to the 
Romanization of the new settlers.   
According to this theory, the classical urban culture was unable to survive two 
hundred years of constant warring and by the 5th century, ancient and previously 
numerous and prosperous cities contracted and re-grouped around a defensible 
acropolis, which was now dominated by the church. The urban nucleus was broken 
into smaller settlements, which featured modest dwellings, built from formerly finer 
buildings, often re-using various architectural elements. This particularly affected the 
interior of the Balkans, where some previously rich cities found themselves cut off 
from trade and cultural exchange. The coastal cities managed to survive mainly 
because they were connected to the less affected centres of the Empire through sea-
connections.37 The situation was worse in the rural areas. After mid-5th century, the 
villa rustica completely disappeared from the map of the Western Balkans. The last 
villa estate that survived up to the 5th century was discovered in the sheltered areas of 
Dalmatia and northeast Bosnia.38 Thus, when the Slavs arrived, better protected coastal 
and well-fortified cities in the southern Balkans managed to survive and preserve the 
Roman/Greek life and civilization, whilst the interior was re-populated by the Slavic 
tribes which, according to the early Byzantine writers, lived without organized 
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 Curta, F. – The Making of the Slavs – History and Archaeology of the Lower Danube Rerion, c.500-
700, Cambridge, 2001, 120 
36
 Curta, 2001, 145 
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leadership or state structure.39 In the depopulated areas, with broken road and trade 
networks, the surviving local Roman aristocracy was too small in numbers to be able 
to make Latin a universal language of communication.  
1.5 The establishment of the first Slavic states in the Balkans, 6th-10th century 
The established date for the settlement of the Slavs in the Balkans is the 6th 
century, after the collapse of the Danube frontier of the Roman Empire. However, the 
early sources for these newcomers do not mention separate Slavic tribes or ethnic 
groups and use the common name Sclaveni (Sclavenoi, Antae) when describing the 
military encounters between the Roman armies and the new enemy. No less than 
twenty chroniclers mention Sclaveni in the period 500-690, but none refer to separate 
Slavic ethnic groups that are known today.40 The most frequent explanation for this 
group identification is sought in the traditional practise of Roman historians to assign 
the common name to all barbarian groups that entered the Empire or because the 
authors themselves hardly knew the Balkan territory and rarely encountered the Slavs 
personally.41 
After the initial reports on the Slavic immigration to the Balkans in the 6th and 
early 7th centuries, both Byzantine and Western historians became silent on the matter 
for another two to three hundred years. The quick collapse of Justinian’s efforts to re-
conquer the former Roman Empire, including the whole of the Balkans, was the result 
of both internal power struggles and continuous wars with Persia, arch-enemy of the 
Roman Empire. The rapid spread of Islam during the 7th century quickly robbed 
Byzantium of its rich Egyptian and Eastern provinces. Forced to defend themselves, 
the Byzantines abandoned the northern border on the Danube. This enabled the second 
wave of immigration and settlement of an amorphous mass of the Slavs in the Balkans 
early in the 7th century. Finally, the conquest of the Eastern Balkans in 681 by the 
Turkic Bulgars posed an immediate threat to the capital Constantinople and the 
southern and more prosperous Balkan cities. Being more concerned with direct threats 
of better organized invaders, it is no surprise that most surviving Byzantine documents 
referring to the Balkans from the period of the 7th-10th centuries are focused on the 
establishment of the First Bulgarian Empire. The Bulgarian Balkan khanate 
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incorporated into their state already settled Slavs and by the time of Bulgarian 
conversion the Orthodox Christianity in 864, they adopted the language of their Slavic 
subjects. The First Bulgarian Empire frequently changed borders, but by the 10th 
century, it governed much of the eastern Balkans – Scythia Minor, Thrace and Dacia, 
as well as parts of the western and southern Balkans – Moesia, Macedonia, Epirus, 
Thessaly and obtained sea exits to the Adriatic and Aegean. The expansion of the 
Bulgars in the Balkans was challenged not only by the Byzantines, but also by the 
Eastern Frankish Empire which at that time controlled the Northern Balkans, Istria and 
parts of Dalmatia. The land in between was controlled by the small principalities which 
were for the first time in history ethnically termed as Croats and Serbs. 
The first reasonably detailed account about the Croats was given by the 10th 
century Byzantine emperor and historian Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus who, in his 
De Administrando Imperio written in 948-952, described the migration of both the 
Croats and Serbs to Byzantine territories during the reign of Emperor Heraclius (610-
642) as separate Slavic tribes who settled in the Balkans. The Croats are specifically 
mentioned in the chapters 29-31. Porphyrogenitus asserted that the territory of Croatia 
was divided into “11 županias” starting from the “River Zentina (Cetina) and 
stretching along, on the side of the coast as far as frontiers of Istria…and at Tzentina 
(Cetina) and Chlebena (most probably Livno) becomes neighbour to the country of 
Serbia (Map 1.a.5).”42 Porphyrogenitus also gave information about the original 
homeland of the Croats and the Serbs, where they seem to have been neighbours, as 
well.43  
The historic names of Croatia and Croats, however, appeared for the first time 
in one Late Mediaeval charter, a copy of an original dated to 852, confirming privileges 
to the Archbishopric of Split issued in Latin by the Prince Trpimir, Dux Chroatorum 
iuvatus munere divino, the ruler of Croatia and official vassal to the Frankish 
emperor.44 The document, however, does not indicate the precise territory of Croatia. 
In the late 19th and early 20th century, Croat historians concluded that the original Croat 
settlement was in the territory of northern and central Dalmatia, stretching from the 
border of the Istrian Peninsula, through the hinterland of the mountain Velebit to the 
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 DAI, Volime I, 30 - The edition of De Administrando Imperio used here is a 2008 reprint of the Greek 
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River Vrbas45 in the west, including parts of the Pannonian Plain and the Cetina River 
to the south.46   
This territory was first mentioned in the 799 Annales Laurissenses and Annales 
Regni Francorum, usually known as the Einhardi annaels about the wars between the 
Frankish and Byzantine Empires. These documents, however, do not mention Croats 
as a separate people. Rather, in 817 Frankish chroniclers refered to the inhabitants of 
the region as “Romans, Slavs and Dalmatians” and there was no description of the land 
or people, assuming this was already known.47 
 
Map 1.a.5 – The territory where the Croats first settled, according to Porphyrogenitus. The generation 
of Croat historians from the late 19th and early 20th century differ little from the map presented here. 
However, some contemporary Croat and Western historians draw the borders of Trpimir’s land further 
east. See, for example, Tanner. 
The first mention of the Serbs under that name also comes from Porphyrogenitus. 
The land they inhabited are described in chapters 29-34 as ranging from “the province 
of Thessalonica, which from that time acquired this denomination” (Map 1.a.6), 
through “what is now Serbia and Pagania and the so-called country of Zachlumi and 
Terbounia and the country of Kanalites (Map 1.a.7).”48 Even the best translations of 
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the four surviving manuscripts, published between the 17th and 21st centuries of the 
DAI agree on the imprecision of the geographic terms used in the text, as archaeology 
has yet to examine many of Porphyrogenitus’ claims.49  
       
Map 1.a.6 – Slavic tribes c.700, as described by  Porphyrogenitus in De Administrando Imperio.         
 
Map 1.a.7 – Serbs, Croats and Bulgars in time of Porphyrogenitus in De Administrando Imperio        
Porphyrogenitus, 10th century. 
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However, based on the etymological derivation of some modern toponyms, the 
territories of Zachlumi and Terbounia roughly correspond to what is now known as 
Herzegovina and south-western Bosnia and Krajina, whilst Serbia covered much of 
the modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Serbia and the south-western parts 
of Kosovo and Metohija. If the DAI notion of the Serbian settlers around Thessaloniki 
is accepted, the Slavs that were related to the Serbs also inhabited parts of present-day 
Macedonia (Map 1.a.8).  
 
Map 1.a.8 – The territory of the first Serbian tribes, without a state structure according to 
Porphyrogenitus. The generation of Serbian historians from the late 19th and early 20th century differ 
from the map presented here. However, some of the contemporary former Yugoslav and Western 
historians reject the idea that the Serbian tribes inhabited the territory west of the Drina River.  
This vast territory of the Balkans is today divided between the modern states of 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia and the 
disputed province of Kosovo, all of which have or used to have a significant percentage 
of a Serbian population on the eve of the wars of Yugoslav succession. 
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1.6 Early Middle Ages and Christianization of the Croats and Serbs 
Between the 6th and 9th centuries, the first polities of the Croats and Serbs formed 
in the western Balkans, located between the increasingly active missionaries from both 
Rome and Constantinopole.50 At the end of the 8th century, the Franks began expansion 
into the northern Balkans and Dalmatia, which were nominally under Byzantine 
control, but in reality ruled by a number of smaller Slavic princes, župans, bordering 
on the First Bulgarian Empire. In the town of Nin, near Zadar, the Frankish chroniclers 
encountered the first known Croat župan Višeslav (c.800-810), whom they called a 
Christian.51 Frankish influence in north-west Balkans was challenged by the 
Pannonian župan Ljudevit Posavski, who rebelled against their rule in 819. Ljudevit 
Posavski attempted to create a larger state by uniting territories under his control with 
those of Dalmatian Croats, but his rebellion was crashed in 822 and, with the support 
of the Franks, the župan of Nin became the only semi-independent Slavic prince in the 
Balkans.52 Except for the well-fortified coastal Dalmatian towns which remained 
unaffected by the influx of Slavs who settled in the hinterland, the župans of Nin began 
a slow process of building a state.  
During the 9th century, Frankish influence in Dalmatia vanished and the 
Byzantines, facing problems with expanding Bulgars in the Balkans and Arabs in the 
Mediterranean, allowed the local Slavs self-government. The Byzantine diplomatic 
masterstroke in retaining significant cultural and religious influence over the Slav 
population in the Balkans without much military power was evident in the imperial 
decision to convert the local Slavs to Christianity. This could be achieved only if the 
Holy Scriptures were preached in their own language. Constantinopole’s competition 
with Rome over church supremacy had grown from the division of the Roman Empire, 
with Rome insisting on exclusive usage of Latin during the liturgy. Constantinople had 
a more pragmatic attitude, enabling the usage of languages other than Latin and Greek, 
provided they acknowledged the supremacy of the Patriarch. Thus, in order to bring to 
their own sphere of influence to as many “barbarians” as possible, the Byzantines 
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 The Avar Khanate existed in this period in the Pannonian plain and included much of the Northern 
Balkans. The Franks warred against them during the 8th century and finally defeated them in the 790s. 
After the destruction of the Avars, the Franks warred against the Bulgars. The Byzantines used this 
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charged two Greek intellectuals from Thessaloniki, brothers Cyril (827/8-869) and 
Methodius (815/20-885), with the task of devising a Slavic alphabet and translating 
the Bible into a Slavic language. Combining Greek letters with some newly invented, 
Cyril and Methodius, who both understood a Slavic dialect spoken in Thessaloniki, 
invented the first Slavic script, Glagolitic, initially used among the Moravian Slavs 
and Bulgars. Their missions to Great Moravia and Pannonia marked the beginning of 
Slavic literacy (Fig. 1.a.6).53 Their lasting legacy was felt most profoundly among the 
Slavs who adhered to Orthodox Christianity. The Glagolitic script survived longest in 
Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands, where the local Slavs kept it as their defence from 
the more powerful influence of Italian and Latin languages.  
In the First Bulgarian Empire, Glagolitic was soon replaced by the Cyrillic 
script, devised in Ohrid by Clement (840-916) and Naum (c.830-910), disciples of 
Cyril and Methodius (Fig. 1.a.7). Naum was particularly engaged with the spread of 
Slavic literacy among the Bulgars who converted to the Orthodoxy in 864, during the 
reign of Tsar Boris (852-889). Boris embraced Slavic literacy to preserve the state 
independence.  
         
Fig. 1.a.6 – The latest monument to Cyril and            Fig. 1.a.7 – The latest monument to Clement and 
Methodius in Skopje, erected in 2010.                        Naum in Skopje, erected in 2010 
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From the perspective of the emerging independent Croat state, the strengthening 
of the principality, after weakening Frankish influence, could help the defence of the 
north, as the new threat of the Hungarian tribes appeared in the Pannonian plain in the 
890s, following the vacuum created by the elimination of the Avar khanate several 
decades earlier. The definite conversion to Roman Catholicism of Croats occurred 
around 879, when the Croat prince from the Trpimirović dynasty (845-1091) in favour 
of Byzantium was killed.54 However, threatened by Hungarians who overran much of 
Pannonia in the north and the Bulgarians in the east, the Croats forged an alliance with 
the Byzantines. They successfully fought the Bulgarians who were then ruled by Tsar 
Simeon (897-927) and in 925, prince Tomislav (910-928), was crowned the first king 
of Croatia (Fig. 1.a.8).55 
In the next two centuries, the Kingdom of Croatia developed and prospered 
under the Trpimirović dynasty, expanding to much of Dalmatia, north-west Bosnia and 
parts of southern Pannonia now known as Slavonia, between the rivers Sava and 
Drava. Throughout this period the question of usage of Slavic language during liturgy 
was subject of several church councils and competition between the Roman Catholic 
bishops of the coastal cities and Slavic bishops supported by Byzantium. The 
increasingly powerful Hungarian state and its conversion to Roman Catholicism 
influenced the Croat Kingdom, already inclining towards Rome. When the last Croat 
king died in battle in 1097, the Hungarians interfered on behalf of the Croatian queen, 
a Hungarian princess. After a short war, peace was concluded in 1102 with the major 
Croat nobles accepting a Hungarian king Koloman (1070-1116) as their rightful ruler. 
After this, Croatia ceased to be an independent state again until 1991. 
Throughout this period, 9th-11th century, Serbian župans were either under 
Bulgarian or Byzantine suzerainty. After Tsar Simeon died in 927, his successor, 
facing many political and military threats from the Byzantines and Hungarians, had to 
recognize the independence of the first Serbian principality of Raška in 930.56 The 
collapse of the First Bulgarian Empire and the disintegration of the Croatian Kingdom 
enabled the Serbian župans of the Vlastimirović dynasty (c.780-960) to assert their 
control over the central western Balkans. The territory of the first semi-independent 
Serbian state under Časlav Klonimirović (933-960) included most of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, western Serbia, southern Dalmatia, Raška, northern Albania and Doclea. 
Doclea was a small province around modern-day Podgorica in Montenegro that, after 
Byzantium subdued Serbia following Časlav’s death, asserted its semi-independence 
in the late 10th century. Most of Serbian lands returned under Byzantine rule, except 
for the principality of Doclea. 
Similar to the rest of the south Adriatic coast, the conversion to Christianity 
among the Serbs came from two directions: The Serbs who converted at the earliest 
date (7th-9th centuries) were in all probability those who lived near Adriatic cities and 
would subsequently belong to the Latin liturgical tradition.57 Surviving papal letters 
from the 10th century suggest that, except for the rulers of Croatia, the rulers of 
Zachlumia (Serbian land according to Porphyrogenitus) also belonged to the western 
rite.58 The complete absence of historical documents makes it difficult to determine 
with any certainty what kind of conversion took place in the interior. Byzantine wars 
with the Bulgarians brought Orthodoxy deep into the Balkan hinterland and by 873, 
the Pope complained that the Serbs were wavering from Rome.59 The conversion to 
Orthodoxy in the hinterland took place during the Byzantine-Bulgarian struggles for 
supremacy in the 9th-11th centuries.  
Simultaneously, the Bogomil Heresy appeared for the first time in the 10th 
century Macedonia, then controlled by the First Bulgarian Empire and spread 
westwards throughout the Balkan hinterland. Most probably named after its founder, 
priest Bogomil, it was a dualistic teaching on the nature of God and as such in conflict 
with both Orthodox and Catholic Churches. It had most success among the illiterate 
peasants and away from well-established ecclesiastical and urban centres. When the 
First Bulgarian Empire collapsed in 1018, the Byzantines regained control over much 
of the Balkans re-introducing Byzantine Orthodoxy and persecuting the heretics.60 The 
coastal Serbs remained Catholic until the Late Middle Ages. Thus, the first Serbian 
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 The majority of the heretics were removed from the places where the state had full control over the 
church matters. Later appearance of the heretics in Bosnia between 12th and 15th centuries is usually 
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principality to be recognized a kingdom, Doclea, was done so by Rome and most 
certainly belonged to the western rite. 
Doclea, in its Slav version Duklja, was the name of the city whose ruins lie just 
outside the modern Macedonian capital Podgorica. In the ancient period the territory 
was inhabited by the Illyrian tribe Docleatae, although Porphyrogenitus claimed that 
the town itself was founded by the Roman Emperor Diocletian, who named it after 
himself. However, by Porphyrogenitus’s time the town of Doclea was deserted whilst 
the surrounding territory was under the Byzantine rule.61 The proximity of the Adriatic 
where the influence of Rome was greatest enabled the local ruling family of 
Vojislavljević (1034-1186) to exploit the dispute between the Bulgars, Byzantines and 
Normans who appeared for the first time in the Balkans in the mid-11th century.  
The Norman invasion of southern Albania and Greece coincided with the Great 
Schism of 1054 and the struggle over church jurisdiction in the Balkans. In this period 
the Albanians appear in written documents for the first time in history. The earliest 
reference to the Albanians and Albania came from the Book IV of the Alexiad, by the 
Byzantine princess Ana Comnena (1083-1153) at the end of the 11th century. 
Describing the events that took place in the area around Dyrrachion62 during the reign 
of her father Alexios I Comnenos (1056-1118), she stated that the city itself was 
divided between the Venetian allies of Alexios and comiscortes from Albania.63  
Meanwhile, the Vojislavljević princes counted on western support against 
Byzantine suzerainty and adhered to Catholic Christianity. The Papal epistle of 1077 
is usually accepted as the year in which the Pope crowned Michael I a king.64 Over the 
next century, the Vojislavljević kings fought against the Byzantines, Normans and 
themselves in order to expand their state on the surrounding Serbian lands of Zahumlje 
and Raška.65 Michael I’s grandsons Vukan and Marko were installed as Grand Župans 
of Raška and Zahumlje and when the main branch of the Vojislavljević dynasty died 
out in the mid-12th century, the junior branch stemming from Marko that ruled in Raška 
from 1112 took over supremacy in Serbian lands. In 1166, the Raškan Grand Župan 
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Stefan Nemanja (1113-1200, ruled 1166-1196) managed to unite Raška, Duklja, 
Zahumlje, southern Dalmatia and northern Albania. He was to become the founder of 
the Nemanjić dynasty (1166-1371), that would rule much of the western Balkans 
during the High Middle Ages. Stefan Nemanja (Fig. 1.a.9) himself was born in Doclea 
and was baptised a Catholic, but for political purposes he later converted to Orthodoxy, 
the faith in which he remained until the end of his life.66 
     
Fig. 1.a.8 – Equestrian monument to King           Fig. 1.a.9 – Fresco portrait of Stefan Nemanja 
Tomislav, by Robert Frangeš-Mihanović              in King’s Church of the Studenica Monastery,  
Created in 1928-29, erected in 1947                      painted in the early 14th century 
 
1.7 The High Middle Ages – The Serbian Empire and the Kingdom of Bosnia 
Norman incursions during the 11the and 12th centuries weakened Byzantine 
influence in the Balkans, providing an opportunity for Bulgarian and Serbian states to 
assert their political independence. Bulgaria declared the establishment of the Second 
Bulgarian Empire in 1185, whilst Stefan Nemanja retained the title of the Grand 
Župan, spending much of his reign in uniting various Serbian principalities and 
fighting the Bogomil Heresy.67 After successful persecution of the Bogomils, Nemanja 
abdicated in 1196 in favour of his second son, Stefan II. The surviving Bogomils 
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withdrew into the Bosnian mountains where they were allowed to live by the Bosnian 
prince Kulin Ban (1163-1204, ruled 1180-1204).68 
During Kulin Ban’s reign, the name of Bosnia as a political entity appeared for 
the first time in history, resulting not from Nemanja’s persecution of the heretics, but 
from the first record of Byzantine – Hungarian rivalries over supremacy in the territory 
increased and the struggle for religious domination between the Catholic and Orthodox 
churches intensified (Map 1.a.9). Traditionally, scholars argued that the name derived 
from the river Bosnia which runs through the central part of the modern republic, 
although some local researchers argued after 1945 that the name Bosnia derived from 
the Illyrian tribe of Bessi or Bossi that inhabited the territory in the pre-Roman 
period.69  
  
Map 1.a.9 – The political map of the Balkans around 1184; state marked pink represents the Serbia of 
Stefan Nemanja, whilst green represents the most probable borders of the Bosnian Principality, ruled 
by Nemanja’s relative Kulin-Ban. 
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 The establishment of the Banate of Bosnia took place sometime after death of Manuel I Comnenos 
(1118-1180, ruled 1143-1180), when Ban Kulin asserted his independence from Byzantium. The 
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by Nemanja’s son Vukan, Prince of Duklja to Pope Innocent III (1198-1216). However, Vukan did not 
describe these heretics and it is not clear whether they were really those who escaped Nemanja’s 
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After the annexation of the Croat Kingdom in 1102, the Hungarians showed on 
several occasions their interest in expanding south of the Sava River into Byzantine 
territories inhabited and ruled by local Slav princes – bans. After denouncing 
Byzantine suzerainty, Kulin Ban, who had close family ties with the senior branch of 
the Nemanjić family70 which was already inclining towards Catholicism during the 
Third Crusade (1189-1192), prompted him to accept Hungarian supremacy and with 
it Roman Catholicism. This was a sensible political option as the Fourth Crusade of 
1204 changed the political and religious situation dramatically. The establishment of 
the Latin Empire in Constantinople reduced Byzantine influence to Nicaea with 
various pockets of Orthodoxy in the Balkans and elsewhere. This prompted Stefan II 
to raise the territories consolidated by his father to the rank of kingdom. 
Stefan the First-Crowned (1165-1228, ruled 1196-1228), as his name suggests, 
was crowned the first king of the Serbs in 1217 under the Catholic rite by his younger 
brother Sava (1174-1236), who became the first Archbishop of the autocephalous 
Serbian Orthodox Church in 1219. In the same year, Sava produced the first Serbian 
Law Code, Nomokanon, a set of Civil and Canon Laws based on Roman Law, written 
in the Serbian redaction of Old Church Slavonic. The two brothers began establishing 
the Serbian Kingdom that incorporated both Catholic and Orthodox populations. 
Through erection of churches, monasteries and castles, which fused Byzantine and 
Latin traditions, they set the course for the cultural development and political 
expansion of their successors.  
In the next two centuries, the Serbian Kingdom developed and prospered under 
the Nemanjić dynasty, which in 1346 became an Empire under Stefan Uroš IV Dušan 
(1308-1355, ruled 1331-1355). Dušan’s state included much of the Balkans and some 
historians argue that he intended to replace the Byzantine Empire.71 On the same day 
he became an Emperor, the Serbian Archbishopric was raised to the rank of 
Patriarchate. In May 1349, in his capital Skopje, Dušan proclaimed a set of laws 
regulating life in the Empire, the Dušan’s Code (Zakonik). An extended version was 
issued in 1353 and the Code remained a form of mediaeval constitution until the 
Ottoman conquest in the 15th century. The Nemanjić dynasty died out with Dušan’s 
son Stefan Uroš V in 1371 and immediately sparked internal struggles for power 
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among the major aristocratic families. This coincided with the new threat coming to 
the Balkans from Asia: the Ottoman Turks. In the same year, 1371, the Serbian 
aristocrat Vukašin Mrnjavčević (1320-1371), a self-proclaimed king of the southern 
parts of the former Serbian Empire since 1365, fought a major battle against the 
Ottomans on the River Maritza in modern Bulgaria.72 After a heavy defeat, the 
remnants of the Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria and Vukašin’s kingdom became vassals 
of the Ottoman Sultan. The Kingdom of Zeta, traditional princedom of the heir to the 
Nemanjić throne became the dukedom of the Balšić family (1362-1421).73 
During the Nemanjić rule of much of the central west Balkans, a small Bosnian 
banate74 was under the suzerainty of Hungarian kings, who insisted on loyalty to the 
Catholic faith of Bosnian Bans. However, the evidence suggests that some form of 
confessional discrepancies existed throughout the 13th and 14th centuries, as several 
papal legates were dispatched to Bosnia to investigate the matter. These confessional 
discrepancies, most commonly described as the existence of the Bosnian Church, are 
not fully known due to scarcity of evidence. Therefore, the interpretation of the nature 
of the Bosnian Church is speculative, with theories ranging from arguments that 
Christianity in Bosnia differed from the official canons of both Catholic and Orthodox 
Churches to that it was a dualist Bogomil heresy that had survived persecution in 
Bulgaria and Serbia.75  
After Kulin Ban, several weaker bans ruled a small Bosnian state until the first 
part of the 14th century, when Ban Stefan II Kotromanić (1322-1353) began asserting 
his influence over territories bordering his dominions in central Bosnia. His father, 
Stefan I secured political support from the Nemanjić kings through marriage, but the 
main problem in the Bosnian banate at the time was the struggle for supremacy 
between the powerful Croatian Ban Mladen II Šubić (1270-1341) and Stefan II 
himself. Eventually, Stefan II prevailed, not through military superiority but through 
political skill. Since the beginning of the 14th century, Hungary was engulfed in 
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dynastic wars in which powerful nobles sided with various pretenders to the throne, 
whilst Serbian kings, after experiencing similar problems, looked eagerly at the main 
prize in Constantinople. Nemanjić’s engagement with the Byzantines enabled Stefan 
II to annex Zahumlje and eastern Bosnia which had a significant Serbian Orthodox 
population. At the same time, the Pope dispatched Franciscans to Bosnia to deal with 
the elusive heresy. The pressure from the Pope and the Hungarian king prompted 
Stefan II to declare himself a Roman Catholic. However, his nephew and heir, Ban 
Tvrtko I (1338-1391, ruled 1353-1391), whilst continuing his uncle’s policy of 
strengthening the state, declared himself Serbian Orthodox and crowned himself King 
of Serbia and Bosnia at the grave of the first Serbian Archbishop Sava Nemanjić in 
1377 (Fig. 1.a.10). The Bosnian kingdom under the Kotromanić dynasty lasted until 
the Ottoman conquest in 1463, but its prosperity and development were hindered by 
internal struggles among powerful nobles. Religious conversions ranging from 
Catholic to Orthodox to Bosnian Church further complicated issues, as did external 
interference from Hungary. 
 
Fig. 1.a.10 – The monument to Tvrtko I Kotromanić in Tuzla (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the Muslim-Croat entity of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina), by Adis Lukač, erected in 2012. The 
inscription omits Tvrtko’s title as the King of Serbs and Serbia. 
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1.8 The Kosovo Battle and the Ottoman conquest 
The Ottomans appeared in the Balkans in the 14th century, during the reign of 
the Byzantine Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos (1292-1383, ruled 1347-1354), when 
they aided him in the Byzantine civil war. The Ottoman Sultans quickly took 
advantage of the situation in which disintegrating Byzantine, Bulgarian and Serbian 
states could not assert control over the powerful noble families, resulting in frequent 
civil wars and mutual political distrust. The Battle of Maritza established Ottoman 
ruler in the southern Balkans, whilst the northern parts of the former Serbian Empire 
remained under the rule of a few high nobles from Dušan’s court. In the second part 
of the 14th century, the Ottomans conquered for the first time strategically important 
cities of Adrianople and Thessaloniki, which provided them with bases for further 
expansion. The transfer of the capital from Bursa to Adrianople in 1365 by Murad I 
(1326-1389, ruled 1362-1389) signalled the beginning of the Balkan conquest. By the 
late 14th century most of Bulgaria was conquered, with its capital Tarnovo taken in 
1393. In 1396, the Second Bulgarian Empire ceased to exist. 
After Maritza, the Ottomans waged several smaller wars against the Serbian 
armies, but the most important battle took place on the 28th June 1389 at Kosovo Polje, 
northwest of Priština, the modern-day capital of the Province of Kosovo.76 The earliest 
records of the battle are unclear,77 but what is known is that the armies were led by 
Prince Lazar (1329-1389, ruled 1373-1389) on the Serbian and Sultan Murad I on the 
Ottoman side. The position of the armies, their numbers and equipment on the 
battlefield became the subject of innumerable academic analyses. The most frequently 
accepted estimate is that the Serbs had between 12000-20000 men, whilst the Ottoman 
numbers were 27000-30000.78 Academic consensus over the outcome of the battle is 
that it was a draw. Both sides suffered heavy losses: Serbia lost almost all of its 
manpower, whilst the Ottomans had to withdraw and regroup in the east. Serbia was 
left as a vassal state, but after “losing the flower of its nobility” it was unable to resist 
the Ottoman Turks effectively.79 The Turks eventually won, because they had greater 
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resources to continue the conquest, whilst the Serbs had been left with too few 
resources to defend their territory.  
This battle marked a turning point in Serbian history, the “doomed battle” that 
condemned the Serbian state and the Serbs to slavery under Ottoman, Islamic and 
“alien” culture for the following four centuries. What made it so special in both Serbian 
and Turkish traditions was that both military leaders, Prince Lazar and Sultan Murad 
were killed in the battle. There are no clear records of how it happened. One of the 
earliest accounts, written c.1433 by Constantine the Philosopher, the chief librarian of 
Despot Stefan Lazarević (c. 1377-1427, ruled 1389-1427) suggests that the Sultan died 
by the hand of an infidel who was a Christian knight.80 The name of the assassin was 
not given and later accounts that mention this episode are scarce. The name of Miloš 
Obilić81 entered the sources relating to the battle at the end of the 15th century through 
Byzantine authors.82 In the next two centuries, several surviving accounts from 
different authors, mainly Greek, Italian and German repeat the name in different 
spelling and place him in Prince Lazar’s service and of Serbian origin.  
The Battle of Kosovo forced the Ottomans to slow their conquest, whilst Lazar’s 
state continued to exist as a Despotate for another seventy years. First ruled by his son 
Stefan and then by his grandson through the female line Ɖurađ Branković (1377-1456, 
ruled 1427-1456), the territory of the Serbian Despotate shrank to the south of the 
Danube River and around the Morava Valley. The capital was transferred to Belgrade, 
but when the Hungarians demanded the Belgrade Fortress in exchange for political 
and military support in 1427, a new capital Smederevo was built also on the Danube. 
When the last Balšić ruler of Zeta died without a male heir in 1421, Stefan inherited 
Zeta and briefly united it with the Serbian Despotate. By then, the Ottomans fully 
occupied most of the southern Balkans which prompted both Stefan and Ɖurađ to seek 
closer ties with Hungary. Even though they remained Orthodox, they began 
introducing some typically Catholic customs to Serbia: knightly tournaments and dress 
code. This trend continued among the native aristocracy of Serbia, Bosnia and Albania 
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until the last of the western Balkan states fell to the Ottomans in the 15th century. 
Creating closer ties with the Catholic Church in order to gain help against the Ottomans 
remained the prime objective. However, none of this was enough to attract more 
support from the West. 
The last Serbian Despot was also the last King of Bosnia, Stefan Tomašević 
(reigned as a king 1461-1463, as a despot shortly in 1459). The conquest of 
Constantinople in 1453 left no doubts that the Ottomans would continue expansion in 
the Balkans. Both Branković despots and Kotromanić kings continued their pleas to 
the Pope and the West for support, but all was in vain. In order to generate a united 
front against the Ottomans, the two families created an alliance through the marriage 
of Stefan Tomašević and Marija Branković in 1459 in Smederevo, effectively uniting 
Bosnia and Serbia. However, this failed to generate a force strong enough to face the 
armies of Mehmed II (1432-1481, reigned 1451-1481). On their part, the Ottomans 
regarded this act of unification unacceptable and after a short war, Serbia was finally 
conquered in June 1459. Stefan Tomašević withdrew to Bosnia, where he succeeded 
his father, King Stefan Tomaš, in 1461. Two years later, the Ottomans conquered 
Bosnia and executed the young king.  
Zahumlje and Travunija, as parts of the former Serbian Empire and Bosnian 
Kingdom, were governed by the dukes of the Kosača family (1331-1480). Bosnian 
kings, too weak to exercise their power over the great nobles and constantly dependent 
on the Hungarian crown, were for most of the 15th century nominally Catholic. The 
Kosača dukes, on the other hand, insisted on their Serbian Orthodoxy and in 1448 they 
adopted the German title of Herzog of Zahumlje and Coast. In 1449, Herzog Stefan 
Vukčić Kosača (1404-1466) styled himself Herzog of St.Sava, in honour of the first 
Serbian Archbishop Sava Nemanjić. When Bosnia was conquered in 1463, the Kosača 
dominions held for another generation. When finally conquered in 1482, the Ottomans 
created a province named after the Kosača’s aristocratic title – the territory which 
included the original lands of Porphyrogenitus’s “Zachlumi and Terbounia” – 
Herzegovina (Map 1.a.10). This territory has remained known under this name ever 
since. 
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Map 1.a.10 – Lands of Stefan Vukčić Kosača in 1440 became Herzegovina after he took the title of 
Herzog in 1448 
While the Ottomans were expanding to Serbia and Bosnia, Zeta was immersed 
in power struggles between the successors of the former Balšić dominions. The 
Republic of Venice had been present in the former Byzantine Adriatic coastal cities 
since the Crusades and persistently interfered in the politics of the eastern Adriatic. 
When the Balšić family declined in the first part of the 15th century, smaller territories 
of Upper Zeta were taken over by the Crnojević family (1326-1515), whilst in the 
south several Albanian noble families gained prominence. Of these, the Castriots, 
originating between the rivers Mati and Drin in northern Albania, quickly began 
expanding their rule, pushing north to Scodra and south to Tirana. In the chaotic 
political situation pf the ruling class in Albania in the mid-15th century, switching 
allegiance between Venice and the Ottomans and conversions between Orthodoxy, 
Islam and Catholicism became proverbial, until the advancing Ottomans finally 
conquered southern and central Albania by 1421.83 The north, being a rugged 
mountainous terrain, remained controlled by the Castriots, George Castrioti 
Skanderbeg (Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu, 1405-1468) becoming the most important 
figure. Successful campaigns against Serbia and Bosnia enabled Mehmed II to give 
full attention to subduing uncooperative Albanians and end Skanderbeg’s defiance. 
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Skanderbeg died in 1468 and was succeeded by his son John, who could only delay 
the inevitable for another decade. By 1479 all of Albania was conquered. Some 
rebellions took place in the mountains, but without any significant success. Zeta finally 
fell in 1496. At the same time, the war with the Ottomas enabled Venice to gain full 
control over the major coastal cities in Zeta and northern Albania. When the Venetians 
took over the coastal towns, they supported the expulsion of the Orthodox priests and 
population. The native aristocracy, both Albanian and Serbian, after losing their land 
to the Ottomans, usually fled to Venice.  
By the beginning of the 16th century, the Ottomans controlled much of the 
Balkans, with the exception of Adriatic coast which was heavily defended by the 
Venetians. The conquered states were incorporated into the Ottoman administrative 
system, forming eyalets or pashaliks, usually centred on important towns or arranged 
according to geography. The Ottomans immediately began resettling the population in 
order to avoid rebellions and exercise more effective government, simultaneously 
massing their troops on the Danube and Sava, prepared to launch new conquests 
further into Europe. Along with the resettlements the conversion of the local Christian 
population to Islam began.  
1.9 Under the foreign rule  
After the fall of Serbian Despotate in 1459, remaining members of the Branković 
family held territories north of the Danube, then part of the Hungarian Kingdom.84 
Belgrade, under Hungarian rule since 1427, remained Hungarian until 1521, when it 
became one of the main strategic points for Ottoman incursions north of the Danube. 
The Bosnian royal family died out with Stefan Tomašević. After the fall of Bosnia in 
1463, some of the surviving nobility and clergy of the Kingdom of Bosnia sought 
refuge in Dalmatian towns or in the Military Frontier.85 Simultaneously, a number of 
high nobles and gentry converted to Islam within a generation. The Ottoman Empire 
crushed the Hungarian Kingdom after the Battle of Mohács in 1526 and extended deep 
into present-day Hungary and Croatia. The only part of the former Hungarian 
Kingdom unaffected by the Ottoman conquest in the Balkans was Croatia Proper, 
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in 1471 in the territory roughly corresponding to the present-day Vojvodina indicates that the Balkan 
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covering the vicinity of Zagreb. This territory, known as Banska Hrvatska or Civil 
Croatia, was taken over by the Habsburgs after the Sabor of Cetin in 1527 and was 
run by the Vienna appointed Ban.86 This situation lasted for the next century and a 
half. 
The Military Frontier (Војна Граница, Vojna Granica) was first established in 
1522 by the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I as protection against the advancing 
Ottomans.87 As the situation in the Pannonian plain began to change to the advantage 
of the Habsburgs in the later 17th century, the Millitary Frontier was expanded 
eastwards. At first, it consisted of two administrative districts, the Croatian Military 
Frontier and Slavonian Military Frontier, separated by a vertical line north of the Una-
Sava confluence.88 The first district included Croatia Proper and the mountainous areas 
of Lika, Kordun and Banija, areas between the Dinaric range and the Adriatic Sea, 
bordering the Venice Republic in southern Dalmatia, as well as the Varaždin District, 
bordering Slavonia. The second district incorporated the province of Slavonia in the 
Pannonian plain, stretching along the Sava to its confluence to the Danube near 
Belgrade (Map 1.a.11). Both parts of Military Frontier were directly controlled by 
Vienna. 
 
Map 1.a.11 – The 19th century Austro-Hungarian map of the Military Frontier (marked red) 
The situation south of the Sava and Danube (in what are now Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, central Serbia and Dalmatia) was no less complicated than in the 
territory of the Military Frontier. Until the 15th century, the Slavic noble families, both 
Catholic and Orthodox, were frequently intermarrying and changing their religious 
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allegiances. It was not unusual for a Catholic baron to marry an Orthodox woman and 
vice versa.89 It was also very common that one generation of the nobles adhered to 
Catholicism and the next to accept Orthodoxy.90 This situation lasted for most of the 
period between the 12th and 15th centuries and was particularly obvious in the 
territories of modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina and southern Dalmatia. The 
Catholic influence of Italian-dominated coastal towns penetrated the hinterland 
through the river valleys of Cetina, Neretva or Morača,91 whilst the Orthodox influence 
through the Slavonic liturgy and Cyrillic script was reaching as far north as the Kvarner 
Islands and Istria. 
From the 12th century, with occasional intervals of Hungarian and Ottoman rule, 
the Dalmatian coast and islands were ruled by the Venetian Republic. The exception 
was the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) which managed to retain its independence as 
a separate state ran by an oligarchy of rich aristocrat-merchants (Map 1.a.12). 
However, Venetian domination in the eastern Adriatic lasted unbroken between 1420 
and 1797. This helped to maintain a form of the corrupt Latin language in major coastal 
towns and its later evolution into a Dalmatian dialect of the Romance language group. 
By the 16th century, this language was replaced by Italian.  
  
Map 1.a.12 – Repubic of Ragusa before the loss of independence in 1808 
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 The Croat Count Mladen III Šubić (1315-1348) married the Serbian princess Jelena Nemanjić, the 
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Ottoman expansion ended with the defeat outside Vienna in 1683. The Holy 
Roman Empire led the counter-offensive to the south of the Danube, captured Belgrade 
in 1688 and forced the Ottomans as far south as Kosovo and Macedonia. The Serbian 
Christian population living under the Ottomans, encouraged by the Serbian 
Patriarchate of Peć,92 joined the Christian armies and participated in the war, but after 
the Treaty of Karlowitz (Карловци, Karlovci) in 1699, Belgrade was returned to 
Ottoman rule and the borders between the two empires were established on the south 
bank of the Sava and Danube rivers. The Treaty of Karlowitz enabled the extension of 
the buffer-zone of the Military Frontier between the Empires and divided the Serbian 
and Croat population between two zones of influence (Map 1.a.11). The extended 
Frontier included parts of the territories of present-day Vojvodina and Romania. The 
Muslim population was promptly expelled from the territories re-conquered by the 
Habsburgs. For a short period of two decades, the Austrians captured much of the 
Belgrade Pashalik, renaming it Kingdom of Serbia (in existence 1718-1739).  
1.10 The Migrations 
Territorial losses prompted the Ottomans to retaliate against the Serbian 
Christian population which actively participated in wars on the Austrian side. 
Following Austrian withdrawal north of the Danube after the Treaty of Karlowitz, 
Serbian Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević (1633-1706), fearing Ottoman retaliation, 
decided to migrate en masse to Austrian territory in 1690.93 The event, known as the 
First Great Migration, was led by the Patriarch himself and included the Serbs mainly 
from Kosovo and Metohija, Macedonia and Raška. The third Austro-Turkish war in 
fifty years ended with the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. The Kingdom of Serbia returned 
to the Ottomans, becoming again the Belgrade Pashalik. The direct consequence of 
this was the Second Great Migration of 1740, led by the next Patriarch Arsenije IV 
Čarnojević. The result of these two great migrations was the changing ethnic and 
religious picture of the Kosovo and Metohija region in favour of the Muslim 
Albanians. The view of Serbian historiography is that 37,000 families crossed the 
Danube in 1690 alone.94  
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The rest of the 18th century witnessed a military stalemate between the Ottoman 
and Habsburg Empires. Engaged in other geo-political events, strategic interests 
shifted from the Balkans. The local population remained subdued between two empires 
until the early 19th century, when Napoleon’s European campaigns brought 
cataclysmic changes. 
1.11 The National awakening in the 19th Balkans century and the birth of 
nationalism 
The ideas of national awakening stemmed from the objectives of the French 
Revolution taking the form of political and cultural movements.95 The Napoleonic 
wars spread revolutionary ideas of nationalism to the rest of Europe. Once firmly 
rooted in the European cultural capitals, they began affecting peoples and territories 
with no direct contact with France. In the Balkans, the early 19th century was marked 
by two great revolutions: the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813) and the Greek War 
of Independence (1821-1832). Both revolutions marked the beginning of the national 
states of Serbs and Greeks after nearly five centuries of Ottoman rule. By the early 19th 
century, the Ottoman Empire was in decline. Leading European Great Powers, Great 
Britain, France and Russia, were increasingly interested in the strategically important 
region of the Balkans, controlled by a weak Islamic state. It is not surprising that they 
interfered both politically and militarily and selectively supported the rebellious Serbs 
and Greeks in their efforts to liberate themselves.  
The First Serbian Uprising led by Djordje Petrović Karadjordje (175296-1817), 
a pig merchant who had served in the Austrian freikorps units of the Military Frontier 
in the 1787-1791 rebellions and wars (Fig. 1.a.11) took place on the territory of 
Belgrade Pashalik. It lasted for nearly a decade, but failed to achieve an independent 
state. In 1815, the Second Serbian Uprising began under the leadership of Miloš 
Obrenović (1780-1860). After initial battles, the struggle continued diplomatically and 
in 1830 the Belgrade Pashalik was recognized as the Principality of Serbia, 
                                                            
the Habsburgs expelled the Ottomans following the Treaty of Karlowitz, a significant number of Muslim 
population was expelled south of the Danube, thus leaving large areas of Slavonija, Srem and Banat 
depopulated. The process of colonization of the Serbs and Croats escaping from the Ottomans, as well 
as the Hungarians and Germans from the north began. Additionally, large areas north of the Danube 
were marshlands and swamps during the Middle Ages, which made them scarcely populated until the 
new population began reclaiming them for cultivation. 
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autonomous within the Ottoman Empire. Miloš Obrenović was recognized as its 
hereditary prince (Fig. 1.a.12). In 1832, the Kingdom of Greece, consisting only of the 
territory south of the line Arta – Volos was created under the patronage of Great 
Powers. 
           
Fig. 1.a.11 - Karadjordje Petrović (1752-1817),       Fig. 1.a.12 – Miloš Obrenović (1780-1860), leader 
leader of the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813).    of the Second Serbian Uprising (1815-1830).   
For the next two generations, Balkan borders remained unchanged and saw the 
gradual political and cultural development of Serbs and Greeks expressed through the 
adoption of more advanced European nation-state models.97 The northern Greeks and 
the Serbs from Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina attempted uprisings against 
the Ottomans during the 1850s and early 1860s, but these were all suppressed.  
The 1848 revolution that engulfed much of Europe had a particularly significant 
impact on the Habsburg Empire. This new revolutionary and populist nationalism in 
the Habsburg Monarchy affected all its constituent people and imposed internal 
threats. The Hungarians, as the second largest ethnic group, were the greatest 
opponents to the nationalism of German speaking Austrians. Wedged between these 
two extremely strong nationalisms were various Slavs of the Empire. The Croats, 
traditionally part of the Hungarian Kingdom, were often in an unenviable position 
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whether to support Vienna or Budapest. To counterbalance both German and 
Hungarian attempts to secure Croat loyalty, the Croat national idea was presented in 
the form of the Illyrian cultural movement.98 Since the Croats were less numerous than 
the Hungarians and Austrians, their political manoeuvring space was seriously limited. 
Thus, from the 1860s, a new national idea that could potentially generate massive 
political support was presented to the Southern Slavs of the Habsburg Empire. This 
was the idea of Yugoslavism – South-Slavism – the idea that counted on rallying the 
Croats and Serbs behind the common goal of achieving political and cultural freedoms 
from the Habsburg rule. 
The 1875 uprising of the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Ottomans, 
marked the beginning of the Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878). In a series of uprisings 
throughout the Ottoman Balkans in which the external influence of Great Powers had 
a major role, Serbia and Montenegro emerged as fully recognized and officially 
independent states. In reality, their borders were determined by the Great Powers 
during the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and they both depended economically and 
politically on Austro-Hungary. Additional political outcomes of the Eastern Crisis 
were the creation of an independent Bulgaria in 1878 and the occupation of the Vilayet 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the politically transformed Habsburg Austro-Hungary. 
Cultural outcomes of the Great Eastern Crisis were the full acceptance of 
European ideas of nationalism amongst the major Balkan nations and the development 
of the national narratives and culture, which began to collide in the territories inhabited 
by ethnically mixed populations.99 However, in the early 20th century, the change of 
dynasty in Serbia altered Serbian foreign policy. Its reliance on Austro-Hungary was 
replaced by that to Russia and France. Equally, the young Balkan states of Greece, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Romania had the same goal to finally expel the 
Ottoman Empire from the territories they considered traditionally theirs.  
1.12 The creation of Albania and Yugoslavia  
The Pig War of 1906 and Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1908 resulted in closure of borders with Serbia. Despite general 
dissatisfaction among Serbs and Croats within Austro-Hungary, which the Serbian 
Government expected to be helpful in a crisis situation, the imperial institutions were 
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far too strong for any thought of military action against such a powerful neighbour 
with Germany as its ally. When the Young Turks’ policies entered the period of 
instability within the Ottoman Empire, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria were 
“explicitly encouraged [by the internal Ottoman instability]100 to start a war against the 
Ottomans, which they did in 1912-1913.”101  
The First and the Second Balkan wars ended with Serbian, Montenegrin and 
Greek victory over the Ottomans and Bulgarians, which all enlarged their territories 
by partitioning Macedonia and incorporating in their new states much of their ethnic 
kindred. This alarmed Austro-Hungary which immediately sought to alleviate the 
outcomes of Balkan wars. However, Serbian competition with Bulgaria over the Slavic 
part of Macedonia which significantly increased after the Ilinden Uprising in 
Macedonia in 1903 resulted in Bulgarian discontent with the division of Macedonia 
and future choice of the allies in both World Wars.102 The creation of an independent 
Albania in 1913 was decided by the Great Powers during the London Peace 
Conference on insistence of Austro-Hungary whose major concern was to protect her 
interest rather than to allow Albanians to live in their own nation-state.103 The Serbs 
were denied a sea exit, following the Austro-Hungarian objections. The 1913 London 
Peace Conference put into effect a temporary agreement between the Great Powers, 
but a satisfactory solution for the borders of the new states was not reached. 
The new Albanian state received its full international recognition in July 1913 
and was placed under the rule of a minor German princely House of Wied. The German 
dynasty lasted for less than six months, before Prince Wilhelm was forced into exile 
following the Muslim Uprising of 1914 that sought to oust the International 
Commission of Control and International Gendarmerie established to control the 
territory and the nascent institutions of the new state. The rebels perceived these 
foreign Christian institutions as oppressive towards the Muslim majority in the 
country. 
Serbia and Montenegro, fully internationally recognized in 1878, gained 
territories from former Ottoman provinces in Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija and 
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Raška. These territories were ethnically and religiously mixed following the centuries 
old Ottoman custom of mixing the population. The borders drawn during the London 
Peace Conference were again determined by the Great Powers. However, barely a year 
had passed before a new crisis erupted in the Balkans. 
The Sarajevo Assassination led to the outbreak of the First World War.104 The 
official visit to Sarajevo of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, on Vidovdan, 28 June 1914, the national day of the Serbs, ended in the 
deaths of the Archduke and his wife by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian member of the 
Yugoslav-orientated Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna). The events surrounding the 
Sarajevo Assassination became a mythologem equally misused by both foreign and 
Balkan historians and politicians.105 Historians still argue whether the assassination 
was organized by the Serbian or Yugoslav nationalists.106 One thing is clear: the 
discontent of the Serbs and some Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the 
Austrian government.  
The two Austrian offensives on Serbia in 1914 and 1915 were repulsed to the 
disbelief of both the Entente and Central Powers, incurring great losses on both sides. 
Eventually, Serbian resources were exhausted and the Serbian Army, King, 
Government and civilians began a difficult retreat over the Albanian mountains in 
autumn 1915, after Bulgaria joined the Central Powers. Over 200,000 lives were lost 
in the severe winter conditions of the “Albanian Golgotha”, before the remnants of the 
army reached Corfu.107 Serbian territory was occupied and partitioned between 
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.  
Already in December 1914, the Serbian government led by the Prime Minister 
Nikola Pašić (1845-1926) announced its war aims in the form of the Niš Declaration, 
which called for the unification of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In April 1915, a 
Yugoslav Committee consisting of Serbian and Croatian intellectuals and politicians 
from Austro-Hungary was formed in order to promote unification with Serbia. In July 
1917, the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government in Corfu signed a 
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Declaration for the unification into a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The 
Corfu Declaration laid down the foundation of a unified constitutional monarchy with 
equality of alphabets, languages, religions and calendars (Fig. 1.a.13).108 During the 
war, the Committee, based in London, lobbied for the Yugoslav cause.109 Later, in the 
communist period of Yugoslavia, the events surrounding the work of the Yugoslav 
Committee and the Corfu Declaration were interpreted as the beginning of the 
“brotherhood and unity” which the Serbian government “forgot” immediately after the 
First World War when it began the implementation of the “Greater Serbian” policies 
towards the non-Serbian population of the Triune Kingdom.  
 
Fig. 1.a.13 – The signatories of the Corfu Declaration in 1917. The document was considered one of 
the foundation stones of Yugoslavia. 
 
The Great War, however, generally stimulated the nationalist sentiments of the 
South Slavs who, for the first time in modern history, experienced the possibility of 
national self-expression. The Serbian nationalist sentiment was particularly affected 
as its image of Serbs as fundamentally democratic people who were forced to 
undertake yet another struggle against a much stronger tyrannical enemy, was 
wholeheartedly supported by the Entente. The parallels between the 14th century, when 
the Serbs were martyred in the Kosovo Battle and the “1915 Golgotha” were often 
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drawn by the Western governments, intellectuals and the press. As for the Serbs 
themselves, both events became a recurring theme in 1941 and 1990s.110  
The complex problems surrounding South Slav unification are still not 
adequately researched. As much as it was a common goal of the Christian South Slavs, 
based on the romantic ideas of unity of language and a shared destiny, it was equally 
strongly influenced by the Great Powers’ political aims. The extent of their 
involvement in the region is best illustrated by the series of treaties and draft 
documents exchanged on the outset of war: The Entente Powers secured Italy’s support 
in exchange for Trieste, Gorizia, Gradiška, the whole of Istria and of historic Dalmatia, 
with its capital Zadar (secret Treaty of London, April, 1915). Serbia and Montenegro 
were to be awarded the Adriatic coast south of Italian Dalmatia, including Split and 
Dubrovnik, whilst Croatia was to be demilitarized. In exchange for the territory of 
Dalmatia, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina and perhaps Slavonia, Serbia 
was expected to give up Vardar Macedonia, which was offered to Bulgaria.111 Clearly, 
Serbia did not have much influence on these, despite declarations and support for the 
Yugoslav cause coming from sympathizers of the idea. Serbia’s warlike rhetoric 
invoking the destruction of Austro-Hungary was an act of defiance which meant to 
boost the morale of both the army and civilian population. The idea of Greater Serbia 
or, indeed, Yugoslavia, could not be more than a hazy dream in 1915, when the 
kingdom was occupied and partitioned and its recovery uncertain. 
The impact of the First World War on Serbia was disastrous. According to the 
official Versailles Peace Conference report, Serbia alone lost 1,247,000 people: 
845,000 civilians and 402,000 soldiers. Within its old borders (before 1912) Serbia 
had 2,900,000 inhabitants, which means that it lost 43% of its overall population. In 
its extended borders after 1912, Serbia had around 4,400,000, which reduces the 
overall population losses to 28%.112 The Serbian intellectual elite was also 
decimated.113 Versailles Peace Conference promoted rights to self-determination of 
the peoples who lived in the territories of defeated Central Powers. Thus, when the 
South Slavs of Austro-Hungary declared unification with Kingdoms of Serbia and 
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Montenegro, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i 
Slovenaca - SHS) was born. 
The new state was formally recognized as the South Slav state, founded on the 
principles of self-determination. However, the census conducted in 1921 after the 
losses during the war revealed that the new Kingdom included in its population almost 
15% of non-Slavic origin (Chart 1.1): 
Chart 1: The ethnic structure of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1921 – based on Group 
of Authors – Istorijski atlas (1st Ed.) –  Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva & Geokarta, Belgrade, 
1997, 91 
1.13 The Inter-war period 1920-1941 in Yugoslavia 
In the chaos of First World War, diplomatic manoeuvres and propaganda, 
Croatian national aspirations were overlooked. With the exception of the period 1526-
1699 most of the Croats had been under Central European influence since the Middle 
Ages. Social and religious development were influenced by the Habsburg Empire and, 
despite resentment towards the policies of Magyarization and Germanization, the 
Croats considered themselves a part of the European cultural domain. Both Slovenes 
and Croats fought in the Austrian armies during the war and, from that perspective, it 
is understandable why Croatian interests were not fully considered either by the 
Entente or by the Serbian Kingdom, especially when the outcome of the war became 
certain. However, a number of Croats, especially from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
formed volunteer units and joined the Serbian army. The Yugoslav Committee, led by 
Serbs 44.57% Croats 23.50% Slovenes 8.51% Muslims 6.29%
Germans 4.22% Hungarians 3.90% Albanians 3.67% Romanians 1.93%
Turkish 1.25% Czech/Slovak 0.96% Ruthenian 0.21% Russian 0.17%
Polish 0.12% Italian 0.11% Others 0.58%
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the famous Croat sculptor Ivan Meštrović (Fig. 1.a.14), believed that the Yugoslav 
cause was the best possible option for the Croatian (and Slovene) national movements, 
as neither had an independent state of their own prior to the war.114 The Serbs 
supported the idea, welcoming all possible help from the Habsburg Slavs. For the 
Croats and Slovenes, therefore, joining Yugoslavia was favourable in practical terms, 
even though Serbia was much less economically developed and still retained traces of 
Ottoman culture. For the Serbs, Yugoslavia presented the opportunity to include all 
Serbs within the borders of one state. As far as the Entente was concerned, the legacy 
of the Great War was the victory of the right to national self-determination, as opposed 
to the principles of historic rights, promoted by the Central Powers.115 However, the 
mapping of the new state-borders was done for the benefit of the main Entante Powers. 
Smaller allies, among which was Serbia, had little influence over the general decision-
making process. 
Faced with a complicated ethnic structure and the economy of Serbia in ruins, 
problems between Belgrade and Zagreb occurred almost immediately after the war, 
threatening to dissolve Yugoslavia before it had a chance to survive as a unified 
country. The pre-war industry was slow to recover, the railway lines were not repaired 
until 1922, Austria’s last-minute flooding of Serbian mines postponed the restoration 
of power, lightning and heating until 1920. Denied a place in the Allied commission 
for dividing up the Austro-Hungarian assets, the recovery of the Serbian economy was 
much slower in comparison with that of Croatia and Slovenia. The new state was even 
forbidden to nationalize the Austro-Hungarian companies in the former imperial 
territories. Not being exposed to the destruction of its infrastructure and economy, 
Croatian and Slovenian economic growth continued unhindered. Although roughly 
equal before the war, by 1926 Croatia’a industrialization was four times that of 
Serbia.116 
The crisis culminated in 1928, when the Montenegrin Serbian MP Puniša Račić 
shot Stjepan Radić (1871-1928), the leader of the Croat Peasant Party during the 
parliamentary debate (Fig. 1.a.15). King Aleksandar I Karadjordjević, in a vain attempt 
to preserve the unity of the state declared a royal dictatorship and, imposing his own 
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vision of unity in the proscribed cultural form termed Integral Yugoslavism, changed 
the name of the country from Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) into the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia (the land of South Slavs). The whole territory of Yugoslavia 
was divided into nine districts (banovinas), named after the major rivers without any 
national prefix (Map 1.a.13). 
       
Fig. 1.a.14 – Ivan Meštrović (1883-1962)                   Fig. 1.a.15 – Stjepan Radić (1871-1928) 
 
Map 1.a.13 – The division of Kingdom of Yugoslavia into nine Banovinas in 1929 did not correspond 
to ethnic or historical borders. 
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The dictatorship ended in 1934, when a group of Croatian and pro-Bulgarian 
fascists from Yugoslav Macedonia assassinated King Aleksandar I Karadjordjević 
(Fig. 1.a.16) in Marseilles. Aleksandar’s heir, King Peter II was a minor, so his cousin, 
Prince Paul (1893-1976) became Regent (Fig. 1.a.17). Oxford educated, Paul favoured 
the British system of government, but its application to the Yugoslav case impossible. 
His years in power were marked by attempts to solve the growing problems between 
Croats and Serbs. However, his situation became ambivalent, when, except Greece, all 
countries neighbouring Yugoslavia on the eve of the Second World War allied to the 
Axis Powers, hoping to revise the borders drawn in Versailles.  
           
Fig. 1.a.16 – King Aleksandar I Karadjordjević          Fig. 1.a.17 – Prince Paul Karadjordjević  
(1888-1934, reigned 1921-1934)                                 (1893-1976, regent 1934-1941) 
 
In August 1939, Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković (1893-1968) and the leader 
of the Croat Peasant Party, the most numerous Croat party in the Parliament, Vladko 
Maček (1879-1964) signed the Agreement (Sporazum) which created the Banovina of 
Croatia (Banovina Hrvatska) which would have special autonomy within Yugoslavia 
and incorporate as many ethnic Croats as possible in its territory (Map 1.a.14). This 
political attempt to solve the crisis came too late. The Second World War had already 
begun in Europe. 
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Map 1.a.14 – Banovina Croatia, created in 1939 within the Yugoslav Kingdom, aimed to include as 
many Croats as possible within its borders. 
1.14 The Inter-war period 1920-1941 in Albania 
After the Treaty of London and the creation of Albania in 1913, an International 
Commission of Control was created to draw up a constitution after investigation of 
local conditions. Vlora temporarily became de facto the first capital of the new state. 
The Commission was advised by Ismail Qemali Bey of Vlora (1844-1919), the first 
head of state of the independent Albania (Fig. 1.a.18). The international police and 
military supervision did not last, as the revolts of the Muslim Albanian peasants 
engulfed the young state in a series of clashes with the foreign police. After several 
years of disturbances and changes of government, Ahmet Muhtar Bey Zogu (1895-
1961), emerged as a strong leader, winning power in 1925, first as a President 1925-
1928, and then as a King 1928-1939 (Fig. 1.a.19). 
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Fig. 1.a.18 – Ismail Qemali Bey (1844-1919),        Fig. 1.a.19 – Ahmet Zogu I (1895-1961, King 1928- 
the first Albanian Head of State in 1913.                1939), the only King of Albania in modern period. 
 
In the inter-war period, Mussolini’s Fascist Italy had major interests in Albania 
and strongly supported Zogu’s regime. In April 1939, Italy invaded Albania and turned 
it into its colony. During the Second World War Albania was enlarged by the 
annexation of Yugoslav territories in Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija, Raška and 
Montenegro. When Italy capitulated in 1943, Germany took over in Albania, supported 
by the pro-Nazi Albanian military units, Balli Kombetar.  
 
1.15 The Second World War and the Communist victory 
Yugoslavia was not involved in hostilities until 1941, as it proclaimed neutrality 
immediately. However, after the fall of France, British withdrawal from Dunkirk, and 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria joining the Axis, Prince Paul, aware of the fragility 
of the situation, was forced to sign the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941. This decision 
infuriated the Serbian population and great demonstrations broke out in Belgrade two 
days later. A military coup removed Prince Paul and proclaimed young Peter II as king. 
The swift German response codenamed Operation Punishment (Unternehmen 
Strafgericht) led to the indiscriminate bombing of Belgrade and other major Serbian 
cities on 6th April, with disastrous consequences. The former Austrian provinces, 
except for the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a predominant Serbian population, 
were spared the bombing.  
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Following the short April War, in which the Yugoslav Army was unable to 
provide any significant defence, Yugoslavia was partitioned. Northern Slovenia was 
annexed by the Third Reich as a historic province of the former Holly Roman Empire, 
whilst its east were occupied by the Fascist Italy, which also annexed all but three of 
the Adriatic islands, Montenegro, Dalmatia and the Bay of Kotor.117 The Independent 
State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska – NDH)118 was proclaimed on 10 April 
and included the territories of Croatia Proper, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Srem119 and islands of Pag, Brač and Hvar. The Bačka region of northern Vojvodina 
and the northernmost part of Slovenia were given to Hungary, whilst the Banat region 
of Vojvodina was under German rule. Kosovo and Metohija were incorporated into 
the Italian colony of Albania, whilst Macedonia and South-East Serbia, were given to 
Bulgaria. Serbia, in its 1912 borders, was occupied by German forces (Map 1.a.15). 
The majority of non-Serb Army officers immediately defected to the newly formed 
national armies in Croatia or joined German forces. This assisted capture of Serbian 
officers and soldiers and their dispatch to German concentration camps.120 The royal 
family and Government fled to London. In the ensuing four years of war, the shattered 
units of the Royal Army and the communist partisans fought the Germans and against 
each other, which proved to be a disaster equal to that of the First World War. Various 
military units based on ethnic and religious groups also fought on all warring sides 
throughout Yugoslavia. Finally, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) emerged 
as the winning force. Immediately after the war, the CPY imposed its version of war 
events and state government, blaming the former royal regime for causing the inter-
ethnic conflicts and civil war by its undemocratic centralism. 
According to Yugoslav official records following the 1948 census and UNRRA, 
Yugoslav wartime losses was then accepted as being 1,7 million.121 This figure became 
one of the most contested casualty numbers in history, as by the late 1990s, it was 
drastically reduced, mainly by Croat authors and those Western scholars advocating 
intervention in the 1990s Yugoslav wars.122 What remains undisputed, however, are 
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the material losses including nearly 50% of industrial assets, 80% of agricultural 
equipment and over 820,000 buildings.123 
  
Map 1.a.15 – Partition of Yugoslavia by the Axis in 1941. 
At the end of the war the communist regime headed by Josip Broz Tito (1892-
1980), supported by both the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, was firmly 
established. Josip Broz Tito (Fig. 1.a.20) believed that a national balance was crucial 
to maintain Yugoslavia’s integrity. On 29 November 1945 the monarchy was 
abolished. The Karadjordjević dynasty and supporters of the old regime were 
forbidden to return and were stripped of their citizenship. The new state became a 
federal republic, consisting of six republics and two autonomous provinces. As Serbia 
was still the largest in population and territory, it was sub-divided into three smaller 
units, following mainly the old pre-First World War delineation. Croatia’s borders 
were slightly modified borders of the Cvetković-Maček Sporazum of 1939. The CPY’s 
first post-war leadership was ethnically varied: Tito himself was half-Croat and half-
Slovene. Others included Edvard Kardelj, Boris Kidrič, Boris Ziherl and Miha 
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Marinko, who were Slovenes, Vladimir Bakarić a Croat, Milovan Djilas (Fig. 1.a.21), 
later dissident and a historian, a Montenegrian Serb and Aleksandar Ranković, a Serb 
(Fig. 1.a.22). Tito’s personal friend Moša Pijade was the only Jew.  
Tito’s role in the history of all former Yugoslav nations became the subject of 
controversy during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but no fully 
acceptable academic assessment is yet available. He made no attempts to create a 
unified Yugoslav nation, wishing to disassociate himself from the Integral 
Yugoslavism of the former royal regime. Tito’s decision to establish three new nations 
on the territory of Yugoslavia after 1945, remains unclear whether it was deliberately 
directed towards reducing Serbian influence or because of his genuine internationalism 
and pacifism.  
     
Fig. 1.a.20 – Josip Broz Tito      Fig. 1.a.21 – Milovan Djilas        Fig. 1.a.22 - Aleksandar Ranković 
(1898-1980)                                (1911-1995)                                 (1909-1983) 
Party authority was achieved through the mechanism of democratic centralism 
manifested through the motto brotherhood and unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo). Since the 
word “centralism” was too closely associated with the pre-war royal centralism, 
leaving Belgrade as the capital of the new federal state seemed a bad choice. Sarajevo, 
in ethnically neutral Bosnia and Herzegovina, was suggested to be the new capital by 
some Party members, but it lacked a sufficient infrastructure and communications. It 
was also argued that Belgrade should remain the capital as it was thought that Serbia 
had been sufficiently humiliated.124  
In Albania, after German withdrawal, the communists also won. They were led 
by Enver Hoxha (1908-1985), the first president of the republic (Fig. 1.a.23) created 
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after the monarchy was abolished in 1946. Initially, Albania adhered to Soviet-style 
communism. This lasted until 1967, when Albania went into self-imposed isolation 
from the rest of the world. During the isolation, which lasted until 1991, Albanian 
communist leadership promoted national awakening, similar in many aspects to the 
19th century national awakenings of other European nations.125  
  
Fig. 1.a.23 – Enver Hohxa (1908-1985), the first Albanian President (1945-1985)  
1.16 The National Question in Communist Yugoslavia  
Immediately after the war, in 1945, the CPY announced the creation of two new 
nations in Yugoslavia: the Montenegrins and Macedonians living in the territories of 
the newly created federal republics. The CPY’s rationale was that the Royal 
Yugoslavia was centralised state with Serbian predominance not only in the numbers 
of the Serbs, but also in territory. Thus, the proclamation of the new nations in the 
territories separate from Serbia Proper, aimed at reducing the potentially powerful 
Serbian influence in the federal government, as up to that moment, peoples living there 
were considered ethnic Serbs.  
Following the break with Stalin in 1948, Tito adopted a softer version of 
communist dictatorship, placing Yugoslavia in the balanced position between the West 
and East. He adopted a new role of “leading oppressed and underprivileged nations” 
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through his Non-Aligned Movement initiative in 1961. In Yugoslavia itself, the 
concept of “brotherhood and unity” officially promoted from 1945, was slowly being 
replaced by the concept of “socialist patriotism.”126 Persisting social inequality among 
the Yugoslav nations, it was thought, could be defeated and justice achieved for all 
only by socialist revolutionary struggle, not by any agreement between Serbian and 
other ethnic political elites. Expressing national and religious affinities was not 
forbidden, but it was strongly discouraged by the authorities. Tito’s definition of 
justice was understood as justice for the disadvantaged and underprivileged. In the 
Yugoslav case, a just society was one in which smaller nations were no longer 
underprivileged.127 Already the creation of the Montenegrin and Macedonian nations 
in 1945 seriously reduced the power and territoriality of Serbian nationalism. 
Furthermore, after the initial reconstruction of the country and successful resistance to 
Stalin, Tito and Kardelj began work on the decentralization of the federal state, the 
reorganization of the Communist Party and of the federal government. After the 
dismissal of Aleksandar Ranković, the last Serb within the CPY top-echelons, the road 
was open for the future reduction of Serbian influence in a state where they still 
constituted a significant percentage. Ranković’s departure from power in 1966 marked 
a complete absence of Serbs in high-profile offices until the appearance of Slobodan 
Milošević in 1987.128 
The national question in Yugoslavia was re-opened in the 1960s. Serbian writer 
Dobrica Ćosić (1921-2014) began an open polemic with the Slovene historian Dušan 
Pirjevac (1921-1977) about nationalism, centralism and autonomy within Yugoslavia. 
In 1968 Ćosić openly criticised Tito’s policies of decreasing Serbian participation in 
the decision-making process on behalf of the minorities, which the Yugoslav political 
elite interpreted as the promotion of equality, especially in Kosovo and Metohija. As 
the leading communist nomenclature in Belgrade did not include many Serbs, Ćosić 
(Fig. 1.a.24) was easily publicly condemned as a Serbian nationalist and proclaimed a 
dissident.129 
In order to preserve their own privileges, the Yugoslav political elite enabled 
slow devolution of the federal state. Facing the strong Croat national movement which 
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occurred in the spring of 1971130 and threatened by the Serbian response, the CPY top 
leadership had to rely on support from the minorities and young Yugoslav nations. 
Thus, in 1971 the new nation of Muslims was created.131 Until the 1971 census, the 
Slav Muslim population living predominantly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Raška-
Sanjak in Serbia were regarded either as the Serbs or Croats who converted to Islam 
during the Ottoman period. Proclaiming the new nation was directed against the 
growing discontent of the Serbs and Croats within the federation. Following a long 
debate, a new federal constitution was adopted in 1974. It was particularly 
unfavourable to the Serbs, as it elevated the status of the Provinces of Vojvodina and 
Kosovo132 to that of quasi-republics, whilst the territory of the former Serbian 
Principality was called “Inner Serbia”. Serbia was supposed to be in control of all of 
its territory but was refused authority to make decisions in Vojvodina and Kosovo and 
Metohija. On the other hand, the representatives of the provinces had full rights to 
participate in decision-making processes for the whole Republic.133 
    
Fig. 1.a.24 – Dobrica Ćosić (1922-2014),      Fig. 1.a.25 – Slobodan Milošević (1941-2006) was the last  
writer and later the President of “rump”        leader of the Serbian Communist Party, before the dissolu- 
Yugoslavia.                                                    tion of Yugoslavia. 
. 
The problematic 1974 Constitution also allowed for the possibility of self-
determination, including secession for Yugoslav constituent peoples and republics, but 
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only if other republics agreed. Self-determination was not based on ethnic, but 
administrative principles, which again affected the Serbs, as they were split into six 
Yugoslav sub-states. 
1.17 The Break-Up of Yugoslavia 
There is no consensus yet for the starting date of the official break-up of the 
Second Yugoslavia. Most Slovene and Croat authors argue that the break-up started 
with the publication of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
(SANU) in 1986 or with the famous speech given on the site of the Kosovo Battle on 
28 June 1989 by the new leader of the Serbian communists, Slobodan Milošević (1941-
2006) who had assumed power in the same year. Milošević (Fig. 1.a.25) sensed the 
change in the popular perception of the Serbian position within Yugoslavia and 
adopted a quasi-national posture. In March 1989 he won support for the repeal of 
clauses in the 1974 Constitution restricting Serbian sovereignty over Vojvodina and 
Kosovo. These provinces were restored to the jurisdiction of the Serbian republic. 
Milošević, however, failed to take into account the international factors which were 
willing to weaken and eventually partition Yugoslavia.134  
The changes that swept over Europe and the Soviet Union in the same period 
were inapplicable in Yugoslavia because of its mixed ethnic structure. When Slovenia 
and Croatia after their first multi-party elections proclaimed independence in 1991, it 
was not difficult to present to the international community the events in Yugoslavia as 
manifestation of Serbian chauvinism. Because the foreign policy of Yugoslavia had 
not been conducted by Serbs since 1945 and the key-ambassadorial positions were all 
in Croat or Slovene hands in the last three decades before the break-up, the position of 
Serbs within Yugoslavia was unknown abroad. In the ensuing media war Slovenian 
and Croatian claims to secede were supported by a newly united Germany and were 
granted in 1991 without much questioning. The traditional allies of Serbia in two world 
wars turned against Serbia. France, Great Britain and the United States joined a general 
condemnation of Serbia for their own reasons, whilst Russia was engulfed in the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. The ensuing civil wars claimed over 100,000 
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lives135 on the territory of former Yugoslavia with devastating consequences. A further 
two million were displaced from their homes, of which Serbia had the greatest number 
of nearly 700,000.136 
When hostilities broke out in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, followed by the wars 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo and Metohija (1999), as well as 
by the NATO attack on Serbia and Montenegro (1999), the leading Western Powers 
seized upon these events as a means to present to the world a new policy of 
international interventionism that did not need approval from the Security Council of 
the United Nations.137 Using the world media, the West without inquiry singled out 
Serbia for war guilt and put it under strict sanctions, which lasted for the next decade. 
The wars of Yugoslav succession ended in 2001, with the Albanian failed uprising in 
the Macedonian Republic. 
Six new states were formed on the ruins of Yugoslavia: Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and disputed Province of 
Kosovo, recognized mainly by the West. They were recognized by the principle of 
ethnic self-determination, but in their communist borders.138 The national self-
determination was respected in all cases, except Serbian. The wars brought major 
physical devastation in those Yugoslav territories formerly ruled by the Ottomans. 
Forced displacement of population left vast territories without prospects, depopulated 
and ready for foreign rule. Slovenia and Croatia joined the European Union in 2004 
and 2013 respectively, but their economic output is not on the level of developed 
European countries. The rest of former Yugoslav republics have the status of 
Candidates for joining the EU, but the dates of when this might take place are highly 
speculative. In the meantime, external pressure requires reconciliation between the 
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South Slavs. This process is, however, hindered by the unequal treatment of the 
Yugoslav successor states and mutual resentment. 
The West, as a major hegemon in the Balkans today, also requires reconciliation 
between the Serbs and Albanians. Albania, which began opening to the rest of the 
world in 1991, has undergone a series of political and economic changes. Endorsed by 
the West and Turkey, Albania strongly supports the national aspirations of its 
compatriots in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The mutual resentment between 
Albania and Serbia is very real and very present, but there are also some indications 
that Greece and Macedonia, which are also mutually distrustful of each other, possess 
similar ethnic and religious tensions with Albania. The economic crisis and general 
poverty of the region as a whole witness major emigration of all Balkan peoples, 
leaving this part of Europe with serious demographic problems (Map 1.a.16). 
 
Map 1.a.16 – Western Balkans today 
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2. Nationalism as a binding force of a Society 
 
“To this very day ethnicity strikes many Westerners as being peculiarly related to all 
those crazy little people and languages out there, to the unwashed (and unwanted) of 
the world, to phenomena that are really not fully civilized and that are more trouble 
than they are worth.”1 Despite a substantial reservoir of Western knowledge about 
Southeast Europe, public debate about national policies adopted in the Balkans is 
“full of false dichotomies, flawed analogies, gross historical exaggerations and well-
worn shibboleths with little foundation in historical reality.”2 The national question 
in the Balkans became an explosive issue in the foreign policies of major European 
powers and coincided with the creation of the first “independent” Balkan states, 
Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria in the 19th century, giving the Balkans a notorious 
nickname as “the powder keg of Europe”. The first attempts to understand the fragile 
and insecure political situation in the Balkans and its subsequent ethnic conflicts 
coincided with the period when the first theories of nationalism were discussed 
among European academic circles, themselves influenced by their own nationalist 
movements. The imperfection of these early theories, and a total absence of an 
academic tradition within the Balkans, added to the confusion in both the European 
scholarly approach and the development of any objective indigenous academic ideas.  
As the phenomenon of industrial society developed in the course of the 19th 
century in the rich countries of Western Europe, nationalism became a binding force 
of such societies. Spreading eastwards, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, 
and especially after the revolutionary 1848, the ideas of nationalism tempted the 
emerging intelligentsia of the industrially underdeveloped European countries to seek 
the formation their own nation-states, modelled on the developed west of the 
Continent. The ideas of nationalism slowly penetrated the Balkans, where they 
acquired potentially lethal influence. This was a direct consequence of the 
underdeveloped societal structures of the Balkan Peninsula which, until the 19th 
century divided between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, had only a few 
decades of the 19th century to move from residual feudalism straight into the modern 
age. Lack of state continuity in all of the Balkan states and a much slower rate of 
                                               
1
 Fishman, J. – Language, Ethnicity and Racism in Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic 
Perspective, Clevedon, 1989, 14-15, quoted in Greenberg, R. D. – Language and Identity in the 
Balkans, Oxford, 2004, 1. My Italics. 
2
 Donia, R. and Fine, J.V.A. – Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Tradition Betrayed, New York, 1994, 3 
Appendix II                                                                        The Theories of Nationalism 
58 
 
industrial development clashed with the swiftness of European progress, finding en 
route a fertile ground for the flourishing of nationalism in its most dangerous forms. 
2.1 Theories of Nationalism 
The very idea of nationalism was born during the Enlightenment period of the 
18th century, with works of great European philosophers of the period: Kant, Herder, 
Rousseau and Fichte only to be surpassed by 19th century thinkers and historians 
such as Marx, Engels, Renner and Michelet, Renan, von Treitschke or Lord Acton.3 
Based on the works of these intellectuals, nationalism developed into a separate 
subject of academic inquiry only after the First World War. With the end of the 
Second World War, the studies of nationalism became diversified with the 
penetration of the ideas of various disciplines, namely sociology, the political 
sciences and international relations.4 As the end of the 20th century approached, the 
ideas of feminism, gender and cultural studies added to the classical academic 
debate, polarised between two major schools of thought marked as “primordialism” 
and “modernism.” In this way, the general aspects of studies of nationalism were 
further complicated by the multiplication of the research areas and instead of creating 
a universal theoretical base for subsequent new analysis, they just added to overall 
confusion. The evidence for this confusion is obvious in the plethora of both 
academic and non-academic publications circulating over the past few decades. 
Similarly, the rise of the information society in the past three decades, with its 
powerful tools of mass media, contributed to the polarisation of academic opinions 
and distorted images of the areas that traditionally had an endemic problem with 
ethnic conflicts. The Balkans became one of the focal points for the modern studies 
of nationalism in Europe.5 By this time, the Balkan states were undergoing yet 
another socio-political change, again at a slower pace, because of the turbulent 
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transition from Communism to Democracy. This should be understood not in the 
sense that the Balkans are lagging behind other European nations because of their 
inability to develop, but rather because all of the new aspects studied nowadays tend 
to act as retarding forces for the real progress of the Balkan societies. This means 
that the newly defined theories of nationalism in the West cannot be implemented 
into the Balkan societies prior to passing the period of adjustment, as those societies 
had a series of interruptions of “natural” developments of nationalism. As such, the 
scholarly inquiries could not fully develop the academic definitions of nationalism 
applicable to the Balkans, therefore remaining interlocked in the traditional debates 
of nationalism that were transformed in the West after the political changes in the 
1990s.  
Balkan nationalism(s) against their historical settings were the most common 
methods in shaping national consciousness and legitimizing the nation-states. They 
developed primarily as national narratives with underlined parochialism with little 
knowledge of the history of their neighbours in the same period.6 The dramatic 
changes during the 1990s led to new lines in scholarly inquiry on the nature of 
Balkan nationalism(s), particularly when addressing the ethnic and national claims of 
various Balkan states, regardless of the ethnic origins of the authors. This inquiry 
was revised and replaced by an alleged multi-layered approach that included not only 
the traditional historicist understanding of nationalism, but also cultural, religious, 
political, ideological, sociological, economic, customary and psychological 
approaches when addressing the problems of the development of nationalism and 
national identity in the Balkans. While the inclusion of all these aspects in the 
theoretical studies of nationalism is generally welcome and considered to be moving 
the boundaries of research forwards, their application to the Western Balkans is still 
very much marred by the traditional misconceptions of the West towards the Balkans 
as a whole. This resulted from the inappropriate application of theories which, as the 
wars in former Yugoslavia intensified, allowed the academic language and 
terminology to frequently descend into open chauvinism by the authors’ willing 
adoption of the traditional bias against the side chosen to condemn.7 Many of the 
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new theories of nationalism were formulated during the wars in the 1990s in 
Yugoslavia, thus losing objectivity and a sense of historical perspective. The 
incorporation of these new Western views on nationalism in the Balkans into 
academic works and social practice should be approached very carefully, as the 
process of national consolidation of the various new Balkan nations is not yet 
complete. With the unwillingness of the West and states and ethnic groups that 
participated in the 1990s wars to hold a reconciliation process by providing an equal 
opportunity for an open public debate, the old dilemmas and debates will remain 
until a consensus on the nature of nationalism in the West Balkans is reached and 
accepted by the competing Balkan nationalisms. As this is not the case, it is 
reasonable to believe that most of the future analysis will be marred by the unsolved 
questions from the past. Bearing this in mind, the present analysis opted for the less 
revolutionary approach in discussing the phenomenon of nationalism in the Balkans, 
by adopting the theories and definitions that stood the test of time and became a 
classical literature in the studies of nationalism, irrespective of the authors’ 
adherence to one school of thought or another. 
2.2 The Great Divide 
Classical theories of nationalism and corresponding analysis of the various 
manifestations of nationalism are generally divided into three main schools of 
thought: primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism. Each school emphasizes 
some aspects of nation-creation, but there is no general theory that would encompass 
all debatable arguments for the appearance and rise of nationalism. Furthermore, 
there is no single theory that would be applicable to every nation or state in the 
world, and certainly not one that would be valid for the case of Balkan 
nationalism(s). 
The studies of nationalism were marked by the great debate between those 
academics in favour of primordialism, who regard national identity as “natural” and 
inborn within the individual, determined in time and space since time immemorial 
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and those that consider national identity as a modern creation, formed by the 
conscious actions of a given state through the mechanisms of education and public 
events. This “great divide” in academic debate enabled the emergence of ethno-
symbolism, which tried to incorporate arguments of both schools into a wider picture 
of the studies of nationalism.  
However, the analysis of Balkan nationalism(s) requires a careful approach 
which would include all applicable arguments from each school, because the 
complexity of the Balkan situation cannot be seen exclusively from just one 
perspective. Before undertaking any such analysis, it is useful to give a brief 
overview of the main interpretations of nationalism studies with the conclusion that 
they can generally satisfy the theoretical background of the nationalism studies in the 
Balkans.8  
2.2.1 Primordialism 
It is generally accepted that the primordialistic approach to nationalism 
studies was based on the works of Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils, who first used 
the term “primordialism” in 1957 in order to describe the family attachments that an 
individual experiences not as a consequence of one’s upbringing, but as a blood tie.9 
Based on this, the primordialistic account of nationalism is strongly related to the 
debate on ethnicity. The main premise of primordialism is that attachment to a group 
is “given” or “natural” that it exists before time and as such is ineffable, 
overpowering and unquestionable. Essentially, it puts into focus feelings and 
affections nurtured by an individual for the group.10 Another common denominator 
of primordialism is the “givenness” of the ethnic and national ties. They are 
embedded in the bloodline and as such transmitted unchanged from one generation to 
another since time immemorial. Following the longevity of the blood ties, the ethnic 
and nationalistic narrative contains several repetitive themes which serve as the 
driving force for national self-realisation: 
- The antiquity of the particular nation – the purpose of such a narrative is 
legitimising the existence of that nation in a given territory and in given 
historical circumstances. 
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- The golden age of the particular nation – the purpose is usually to set the 
political course of the present in order to achieve what was once possessed, 
but now lost. 
- The superiority of national culture – the purpose is to show the exclusivity 
and greatness of the particular nation. 
- The period of decline of the particular nation – the punishment for choosing 
the wrong course in achieving national objectives. 
- The theme of the national hero – serves the purpose for the awakening of the 
particular nation after the period of decline and decadence.11  
However, it would be wrong to assume that the complete principles of 
primordialism are based solely on feelings that an individual develops through the 
ties of kinship endorsed by upbringing. Primordialists amongst themselves create a 
much wider sphere of theoretical research which varies from the naturalistic and 
socio-biological approaches to the cultural approach which has much in common 
with some modernistic views. The naturalistic approach is by some academics seen 
as extreme primordialism, because of its predeterministic attitude towards members 
of the nation and negation of the ethnic groups as separate entities.12 In the words of 
Anthony Smith, “nations are like natural organisms, subject to the laws of nature, 
forgotten and silent, perhaps, but continuing to exist beneath the debris of history 
until the moment of their rebirth.”13 However, this approach fails to explain the 
composition of modern nations, particularly the aspect of the historic exogamy of 
various ethnic groups from which these nations were moulded. The socio-biological 
approach, championed by Van den Berghe, arose as a special theory within a theory 
in the past three decades with the advancement of genetics and examines the kin 
selection in intra-group relations, as well as inter-group relations with neighbouring 
groups.14 According to this approach, the myths of common descent, shared by the 
members of the nation, correspond to the real biological lineage through the common 
ancestry. This aspect of primordialism is particularly useful when examining the 
similarities of border groups that compete for the control of the common territory. 
However, as is the case with the Balkan ethnic groups, it fails to explain the same 
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myths shared by different ethnic groups15. The third aspect of primordialism, the 
cultural approach, emphasizes the significance of the individual’s beliefs and 
perceptions.16 This approach put the “givens” of the human existence – territory, 
congruities of blood, speech, custom, religion, but fails to explain the emotional 
impact that the nation exerts over its members.17 
2.2.2  Perennialism 
Perennialism is a modified version of primordialism and even though it 
acknowledges the main postulates of the later, it maintains the significant difference 
which is that “the nations exist throughout recorded history, but are not part of the 
natural order.”18 For the perennialists, nations can be continuous, existing through 
centuries, or recurrent, emerging and dissolving under the various historic 
circumstances. Smith criticizes perennialsm as particularly dangerous when trying to 
impose “the retrospective nationalism onto communities and cultures, whose 
identities and loyalties are local, regional and religious, but barely national.”19 It also 
fails to explain the phenomenon of “recent nations”, designed and created by 
nationalists or pragmatic politicians from the time of the Napoleonic wars onwards.  
2.2.3  Modernism   
As a response to the claim of the antiquity of nations, in the 1960s a new 
approach was conceived, turning the basics of primordialism upside-down. The main 
premise of modernism asserted the model of the modernity of nations and 
nationalism, formed as a legacy of the French Revolution. For the main champions of 
modernism, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner, “the nation is not only recent, it is 
also novel, and a product of modernization.”20 Together with the emergence of 
capitalism, industrial society and secularisation in the aftermath of the Napoleonic 
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wars, new state bureaucracies orchestrated the theme of the sovereignty of the nation 
through organized state institutions, education and economy. “It was then that the 
ideal of the sovereignty of the people was fused with the drive to cultural 
homogeneity, to forge self-determining nations of co-cultural citizens.”21 Planned 
public celebrations of the established national holidays and the introduction of 
national symbols served the purpose of strengthening the national feelings and 
boosting national pride.22 Unlike primordialistic approaches which are generally 
more compact in explaining the origins of nationalism and nations, modernists 
encompass a wide field of different accounts, ranging from economic and political to 
social and cultural. The number of scholars regarded as modernists is vast, since this 
approach dominated the past few decades and each scholar emphasized one set of 
factors at the expense of the others.23  
2.2.3.1 Economic aspect of modernism 
Economic, or more precisely, socio-economic modernism was devised by 
the neo-Marxist academics, such as Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter in the mid-
1970s.24 Based on Marxist ideas of capitalistic and social development of the 19th 
century, the appearance of nationalism was viewed strictly in Eurocentric terms, 
spreading from the faster developing countries of Western Europe towards the east of 
the continent.25 The so-called “core” or “historic” nations developed nationalism 
first, whilst the “peripheral” or “historyless”26 nations absorbed the nationalistic 
ideas as a way of self-preservation from the oppressive regimes of the 19th century 
imperial powers. The Marxist scholars believe that nationalism appeared as a 
response to the “uneven development” (Nairn) of industrial society and disparities in 
regional resources or as a consequence of “internal colonialism” (Hechter) in which 
the dominant ethnic group of one society exploits the submissive one. For the most 
part, Marxist scholars perpetuated the idea of the historic and non-historic nations, 
first expressed by Marx and Engels in discussing the 1848 revolutions. This idea 
based solely on the Marx-Engels analysis of the economic development at the time, 
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supported the idea of the creation of nation-states only for great and historic nations, 
whilst the small ones, “the residual fragments of people” were not worthy of such an 
award. The Southern Slavs particularly were harshly dismissed as “peoples which 
have never had a history of their own…and who are not viable and will never be able 
to achieve any kind of independence.”27 This was also a view endorsed by the highly 
influential Mazzini in the 19th century. 
2.2.3.2 Political aspect of modernism 
For scholars who adhere to the political approach, nationalism is viewed as 
a form of politics and consequently, the appearance of national movements is a 
political construct. Even though not a theorist himself, John Breuilly referred to 
nationalism as “political movements seeking or exercising state power, justifying and 
using nationalist arguments.”28 Nationalist political doctrine is based on three widely 
used themes: 
- There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. 
- The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and 
values. 
- The nation must have some form of independence, a minimum of which is 
nominal political sovereignty.29 
According to the postulates of this approach, nationalism is, first and foremost, 
a political movement used by the competing state elites in order to generate and 
achieve power and prestige. Used as a powerful political tool, ethnic differences 
become instrumentalised in the hands of those political groups. Viewed in this way, 
ethnicity is explained in a diametrically opposed manner from that of primordialism, 
because the “instrumental” nature of ethnicity is reduced to a mere political 
construction, without any reference to the “givenness” of the ethnic ties.30 In a fierce 
debate that followed, many scholars pointed out the neglect of national culture. The 
consequential reply was that the political elites use various aspects of cultural forms 
as a resource for the political struggle. Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, 
those elites may choose the level of usage of ethnic and national identity – 
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downplaying or exaggerating ethnic differences in order to gain political prestige. 
Used in this way, the formation of national identity becomes a reversible process, 
changeable in historically linear time.31  
It is precisely the concept of the “linear time” that inspired Benedict Anderson 
to formulate the term “the imagined community” – a nation created through the 
spread of the instruments of the modern state: literacy and mass-media in vernacular 
languages.32 Smith particularly criticized the idea of imagined communities, arguing 
that the very idea “fails to explain how various nationalisms influence emotionally 
and why they become the power for the feeling of nationhood and mass self-
sacrifice.”33 Anderson’s allegory of the development of a human being and ones 
psychology from babyhood to adulthood, followed by the process of imitative 
learning and education through the repetition of predetermined historic narrative is 
perhaps the closest answer to such criticisms. However, this allegory underlines a 
difference between the nation and an individual; whilst an individual has the 
beginning and the end, the nations have no manifestly identifiable births and their 
deaths, if they should happen, are never natural.34 Even though Anderson admitted 
the lack of a strict date for the birth of a nation, some academics, such as Ernest 
Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, championed the view according to which the majority 
of the contemporary nations were “born” in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. 
This theory is probably the most comprehensive modernistic approach, because it is 
based on a socio-cultural approach. 
2.2.3.3 Socio-cultural approach 
Gellner proposed a model according to which “modernization eroded 
traditional societies and cultures, uprooting masses of people and proletarianizing 
them into the anonymous city. Here, cultural homogeneity is provided by state run, 
standardized and public education system. Uneven development [of urban and rural 
societies] created conflicts over resources between the old inhabitants of the city and 
newly urbanized ex-peasants.”35 For Hobsbawm, nationalism is the product of the 
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industrial revolution and as such an engineered process of the “invention of 
tradition.”36 This invention can appear either as the adaptation of old traditions for 
novel purposes, which are more or less used by every society, or as a complete 
fictional construction, in times of rapid socio-political change, when the necessity for 
creating a more compact national community becomes paramount.37 For these 
purposes, the invention consists of three phases: massive public education, the 
organization of public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments.38 
Organized in this way, the nations become a product of the recent past, with the rise 
of a modern territorial state. In his words, “nations do not make states and 
nationalism, but the other way around”, which reflects D’Azeglio’s attitude towards 
the creation of the Italian state in the mid 19th century.39 Any such national culture 
has a vertical line of construction, starting from above, maintained and nurtured 
through the controlled programmes of state elites. In Gellner’s terms, such national 
cultures can be considered either as “wild” or as “garden” cultures. The first 
reproduce themselves from generation to generation without any planned design, 
state supervision or special nutrition, whilst the latter, even though originating from 
the former, are a conscious implementation by the literate strata of state elites.40 
Comparing the culture of the state elites of the pre-industrial age, in which only the 
privileged could impose their literacy upon the totality, with the culture of the 
industrial era, which endorses literacy of the society as a whole, Gellner underlines 
the argument that such a culture needs state support, particularly a political one.41 
However, Gellner recognizes the imperfection of such support: 
“…This tendency among developing societies of overrating formal paper 
qualifications, undoubtedly has harmful side effects (Diploma Disease). We live in a 
world in which we can no longer respect informal, intimate transmissions of skills, 
for the social structures within which such transmissions could occur are dissolving. 
Hence, the only kind of knowledge we can respect is that authenticated by 
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reasonably impartial centres of learning, which issue certificates on the basis of 
honest, impartially administered examinations…”42 
The risks of such educational indoctrination is a powerful tool in maintaining 
national interests, as expressed by the governing elites, particularly in mobilizing the 
intelligentsia for the purpose of spreading national culture, and through it, the 
seductive ideas of territorial pretensions.43 Where neighbouring cultures are prone to 
coercion, the weaker one is either going to bow down, or if there is a chance for 
resistance, it will fight for all available populations and “space-state”44 in a 
nationalist or ethnic conflict.45 
Once a conflict occurs, no modernist theory gives a satisfactory explanation to 
question: Why, then, so many people are ready to die for their country, nation and 
ethnic kinsmen, if the national identity and nationalism are artificially imposed by 
the state over the members of a society? The modernist approach here becomes a 
theory based on consequences, rather than on causes. 
2.2.4  Ethno-Symbolism  
Ethno-symbolism is commonly linked to the works of Anthony Smith, who 
tried to reconcile the idea of long traditions of certain cultures and modernistic views 
which insist on novelty of the nations and national feelings.46 Focusing on ethnic ties, 
myths and symbols predating the modern nation state, the ethno-symbolist argued 
that modern nations cannot be understood without taking into account their ethnic 
forebears and that the difference between the two is a matter of degree, rather than 
level.47 The power of nationalism is in the degree of the engagement of ethnic 
heritage and the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, 
rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern national intelligentsias.48 In the process of 
rediscovery and reinterpretation, everyday politics and interests are turned into 
cultural wars, which often serve as a façade for the competing claims to territory, 
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patrimony and resources.49 History and culture provide powerful motives both for the 
conflicts and solidarity, forged by the elites’ strategies.50 
For ethno-symbolists, the formation of nations is to be analysed over la longue 
durée, that is, over a period of time that spans through many centuries, but not in the 
manner proposed by the primordialists, who consider nationalist feelings as “given” 
and “inborn”. The ethno-symbolists support the idea of the longevity of ethnicity, but 
the feelings that are generated through the membership are manipulated by the 
intelligentsia.51 The nationalist narrative explaining the national past, present and 
future, according to the ethno-symbolist uses three themes for national self-
realization: 
- Recurrence – History of earlier epochs is to be read in the light of the national 
present. 
- Continuity – Points out the commencement date of the nations and explores 
ethnic elements that are handed down through generations: names, symbols, 
languages, customs, territories and rituals of national identity. 
- Reappropriation – National intelligentsias are seen as political archaeologists 
who aim to return to the past and to recover its pristine ethos and to 
reconstruct a modern nation in the image of the past ethnie.52 
The term “ethnie” Smith uses in its French version in order to describe 
communities of human population which are seen both by themselves and the 
outsider groups as possessing specific attributes, such as: myths of common ancestry, 
shared historic memories, common culture, association with a homeland and 
solidarity among its members.53 Inevitably, after establishing the term “ethnie”, 
Smith suggested the formulation of clear and acceptable definitions of the terms 
“nation”, “nationalism” and, consequently, “nation-state.”54 Smith’s own proposed 
definitions of nation as “a named human population sharing a historic territory, 
common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy 
and common legal rights and duties for all members”55 and nationalism as “an 
ideological movement for attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy of 
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a social group some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential 
nation,”56 were much appreciated, even among his critics. Furthermore, Smith argued 
that nations are deeply rooted in ethnies, but concurred with the idea that ethnies are 
largely subjective social entities, albeit to a limited extent; if the nation is wholly 
subjective, this could lead to any social group being described as a nation.57 Ethno-
symbolism expressed by Smith, describes the “core doctrine” of nationalism, as “a 
must”: the nation is viewed as a source of all political power and social and cultural 
influence and that every human being has to be a loyal member of a certain nation, in 
order to achieve freedom and self-realization.58  
However, nationalism is not uniform as such, and two types can be 
distinguished: the territorial and ethnic (Western) and ethnic-genealogical 
(Eastern).59 These two types are mostly endorsed by John Plamenatz, a native to the 
Balkans, who distinguished between “high cultured nationalisms of 19th century 
Western Europe and those with poor cultural resources like the Slavs and Africans, 
whose nationalism is imitative and competitive.”60 This attitude is further advanced 
by Seton-Watson’s influential typology of nationalism distinguishing “old, 
continuous nations” from the “new ones of the Serbs, Croats, Rumanians…”61 
Observed in this way, the basic postulates of ethno-symbolism mutually 
conflict, because the theory cannot sustain the identical approach for analysis of each 
individual nation formation. The relationship between modern nations and the 
cultural heritage they inherit from the pre-modern period is highly disputable, whilst 
the longevity of the process of formation of national consciousness is misleading. 
The modernists expressed the fiercest criticism of the use of myths and symbols, 
because they are often invented by the nationalists themselves.62 Conversely, the 
nationalists ignore those myths that oppose their aspirations. Accordingly, the mere 
existence or longevity of myths is not a guarantee that the national ideas, identities 
and aspirations are going to succeed in the pursuit of the realization of the dream of 
their national state. Moreover, a number of nationalist movements managed to form 
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national states without having a rich heritage and history to use as a basis for state-
building.63 
2.3 Addressing National Identity in the Balkans 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, general theories described above 
offer a reasonably satisfactory explanation of the problematic issues of Balkan 
national identities. However, since the distinction between the West Balkan nations 
is a relatively novel phenomenon, their application required minimal refinements in 
order to avoid a currently prevailing view that all the people inhabiting the area were 
from the distinct ethnic groups since at least the Early Middle Ages. This 
generalization was derived from the scholarly approaches to the study of nationalism 
formulated during the 1990s which, through the attempt to incorporate as many 
aspects of modern social and anthropological theories as possible, actually 
deliberately obfuscated the political intent hidden behind normative historiography. 
The political intent based on traditional misconceptions is obvious when carefully 
examining the studies written between the 1980s and the present, both by foreign and 
Balkan scholars. Particularly disturbing in the analyses and commentaries about the 
Western Balkans published at this period is the portrayal of the Balkans as Oriental 
societies prone to violence because of their cultural characteristics.64 The arguments 
presented by (mostly Western) authors depict the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans as a 
part of the wider civilizational conflict (Islam versus Orthodox versus Catholic). A 
number of authors used their academic and media privileges to promote and justify 
the interventionist policies of their governments towards Balkan problems, by 
reducing the conflicts to simplistic explanations (Bad versus Good, Civilized versus 
Barbaric, Communist versus Democratic).65 By doing so, they have conceptualized 
the notion of the Balkan “Otherness” from the rest of Europe.66 At the same time, 
authors of Balkan origin, working predominantly at the Western universities, 
contributed to the polarization of the political intent by allowing their own national 
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belonging to take precedence over the academic objectivity. Much quoted Croat 
historian in the West, Ivo Banac (b.1947) in his widely popularised The National 
Question in Yugoslavia – Origins, History, Politics, published in 1984, asserted that 
he “made every effort to present a truthful – if not necessarily detached – picture of 
events.”67 By simple juxtaposition of the personalities and events from different 
historical periods as contemporaries, as applied by Banac, a distorted picture of the 
national question in Yugoslavia became a norm in all subsequent analyses of the 
ethnic conflicts that took place in the 1990s.  
Furthermore, a number of studies published in recent years were heavily 
influenced by media reports and various political agendas hidden behind the national, 
cultural and socio-economic issues. Similarly, during the 1990s, academic exchange 
became minimal due to the wars in Former Yugoslavia, while the greatest part of 
intellectual debate in each country involved in the conflict was employed as war 
propaganda. Scholars from the West, with little or no knowledge of the languages of 
the region, sought to explain the ethnic conflicts in terms of the re-assertion of 
traditional national, cultural and territorial claims and conflicts, based on the 
premises of the civilizational clash by deliberate misrepresentation of historical 
facts.68 Although the conceptual and historical inaccuracies have been pointed out by 
a number of scholars (most notably, Maria Todorova in her Imagining the Balkans, 
published in 1997) such biased views are remarkably persistent in policy making and 
historical discourse.69   
To analyse the construction of new nations in the Western Balkans through the 
current perspective of normative historiography, some scholars proposed the 
application of the already mentioned multi-layered approach to the study of 
contemporary interpretations of national and cultural identities in the Balkans by 
arguing that the classical theories discussed above failed to offer a satisfactory 
account of the creation of national identities in the Balkans.70 Alex Bellamy, for 
example, argued in favour of those Croat historians who asserted that the national 
identity of the Croats existed in the pre-nationalist period as the awareness of a 
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distinct state-tradition among the Croats, despite the fact that there had been no Croat 
nation-state for nearly a thousand years.71 In order to bridge this gap, he proposed a 
new theory of development of nationalism labelled “continuity-in-discontinuity”72 
which “represents an attempt to find a third way between primordialism and 
modernism,” denying that continuity and discontinuity are mutually exclusive 
concepts. Viewing Balkan ethnic communities from this perspective, the dominant 
theme of nation-building is constantly changing, whereas historical continuities 
depend on socio-political circumstances.73 Hence, the context in which 
implementation takes place cannot be understood without broader social, political 
and strategic intersection. According to this approach, national identity is formed as a 
summary of various identities which each individual member of the ethnic 
community might decide to change at a fairly rapid pace.  
This approach of “continuity-in-discontinuity,” as a recent formulation, 
originates from scholars examining the problems of nationalism from the point of 
view of the social sciences. Despite this approach sounding simplistic, this fully 
embraces the current revisionism of the normative historiography that depicts the 
problem of Balkan nation-building by the arguments behind interventionism. The 
“continuity-in-discontinuity” theory aims to justify the modern invention that the 
belief of national belonging among the newly constructed nations on a massive scale, 
dates back to the time when those nations actually did not exist. Since Balkan 
societies have a long record of historical “continuity-in-discontinuity” in terms of 
unstable and frequently changeable borders of state-traditions that incorporated 
various geographical74 regions at various periods of time, the use of the theory itself 
still has no full confirmation in practice. On the other hand, the lack of clarity of this 
newly developed theoretical approach serves as a good basis for the West Balkan 
intelligentsia belonging to the new nations in their effort to strengthen the national 
consciousness and national identity of their young nations. Applied in this way, the 
idea of changeability fully conforms to the Western perception of the Balkan 
“Otherness,” as it could be understood as a permanent characteristic of the region as 
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a whole. Furthermore, the theory leaves the space for some future change of borders, 
identities and cultures in the West Balkans.  
Unlike the theory of “continuity-in-discontinuity” which is prone to logical and 
terminological manipulations, Gordana Uzelac and Atsuko Ichijo proposed the 
adoption of the meeting points of primordialist, ethno-symbolist and modernist 
theories, arguing that national identity in the Balkans is created through the 
interaction of three levels of socio-political abstraction.75 In itself, this is a sensible 
approach, as it attempts to include the widest possible range of theories that could be 
detected in the evolution of national narratives of the observed West Balkan nations 
and ethnic groups. However, as theoretical narratives usually require the 
confirmation in the material evidence, this study endorses the inclusion of the 
“processualist approach” which emphasizes that analysis and comparisons of social 
structures have to be executed using the same methodological principles and relying 
on the objectivism of material interpretation of evidence. A modern authority on the 
archaeology and history of the Balkans, and especially the early Slavs, Florin Curta 
championed the processualism through the thorough examination of the material 
remains that marked the development of Balkan societies, carefully avoiding 
succumbing to any misconceptions devised by the new theories of nationalism. 
According to him, culture is not shared, but participated in.”76 In this manner, the 
material heritage of the region, now subject to fierce nationalist debates aiming to 
draw clear demarcation lines among themselves, remained outside manipulation.  
2.4 Key terms and definitions 
As discussed earlier, the multitude of definitions of nationalism and related 
terms proposed by various scholars reflect the academic thinking of the time when 
they were first introduced. But what, in its essence, is nationalism? Smith argued that 
the current trend of defining nationalism as exclusively negative and intellectually 
incoherent, due to the inconsistencies of deployed doctrines aiming to define the 
nature of nationalism suffers major logical deficiencies.77 By recognizing that 
nationalism divides the world into nations, each autonomous, free and secure and 
with its own characteristics and destiny, Smith devised a working definition of 
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nationalism as an “ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of 
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its 
members to constitute a nation.”78 This definition is considered to be generally 
applicable in its original form to all Balkan nationalism(s), irrespectively of the 
period of their first appearance. Having neutral meaning, it avoids current scholarly 
misrepresentations which strive to ascertain that the early 19th century nationalism, 
when its main role was positive and emancipatory, is in its essence the same as the 
late 20th century nationalism, which is predominantly the product of the conscious 
political manipulation. 
The vivid academic debate about the essence of nationalism and associated 
terms such as: Nation, State, Nation-State, National Identity, Ethnicity, Citizenship, 
Cultural Identity, Collective Memory, National Heritage, Civic and Minority Rights 
did not provide the all-inclusive theoretical basis that could be uniformly applied to 
all Balkan peoples and states. Rather, they all shed some light on certain aspects of 
the Balkan variant of nation-building. For the purpose of this work, it is necessary to 
give the definitions of the above mentioned terms that would incorporate the Balkan 
specificities into the general theories. Most scholars, regardless to which theory of 
nationalism they adhere, agree that there are two types of nationalism: the Western 
and the Eastern. Western nationalism is seen as civic orientated with a strong 
emphasis on citizenship, human rights, democratic values, and the territorial nature 
of the state. Eastern nationalism is regarded as collectivistic with a strong emphasis 
on ethnicity, cultural uniqueness, nationhood and kinship.79 The spatial link between 
the two types contributes to the popularization of the stereotypes about the “Other,” 
and all nationalisms that are peripheral to the Western one are labelled as “tribal” or 
ethnic unrest which confirm their cultural superiority and inferiority.80 As shown 
earlier, debate on the nature of nationalism, especially its Balkan versions, is still 
ongoing, but there appears to be a general consensus that nationalism is a modern 
phenomenon. Hobsbawm’s idea of the novelty of the nation perfectly fits the Balkan 
case: the earliest Balkan states were created in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution and nation-building very much coincided with the modernization that 
took place after the Ottoman departure in the mid-to-late 19th century. Since the 
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modernization of the Balkans meant accepting without questioning the then ruling 
European principles, the Balkan nationalism(s) can be viewed as imported goods. In 
other words, the nationalism in the Balkans as a movement is not only a novel 
product of modernization, but was imposed on the Balkan peoples before they had 
time to understand the European system of values.  
This last statement may serve as an overture to my small contribution to the 
general discussion on the theories of nationalism. “Imposing” nationalism on states 
and societies so far had the connotation of introducing ideas of nationalism from 
politically more advanced societies and their intellectual centres, which were often 
foreign. When comparing the chronology of the West Balkan nationalisms, it 
becomes clearly visible that all the nations that appeared in the former Yugoslavia 
and Albania had their nationalisms developed outside of their core-territories. In case 
of Serbia, main bearers of national ideas in the first half of the 19th century, even 
though ethnic Serbs, lived in the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, outside of the 
nascent Serbian state. Only after their arrival to the Serbian Principality could these 
ideas gain strength and become the guiding principles for the Serbian nation-building 
programme. In Croatia, the Illyrian movement represented the more inclusive ideas 
of South Slav nationalism and only after the Nagodba could ideas of a more distinct 
Croat nationalism have developed. Ante Starčević, born in the Lika region of the 
Military Frontier and educated in Hungary, introduced the Croat nationalism to 
Croatia Proper in the 1870s. Early Albanian nationalism was developing in the US 
through the work of Albanian Christian emigres and European scholars at the turn of 
the 20th century. Similarly, notions of distinct Macedonian national ideas that first 
appeared during the Second World War in Yugoslavia were legally sanctioned by 
Tito’s regime in Belgrade in 1945. The Bosnian Muslims had their nationalism 
imposed first by Vienna during von Kállay’s tenure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
the late 19th century and then by Belgrade in 1971. Finally, the definition of the 
Montenegrin nationalism originated during the exile of King Nikola in France and 
then re-asserted itself in the early 2000s, generously helped from abroad.81 Bearing 
all this in mind, it can be argued that the West Balkan nationalisms developed “from 
the periphery” of national territories. This is not unexpected, because the peripheries 
were experiencing more ethnic and religious mixing, where it was of great 
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importance to preserve national/ethnic consciousness at any cost. Unlike in the West, 
where national ideas were emanating from the national capitals and important centres 
of learning, in the West Balkans, the process was reverse: nationalism was growing 
from outside towards the centre. Consequently, the West Balkan type of nationalism 
may be labelled as a product of modernism and more precisely of the peripheral type. 
Accordingly, the nations that developed their grand narratives based on the 
peripheral nationalism will eventually suffer changes of those narratives, subject to 
the historical territorial realignments. 
Even though Smith’s definition of a nation82 is clear and encompasses what the 
nation should be, it fails to grasp the problem of the Balkan peoples, because the 
historic territory of most of the Balkan nations changed in time as various states 
(particularly non-nation-states) and governments ruled the territory. Thus, the 
proposed definition for the purpose of this work presents a slightly modified version 
of Smith’s definition: “Nation is a named human population sharing the same 
common myths and memories, linked in linear time by the sequence of historic events 
that created the sense of belonging for each individual of the said population.” It 
must be noted here that the above definition contains the phrase “linear time”, which 
was used by Anderson for defining the concept of “the imagined community”. Since 
various Balkan peoples did not obtain their states before the 19th and 20th centuries, 
during which the shifting borders and exchange of population happened on a 
dramatic scale, the formation of the state and even more, the nation-state, had to be 
created by the elites. The first core states created by the Greeks, the Serbs and the 
Bulgars did not incorporate all the members of each nation. However, with the 
creation of the independent Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, it was possible to construct 
an ideal of the national community and national unity which would be the platform 
for the future unification of all members of a nation. For most of the Balkan peoples, 
the idea of the nation and the sense of belonging to a nation were thus created from 
above, through the state mediums of literacy (education), mass media and public 
ceremonies.  
Introducing the European state models in the post-Ottoman Balkans was a 
historical inevitability. However, the low literacy rates of the majority of the 
population meant that understanding the concept of state in a sense promoted by the 
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French Enlightenment83 was going to be not only difficult, but to a certain extent 
impossible. The Western idea of a nation-state was based on the notion of 
citizenship, which represented the approved, universalistic dimension of nationality 
and its key ingredient was literacy and education, as expressed by Gellner.84 Literacy 
served as the means through which individual members of a state could become 
aware and relate to their fellow citizens. As the illiteracy rates in the early 19th 
century Balkans were over 90%85 the only way that the individuals could relate to the 
state was through their kin and their religion. Thus, the citizen-state based on 
egalitarian distribution of rights and duties, civic and increasingly secular, could not 
be implemented without the swift conversion of the peasantry into the working class. 
Since a working class is closely linked to industrialization, it is obvious that Balkan 
states had to find a model which would be understandable and acceptable for its 
population. The only way that the newly formed Balkan states could maintain their 
existence was to become nation-states, that is, to create a state that belonged to a 
designated nation. The concept of a Nation-State was maintained throughout the 19th 
and early 20th centuries and its Balkan variant should be understood as a “state 
created by means of bureaucratic incorporation from the top, but deeply rooted in 
the traditional patriarchal bonds between its subjects.” To strengthen loyalty to the 
state, it was necessary to create and promote the sense of national identity. Smith 
defined the national identity as a sense of “sameness” – the members of a particular 
group speak the same language and are alike in just those respects in which they 
differ from non-members outside the group.86 The key-role of the national identity is 
to create and maintain a distinct and unique national character. If it lacks one, it must 
be endowed with one.87  
The first stage in the creation of national identity and the building of national 
consciousness was the formulation of “grand narratives” of national history aiming to 
legitimise particular political aims in the contemporary context. Bulgarian, Greek 
and Serbian “grand narratives” were developed in the course of the early to mid-19th 
century, when their purpose was to agitate for liberation from centuries of foreign 
rule. The subsequent nation building was not the cause, but was primarily the effect 
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of the political disorder in the Ottoman Empire.88 These “grand narratives” in their 
formative periods served two purposes: the first was to distinguish the local 
population from the foreign rulers and the second to imbue a sense of national 
identity, which was often vague, because most illiterate peasants, still bound by 
feudal ties, could express their nationality only through their religion.89  
Because the political elites of the period were emerging under the tutorship of 
the main universities of Central Europe and Russia, the creation of “grand narratives” 
was more the echo of their contemporary academic thinking applied to Balkan 
conditions, than the independent achievement of native intellectuals. Since this elite 
was in its nascent phase, it lacked power to mobilize ethnic populations over the 
entire ethnic territories, so “grand narratives” of the period do not reveal any 
particular preparation or conscious determination for exclusive nation-state 
building.90 Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia were allowed to form their states on the 
territory of the crumbling Ottoman Empire and actively participated in the creation 
of their nation-states. On the other hand, the Croatian and Albanian “grand 
narratives” formulated in the last quarter of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
century, when the concept of nationalism and national revival significantly changed 
from its early 19th century nascent phase, relied more on mobilization of the wider 
populations to achieve political powers and freedoms that were until then denied by 
the ruling Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Initially, neither Croat nor Albanian 
nationalism(s) strove for full national liberation and creation of their nation-states. 
Later national liberations came as a consequence of the changed geo-political 
situation in Europe, rather than the triumph of national will and active participation 
in liberation from foreign rule. In this sense, the “grand narratives” formulated in the 
later part of the 19th and during the 20th century served the purpose of creating 
national identity exclusively for the political reasons of governing elites rather than 
full mobilization of the entire population.  
The concepts of ethnicity and ethnic identity predate the concept of nation. 
Smith has successfully argued91 that nation creation is strongly linked to ethnies (as 
defined above), pre-nation groups that were connected by genealogical descent, 
vernacular codes and historical nativism. Modern scholars tried to define ethnicity in 
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terms of: language, culture and customs, territory and political organization.92 
However, the ethnic determinism of the Balkan populations was hindered in two 
ways; firstly, the Ottoman conquest destroyed the material basis of their civilizations, 
wiped out their old aristocracies and middle classes and even in some cases 
obliterated their traditional frontiers.93 This meant that by the time of the Ottoman 
departure, the sense of ethnic belonging was blurred and distinguished only by 
religion. A perfect illustration of this is written by the prominent English journalist 
H.N. Brailsford in the early 20th century. In 1905, talking to the illiterate boys from 
the Ohrid area about the ruins of the castle overlooking the lake he inquired who 
built the castle. “The Free Men,” was the answer. “And who were they?” “Our 
Grandfathers.” “Yes, but were they Serbs or Bulgarians or Greeks or Turks?” “They 
weren’t Turks, they were Christians.”94 Secondly, the pre-Ottoman ethnic affiliations 
of the Balkan populations were those of loyalty to the mediaeval kingdoms and the 
then ethnic rhetoric and self-representation. As our knowledge of the early Slavs is 
scarce it is impossible to say much about their sense of identity, except that it was 
strongly rooted in local or regional communities.95 Since there is no internationally 
accepted academic consensus about the role of ethnicity in the mediaeval period, for 
the purpose of this work, the term ethnicity should be read as: “a link between the 
individual members of a group expressed through the religious and cultural 
affiliations towards the historical and ancestral concepts measured by the strength of 
solidarity among them.” This definition derives from Smith’s definition of ethnie,96 
but omits his notion of historical memories and ancestral/founding myths as a 
unifying factor. The reason for this is that, as it will be discussed later, various 
Balkan populations of different religious and language affiliations share the same 
myths and historic memories. What is self-defining is the strength of solidarity that 
those populations employ in their collective belief in those myths and memories. The 
strength of solidarity also directs the development and usage of myths and memories 
and, even though these “myths only do not have to be true, they do not have to be 
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old”97 the measure of solidarity defines their longevity. Thus, the 19th and early 20th 
century creation of the grand narratives served to mobilize ethnic affiliations first to 
build ethnic and then national identities. 
Used in contemporary context, grand narratives of the 19th century would seem 
terribly dated, if they were not reinterpreted for modern political aims, which are 
mainly orientated towards breaking with the practises and ideologies established 
during the communist period. With the contemporary creation of new nations of the 
Macedonians, the Montenegrins and the Bosniaks, the 19th century methods of 
nation-building are redeployed, aiming to prove the antiquity of these new nations. 
However, this time the process runs at a much faster pace, as the literacy levels are 
high and the state institutions, such as schools, universities and mass media are easily 
accessible to the population. Consequently, Balkan national identities derive from 
embedding grand narratives in the individual perceptions of ethnic pride. In other 
words, ethnicity cannot exist without the awareness of it,98 but also, it cannot thrive 
without being constantly reminded of it by the state.  
This new awareness, propagated and imposed by the political elites and 
mobilized on a large scale, surpassing both the demography and the geography of the 
West Balkan area, shows signs of academic confusion, if not a total absence of 
balance. The evidence of that can be found in the constant rewriting of education 
syllabuses that occurred in the late 20th century, containing quite opposing arguments 
of the origins of the Balkan nations. The general characteristic of each of these 
narratives emphasizes the antiquity of a particular nation and uses the methods of the 
primordialistic approach when discussing its own history of statehood, whilst at the 
same time neighbouring narratives are interpreted in modernistic terms, that is as 
novel, “historyless” and lacking in continuity. This argument is very much in line 
with Todorova’s conclusion that the national identities in the Balkans were built with 
a certain degree of parochial ignorance towards the wider political and geo-strategic 
context of the region as a whole.99 The tendency to draw a visible demarcation line 
between neighbouring nationalities, or to make them opaque and fluid, in accordance 
with the political programmes of the governing elites, is a postmodernistic approach 
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which can be labelled as “banal nationalism.”100 However, banal nationalism, when 
applied to the Balkan mentality, becomes enormously amplified, particularly towards 
neighbours who share the same geographic area. At the same time, aspects of banal 
nationalism, when expressed outside the Balkans, do not achieve such a high 
emotional context.  
This curious manner of expressing national identity, so similar amongst all 
Balkan ethnic groups, has deep roots in the popular mentality. Awareness that the 
existence and development of national and state continuity was seriously disrupted in 
the course of history creates on a sub-conscious level a form of collective inferiority 
complex when compared with the majority of great European nations. Here we find a 
reminiscence on Anderson’s allegory that ethnic communities develop in the same 
manner in which a baby’s psychology develops into an adult form,101 with the 
exception that in the Balkans we deal with the communities whose “childhoods” and 
natural developments were so seriously affected, that by the time they reached 
adulthood, they took the form of divided personalities. Thus, as with individuals, 
hiding an inferiority complex is usually masked by aggressive attitudes towards their 
closest contacts; in the case of the Balkan states, this aggressiveness is expressed 
through general mistrust and a dismissive attitude towards the culture of the 
neighbouring countries. This means that the first level of building national identity 
using the tools of “grand historic narratives” is as much the psychological as a 
political response of Balkan governing elites transmitted to the members of the wider 
communities.102  
The second stage of the creation of national identity in the Balkans is 
implementation of the grand narratives into the public culture. As with the history of 
the Balkan states, this aspect also lacks continuity and has been disrupted, 
particularly in the course of the 20th century. Insisting on a uniqueness of the 
character of the national culture by the relevant intellectuals and governing elites, the 
interpretations of the grand narratives in a nationally favourable manner, become 
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more intelligible for the majority of people through repetition and simplifying the 
academic language to that of mass media and popular culture. The emphasis on 
national culture and a separate, unique identity from those of the neighbours is 
expressed through the names and symbols of the most important national cultural 
institutions, such as national museums and galleries, designed to have on permanent 
display important national treasures. At the same time, the erection of monuments 
visually depicting adopted national symbols, or the use of the pre-national heritage, 
most notably of the prehistoric and antique archaeological sites, increases the sense 
of belonging to the particular area.103 But here we encounter a major problem. When 
examining the existing sources for the Balkan populations from the 7th to the 18th 
centuries, one of the most striking facts is a constant change of labels denoting 
peoples and places.104 Foreign authors, who wrote about the Balkans in the earlier 
periods, brought to the process even more confusion, because they themselves could 
not distinguish between various Slavic ethnicities due to the “sameness”105 of the 
language. Thus, the language became the first serious flaw in creating national 
identity because it proved to be neither an objective, nor immutable factor. The same 
problem occurred with the question of ancestry, because the blood ties and genetic 
modes are close, which makes them insufficient in determining the group identity.106 
Therefore, religion became a sole supporting pillar in creating national identities in 
the Western Balkans. The Albanians, the only non-Slavic group discussed here, are 
excluded from the territorial claims based on language issues, but rely on religious 
difference from their Slavic and Greek neighbours. Where religious differentiation 
was insufficient, finding a link with the ancient cultures that once inhabited the 
Balkan area become an essential tool in building the national identity. 
The third stage of creating a national identity is the perception of the ideas and 
interpretations of grand narratives in accordance with the contemporary political 
requirements. Presently, the possibility of entering the European Union after the 
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imposed transition period brought into the focus the notions of citizenship and civic 
and minority rights. In its modern meaning, the definition of citizenship relies on the 
current Western idea of civic nationalism which maintains that the nation of a state 
should be composed of its citizens – regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, 
language and ethnicity – based on their equality and rights and duties.107 Similarly, 
the civic and minority rights, as regulated by the legislation of the European Union 
are strongly defined in supra-national terms, aiming to achieve the highest possible 
level of civic and social inclusion of its many nations and ethnic groups.108 In the 
aftermath of the transitional 1990s, all post-Yugoslav states in the Western Balkans 
and in Albania include in their Constitutions the reference to these definitions.109 
However, the ethnic cleansing that took place during the wars of Yugoslav 
succession and formation of the new states under the supervision of the European 
Union still did not incite the return of displaced populations. Therefore, the notion of 
citizenship and civic and minority rights, as promoted by the legislation has little or 
no value in the newly created West Balkan states. In Albania, there is a tension 
between the Albanians and Greeks in the Albanian part of northern Epirus, because 
of the refusal of the Albanian state to recognize the existence of the Greek and other, 
mostly Serbian, Vlach, Macedonian and Roma ethnic groups outside of the 
designated “minority zones.”110  
Even though there is a declarative support of the European Union for the 
integrative processes in the West Balkans and the introduction of civic rights and 
citizenship in its Western sense, the majority of the newly created nations form the 
basis of their states on the revised principles of ethnic nationalism, which reduces or 
openly denies the rights of neighbouring nations to live inside the borders of their 
new national borders.111 
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2.5 The tradition of inventing traditions 
Various Balkan peoples re-discovered themselves in different periods over the 
past two centuries. With the formation of first (semi)independent states the process 
of historical claims to territory started immediately.112 This resulted from the 
formation of grand narratives during the development of nation-states. Apart from 
the state educational systems that actively participate in maintaining those postulates, 
Hobsbawm identified two other ways of nation-building.113 One was the introduction 
of public ceremonies and another, the erection of public monuments. However, with 
the current delineation of the “old” and “new” nations in the Western Balkans 
supported by the revisionist normative historiography, a relatively new phenomenon 
of appropriation of the historical cultural heritage by the latest Balkan nations took 
place on an unprecedented scale. Lacking the historical memories, as defined by 
Smith,114 and fully a developed cultural and national heritage, the adoption of the 
monuments of the past which survived in their new national territories, became a 
crucial factor in building new cultural and national identities. This method of nation-
building is defined as historical re-appropriation. In its essence, the historical re-
appropriation includes the acquisition of the inherited material evidence from the 
past by adding a prefix of the national name and interpretation in exclusively 
national terms.115 The most startling examples of historical re-appropriation are the 
renaming the mediaeval cathedrals and churches in Dalmatia, built by the Italians, as 
Croatian, or renaming monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo as 
Albanian. Similarly, linking the modern Macedonian state to the Ancient Kingdom 
of Macedon and the current Bosnian Muslim nation as direct descendants of the 
Mediaeval Bosnian Christians, considered as being ethnically different from the 
Croats and Serbs, represent one aspect of historical re-appropriation. Acquiring the 
past by designating a national name to the heritage discovered within the borders of 
the nation-state serves the purpose of strengthening national self-confidence, 
legitimizing the possession of the territory, as well as the future expansion of the 
nation-state. Heritage itself has the primary role of imprinting the national 
interpretation of the evidence into an organized system of constructed memories 
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capable of self-replication with each new generation. The notion of the inherited 
material evidence from the past is commonly called the cultural heritage. Since 
cultural heritage encompasses a much wider scope of material remains, the definition 
in which it will be used in this work is given in the Article I of the UNESCO World 
Heritage Convention 1972.116  
2.5.1 Constructing the memories in the Balkans 
Two categories of memories can be identified in the Balkans. The first 
category consists of traditional beliefs which can be traced to the pre-nationalism 
period before 1789, which marks the beginning of the constructed memories. Most of 
these memories were included in an extraordinary rich folklore and survived as 
customs and traditional literature. This type of traditional memories were recorded 
either in the pre-nationalism period or immediately afterwards, when the construction 
of national myths was a widespread European phenomenon. Due to the unequal 
distribution of the recording processes in the Balkans, modern revisionists from 
within and outside the Balkans unjustifiably argue that those first compilers of the 
national memories were doing that in order to reinforce national aspirations of their 
own ethnic groups.117 These accusations are false for several reasons: 
i) firstly, the first compilers of the national myths in the immediate 
aftermath of the French Revolution, were following contemporary 
European academic and literary movements; 
ii) secondly, their work did not have the nationalist overtones which became 
prevalent towards the end of the 19th century;  
iii) thirdly, their work cannot be considered as a form of “banal nationalism” 
as described by Billig118, since most of the Balkan nation-states did not 
exist at that time, and finally,  
iv) ascribing nationalist tendencies to (in the modern understanding of the 
concept of nationalism) by modern authors is in itself an example of 
“banal nationalism” as it serves their own modern political programmes.  
The second category of memories consists of those constructed in the latter part 
of the 19th and throughout the 20th centuries. These memories can certainly be 
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labeled as “banal nationalism”, as their commencement can be dated, their authors 
are usually known and their development is well recorded. This type of constructed 
memories coincides with the changing structure of nationalism due to modernization. 
2.5.2 The modernization of the Western Balkans and its impact on the 
current nation-building 
The modernization of the Balkans is a slow, uneven and still a very much 
ongoing process whose beginning coincided with the start of the withdrawal of the 
Ottoman Empire. Definitions of the modernization are numerous and varied and the 
consensus of its commencement date has not yet been reached. Discussing the whole 
concept of modernization would go beyond the scope of this study. For present 
purposes the concept of modernization in the Balkans is defined as follows: 
i) the modern period began with the transformations of the predominantly 
agricultural into urban and semi-industrial societies; this was possible 
only after the economically weakened late Ottoman Empire allowed the 
European Great Powers to assert control over the economy of the region. 
ii) the self-assertion of the national elites through the formation of domestic 
bureaucracies and the development of state institutions;  
iii) the introduction of compulsory primary education, aimed at the 
eradication of illiteracy. 
Clearly, all this was possible only with the introduction of the European state-
concepts in the course of the 19th century. The modernization followed the 
encroachment of the European Powers upon the Balkans. Strategically more 
important areas were exposed to the swift and more radical changes. The pace of 
change was best expressed through the quick demolition of the Ottoman casaba and 
the adoption of the urbanization – building of cities and towns according to European 
models. Even though there was a natural desire for the improvement of peoples’ lives 
through modernization, quite frequently the European novelties were ruthlessly 
imposed by the state elites, as part of their duties towards the Great Powers, rather 
than by the natural evolution of the cultural characteristics.  
In the 19th century, the formation of the Balkan nations and nation-states took 
place under the eye of the Great Powers of Europe. Despite the modern rhetoric that 
includes the current concepts of democracy and civic society, the process of 
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formation of new Balkan nations now, as much as it was the case over 150 years ago, 
is taking place under the selective principles of nation-building. Like then, this is 
happening under the scrutiny of the European Union and the United States. By 
allowing the political intent to take precedence over the real academic knowledge 
that aims to understand the past, the modern Great Powers of the West are sowing 
the seeds for future conflicts in the Balkans.  
 
 
 
